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Risk has been studied at IIASA f o r  many years.  The work has been sub- 
stantial, covering both technological and acceptability questions. Some of 
the  case studies examined include: 
l Nuclear accident preparedness  and management 
l Two blowouts in t h e  North Sea  
l Siting of liquefied energy gas  facilities 
l Regulating industrial r i sk s  
l Risk management of hazardous waste s i tes  
T r a n s p o r t  of dangerousgoods 
l Insuring and managing hazardous r isks  
During t h e  course of these  studies, a l a rge  international network of colla- 
bora tors  has  been built up. 
In t he  late spring of 1985, t he  question a rose ,  "What should IIASA do  
next in t h e  study of risk?". A t  tha t  time, t he  IIASA agenda w a s  r a t h e r  full, 
planning f o r  a summer meeting on the  role of insurance in managing r isks ,  
and preparing a final r e p o r t  to Transport Canada on the  t ranspor t  of 
hazardous substances. Nevertheless, i t  was fe l t  appropr ia te  to look ahead 
to t h e  next  generation of issues. 
Our proposal to hold a Task Force Meeting in November 1985 to discuss 
"Risk and Policy Analysis Under Conditions of Uncertainty" proved to be  a 
winner, certainly with r e spec t  to t he  several  agencies (UNESCO/MAB; US 
EPA; Canada FEARO; Canada Health and Welfare) who cosponsored t h e  meet- 
ing. 
The IIASA re sea rch  activities are undertaken within an international 
East-West framework and are policy4riven. The Task Force Meeting w a s  
therefore  asked to identify t h e  main risk-related policy issues t ha t  needed 
to be addressed in an  international context, and to determine t h e  associated 
long-term re sea rch  needs. 
Thanks to t h e  hard-working participants and to financial support  from 
the  sponsoring agencies, the Task Force meeting lived up to expectations, 
providing IIASA with a very full menu indeed f o r  fu ture  activities in t h e  r isk 
area. Special c red i t  should be  given h e r e  to Dr. Carol Miller, coordinator 
of t h e  meeting, who p repa red  this  repor t .  
Currently t he  IIASA Directorate  is  seriously reconsidering the  ques- 
tion: 'What should IIASA do  next in t h e  study of risk?" The r e p o r t  of t h e  
Task Force Meeting will help tremendously in answering th i s  question. 
P. Kteindorfer and R.E. Munn 
ABSTRACT 
The Task Force focused on the  uncertainties in decision systems f o r  
choosing or modifying technologies intended to improve human well-being. 
The challenge w a s  t o  delineate an  international r e sea rch  agenda t o  assist  
communities to venture  into t h e  future  with g r e a t e r  confidence in techno- 
logical innovation*. 
The Task Force recommended r e sea rch  in t h r e e  interrelated areas: 
Protocols. Development of procedural advice f o r  t h e  integrated assess- 
ment of t h e  contribution of technologies t o  environmental and economic 
achievements, and t h e  associated uncertainties. 
Case S tudies .  Integrated assessments involving local or regional c lusters  
of technologies and decision-making bodies, and investigation of ecosystem 
effects,  economic effects,  and effects  on human well-being, as well as t he  
s t ruc tu re  and performance of institutions. 
Educational MateriaLs. Development of educational materials to support  
integrated assessments. 
 h he World Bank, 1984. 
"The Bank - will not finance projects that  cause severe or irreversible environ- 
mental deterioration -". 
WHO. Targets for Health for  All. (HFA2000)1984. Target 18. Multisectoral Policies: 
"By 1990, Member States  should have multisectoral policies that  effectively protect 
the human environment for  health hazards, ensure community awareness and involve- 
ment, and effectively support international efforts t o  curb such hazards affecting 
more than one country." 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1. P u r p o s e  of the Task F o r c e  
The IIASA Task Force Meeting on Risk and Policy Analysis under Conditions of 
Uncertainty had as i ts  primary objective the  delineation of research opportunities 
in an international context. This objective w a s  an outgrowth of the previous 
decade of research at IIASA on technological and environmental risks. The Task 
Force Meeting w a s  planned t o  take stock of where IIASA had been and where i t  
might devote i ts  research efforts  on risk issues in the future. The meeting w a s  
also directed toward determining potential areas fo r  collaborative research among 
interested countries and international agencies. This introduction will concen- 
t r a t e  primarily on IIASA's research interests, pointing out a few of the  main 
strands of IIASA's past and present risk research. 
1.2. IIASA's Contr ibut ions  to Risk Research 
Over the  past decade IIASA has supported risk research within complemen- 
t a ry  programs in Environment and Systems and Decision Science, and now new ini- 
tiatives in Technology. Economy, and Society are being developed. The Systems 
and Decision Sciences Program has conducted research into the basic foundations 
of robust mathematical and statistical methods to  support decision making. In addi- 
tion t o  quantitative methods, the  research has included studies of interactive deci- 
sion processes and pioneering work on the linkage between computer data manipu- 
lation systems and group procedures f o r  soliciting the perspectives of stakehold- 
ers and structuring the  problem t o  be addressed. 
A parallel thrust has been the  policy-oriented research of the Environment 
Program. Together, these Programs have established IIASA as a center  for. a 
growing network of scientists concerned with environmental and technological 
risks. A major strength of the  research at IIASA has been i ts  continuing focus on 
substantive problem areas with evolving and often seminal conceptual approaches. 
Mention of a few of the  environmental projects at IIASA over the  past decade will 
indicate the  breadth of IIASA's commitment. 
Oil DriLLing in  the  North Sea: This early IIASA research project applied deci- 
sion analytic tools developed at IIASA and elsewhere and served as an important 
introduction to the unique policy concerns created by the low probability but 
potentially catastrophic impact of a systems failure in large-scale technologies. 
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Nuclear Power: This collaborative project  with t h e  International Atomic 
Energy Agency on the  r i sks  from nuclear power generation gave IIASA wide recog- 
nition f o r  its contribution to t h e  psychological foundations of risk perception. 
Liquid Energy Gas: This IIASA project  on t h e  siting of liquid natural and 
petroleum gas terminals in four  different countries articulated the  issue of 
disagreement among exper t  advisors and consultants. 
Hazardous Materials: Several projects  at IIASA have examined t h e  problems 
of regulating both hazardous wastes and dangerous goods. These projects  have 
explored both the  environmental impacts of hazardous materials as well as 
appropriate  institutional mechanisms f o r  controlling the  r isks  associated with 
hazardous materials. 
Acid Deposition: This ongoing project  has  evaluated and extended descriptive 
models f o r  t h e  processes and consequences of acid deposition and the  policy 
options f o r  international coordination and control of t h e  associated technologies. 
Sustainable  Development of the Biosphere: This collaborative project  
engages a n  international and interdisciplinary team in questions of t h e  long-term 
consequences of man's use of t he  biosphere. This project  is closely related to 
o the r  past and ongoing work on climate and forestry.  
Environmental Monitoring: Ongoing work at IIASA has supported diverse 
projects  on environmental monitoring and the  assessment of man-environment 
interactions. 
1.3. Conceptual Trends in Riak Besearch 
Risk: Constraint  o r   portu unit^? Managers in industry, government and 
research  a r e  beginning t o  look at risk in new ways. Central to this conceptual 
shift  is t h e  separation of t h e  notion of uncertainty from t h e  judgment of t h e  "bad- 
ness" of t he  consequences. Both positive and negative consequences are equally 
subject to uncertainty. Quite apart from adverse effects, uncertainty i s  itself 
discomforting even when associated with some positive consequences. People Like 
to know where they stand. A t  t he  same time, t he  willingness to take a chance and 
a c t  in spi te  of uncertainty is inherent in t he  entrepreneurial  spirit .  This psycho- 
logical tension between security and opportunity can e i ther  drive or inhibit inno- 
vation and forward progress.  How people think about risk is important. 
In t he  past,  "risk" has  been regarded as a negative thing, forcing a wedge 
between long-term social and environmental interests  and the  more immediate 
economic ones. There has  even been an implicit assumption tha t  these interests  
are mutually exclusive. Now, t h e  interconnections between these interests are 
increasingly recognized. Most human activities have some potential fo r  both posi- 
tive and negative consequences, and uncertainty is a property of both. Uncer- 
tainty is thus neutralized. I t  stands as a property of t he  future,  separate from t h e  
judgment of what is good o r  bad. From this perspective, uncertainty can be 
assessed more objectively and more positively. The challenge is t o  venture into 
the  future with a clearer understanding of what the  opportunities really are. 
Knowledge of t h e  pitfalls is not a n  impediment to progress,  but r a t h e r  a guide to 
success. Recent t rends in t h e  approach to r i s k  r e sea rch  wil l  demonstrate this 
conceptual reversal .  
ZYae Risk Perspective. (Figure 1) IIASA's f i r s t  r isk r e sea rch  was on r isk per- 
ception. Generally, i t  w a s  human health and safety tha t  w a s  at risk. The main 
insight of this research  w a s  tha t  perceptions of "risk" have several  dimensions 
which can be factored out, and tha t  t he  risk generators  ( n a t m l  hazards and tech- 
nologies) have multiple at t r ibutes  whose relative significance is variably per- 
ceived and evaluated. This w a s  pioneering work, and gave IIASA a justified 
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Figure 1: The "Risk" Perspect ive 
Internationally, a significant cleavage w a s  developing, though not really ar t i -  
culated, through the  la te  1970s and beyond. On the  one hand "risk research"  took 
RISKS as t he  origin, and black-boxed the  technologies which are t he i r  source.  A s  
a resul t ,  some analysts tended to r ega rd  t he  technologies as fixed, and did not ade- 
quately consider potential technological innovations. This view isolated the  nega- 
tive aspects  of r isk from the  broader  context of forward progress .  On the  o the r  
hand, a smaller th read  in the field kept  trying to root r i sks  in TECHNOLOGIES, and 
to  analyze t he  a t t r ibu tes  of t he  technologies which gave r i s e  to r i sks  and r isk per-  
ceptions, r a t h e r  than to analyze r i sks  detached from the i r  source.  
The next phase of IIASA's work examined r i sk  analysis f o r  one general 
category of r isk (and technology), t he  low probability, high consequence kind. 
That is, relatively compact, well-defined, single plant failures - oil well blowouts, 
nuclear reactor accidents,  and liquid energy gas (LEG) accidents. The LEG siting 
study, comparing four  countries, was useful mainly f o r  i t s  analysis of t he  diver- 
gence of different r isk analyses commissioned by different stakeholders. Often, 
science was used as a means of political advocacy, r a t h e r  than as a n  aid to policy 
synthesis. Disagreement among exper t s  was by then (and remains) a cent ra l  prob- 
l e m  f o r  policymakers. 
The Environmental Perspective. Work in the  environmental a r e a  also began 
with t he  evaluation of low probability systems failures, f o r  example the  collapse of 
a dam. However, interest  quickly shifted to the  r i sks  associated with t he  routine 
operation of new technologies, especially those releasing chemicals to t he  
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environment. In t he  ear ly days, pollution and its effects were immediately 
apparent.  A s  each round of remedial measures w a s  implemented, however, t h e  
residual problems became more subtle and more uncertain, involving t m c e  contam- 
ination, long latent periods. and complex causal pathways, but nonetheless with 
highly significant consequences. In response t o  these circumstances, the  quantita- 
t ive estimation of probabilities began to take its place in environmental impact 
assessment. 
However, with this  insertion of concern over  t h e  probability of uncertain 
future events, t he  focus on technologies was lost. Analyses centered around a 
specific chemical agent and the  probability of i ts  effects on human health. This 
discrete  p a r t  of t h e  r isk analysis field, dealing with chemical agents and health 
effects,  became known, at least in the  USA, as "risk assessment". Simultaneously, 
health effects began to drop  out  of technology-focused environmental impact 
assessments (EIA), m d  EIA became more the  domain of ecologists than toxicolo- 
gists. Steps are now being taken to r e s to re  t he  balance of ecological and health 
considerations, and i t  is hoped tha t  t h e  swing of t h e  pendulum wil l  not now impede 
t h e  ecosystem approach. 
Most environmental impact assessments focused on a single, new, site-specific 
project  - t he  building of a factory, power plant o r  waste facility. This narrow 
focus entrenched the  notion tha t  technologies can be compartmentalized - each 
being t rea ted  as if t h e  o thers  did not exist. Now analysts are recognizing the  
important interconnections. For example, extensive use of fossil fuels, agricul- 
t u r d  use of nitrogen ferti l izers,  climate warming, acid deposition, and stratos- 
pheric  ozone depletion are all interrelated through the  biogeochemical cycling of 
chemicals. 
In response to this  integrated perspective, the  field is  adjusting itself in two 
ways. Assessments such as IIASA's Doon Valley (India) project  which examines 
man-environment interactions at a geographical location, are beginning to involve 
an interacting network of technologies. Also, in thinking about risk-generating 
systems, consideration is given not just to NEW technologies, but t o  t h e  spectrum 
of "baseline" activities and natural  phenomena as wel l .  
This is not to suggest tha t  t h e  boundaries of t he  system can be moved out to 
infinity. Rather,  t he  rationale f o r  t he  inclusion/exclusion of valued at t r ibutes  and 
t h e  phenomena relating them has  become more explicit. 
This broadly based approach to t he  understanding of society's impact on the  
present  and fu ture  condition of t h e  environment has  led t o  one more important con- 
ceptual shift. Since benefits to some people are r i sks  to others ,  and improvements 
f o r  one a t t r ibu te  (food productivity through monoculture crops)  are r i sks  f o r  
another  (ecosystem resilience) w e  are forced to question any absolute distinction 
between r i sks  and benefits. If t h e  probability of good health is accounted as a 
benefit, then increased cancer  r isk simply lowers t h e  probability of good health. 
There is  no need, in f ac t  i t  is downright deceiving, to engage in double accounting. 
There is now a (healthy) t rend toward concentrating on the  aggregate of incremen- 
ta l  benefits. Assessments shed light not s o  much on priorit ies f o r  r i sk  reduction, 
but r a t h e r  on pr ior i t ies  f o r  positive innovation and improvement (see Figure 2). 
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1.4. Implications for Risk Research 
Ins t i tu t iona l  Arrangements:  One important implication of this conceptual 
shift is that ,  in future,  new initiatives f o r  optimizing benefits will less frequently 
take  t h e  form of government interventions and will more frequently take  t h e  form 
of local technological innovation. The responsibility f o r  initiating action will 
reside less with regulators,  and more with technology managers and communities 
themselves. The responsibilities of t he  public and private  sec tors  a r e  shifting as 
are t he  ro les  of scientists and citizens. N e w  institutional arrangements f o r  linking 
responsibility and accountability will be  important. 
IIASA could play an important ro le  in smoothing t h e  way f o r  this  change. With 
new players  and new roles  t h e r e  will be a need f o r  new institutional arrangements, 
new avenues of communication and education, and new approaches t o  t h e  effective 
use of both natural and social sciences in t he  synthesis of public policies. 
Environmental  C h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n  of Technologies: An effort  is  needed t o  
look into the  chaotic phase of t he  many competing embryonic technologies. IIASA's 
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new Technology, Economy, and Society Program proposes to characterize techno- 
logies in terms of the life cycle of their  market penetration. It may be possible t o  
characterize technologies not only in t e r m s  of the i r  economic performance, but 
also in terms of descriptors f o r  their  environmental consequences. Already, many 
front-end innovation processes are being pressed to internalize downstream 
environmental risks as costs and reactions escalate. Thus, potential environmental 
consequences have a place in the  characterization of technologies. This may assist 
preferential selection of the  "winners" with respect to subsequent market penetra- 
tion. In addition, the  approach could be used to determine which technological 
adaptations the  host society would specially value and welcome. However, it will be 
necessary t o  synthesize a bet ter  understanding of the uncertainties inherent in 
the  relationship between technologies and natural phenomena. 
This "hard" science cannot stand alone. Development policies must look to the  
shifting goals of societies, and understand the  objectives that  motivate change. In 
the  risk perception area, a start has been made to identify the  factors that influ- 
ence the  willingness of people to accept risk and t o  take risks. However, the 
interaction between social and natural scientists has not been sufficient. Toxicolo- 
gists, f o r  example, do not always address the questions of most significance to pol- 
icy development. Not having made their needs clear,  policymakers then become 
frustrated and regard science as useless. It is essential that  social and natural 
scientists be persuaded t o  become collectively engaged in t h e  elaboration of alter- 
native development pathways. 
Communication: In the  selective elaboration of technological development 
(and in securing a legacy fo r  the future), communication plays a strategic role. 
The speed and penetration of modern communication technologies has created a 
"New World" in which plants, factories, and firms become public terr i tory.  It  is no 
longer possible (let alone acceptable) to conceal information about ei ther  routine 
operation o r  system failure, o r  t o  repor t  i t  in an anaesthetized way. There is no 
private sector. 
There is an urgent need fo r  new technical and institutional structures that  
can cope adequately with the  "New World" of communication. Nowhere is the  com- 
munications issue more apparent than in the  field of toxicology. For 20-30 years, 
industries and governments have wrestled internally with the  uncertainties of 
evaluating the  effects on human health of such essential technologies as food 
preservation, pest management, and pharmaceuticals. Now, in addition to these 
deliberate chemical applications, consideration must be given to the many inadver- 
tent chemical intrusions into the  environment. While controlled consultation with 
selected "publics" has been a component of past evaluations, it was generally only 
the overall conclusion and not the  supporting rationale that  reached the public a t  
large. Rarely were the  assumptions and uncertainties made explicit. Now, with the  
"New World" of communication, these uncertainties are bursting out, and people, 
having been allowed t o  believe that  safety was absolute, feel betrayed - outraged. 
The current  "toxic chemical" issue may wel l  be as much an issue of how infor- 
mation is communicated, both t o  and from the public, as an issue of health effects 
o r  technological management. In the characterization and preferential selection 
of new technologies, two-way communication is a strategic imperative. 
1.5. IIASA's Future Role 
Against this background, it seemed to be important t o  clarify where IIASA 
might best place its emphasis in the risk area ,  with an eye on IIASA1s key position 
in the  international research community a s  a nonpolitical East-West research 
institute with a broad basis of support in its National Member Organizations. 
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Today the  t rend is more and more toward research  directed specifically at 
t he  needs of identifiable clients, and IIASA is firmly committed t o  this  approach. 
Thus, one of t he  main purposes of this workshop has  been to  explore priorit ies 
tha t  are shared between IIASA and potential sponsoring agencies o r  institutions. 
Intensive consultation with IIASA's National Member Organizations is  much needed. 
The handling of problems involving high degrees of risk and uncertainty seems 
t o  have been character ized in t he  past  by a lack of communication, not only 
between technical exper t s  and the  decision makers they seek t o  advise, but also 
between t h e  technical exper t s  themselves, working too often in isolation from each 
o the r  and thus failing to best use the i r  collective expertise.  If societies are to 
manage new technologies effectively, new decision processes and new institutional 
arrangements must be developed by which a n  integrated, systematic analysis of 
policy options can be  car r ied  out. IIASA provides a rare opportunity f o r  this kind 
of interdisciplinary synthesis. The difficulties are serious; but t h e  need is  press- 
ing. 
Among t h e  general areas of concern are a be t t e r  understanding (by all par-  
ties) and communication of (1) t h e  interrelationships between technologies and 
natural phenomena; (2) t he  origins of uncertainty in scientific assessments; (3) t he  
social values and r isk perceptions tha t  motivate public policy; and (4) institutional 
arrangements t o  unite government, industry, science and citizens in a manner tha t  
links ability, responsibility and accountability. However, t he  political sensitivity 
of t he  issue makes i t  difficult f o r  national organizations (public or private  sector)  
t o  undertake this cr i t ical  analysis on the i r  own. IIASA, on the  o the r  hand, is in a 
good position t o  undertake a n  objective, cross-cultural analysis. The integration 
of disciplines, t he  synthesis of cultural perspectives and an  objective, positive 
approach t o  uncertainty are of vital importance t o  t he  future. IIASA could contri- 
bute through the  analysis of systems f o r  t he  synthesis of decisions f o r  ecologically 
sustainable technological development. 
2. (TYERVIEW OF PAPERS 
This section will present  a few selected themes from the  presentations contri- 
buted by Task Force participants. The intention is  t o  show how t h e  presentations 
fi t  into t he  conceptual evolution described in Section 1 and d i rec t  t h e  r eade r  t o  
specific papers  f o r  more detailed treatment. 
The sponsors of t he  meeting contributed the i r  views on the  main policy issues 
requiring new approaches. The overview begins with highlights from this  policy 
perspective. The scientific papers  have been grouped on t h e  basis of their  dom- 
inant orientation: t he  scientific assessment of risk; applications t o  technological 
management; perceptions and communication; and institutional arrangements. I t  i s  
recognized tha t  most of t he  presentations span several  of these areas. Indeed, t he  
deliberate bridging of disciplines and traditional pract ices  may be  a major contri- 
bution of t h e  papers ,  which are reproduced in the i r  entirety following this repor t .  
2.1. From the Sponsors: Main Policy Issues 
A shift  of concern from obvious detrimental pollution t o  t he  subtle human 
health impacts of t r a c e  amounts of toxic chemicals and the  diminishing re turns  of 
fu ture  regulations are prompting a revolution in the  principles guiding environ- 
mental protection decisions in t he  USA. In Canada, public Environmental Impact 
Assessment Panels are seeking guidance on risk assessment. Simultaneously, the  
rapid transplant of technologies into a cultural setting very  different from tha t  
which spawned the  technology and the  associated urbanization are bringing the  
need f o r  integrated r isk analysis into sha rp  focus. 
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In the USA "risk assessment", the determination of the nature and magnitude 
of existing and reducible risks, is now the cornerstone of environmental policy. 
The ear l ier  criterion of total protection with an ample margin of safety was  simply 
not realistic. The insights of natural science are now used to find out what the 
problems are, and prevailing environmental, social, economic and political values 
are used in conjunction with legal precedent to decide what to do about those prob- 
lems. The myth that science alone could provide defensible policies is being 
dispelled, and the rest of the components of the decision system are being slowly 
identified. 
Analysis of both the scientific and political elements of this decision system 
has identified some opportunities for improvement: 
1. Integrated assessment.  There is a need for new methods to evaluate all of the 
risks at a location in an integrated way. Centralized federal decision-making can- 
not take into account the specific circumstances of communities. Local authorities 
need integrative methods to support risk management decisions under the more 
general umbrella of national and international guidance. Inventive, local solutions 
could then take into account the  specific properties of the  particular mix of tech- 
nologies, the receiving environment and local social, economic and cultural fac- 
tors. In addition, guidelines may be developed whereby regional authorities can 
handle different problems and clients a t  the same time, using a multiactor 
decision-making framework. 
2. P r i o r i t y  set tin^. Legitimate procedures are needed to set priorities fo r  regu- 
latory attention. Such procedures must accommodate explicit analysis and display 
inherent uncertainties. Without this, regulatory agencies are set up for  failure 
and loss of credibility. People must be brought into the process. Rules that 
automatically spit out decisions are not acceptable. 
3. Risk Assessment Rules. In the analysis of selected cases, to assure that  factual 
information is not being warped and manipulated to serve particular interests, EPA 
endorses the use of formal, public rules that guide the conduct of scientific risk 
assessment. The Guidelines prepared by EPA deal with the conduct of toxicological 
studies of chemicals and mixtures in appropriate animal species and test systems. 
Flexibility and agency discretion are restricted to the political risk-management 
stage. 
Hopefully, any scientific assessment rules wil l  achieve a high degree of scien- 
tific consensus and be subjected to ongoing and rigorous scrutiny of their  theoret- 
ical foundations, presuppositions and uncertainties. 
4. EIA Protocols. There is an urgent need for risk assessment protocols to  provide 
substantive direction to those responsible fo r  preparing EIA guidelines and 
reviewing the  resulting studies. In particular procedures are needed t o  define the 
risk event and the vulnerable resources more clearly at the beginning of an EIA. 
New procedures are needed to ensure that  the analysis reflects the risks as per- 
ceived by the public. 
5. Ecosystem Enects. There is a need to assess the probability of effects at the 
ecosystem level. How much pollution is how likely to cause how much ecological 
damage? The presence of traces of exotic chemicals is not necessarily harmful. 
6. AnaLysis of' the Tot& Decision a s t e r n .  The tools of systems analysis have been 
most  extensively applied to the natural science component of public policy 
decision-making. A s  the myth of entirely science-based policies fades, i t  becomes 
increasingly urgent to  explore in an equally systematic way the political elements 
of the decision system, the principles that drive it, the institutions that harbor it ,  
and the mechanisms used to  interpret social, economic and environmental 
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outcomes. 
2.2. Uncertainty in the Scientific Assesrrment of Risk 
Andrews t raced  t h e  independent origins of "risk assessment" (RA) and 
"environmental impact assessment" (EIA). RA emerged in t h e  scientific community 
in response t o  t h e  need t o  advise regulators about uncertain health hazards, most 
often associated with chemical agents. EIA, on the  o the r  hand, evolved as a tool 
used by proponents t o  assess qualitatively the  biogeophysical impact of technologi- 
cal  projects.  Long-term effects  on human health received relatively l i t t le atten- 
tion. 
These two processes - risk assessment and environmental impact assessment - 
were built on different kinds of expertise,  served different clients, and addressed 
different issues. Each has i ts  advantages, and future decision s t rategies  could 
constructively blend community involvement and practicality arising from the  
specific context of an  EIA with the  g rea t e r  r igor  and long-term foresight of RA. 
In his r e p o r t  of a "Workshop on t h e  Application of Risk Assessment Principles 
t o  Environmental Impact Assessment in Canada", Grima agreed tha t  RA and EIA can 
be  mutually supportive; t h e  fields have much in common and have evolved to  t h e  
point where the i r  different pathways toward a n  appropriate  mix of scientific 
r igor ,  social concern and political judgment are converging. 
One beneficial effect of t h e  application of RA concepts t o  EIA would be t o  
infuse the  whole process  with t h e  risk philosophy. That is, t o  r e j ec t  t h e  dichotomy 
of safe and unsafe with i ts  implied certainties,  and explicitly recognize a range of 
risks. While i t  is  t r u e  tha t  a combination of scientific and societal  judgments may 
lead t o  a level of "acceptable" r isk,  this level is  based on some range of probabil- 
ity and consensus and not on iron-clad certainty o r  universal acceptability. 
Grima's r e p o r t  discussed t h e  implications of this r isk philosophy f o r  techniques of 
risk analysis, public involvement and institutional arrangements. 
Suter  described applications of "formal" r isk assessment. Data are manipu- 
lated to provide quantitative estimates of t he  probability (and uncertainty) of 
selected outcomes. The paper  contributed a useful analysis of t he  different ori- 
gins of uncertainty, and showed tha t  different approaches are needed to address,  
display and reduce each type of uncertainty. 
In those situations where a mathematical model of t h e  dynamic cause-effect 
relationship can be  described, e r r o r  analysis can be applied t o  express  t h e  
resul ts  as probability distributions. E r r o r s  in predictions generated by models 
resul t  from faults in t h e  model s t ructure,  inaccurate estimation of t he  parameters,  
and the  natural  variability of t h e  environment. 
Examples of t h e  application of quantitative RA t o  waste effluents, acid deposi- 
tion and genetically engineered organisms were described. Results were directed 
toward decisions such as whether t o  a c t  now o r  do more research;  how t o  allocate 
research  funds; whether t o  proceed fu r the r  in a t iered hazard assessment; and 
whether a cer ta in  scenario is in compliance with regulatory standards. 
Habegger contrasted t h r e e  different contexts where RA may be useful. The 
f i r s t  used relatively simple physical, chemical and biological data t o  provide an 
initial ranking of the  hazards associated with chemical substances. This ranking 
w a s  independent of t h e  realit ies of any part icular  technological, environmental o r  
social setting. 
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A second application w a s  the  more detailed evaluation of r isks associated with 
a single pollutant o r  activity. Each such specific RA could become a component t o  
support the  third category of broader technology assessment. A s  an example, an 
analysis of energy alternatives w a s  described as one input t o  decisions t o  continue 
o r  redirect  research and development of alternative technologies. 
Variations in the  semantics for the  sequence of steps involved in risk assess- 
ment and management as applied t o  the health effects of specific agents were out- 
lined by Krewski and Birkwood. While all of the  selected schemes recognized both 
scientific and extra-scientific components, the extent to which these do o r  should 
operate in isolation from each o ther  was debatable. 
Fowle focused'on problems associated with the information base. The introduc- 
tion discussed the  kinds of information needed and the  problems of uncertainty. A s  
various scientific inquiries and interpretations converge, confidence in the result- 
ing decisions increases. However, information and understanding a r e  never com- 
plete. In many cases, the  largely subjective judgment of experienced administra- 
to r s  and politicians plays the  paramount role in decision making. 
Subsequent sections of the paper  dealt with the  uses of information in risk 
analysis and management and, finally, the problems of securing adequate informa- 
tion. These ranged from a simple lack of information, lack of standardization, and 
faulty methodologies, t o  complex processing and transfer  of information in 
hierarchical organizations, and failures in intersectoral and interagency communi- 
cation. 
It  is inevitable tha t  decisions will have t o  be made under uncertainty. Fowle 
concluded that  the  central problem in risk management is coping with uncertainty. 
2.3. Uncertainty and Technological Management 
Pegov reports* several definitions of "systems analysis". Systems analysis 
may be regarded as "quantitative common sense". This view is reflected in the  
thinking of practitioners of RA. From the  operations research perspective, sys- 
t e m s  analysis is "a tool for improving an organization by marshalling its s tructure 
and function, and orienting it toward problem solving fo r  the  accomplishment of i t s  
goals at earlier dates and lower costs". This view will be  familiar to those most 
concerned with the  institutional aspects of EIA. Both of these concepts - a 
rational way of thinking, and organizations directed toward problem solving - are 
central to the  analysis of man-nature interactions. 
Pegov describes an  approach based on the premise that  ecological stability is 
fundamental to acceptable man-nature interactions. For each development alter- 
native, expert  judgments (combining formal and heuristic knowledge) are used to 
characterize the  risk level (probability) of changes in environmental state and 
population health for selected indicator species that inhabit the  area in question. 
These risk levels may be expressed on ordinate scales with verbal descriptions of 
quality easily interpreted by economists and decision makers. In this approach, 
"risk" (the probability of severe ecosystem damage) is used t o  characterize 
development alternatives. Social and economic properties are assessed indepen- 
dently prior  to an overall appraisal. 
Pegov's approach t o  the characterization of technologies looks outward to 
the  environment f o r  guidance. It  stands in contrast to many other  schemes, which 
focus on neither the  technology nor the receiving environment, but on the 
This paper was submitted after the Taek Force Meeting. 
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propert ies  of t he  agent mediating between them. Examples of systems tha t  focus on 
the  chemical intermediary include the  OECD minimum premarket data  (MPD) 
scheme; the  US-EPA pre-manufacture notification (PMN) scheme; WHO'S "Rapid 
Assessment" f o r  a i r ,  water and land pollution, and most hazard ranking schemes. 
A model system known as RAINS (Regional Acidification Information and Simu- 
lation) is being developed at IIASA to  support integrated assessments of t he  com- 
plex problem of acid deposition in Europe. The credibility and usefulness of such 
models depends on sound estimates of uncertainty - t he  depar ture  of model calcu- 
lations from cur ren t  o r  future "true values". 
Hordi jk described a step-wise approach t o  the  evaluation of uncertainty: 
1. Inventory of Uncertainty  Sources. The purpose is t o  identify and classify 
sources of uncertainty. These include model s t ruc ture ,  parameters and forcing 
functions. 
2. Screening and  Ranking of Uncertainty .  The goal he re  is t o  reduce the  number 
of sources of uncertainty that  need to  be  quantitatively evaluated. Conventional 
sensitivity analysis o r  qualitative judgment is used. 
3. EvaLuation of Uncertainty .  Depending on the  source, techniques may include 
model comparisons, Monte Carlo analysis, matrix analysis, statistical analysis and 
historical data  correlation. 
4. AppLication to Decision Making. The model user  (decision maker) assesses t he  
outcome f o r  various scenarios. For example, even with a constant confidence 
interval in forecast  sulfur deposition, t he  importance of uncertainty varies spa- 
tially and temporally. Therefore, depending on the  location of sensitive targets ,  
expenditures t o  reduce uncertainty may o r  may not be  warranted. 
Pitovranov compared two approaches t o  the  synthesis of advice with respect  
t o  the  allocation of lands t o  specific agricultural crops. The f i r s t  used complex 
historical climatic da ta  t o  direct  land allocation while the  second used relatively 
simple measurements of springtime water storage in topsoil. In both cases data 
were used describing yields f o r  specific crops in t h e  Marx dis tr ic t  of t he  Saratov 
Region of t he  USSR. 
Three decision philosophies were considered: "maximin" in which the  decision 
maker wishes to  obtain the  maximum benefit f o r  the  worst possible case; a less con- 
servative philosophy which attempts t o  achieve the  maximum benefit f o r  average 
conditions; and a third strategy which attempts to  minimize the  maximum deviation 
from average. Springtime water turned out t o  be a bet te r  indicator of what and 
where to  plant than t h e  weatherman. 
Kaczmarek discusses* the  treatment of uncertainty in the planning and opera- 
tion of water resource systems with specific reference to the  Vistula and Tisza 
River Basins. He describes in practical terms the  range of sources of uncertainty 
recognized ea r l i e r  by Suter ,  and shows tha t  dealing with individual risk estimates 
(probabilities) f o r  each (or  just a few) of these i s  not adequate t o  describe the  
higher o r d e r  overall uncertainty associated with the  project. This need f o r  
higher o r d e r  estimates w a s  also recognized by Clark in the  context of climate 
warming. 
This  paper w a s  submitted a f t e r  t h e  Task Force  Meeting. 
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Kaczmarek reconfirms the need for an interdisciplinary approach combining 
the social and natural sciences. The need for better  understanding of the hydrolo- 
gic system is no more or less important than understanding the social and economic 
processes that  contribute to the dynamics of demand and the synthesis of criteria 
to  govern decisions. Kaczmarek recommends a scenario approach for the study of 
alternative futures. the explicit description of all sources of uncertainty, and sen- 
sitivity analysis of management alternatives. 
2.4. Uncertainty. Perceptions and Communication 
Renn provided a conceptual framework of the interdependencies between 
beliefs, concerns, values and attitudes. Perception of an object naturally includes 
perception of its hazardous consequences, their mental assimilation and general 
mechanisms to cope with uncertain situations. The separate measurement of object 
perception and risk perception can answer the question whether the re  are typical 
patterns in the intuitive perception of risk sources which can assist in predicting 
how people will react. Such insights are of prime importance in the characteriza- 
tion of new technologies that  are likely to be economically successful and socially 
acceptable. 
Major results of risk perception studies with immediate impact on the process 
of risk management and policymaking included: 
the strength of the belief that  a catastrophe can happen is more important 
than the expected losses over time; 
.- risks that  are perceived as dreadful, involuntary, unaccustomed and person- 
ally uncontrollable receive special attention, regardless of the probability of 
occurance or the expected number of victims; 
the re  is no universal threshold for risk acceptance - risks differ; 
judgments on risky activities depend on a whole range of interrelated factors 
including reference group judgments, previous loyalties, and rationalizations 
of unconscious feelings and social constraints tha t  are very difficult to eluci- 
date. 
Renn concluded that both scientific risk analysis and analysis of lay percep- 
tions are essential for the synthesis of public policies. 'The values of each citizen 
should have the same impact on policy as those of experts  or policymakers." Inno- 
vative survey methods combining attitude measurements, information and partici- 
pation have to be developed to resolve the c o n c e r n  that underlie the overt resis- 
tance against modern technologies that impose public risks. 
Chrk  vividly displayed the reality of Renn's conclusions fo r  the carbon diox- 
ide and climate warming issue. To the extent that one believes the available risk 
figures, the chance that  the world of 2100AD will  have witnessed a major nuclear 
power catastrophe is probably 10 and perhaps 100 times l e g  than the chance of 
drastic climate warming (e.g., a "Cretaceous earth" with ice-free Arctic Oceans 
and profound changes in agriculture). Y e t ,  the public and political attention given 
to these t w o  issues is not at all proportional to these probabilities. For the carbon 
dioxide greenhouse issue, the policy analysis community has, almost without excep- 
tion, ignored the uncertainties and their implications. 
Clark's presentation of relative probabilities in nuclear and climate warming 
issues became a topic of hot debate within the Task Force. Clark w a s  accused of 
"taking us back to  the Cretaceous era of risk analysis" by dealing only in probabil- 
ities and ignoring important perceptions of the nature of the consequences 
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involved. Clark challenged the  methodological pundits t o  show how they were 
going t o  improve the  analysis by including perceptions of the  relative seriousness 
of two conditions people cannot even imagine. The stumbling block w a s  clearly 
located in the  area of communication and education. 
There w a s  general agreement that  closer integration of political and environ- 
mental perspectives is required. The paper  provided an authoritative review of 
techniques used to  assess and display the uncertainties of extreme events. 
Lagadec's essay on strategies f o r  communication in cr is is  situations showed 
how a slip in communication becomes a skid into a swamp. Two fundamental and 
profoundly wrong assumptions were identified. 'The assumption tha t  equipment and 
experts  are infallible is t he  mark of a society with too many milk teeth." In 
response to  system failure this expectation leads to  reticence, silence and even 
relentless denial with a regularity that  borders  on the caricature.  
Second, "the assumption that  economic enterprise  i s  private and preserved 
from outside interference is patently false." The formidable power of the media, 
ingenious lines of access t o  information and the  lightning speed of modern commun- 
ication destroy all possibility of a private sector .  
Tactical materials and even fundamental s t rategic abilities often reveal  the i r  
limitation only when an  actual cr is is  has to  be met head on. There is a need f o r  
practical drills, which test not only the competences of individual participants, but 
also the  ability of the  combined team in dealing together with delicate situations. 
However, such preparedness i s  cumbersome and, perhaps more significant, inglori- 
ous, especially if i t  is successful in avoiding any maelstrom of public profile. 
Lagadec provided a framework f o r  developing competence in crisis communi- 
cation, and called f o r  new initiatives in the sharing of "expert" scientific interpre- 
tations. 
2.5. Uncertainty and Institutional Arrangements 
Linnerooth returned to  the  kind of r isk assessment and management models 
discussed by Krewski, and made the case that  despite all  the  models in print,  the 
process does not, in fact,  t ake  place in anything like the  linear flow described. 
Examples were given where risk assessments, r a t h e r  than becoming a par t  of the  
policy synthesis, w e r e  used t o  defend the positions and biases of particular stake- 
holders. A shift w a s  recommended away from closed decision processes dependent 
on an ever-increasing demand for  more and be t te r  science, to  new institutional 
arrangements in support  of open, multiparty negotiation. 
Kleindorfer reported on an ear l ie r  Task Force which met in July, 1985, t o  set 
a 5 to 10  yea r  research  agenda in the area of hazardous materials management. 
Detailed research  recommendations were developed f o r  each of the  following 
themes: 
1. ProbLem Contez t .  There is a need t o  increase our  understanding of t he  problems 
and opportunities facing firms which manufacture products tha t  create toxic 
waste, the  alternatives open t o  t ranspor ters  of hazardous materials, and the  chal- 
lenges facing those involved in the  siting of s torage and disposal facilities. 
2. Risk A n a l y s i s .  There is a need t o  document the  potential benefits and inherent 
limitations of risk analysis, both at t he  assessment level and at the  level of com- 
munication t o  different parties. In particular,  w e  need to  understand how bargain- 
ing and negotiation can facilitate the  decision process. 
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3. Risk Manugement and Insurance. There is a need to  understand the role that 
legal institutions and regulation can play in facilitating the production, transport 
and storage of hazardous materials. What is the appropriate role of insurance in 
dealing with these problems? 
Krishna Murti contributed sensitive insights into the problems of the cultural 
transplant of technologies from industrialized countries into developing ones. 
First, there  is a rea l  tendency f o r  the specific transplant of hazard-prone techno- 
logies. Further, change is very fast. None of the natural forces of moderation 
that  governed the original evolution of the technology are operative in the new 
setting. On the technical side, the  development has already taken place. The new 
uommunity has little opportunity to adapt itself, or adjust the technology. New 
technologies are often greeted with fatalistic attitudes: tragedy must be both anti- 
cipated and accepted. 
Sometimes, r a the r  than an improvement in the basic quality of life, the result 
is a double burden. The familiar stresses of food supply, infectious disease and 
sanitation are compounded with threats  of chronic pollution, environmental degra- 
dation, and catastrophic systems failure. 
The level of public education often leads. of necessity, to "elftist" decision 
processes. The lack of proper attention to the cultural result of invasive technol- 
ogy transfer is fostered by the absence of organized pressure groups and political 
lobbies. Krishna M u r t i  concluded that the need f o r  bet ter  institutional arrange- 
ments f o r  the pragmatic consideration of simple, local, social, economic, health 
and environmental factors f a r  outweighs the need fo r  sophisticated probabilistic 
analysis. 
Consensus: One recommendation was uniformly endorsed by all participants 
from cultures as diverse as the USA, India, USSR, Canada, Poland, Fmnce and Ger- 
many. Conscientious management of technology development wffl require an inter- 
disciplinary approach that unites social, political and natural science more effec- 
tively than has been the case in the  past. For IIASA, a significant issue will be to 
find appropriate structures within its own operation to achieve this disciplinary 
synthesis. IIASA was designed as an integrating institution to bridge the cultures of 
East and West through collaborative scientific research. What institution is bet ter  
suited to take up the challenge of disciplinary synthesis in risk and policy 
analysis? 
3. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The Task Force identified three  approaches to improving the  validity and 
credibility of risk and policy analysis under conditions of uncertainty: 
protocol development, 
case study analysis, 
preparation of educational materials. 
3.1. Protocois 
Recommendation I,- Procedurat advice should be developed for the integrated 
assessment of the contribution of technologies to envtronmentcrt and economic 
achievements and the associated uncertainties. 
I t  would not be enough fo r  experts  to know how to conduct risk analyses - 
however perfect their  expertise might become. It is essential that  the expertise 
be transferred to those who have the opportunity to use it. 
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There i s  a pressing need f o r  specialists and users  to  communicate more effec- 
tively and together develop understandable guidance on how t o  conduct risk and 
policy analyses. The various stakeholders involved in the  analyses have different 
backgrounds, interests  and roles,  and the  protocols should use a common language. 
The protocols should capture  the  principles underlying key components of t he  
risk and policy analysis process (e.g., understanding the  institutional setting, 
structuring the  issue, displaying the  conclusions and uncertainties of science, and 
evaluating the  importance of t he  consequences of alternative courses of action). 
They should provide an overview of the  roles and responsibilities of participants, 
what the  available pract ices  and procedures a r e ,  and what pitfalls are currently 
recognized. 
The protocols would serve several  purposes: provide practical guidance to 
users; promote the  application of systematic policy analysis techniques, and pro- 
vide a framework t o  integrate subsequent research  efforts. Users might include 
government officials at municipal, regional, national, and international levels and 
the  stakeholders (including the  public) t ha t  they serve. 
AnuLyticaL Procedures: Fundamental to the  process of r isk and policy analysis is 
t he  application of a wide range of scientific expertise (natural and social) in o r d e r  
to understand cause and effect relationships. The list of analytical procedures in 
Table 1 makes no attempt to be  comprehensive, but selects particularly thorny 
areas which the  protocols could address. 
The Task Force Meeting suggested areas fo r  initial attention. The need f o r  
procedures to integrate all r i sks  at a location arose repeatedly in several  dif- 
ferent  settings. Integrative methods fo r  the  analysis of multiple r i sks  are needed 
as an  aid to priority setting within regulatory agencies, to planning f o r  environ- 
mental protection in a community, and especially t o  s t rategic planning to guide 
urbanization in developing countries. 
R e  Importance of Contezt: A t  t he  Task Force Meeting i t  w a s  apparent  t ha t  t he  
limitations of risk and policy analysis did not a r i s e  solely from analytical tech- 
niques. Rather,  improvements to t he  pract ice of r isk and policy analysis require  
g rea t e r  attention t o  t h e  constraints imposed by the context in which the  analysis is 
set. I t  i s  the  context of t h e  issue tha t  determines t h e  people most involved, t he  
information available, t he  range of options to be considered, the  analytical pro- 
cedures to be used, t he  institutional arrangements available fo r  decision analysis, 
and the  cultural norms of responsible conduct. 
Important dimensions of issue context include t h e  purpose of t he  analysis, t he  
institutional setting, and t h e  scope of the  issue to be analyzed. To the extent  t ha t  
they are known, the  constraints and opportunities arising from the  context in 
which an issue occurs  should be  spelled out in the  protocol. 
3.2. Case Studies 
Recommendation 2: Comparative in ternat ional  case s t u d i e s  should be con- 
ducted invo lv ing  local o r  regional c lusters  of technologies a n d  decision- 
making bodies, ecosystem enects,  economic m c t s ,  a n d  enects o n  h u m a n  well-  
being, as well as the  s t ruc ture  a n d  p e r p m a n c e  o f i n s t i t u t i o n s .  
Comparative study of international and cross-sectoral cases provides insight 
into effective methodologies f o r  r isk and policy analysis based on practical 
experience. In the  previous consideration of protocols, problems were identified 
arising from both the  analytical techniques and the  context in which they must be  
applied. These same concerns provide the  focus f o r  comparative aase studies. 
Case analyses should emphasize problem structuring, t he  institutional setting, 
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Table 1. Risk and Pol icy  Analyak Areas for  Protocol Development. 
Sociad Sciences 
strategies for problem structuring by drawing out relevant causal 
events, activities, o r  phenomena and the full range 'of interests and ob- 
jectives a t  stake; 
strategies for  defining legitimate distributions of risk and benefit; 
strategies for information sharing, education, and training. 
strategies for facilitating the construction of viable compromises. 
Naturad Sciences 
methods to integrate all risks a t  a location; 
methods to monitor the environment, with emphasis on efficient and effec- 
tive sampling design; with special attention to the transport and 
transformation of chemicals in tropical and arctic environments; 
methods to estimate ecosystem effects (indicators and criteria for as- 
similative capacity, instability thresholds, and recovery time); 
methods to estimate noncancer risks to health; with special attention to 
mechanistic models  reflecting biological heterogeneity, adaptive 
responses, explicit presuppositions. 
methods to organize scientific expertise. 
Economics 
strategies to generate incentives for  voluntary, responsible stewardship; 
strategies for benefit distribution: insurance, payments in cash o r  kind, 
tax relief, oommunity services and facilities. 
Mathematics and Statts t ics  
study of the sources of uncertainty in cumulative, low risk scenarios; 
methods to estimate and express uncertainty; 
methods for dealing with incomplete dnta; 
appropriate reporting formats; 
methods for dealing with the time dimension: cumulative effects; adaptive 
response ; economic discounting. 
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monitoring systems f o r  problem identification, priority setting and program 
evaluation, as wel l  as methods f o r  estimating and displaying uncertainty. 
Several major issues (Table 2) w e r e  identified f o r  which t h e r e  has  been signi- 
ficant experience with respec t  t o  t h e  nature of t h e  risk, t h e  policy analyses con- 
ducted, t h e  impact tha t  t h e  analysis did o r  did not have on subsequent actions, and 
the  consequences f o r  t he  human condition. This body of experience should be 
exploited t o  p repa re  prescriptive advice, f o r  application in t h e  management of 
new technologies (e.g., biotechnologies) o r  newly recognized consequences (e.g., 
global environmental changes). 
Table 2. Iames for Retrospective and Prospective Case Study 
of Risk and Policy Analysis. 
Retrospective 
Natural Resource Management 
International Rivers 
Agriculture, Fisheries, Forestry 
Acid Deposition 
Urbanization 
Urban Risk Management (steady s tate)  
Hazardous Materials 
Cradle t o  grave  management 
Transportation 
Waste Disposal Siting 
Hazardous Facility Management 
Pesticides, Food Additives and Contaminants 
Energy Sources 
Prospective 
Biotechnology 
Global Environmental Change 
Climate warming 
Stratospheric  ozone depletion 
Trace Contamination of Drinking Water 
The institutional setting of a n  issue significantly influences the  procedures 
needed t o  support  efficiency, effectiveness and equity in decision making. New 
insights are needed as to how t o  set t he  s tage f o r  constructive international colla- 
boration. Processes  are needed t o  sha re  knowledge, perceptions, and uncertain- 
t ies and ensure tha t  participants truly represent  t he  constituencies who will be 
expected t o  implement t he  agreements. Such insights could be derived from study 
of t he  histories of commissions dealing with international r ivers ,  t he  history of t he  
l a w  of t he  sea,  Admiralty law, and o the r  international agreements with global 
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influence. 
A recurring theme in the Task Force discussions w a s  the need fo r  improved 
communication of science. Better approaches are needed t o  make both the 
knowledge and the uncertainty arising f r o m  scientific studies understandable to all 
of the people involved in the issue, as major stakeholders, authorities and citizens. 
A different kind of communication challenge is apparent within the  scientific 
community. While quantitative procedures and the formal logic of mathematics can 
be effectively used t o  manipulate and interpret complex data bases, the structur- 
ing of the problem in terms of the  perceived stresses and social values at risk 
requires the  application of social sciences. In o rder  to pose appropriate ques- 
tions, these often isolated disciplines must work together. The mathematician must 
provide guidance on the  kind of structure and information needed f o r  meaningful 
analysis. Equally, the  social scientist must make the structure of the  real situation 
and the purpose of the analysis clear to the quantitative specialist. Only then will 
the  talents on both sides become useful in the solution of socially relevant prob- 
lems. 
The analysis of cases must provide insight into the principles underlying 
prescriptive advice. Case descriptions are not enough. Case comparisons should 
be carefully directed toward the  elucidation of principles and, further, to dissemi- 
nation of these principles to those who can apply them. 
3.3. Educational Pataial. 
Recommendation 3: Educational materials to support the tntegrated case stu- 
dies should be prepared. 
Educational materials are needed to familiarize those engaged in public policy 
decision processes (e.g., environmental risk assessment, municipal planning) with 
the nature of the process and thei r  roles. Equally imporhnt is the need to 
motivate and inform employees involved in safety procedures, as well as the gen- 
eral  public. 
It  is recommended that  interactive microcomputer learning systems be 
prepared. Careful attention must be paid to the level and nature of understanding 
of the  user. A range of decision models could be incorporated into the system 
along with the capacity f o r  users to input their own information, or access avail- 
able data bases. U s e r s  would then have the  ability to ask "what if" questions, and 
gain valuable insights into the significance of various assumptions and uncertain- 
ties. 
3.4. Conclurion 
These approaches to improving the practice of risk and policy analysis - 
development of protocols, case studies and educational materials - are interre- 
lated. Protocol development has been deliberately placed f irst  in the list to 
emphasize the  need fo r  "best available" advice - however tentative. Policy 
analysts should not fall into the  t r ap  of refusing to give advice because their  art is 
not perfect! I t  is through the testing of even tentative procedures that progress 
is made. This progress will be s l o w  if the rationale underlying policy decisions 
remains aavert  and is not subjected to thoughtful, constructive analysis. 
The variations in the scope of the cases that might be analyzed is infinite, 
considering oombinations with respect to person, place, time, causes, effects, fre- 
quency and magnitude of risks. The Task Force recognized the need f o r  interna- 
tional collaboration in the design and conduct of a program of research .into risk 
and policy analysis. The many centers of interest and expertise need to coordinate 
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the i r  e f for t s  t o  ensure maximum benefit from the  individual contributions. 
Internat ional  Cbllaboration. The Task Force agreed t h a t  international 
bodies have special ro les  to play in helping t o  carry out t h e  recommendations 
given above. There i s  clearly a need for:  
international exchange of information on cu r ren t  and proposed 
research ,  and t h e  availability of expert ise  in r isk and policy analysis. 
This exchange would lead t o  t he  identification of common needs f o r  proto- 
cols, as w e l l  as shared  interests  in par t icular  issues. A coordinated 
international program, directed toward defined achievements, i s  needed; 
internationally accepted protocols t ha t  cap ture  t h e  principles underly- 
ing key components of t h e  consensus-building process  (e.g., understand- 
ing the  institutional setting, structuring t h e  issue, and displaying the  
conclusions and uncertainties of science); 
collaborative investigation of cases in which those technologies common 
to many nations interact  at a geographic location with t h e  potential f o r  
international impact; 
preparat ion of educational materials t o  t ransfer  t he  lessons learned. 
In t h e  health r i sk  field, t he  r ecen t  proposal of IAEA/ILO/UNEP/WHO on 
"Assessing and Managing Health and Environmental Risks from Energy and Other 
Complex Industrial Systems" is  to be  commended. 
With r e spec t  to r isks  to ecological and natural  resource  systems, intergo- 
vernmental bodies such as UNESCO/MAB, UNEP and WMO have important roles.  
Amongst nongovernmental organizations, IIASA should be  especially mentioned 
f o r  t h e  following reasons: 
IIASA has long been involved in r isk research;  
IIASA is  nongovernmental and nonpolitical; i t  is  supported by 16 coun- 
t r ies ,  and thus has  a l a rge  number of national organizations t o  turn  t o  
when networking seems appropriate;  
IIASA i s  particularly effective in contributing to t h e  East-West dialogue, 
because of i t s  member organizations; 
IIASA provides a place where research  scientists from different coun- 
t r i e s  and different disciplines can join together  f o r  sustained periods of 
time t o  work on common problems. 
Overall t h e  Task Force Meeting provided lively debate  and a aonstructive syn- 
thesis of perspectives. The task now i s  to find the  intersection between the  priori-  
t ies  of nations and international agencies, and the  international r e sea rch  capacity 
in terms of both money and expertise.  
National Member Organizations, Research Agencies and Industrial Organiza- 
tions are invited to express  the i r  interests  in participating in such projects  
through the  contribution of expertise,  collaborative research  o r  project  funding. 
Increased public confidence in t he  securi ty  of t h e  fu ture  is  a worthy goal and 
a major challenge. The Task Force Meeting indicated that  IIASA could play a signi- 
ficant ro le  in t h e  s t rategic  analysis of technological change. 
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Background 
The Task Force focused on the uncertainties in decision systems for choosing 
technologies intended to improve human well-being. The challenge was to delineate 
an international research agenda to assist communities to venture into the future 
with greater  confidence in technological innovation. 
A holistic model of decision systems for choosing technologies w a s  inherent in 
the Task Force discussions. In this model  the effects of technologies were seen as 
mediated by (1) the  biogeochemical environment; (2) the economy: and (3) the pol- 
itical institutions of the community in question (Figure 2). Understanding the 
impacts of technology on society requires consideration of the  structures and 
foroes operating in each of these three subsystems. The resulting knowledge and 
perceptions about the  well-being of man and the environment are then processed 
back through scientific institutions, economic institutions, and political institu- 
tions. The products of this information processing become the forces that motivate 
the selection of new or modified technologies. Clearly the three  lines of reasoning 
are not in fact so simple, and many interactions occur. 
Among these contributing elements, only the  biogeophysiaal environment and 
the tangible effects mediated by it are subject to the immutable l a w s  of nature. All 
the rest are products of man's ingenuity, and are subject to human intenention. It  
seemed reasonable, then, to concentrate on understanding those natural struc- 
tures and forces that w e  must learn to live with, in conjunction with opportunities 
for directed change in the man-made elements. 
Issacs 
The Task Force identified a set of issues - points of debate, controversy and 
uncertainty - in this decision system. In each case the need f o r  integrated pro- 
cedures was at the  root of the problem. 
RA a d  ELA. Risk Assessment (RA) has dealt with the probability and effects of a 
chemical, physical or biological agent or process, usually on the physical health of 
man. Environmental impact assessment (EIA) has looked at the probability and 
effects of proposed new technologies or projects, usually on the  biogeochemical 
environment. There have been too many battles over who owns the turf at the 
interface. There is a need to develop integrated procedural advice ("protocols") 
combining RA and EIA. 
Integrated Geographic Assessment. In the past, assessments have focused on a 
single technology or development project. However, the effects of technologies 
are not independent. Procedures f o r  the integrated assessment of all technologies 
at a location are needed. Opportunity for a first  level of integration is provided 
by study of the technology-environment interaction (EIA), s h o e  all technologies 
act on the same environment. A higher order of integration may be achieved by 
considering the  ultimate effects on human well-being, where not only the effects 
mediated by the environment, but also effects mediated by economic and political 
s tructures come into play. 
Priority Setting and Risks Without Precedent. The scope and scale of modern 
technology are creating risks for which there  are no precedents. Society has not 
had (and hopefully never will have) experience of a Nuclear Winter. While geologi- 
cal history records wide shifts in climate, changes as great as those which appear 
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possible due to anthropogenic greenhouse gases have not been experienced within 
the  history of civilization. Therefore,  society has  no precedent f o r  judging t h e  
importance of such events relative to competing demands f o r  r e sea rch  and policy 
development. Pr ior i ty  setting will requi re  not only new approaches f o r  t h e  
integrated assessment of relatively familiar risks,  but also methods f o r  dealing 
with entirely new kinds of risk. 
Ecosystem m e c t s .  I t  is  not realistic t o  consider effects  on components of t h e  
environment in isolation, since, again, t he  components interact.  Indicators t o  
character ize t h e  impact of technologies on important propert ies  of ecosystems 
need to be  applied and validated. 
Health Risk Assessment. RA is  generally based on estimates of exposure, t he  phy- 
sicochemical proper t ies  of t h e  agent, and laboratory tests in selected species, 
supported by any available epidemiological evidence. R A  has  become a corner-  
stone of environmental policy, and cer tain RA methodologies are becoming fixed in 
law.  However, analysis of t h e  presuppositions underlying cu r ren t  methodologies 
reveals  some highly debatable assumptions. Examples include t h e  assumption tha t  
not only individuals but  also species are identical, and tha t  organisms including 
man cannot adapt  to low level stress. 
Further ,  studies of t he  fac tors  tha t  most influence the  willingness t o  take  
r isks  indicate tha t  things like opportunity f o r  personal intervention and t h e  
dreadedness of t h e  outcome are more important to decision making than t h e  proba- 
bility of occurrence of t h e  event. Yet, many toxicological evaluations focus more 
on tenuous quantitative measures of probability (dose-response in test animals) 
than on these o the r  factors.  There is  a need to develop alternative toxicological 
models based on more relevant assumptions and t o  use more of t h e  available 
insights into t h e  causal chain of events linking technologies and human health. 
Objectives of Technological Development. The success of technological develop- 
ment can only be  evaluated (and appreciated) if the  objectives are understood (and 
accepted). There i s  a general consensus tha t  t he  long-term integrity of t he  
environment and the  physical, psychological and social well-being of people, a r e  
"good" things. However, methods need to be developed f o r  displaying, even quali- 
tatively, t h e  probabilities and degrees of achievement within each of these gen- 
eral areas. Rarely are t he  objectives sufficiently clear even to allow constructive 
debate. 
Societal goals change and normative solutions t o  risk management may be  
dangerous. Dynamic ways to identify t he  objectives "at risk" f o r  each group of 
people and then to evaluate and compare achievements a r e  urgently needed. 
Further ,  r a t h e r  than attempting t o  assign shadow prices  to human values, i t  would 
allow a more fundamental level of understanding to search  f o r  ways t o  express  
economic values in human terms. 
Equi t y  a n d  Discounting. The effects (positive and negative) of technological 
development do not distribute themselves uniformly across  society. A major chal- 
lenge t o  economic and political institutions is to seek be t te r  methods f o r  equitable 
distribution, and t o  accommodate long time scales. 
Communication a n d  Inst i tut ional  Arrangements. Four broad classes of instttu- 
tions are identified in Figure 2: technological (e.g., firms, multinationals); econom- 
ics (e.g., banks, insurance companies, stock markets); scientific (e.g., professional 
societies, research  Institutions), and political (e.g., governments, communication 
media, interest  groups). Each of these exists on international, national and a 
range of subnational levels. Each has information processing and communication 
(receiving and sending) roles. Each contributes t o  t he  motivation of technological 
development. Integration of these motivating forces  does occur ,  and new or 
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improved technologies are chosen, one way or another. However, confidence in 
the choices would be strengthened if the contributions of major institutions and the 
mechanisms of integration could be made more explicit. 
The Task Force recognized the dynamic state of institutional roles. Multina- 
tional corporations seem to have increasing control over technology development 
relative to national governments. In the scientific community, national institutions 
are deferring to international organizations (UNEP, ICSU , SCOPE, OECD, etc.) fo r  
standards and guidelines. On the other hand, responsibility for the choice of 
specific interventions may be shifting from the national to the local arena, to  facil- 
itate inventiveness based on knowledge of the specific mix of technologies in 
specific environmental and cultural settings. National governments s e e m  to be left 
more and more with the responsibility for softening the impact of change and 
achieving some degree of equity. With such a dynamic decision kystem i t  is 
increasingly important to explore and make explicit the roles of the various insti- 
tutions and to seek new ways to link responsibility and accountability. 
Becommendations 
The Task Force recommended three  interrelated approaches to addressing 
these issues: 
Protocok. Development of procedural advice f o r  the  integrated assessment of 
the contribution of technologies to environmental and economic achievements, and 
associated uncertainties. 
Case Studies. Integrated assessments involving local or regional clusters of 
technologies and decision-making bodies, and investigation of ecosystem effects, 
economic effects, and effects on human well-being, as well as the  structure and 
performance of institutions. 
Educational Materiak. Development of educational materials to support 
integrated assessment. 
This comparative analysis of cases would serve both corporate and public 
clients. Industrial corporations would gain insights into the potential outcomes of 
development scenarios, drawing on international scientific expertise. Such 
insights would complement their  own perspective of development priorities. Public 
authorities would receive insights into how best to influence the directions and 
outcomes of technology development. Comparison of similar geographic and tech- 
nological scenarios in different cultural settings in East and W e s t  would assist in 
the transfer of insights gained f r o m  specific cases to strategic planning more gen- 
erally. 
By undertaking such studies, IIASA would provide a forum fo r  the  integration 
that was identified as the crucial gap underlying current  issues in risk and policy 
analysis. 
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Resolution of the =A Council (13 Jane 1986): 
IIASA Task Force on Technological Risks 
IIASA/COUN-XXVI/Reslu 178 
13 June. 1986 
Whereas IIASA has since i ts  inception compiled an  internationally recognized 
research  r eco rd  of high quality in the fields of r isk analysis, r isk management, 
risk perception, and t h e  management of technological emergencies, 
whereas IIASA has cooperated closely with t h e  IAEA in ea r l i e r  years  along 
such lines, 
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of IIASA alumni and t h e  Institute's former and cu r ren t  collaborators in t he  above 
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issues of safety, risk. health, standards, monitoring, information exchange, e m e r -  
gency cr i ses  management, and public understanding, 
whereas i t  i s  a prime objective of IIASA to seek t o  improve "methods of inves- 
tigation and analysis ... to make them more adequate t o  predict,  evaluate and 
manage the  social and o the r  repercusions of scientific and technological develop- 
ment" (IIASA Charter).  
whereas IIASA as a nongovernmental international institution would bring, by 
providing a comprehensive approach, par t icular  advantages to a joint involvement 
with organizations such as the  IAEA. WHO and/or UNEP, which have a direct ,  
immediate interest  in the  above mentioned accidents, 
t he  Council therefore  moves 
1. t o  create a task fo rce  consisting of a standing group .at the  Institute and 
scientists in the  NMO countries tha t  are able and willing to actively contribute to 
the  work of tha t  task force;  
2. t o  ask tha t  task force  t o  consider 
- t h e  international management of perceived r i sks  
- the  societal issues in perceiving technology r i sks  including the  notion of 
probability 
- t he  design of a n  international monitoring and warning system; 
3. t o  approach the  IAEA and to  look f o r  ways and means t o  associate t he  
activities of IIASA as closely as possible to tha t  Agency, in par t icular  by consider- 
ing the institutional mechanism tha t  would resul t  in international r e a c t o r  safety 
measures and standards; 
4. t o  invite the  NMOS f o r  fu r the r  specific suggestions of the  ro le  the Institute 
might play; 
5. t o  ask the  Director of IIASA t o  propose t o  the  Council a scheme f o r  imple- 
menting the  above ideas including the  aspec t  of financing. 
RISK ASSESSMENT AND RISK MANAGEMENT: 
TOOLS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ANALYSIS 
Dan Beardsley 
Di rec to r ,  Regulatory In tegra t ion  Divis ion 
United S t a t e s  Environmental P ro tec t ion  Agency 
Since t h e  U.S. Environmental Pro tec t ion  Agency was founded 
i n  1970, much has changed i n  how we view t h e  use of sc ience  i n  
making environmental p ro tec t ion  decis ions.  That we a r e  here  i n  
Vienna t o  d i scuss  managing r i s k  r a t h e r  than e l imina t inq  it under l ines  
t h e  movement toward a  s c i e n t i f i c  way of th inking  -- and g r e a t e r  
rea l i sm about t h e  absurd i ty  of t h e  not ion t h a t  we could o r  should 
e l imina te  r i s k  i n  i n d u s t r i a l  and technologica l  soc ie ty .  
Much has changed i n  t h e  way EPA approaches problems because,  
i n  p a r t ,  t h e  problems themselves have changed. F i f t e e n  years  ago, 
we i n  America were concerned with obvious problems i n  t h e  
environment: we were looking a t  dead f i s h ,  c losed beaches, dying 
l akes  and f i r e  i n  our r i v e r s  with smog-born t e a r s  i n  our eyes. 
Early s o l u t i o n s  t o  p o l l u t i o n  were t o  e s t a b l i s h  r i g i d  s a f e t y  
s tandards  and impose mechanical and technologica l  f i x e s  -- and 
t o  a  l a r g e  e x t e n t ,  they worked. Because of t h e s e  quick ,  
enforceable  c o n t r o l s  we could,  by t h e  mid-70's, begin t o  see  
again t h e  s t r ee t l amps  of P i t t sburgh ,  and f i s h  were r e tu rn ing  t o  
r i v e r s  we had bel ieved t o  be hopeless ly  fouled. 
But t h e  focus of our  environmental po l i cy  has now s h i f t e d  
t o  s u b t l e r  hazards t o  h e a l t h  and our biosphere.  By 1980, r e f ined  
measurement technology showed t h a t  a i r  and water t h a t  seemed pure 
10 years  ago were i n  f a c t  harboring toxics .  Dramatic e a r l y  
v i c t o r i e s  a g a i n s t  obvious p o l l u t i o n  t a r g e t s  have given way t o  a  
campaign of a t t r i t i o n  aga ins t  l i t e r a l l y  thousands of p o t e n t i a l  
enemies t o  human hea l th .  
We a r e  a l s o  becoming more conscious of what t h e  economists 
c a l l  t h e  "knee" of t h e  cos t -e f fec t iveness  curve. Ten years  ago, 
t h e  job seemed easy: huge p o l l u t i o n  reduct ions could be achieved 
f o r  r e l a t i v e l y  l i t t l e  c o s t ,  Now, however, t h e  c o s t s  a r e  
p o t e n t i a l l y  much more p a i n f u l  t o  u s ,  and t h e  environmental 
b e n e f i t s  much more d i f f i c u l t  t o  demonstrate, 
These two cons idera t ions  -- a s h i f t  of concern t o  the  s u b t l e  
human h e a l t h  impacts of t o x i c s  p o l l u t i o n  and t h e  p o t e n t i a l l y  
diminishing r e t u r n s ,  i n  economic terms, of f u t u r e  r e g u l a t i o n  -- 
a r e  prompting an i n t e l l e c t u a l  r evo lu t ion  i n  what should be t h e  
proper  b a s i s  f o r  making environmental p r o t e c t i o n  dec is ions ,  
"Risk" i s  t h e  key concept i n  what has occurred. In t h e  e a r l y  
years  of EPA, we were concerned with " sa fe ty" ,  which w a s  usua l ly  
def ined as t o t a l  p ro tec t ion ,  The Clean A i r  Act demands t h a t  we 
s e t  s tandards  t h a t  w i l l  p r o t e c t  pub l i c  h e a l t h  with "an ample 
margin of safe ty ."  Risk i s  no t  mentioned. What focused pub l i c  
a t t e n t i o n  wonderfully were hazards flowing from two carcinogenic 
substances ubiqui tous i n  t h e  American environment -- PCBs and 
asbes tos ;  a  r e a l i z a t i o n  t h a t  exposure t o  a  very l a r g e  number 
of unfami l i a r ,  l a r g e l y  untes ted  chemicals w a s  widespread; 
l abora to ry  and s t u d i e s  t h a t  a s soc ia ted  c e r t a i n  widespread 
p o l l u t a n t s  w i th  cance r ;  and f i n a l l y ,  t h e  consuming p u b l i c  i s s u e  
o f  abandoned toxic-chemical  dumps. A l l  t h e s e  even t s  c r e a t e d  
a n o t a b l e  s h i f t  i n  t h e  way EPA approaches i t s  mission.  
F i r s t ,  s u b t l e r  problems have changed t h e  way i n  which 
s c i e n c e  i s  app l i ed  t o  p r a c t i c a l  ques t ions  of  p r o t e c t i o n  and 
environmental  r e g u l a t i o n s .  Second, i t  has r a i s e d  d i f f i c u l t  
q u e s t i o n s  of  how t o  manage c h r o n i c - r i s k s  w i t h i n  t h e  c o n t e x t  
o f  democratic i n s t i t u t i o n s .  These developments urged us t o  
adopt a new approach t o  a s s e s s i n g  and managing r i s k .  
Major impetus f o r  EPA i n  t h i s  came from a 1983 r e p o r t  
by t h e  Nat iona l  Academy of  Sc i ences ,  Risk Assessment i n  t h e  
Federa l  Government. The r e p o r t  made a c r i t i c a l  d i s t i n c t i o n  
between r i s k  assessment and r i s k  management, i n s i s t i n g  t h a t  t h e  
two a c t i v i t i e s  should be  i n s u l a t e d  from each o t h e r  i n  agency 
decision-making. S c i e n t i s t s  a s s e s s  a r i s k  t o  f i n d  what t h e  
problems a r e  - -  u s i n g  in format ion  about l i k e l y  human exposure 
and g e n e r a t i n g ,  through p l a u s i b l e  assumptions ,  an  e s t i m a t e  o f  
human h e a l t h  r i s k .  The p roces s  o f  dec id ing  what t o  do about 
t h o s e  problems i s  r i s k  management. I d e a l l y ,  t h e  a c t i o n  decided 
upon i s  based on f a c t o r s  such a s  t h e  g o a l s  of h e a l t h  and environ- 
mental  p r o t e c t i o n ,  r e l e v a n t  l e g i s l a t i o n ,  l e g a l  precedent  and 
p r e v a i l i n g  s o c i a l ,  economic and p o l i t i c a l  va lues .  
Risk assessment  -- t h e  de te rmina t ion  of t h e  n a t u r e  and 
magnitude of e x i s t i n g  and r e d u c i b l e  r i s k s  --  i s  t h e  co rne r s tone  
of accomplishing our  mission.  Our d e c i s i o n s ,  t h e  r e s u l t  of o u r  
r i s k  management p rocess ,  flow from the  information about r i s k  
reduct ion  p o t e n t i a l  and a l l  of t h e  o t h e r  t h i n g s  which we 
must take  i n t o  account. Risk assessment i s  t h e  b a s i s  from which 
our p r i o r i t i e s ,  our  choices  a s  t o  what r i s k s  t o  a t t a c k  f i r s t ,  flow. 
I t  i s  a l s o  t h e  b a s i s  f o r  determining how s t r i c t l y  p o l l u t a n t s  
should be c o n t r o l l e d  t o  provide f o r  t h e  t o t a l  we l fa re  of t h e  
people  we serve .  Yet,  we a r e  cons t ra ined  i n  our  use  of  r i s k  
management and r i s k  assessment f o r  t h e s e  purposes i n  a  number 
of  ways. 
I n  performing our  r i sk - reduc t ion  mission EPA a c t s  under 
n i n e  p r i n c i p a l ,  and va r ious  o t h e r ,  minor s t a t u t e s .  They h e l p  d e f i n e  
how r i s k  assessments can be used i n  d e c i s i o n  making. These 
s t a t u t e s  were passed by Congress a t  d i f f e r e n t  t imes ,  under 
d i f f e r e n t  c i rcumstances ,  wi th  d i f f e r e n t  mot iva t ions ,  and wi th  
d i f f e r e n t  ends i n  view. Some of those  s t a t u t e s  a r e  r i sk-ba lanc ing  
s t a t u t e s ,  such as t h e  Toxic Substances Control  Act and FIFRA -- 
t h e  act under which we r e g u l a t e  p e s t i c i d e s .  These Acts s p e c i f i c a l l y  
t e l l  u s  t o  t a k e  i n t o  account t h e  broad c o s t s  and b e n e f i t s  of 
r e g u l a t i n g  t o x i c s  and p e s t i c i d e s  and come up wi th  a  reasoned 
d e c i s i o n  t h a t  w i l l  p r o t e c t  t h e  American p u b l i c  appropr i a t e ly .  
On t h e i r  f a c e ,  however, o t h e r  s t a t u t e s  g ive  us l i t t l e  
oppor tuni ty  f o r  r i sk-ba lanc ing  i n  t h e  dec i s ions  we make, and 
r e l a t i v e l y  l e s s  f l e x i b i l i t y  i n  making reasoned judgments based on 
r i s k  assessments.  For example, t h e  Clean A i r  A c t  t e l l s  us t o  set 
s tandards  f o r  emission of  hazardous a i r  p o l l u t a n t s  t o  provide 
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... an ample margin o f  s a f e t y  t o  p r o t e c t  t h e  p u b l i c  h e a l t h  ... I t  
Consider t h e  imp l i ca t ions .  There a r e  emiss ions  of  p roduc ts  t h a t  
have been judged t o  be ca rc inogen ic  and t h e  s c i e n c e  says  t h a t  we 
must conclude t h e r e  a r e  no th re sho lds .  Thus, on i t s  f a c e ,  t h e  
s t a t u t e  sugges t s  ze ro  emiss ions  be allowed f o r  t h e s e  subs t ances .  
I b e l i e v e  t h a t  as p u b l i c  s e r v a n t s  we need c o n s t r a i n t s .  The 
l a w  should n o t  s imply say  "do good." But ,  we a l s o  need f l e x i b i l i t y  
i f  we a r e  t o  u s e  EPAts and s o c i e t y ' s  l i m i t e d  r e sou rces  f o r  
maximum environmental  r e s u l t s .  The law recognizes  t h a t  need f o r  
f l e x i b i l i t y  when it g i v e s  us  t h e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  t o  admin i s t e r  t h e  
l a w s  -- t o  dec ide  how they  a r e  t o  be app l i ed  and implemented. 
For example, under t h e  Clean A i r  A c t  as noted above, our  cho ice  
i s  e i t h e r  t o  i n t e r p r e t  t h e  l a w  as n o t  say ing  zero  emiss ions ,  o r  
e l s e  t o  deny u s e  of  c e r t a i n  p roduc t s ,  some of  which a r e  e f f e c t i v e l y  
e s s e n t i a l  t o  a modem economy, because zero  emiss ions  i n  t h e i r  
ou tpu t  is  impossible .  We conclude t h a t  t h e  l a t t e r  is  n o t  in tended.  
Congress a l s o  i m p l i c i t l y  recognizes  t h e  need f o r  f l e x i b i l i t y  when 
i t  e s t a b l i s h e s  our  budget :  it i s  impossible  f o r  us  t o  do every th ing  
wi th  a l i m i t e d  sum of  money. So, one o f  ou r  major t a s k s  under  
t h e s e  laws i s  t o  s e t  some p r i o r i t i e s  and determine which t h i n g s  
we ' r e  going t o  do f i r s t .  
I m p l i c i t l y  t h e r e  i s  f l e x i b i l i t y .  But t h e r e  is a l s o  a mood 
i n  t h e  Congress t o  r e s t r i c t  t h a t  f l e x i b i l i t y ,  sometimes w i t h  
d e l e t e r i o u s  consequences t o  h e a l t h  and t h e  environment. Here i s  
one example. In  our  s t a t u t e s ,  we f a c e  we l l  ove r  400 s p e c i f i c  
s t a t u t o r y  dead l ines ,  w r i t t e n  i n t o  separa te  s t a t u t e s  by s e p a r a t e  
committees, a t  d i f f e r e n t  t imes,  which precluded j o i n t  cons idera t ion  
of t h e  e f f e c t s  of t h e  t o t a l  s e t  of deadl ines  on t h e  Agency's 
workload. Everything is important ,  but  i n  t h e  n a t u r e  of th ings ,  
Congress cannot meaningfully decide which th ings  a r e  more important,  
The consequence i s  t h a t  we a r e  t o l d  t o  do everything,  - now, We 
c a n ' t  meet a l a r g e  propor t ion  of these  d i r e c t i v e s  on time. The 
problem i s  n o t  t h a t  we a r e  i n a c t i v e  o r  not  t ry ing .  In some cases  
it i s n ' t  a ma t t e r  of resources e i t h e r ;  i n  some s i t u a t i o n s  it 
simply takes  more time than i s  a v a i l a b l e  t o  do t h e  sc ience ,  w r i t e  
t h e  r e g u l a t i o n s ,  and f u l f i l l  t h e  requirements of t h e  Administrat ive 
Procedures Act (and of good government) i n  g e t t i n g  comments and 
information from knowledgeable and .a f fec ted  p a r t i e s .  A s  a r e s u l t ,  
we f ind  ourse lves  f r equen t ly  i n  v i o l a t i o n  of these  s t a t u t o r y  
deadl ines .  
What does t h i s  mean i n  terms of our mission? One th ing  it 
means i s  t h a t  we a r e  mostly working on someone e l s e ' s  agenda, 
s i n c e  every time one of these  deadl ines  i s  missed we a r e  t e c h n i c a l l y  
v i o l a t i n g  t h e  s t a t u t e .  Anybody who wants t o  sue us  can,  and any 
judge can f i n d  f o r  t h a t  p l a i n t i f f  and s e t  us  on a court-ordered 
schedule,  enforceable  with contempt sanct ions .  So, a t  any given 
t ime,  we f i n d  ourse lves  d i r e c t i n g  our resources t o  t h e  most 
Draconian court-ordered deadl ine  t h a t  happens t o  come next .  
That i s  a l l  r i g h t  i f  meeting t h e  next  court-ordered deadl ine  
happens t o  make a major con t r ibu t ion  t o  reducing r i s k s .  Sometimes 
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t h a t  i s  t h e  case .  But o f t e n  it i s  n o t ,  f o r  an unde r s t andab le  
reason.  The s u i t s  a r e  brought by people  a c t i n g  wi th  a s p e c i f i c  
environmental  media agenda, which does n o t  t a k e  i n t o  account  t h e  
a l t e r n a t i v e  r i s k s  t h a t  we could be reducing i f  we were a c t i n g  on 
some o t h e r  i s s u e  r a t h e r  than t h a t  one. Thus a s k e i n  of  imposs ib le  
d e a d l i n e s  s e t s  us up f o r  f a i l u r e  and l o s s  of c r e d i b i l i t y ,  and 
causes  us  t o  be  u n t r u e  t o  our  u l t i m a t e  miss ion  t o  p r o t e c t  t h e  
American people  t o  t h e  maximum e x t e n t  we can. 
There i s  ano the r  c o n s t r a i n t  on' our  u s e  of r i s k  assessment  t o  
inform our  r i s k  r e d u c t i o n  miss ion  -- t h e  p u b l i c  -- which a l s o ,  
aga in  p r o p e r l y ,  h e l p s  t o  s e t  our  agenda. When t h e  p u b l i c  w o r r i e s ,  
it i s  our  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  t o  worry. This i s  c l e a r l y  t r u e  because 
i n  a democrat ic  s o c i e t y  we a r e  t h e  c r e a t u r e s  o f  t h e  people.  In a 
deeper  s e n s e ,  t o o ,  removing a n x i e t y  i s  a l s o  a  p u b l i c  h e a l t h  good. 
We must be  mindful  of t h e  need t o  address  t h e  s p e c i f i c  f e a r s  
people  have about t h e  food they  e a t ,  t h e  wate r  t hey  d r i n k  o r  t h e  
a i r  t hey  b rea the .  We would n o t  succeed i n  ou r  b roader  p u b l i c  
h e a l t h  miss ion  i f  we simply used r i s k  assessments  t o  rank r i s k s  
and then  i n  same mechan i s t i c ,  c a l c u l a t i n g  way sought  t o  maximize 
changes i n  t h e  m o r t a l i t y  and morb id i ty  t a b l e s  f o r  t h e  American 
people.  
I n s t e a d ,  we must welcome and f a c i l i t a t e  t h e  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  of 
t h e  p u b l i c  i n  ou r  d e c i s i o n  p r o c e s s e s ,  n o t  on ly  i n  choosing ou r  
p r i o r i t i e s  b u t  a l s o  i n  determining t h e  n a t u r e  and s t r i c t n e s s  of  
t h e  c o n t r o l s  we pu t  i n  p lace .  In  c o n t r a s t  t o  t h e  r i s k  assessments ,  
r i s k  management dec i s ions  a r e  value-laden choices about which 
everyone has t h e  r i g h t  t o  an opinion. This means br inging  people 
i n t o  t h e  process  -- p o l i t i c s ,  with t h e  small  "p ." 
In order  t o  f a c i l i t a t e  p a r t i c i p a t i o n ,  we t r y  t o  l e t  people 
know -- i n  q u a n t i t a t i v e  terms t o  t h e  ex ten t  t h a t  we can ,  i n  non- 
q u a n t i t a t i v e  terms when t h a t ' s  impossible -- what t h e  s c i e n t i f i c  
bases  of our dec i s ions  are .  We a l s o  seek t o  expose t h e  impl ica t ions  
of t h e s e  dec i s ions  i n  terms of economic, s o c i a l  and o t h e r  impacts. 
In  doing s o ,  we open t h e  decision-making process  so t h a t  people 
can s e e  both t h e  va lues  and t h e  sc ience  t h a t  go i n t o  our dec is ions .  
Then they  can judge -- and in f luence  -- those  d e c i s i o n s ,  and 
poss ib ly  conclude t h a t  t h e i r  s t a t u t o r y  p red ica tes  should be 
changed. 
Another c o n s t r a i n t  on use of r i s k  assessments t o  d r i v e  
dec i s ions  i s  t h a t  t h e  s c i e n t i f i c  b a s i s  f o r  es t imat ing  r i s k s  i s  
incomplete and uncer ta in .  The hazard of some chemicals i s  poorly 
def ined ,  and t h e  dose-response r e l a t i o n s h i p  f o r  most substances 
i s  s u b j e c t  t o  s u b s t a n t i a l  unce r t a in ty  because of t h e  necessary 
ex t rapo la t ion  from high t o  low doses and from animals t o  man. 
Perhaps even more s u b j e c t  t o  e r r o r  i s  t h e  exposure assessments 
t h a t  t r a c e  emissions through t h e  rou tes  by which they reach man 
and t h e  environment. Research i s  cont inuously improving t h e  
q u a l i t y  of t h e  e s t ima tes ,  bu t  unce r t a in ty  w . i l l  always be present .  
This  does no t  mean t h a t  r i s k  assessments can no t  provide t h e  
b a s i c  in format ion  on which d e c i s i o n s  can b e  made; comparat ive  
e s t i m a t e s  of  r i s k ,  based on c o n s i s t e n t  a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  r i s k  
assessment p r i n c i p l e s ,  a r e  p a r t i c u l a r l y  h e l p f u l .  It does mean, 
however, t h a t  r i s k  assessments  p rov ide  t h e  anchor f o r  d e c i s i o n s ,  
n o t  a s e t  of  numbers t h a t  w i l l  a u t o m a t i c a l l y  s p i t  o u t  a  dec i s ion .  
Judgment i s  always necessary .  
An example of t h i s  can b e  found i n  our  r e c e n t  d e c i s i o n  
r ega rd ing  e t h y l e n e  dibromide o r  EDB. For some t ime we had been 
examining t h e  p o t e n t i a l  h e a l t h  e f f e c t s  from fumigants and o t h e r  
p e s t i c i d e s ,  i nc lud ing  EDB, used t o  p r o t e c t  food s u p p l i e s  from 
d e s t r u c t i o n  i n  t h e  f i e l d  and d e t e r i o r a t i o n  i n  s to rage .  In t h e  
f a l l  o f  1983 EPA suspended t h e  u s e  of  EDB a s  a s o i l  fumigant 
because groundwater moni tor ing  d a t a  showed contaminat ion.  Based 
on what was known t h e n ,  we a l s o  p u t  i n  motion a process  t o  cance l  
t h e  g r a i n  and f r u i t  fumigant u ses  of  EDB t h a t  most l i k e l y  would 
have r e s u l t e d  i n  e l i m i n a t i o n  of  i t s  u s e  i n  1986. Despi te  i t s  
h e a l t h  r i s k s ,  we d i d  n o t  suspend i t s  g r a i n  and f r u i t  fumigant u se  
immediately. One f a c t o r  t h a t  went i n t o  t h i s  d e c i s i o n  w a s  t h e  
p o s s i b l e  h e a l t h  e f f e c t s  o f  s u b s t i t u t e s  about which r e l a t i v e l y  
l i t t l e  w a s  known, though s t u d i e s  were underway. 
Subsequent ly ,  more in format ion  about EDB exposures came t o  
l i g h t .  S p e c i f i c a l l y ,  food r e s i d u e s  of  EDB were found which, 
wh i l e  s u b s t a n t i a l l y  s m a l l e r  than  we had es t imated  i n  ou r  
conse rva t ive  exposure assessment ,  were a l s o  more widely  found i n  
g r a i n  and f r u i t  p roduc ts  t han  expected. 
Of u l t i m a t e l y  g r e a t e r  s i g n i f i c a n c e ,  EDB became a mat ter  of 
in tense  pub l i c  anx ie ty ,  leading  t o  demands f o r  Federal  a c t i o n  and 
t o  l o c a l  and s t a t e  i n i t i a t i v e s .  S t a t e  a f t e r  s t a t e  began adopting 
"nondetect" l e v e l s ,  o r  one p a r t  per  b i l l i o n  l e v e l s ,  f o r  food 
suppl ies .  Not only did t h e  prospect  of d i f f e r e n t  s tandards  i n  
d i f f e r e n t  a r e a s  c r e a t e  t h e  p o t e n t i a l  f o r  s e r i o u s  d i s r u p t i o n  of 
food d i s t r i b u t i o n ,  bu t  s tandards  a t  t h e s e  l e v e l s  c rea ted  t h e  
p o t e n t i a l  f o r  d e s t r u c t i o n  o r  d ive r s ion  of a s  much a s  a  quar t e r  of 
our raw and in termedia te  g r a i n  products -- without  anything near  
commensurate b e n e f i t s  i n  terms of pub l i c  h e a l t h  gains .  Under 
those  circumstances w e  would have been d e r e l i c t  i f  we had s a i d ,  
"we do not  know enough t o  a c t ,  because we have i n s u f f i c i e n t  
information t o  know whether,  considering s u b s t i t u t e s  and food 
l o s s ,  removing EDB w i l l  do more harm than good." Although t h e r e  
were g r e a t  u n c e r t a i n t i e s  about t h e  r i s k  of t h e  leading  s u b s t i t u t e ,  
methyl bromide, informed opinion held t h a t  it was probably no t  
more potent  than EDB and would almost c e r t a i n l y  leave  fewer 
res idues .  A s  a p u b l i c  h e a l t h  ( i n  t h e  broadest  sense) agency, w e  
were forced t o  a c t .  
What w e  did  was t o  immediately suspend almost a l l  uses  of 
EDB so  t h a t  it would u l t i m a t e l y  be removed from t h e  food chain. 
Fur the r ,  we es tab l i shed  " l e v e l s  of concern" f o r  EDB such t h a t  
people could know what food was "acceptable" and what should be 
destroyed. And, working with s i s t e r  Federal  agencies ,  t h e  s t a t e s ,  
and t h e  food indus t ry ,  we es tab l i shed  an inspect ion  system t o  
g e t  contaminated food o f f  t h e  market. The r e s u l t  was a  diminution 
of pub l i c  concern, a  reduct ion  of one r i s k  from our food supply,  
and an o rde r ly  response t h a t  prevented t h e  l o s s e s  t o  we l fa re  
(from diminished d i e t ,  p r i c e  increases  and income l o s s )  t h a t  
would have r e s u l t e d  had massive amounts of food been destroyed. 
Now i f  we a r e  going t o  be basing dec i s ions ,  t o  a t  l e a s t  some 
e x t e n t ,  on r i s k  c a l c u l a t i o n s ,  it becomes e s s e n t i a l  t o  reach an 
i n t e r n a l  consensus on what t h e  r i s k s  posed by p a r t i c u l a r  chemicals 
a c t u a l l y  a re .  A s  I noted ,  t h i s  i s  hard t o  do wi th in  t h e  normal 
r u l e s  of science.  But i f  we c a n ' t  achieve c e r t a i n t y  i n  s c i e n t i f i c  
f i n d i n g s ,  we can achieve consis tency i n  t h e  way sc ience  is  used. 
I f  we cannot have p e r f e c t  c e r t i t u d e ,  we can a t  l e a s t  apply sc ience  
i n  t h e  same fashion  i n  d i f f e r e n t  r i s k  assessments. This n o t  only 
b u i l d s  a  s e t  of precedents t o  guide f u t u r e  agency a c t i v i t i e s ,  but  
a l s o  serves  t o  a s su re  t h e  pub l i c  t h a t  r i s k  assessment i s  no t  
being warped by pol icy  cons idera t ions  t h a t  properly belong i n  the  
realm of r i s k  management. To these  ends,  we a r e  formulat ing 
o f f i c i a l  EPA gu ide l ines  f o r  a s sess ing  r i s k s  t o  human h e a l t h  i n  
f i v e  major a reas  of r i s k  assessment: cancer ,  reproduct ive  r i s k ,  
mutagenici ty ,  complex chemical mixtures ,  and exposure assessment. 
The Guidelines a r e  formal ,  pub l i c  r u l e s  t h a t  guide t h e  
necessary i s s u e s  and assumptions t o  be examined i n  each case ,  
reducing t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  of-  manipulating f indings .  E x p l i c i t ,  
open c o d i f i c a t i o n  d i s c l o s e s  t o  t h e  s c i e n t i f i c  community and the  
p u b l i c ,  too ,  what i s  going on. It a l s o  o f f e r s  the  hopeful -- 
i f  d i s t a n t  p o s s i b i l i t y  -- t h a t  one day a l l  t h e  government's 
p r o t e c t i v e  agencies might speak with one c o n s i s t e n t  voice  when 
they address  r i s k s ,  so  t h a t  t h e  pub l i c  can a t  l e a s t  make a sound 
comparison of t h e  management dec is ions  of var ious  agencies.  It 
may no t  be too  much t o  hope t h a t ,  i n  t h e  f u t u r e ,  t h e s e  measures 
t o  achieve consis tency i n  using sc ience  may a l s o  he lp  our coun t r i e s  
t o  approach i n t e r n a t i o n a l  consis tency i n  a s sess ing  t h e  environmental 
problems t h a t  s p i l l  across  our boundaries. The u n i t y  of n a t u r e ,  
demonstrated once again by i t s  contempt f o r  na t ional i sms,  may 
urge  us  toward t r e a t i n g  our environmental interdependence as  
c a r e f u l l y  a s  we t r e a t  our economic interdependence. 
EPA has a l s o  s e t  up a Forum on Risk Assessment t h a t  includes 
our  most s e n i o r  s c i e n t i s t s .  Meeting r e g u l a r l y  t o  d i scuss  
assessments i n  progress ,  t h e  Forum i d e n t i f i e s  a reas  where we need 
new guidance as wel l  a s  d iscuss ing  new developments i n  toxicology 
and o t h e r  d i s c i p l i n e s .  
Another e s s e n t i a l  p a r t  of t h e  r i s k  management approach 
i s  br inging  i n  t h e  publ ic .  I ' v e  suggested how c l e a r  gu ide l ines  
f o r  how we make assessments ,  c l e a r l y  d i sc losed ,  i s  one p a r t  of 
t h i s .  Burying es t imates  wi th in  some procedural framework o r  
a b s t r a c t  scor ing  system is  no so lu t ion .  Fur ther ,  e f f e c t i v e  
r i s k  management depends i n  t h e  end on many hundreds, i f  not  
thousands, of people co-operating; e a r l y  knowledge encourages 
psychic investment i n  f ind ing  s o l u t i o n s  t h a t  work. Also, i n  t h e  
atmosphere of m i s t r u s t  t h a t  has charac ter ized  r e l a t i o n s  between 
t h e  U.S. publ ic  and i t s  government s i n c e  Vietnam and Watergate, 
it i s  v i t a l  t o  be forthcoming wi th  - a l l  t h e  information involved 
i n  decis ions.  Without advance information, t h e  publ ic  a l s o  f a i l s  
t o  understand genuine r i s k s ;  then ,  a s  Senator Moynihan of New 
York has w r i t t e n ,  "When th ings  don' t work out  a s  promised it i s  
a l l  too easy t o  suspect  t h a t  someone intended they should not." 
So we a t  EPA a r e  more a c t i v e  i n  publ ic  educat ion and 
information than we used t o  be. Bringing po l i cy  t o  t h e  people 
a l s o  involves us i n  s t r e s s i n g  t h e  l o c a l  aspect  of problems -- 
indeed, t h i s  i s  s c i e n t i f i c a l l y  sound i n  view of t h e  e c c e n t r i c  
d i s t r i b u t i o n  of many p o l l u t a n t s ,  and t h e  mul t ip le  r i s k s  t o  which 
some communities, and even s p e c i a l  sec t ions  wi th in  those  communities, 
a r e  exposed. 
Local emphasis i s  an i n e v i t a b l e  p a r t  of our program of 
r i s k  assessment and r i s k  management f o r  o t h e r  very good reasons.  
Everyone i s  i n  favor  of  s a f e  d i s p o s a l ,  but n o t  i n  t h e i r  backyards, 
so  many debates  about appropr ia t e  r i s k  management end up i n  t h e  
high school auditorium. A system of cooperat ive s t a t e - l o c a l -  
f e d e r a l  a c t i o n  based on l o c a l  r i s k  management dec is ions  under t h e  
umbrella of c o n s i s t e n t  f e d e r a l  g u i d e l i n e s ,  may c h a r a c t e r i z e  t h e  
most e f f e c t i v e  c o n t r o l  programs. Many l o c a l  communities a c t u a l l y  
c o n t r i b u t e  invent ive  answers and help f ind  s o l u t i o n s  t h a t  people 
can l i v e  wi th ,  too. 
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A t y p i c a l  example of t h e  l o c a l i z a t i o n  of r i s k  i s  where an 
i n d u s t r i a l  p l a n t  imposes some l o c a l  r i s k s  d e s p i t e  t h e  i n s t a l l a t i o n  
of advanced p o l l u t i o n  cont ro ls .  Local economic i n t e r e s t s  then 
confront  l o c a l  h e a l t h  i n t e r e s t s  i n  reducing r i s k .  A paradigm 
of such a case w a s  t h e  s i t u a t i o n  i n  Tacoma, Washington, where 
u n t i l  r e c e n t l y  a copper smel ter  processed a r sen ic - r i ch  o r e  
and re leased  q u a n t i t i e s  of t h i s  suspected carcinogen t o  t h e  ambient 
a i r .  Even a f t e r  t h e  p l a n t  w a s  heavi ly  c o n t r o l l e d ,  i t  appeared 
impossible t o  e l imina te  t h e  carcinogenic r i s k  from t h i s  r e l e a s e ,  
t h a t  i s ,  e l iminat ing  t h e  r i s k  meant e l iminat ing  t h e  p lant .  EPA's 
Administrator bel ieved EPA had a r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  t o  expla in  t o  
t h e  people-who would be most d i r e c t l y  a f f e c t e d  by t h e  dec is ion  
what we knew about t h e  risks from t h e  smelter .  True pub l i c  
involvement meant fo rc ing  t h e  publ ic  t o  confront  t h e  t rade-offs  
involved i n  t h i s  r i s k  management decis ion.  When we began t o  
examine t h e  Tacoma s i t u a t i o n  i n  d e t a i l ,  we discovered t h a t  most 
of t h e  l o c a l  people were w i l l i n g  t o  view t h e  problem i n  terms of 
a r i s k  management choice ,  although t h e i r  p o s i t i o n s  on t h e  a r s e n i c  
r i s k  depended, understandably,  on where they l i v e d  i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  
t h e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  p a t t e r n  of t h e  emissions,  and on whether they 
had a personal  economic s t a k e  i n  t h e  p l a n t  remaining open. As 
t h e  publ ic  d iscuss ions  continued and we re f ined  our d a t a  on both 
t h e  r i s k  and t h e  means of reducing it t h e  c i t i z e n s  of Tacoma 
began t o  came up with h e l p f u l  ideas  about how we could minimize 
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t h e  a c u t a l  impact of  t h e  a r s e n i c  emiss ions  and keep t h e  
s m e l t e r  open. 
Although t h e  p l a n t ' s  owners e v e n t u a l l y  decided t o  c l o s e  it 
( f o r  reasons  n o t  d i r e c t l y  connected wi th  t h e  p o l l u t i o n  i s s u e )  we 
l ea rned  something v a l u a b l e  from t h e  exper ience.  Desp i te  i n i t i a l  
f e a r s ,  it i s  p o s s i b l e  f o r  people  s u b j e c t  t o  t o x i c  r i s k  t o  t h i n k  
r a t i o n a l l y  about  it. It i s  p o s s i b l e  f o r  them t o  con f ron t  t h e  
hard t r u t h  t h a t  s o l u t i o n s  t o  such problems n e c e s s a r i l y  i nvo lve  
an uneven d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  r i s k s  and b e n e f i t s .  This  r a t i o n a l  
t h i n k i n g  involves  plunging i n t o  t h e  u n c e r t a i n t i e s  involved i n  t h e  
ana lyzes  we use  t o  d e f i n e  t h e  i s s u e s .  How s u r e  a r e  we about 
exposure? How s u r e  a r e  we about  t h e  e f f e c t  of  t h e  subs tance?  
How c e r t a i n  a r e  t h e  economic impacts? It r e q u i r e s  a kind of  
democrat ic  c i t i z e n s h i p  t h a t  is  w i l l i n g  t o  d i g  deeper  than  t h e  
g l i b  head l ines  and t h e  u s u a l  i n v i t a t i o n s  t o  panic.  It a l s o  
r e q u i r e s  much more from t h e  r e g u l a t o r y  agency provid ing  t h e  f a c t s :  
a w i l l i n g n e s s  t o  e x p l a i n ,  an a b i l i t y  t o  communicate, and,  most of 
a l l ,  i t  r e q u i r e s  t h e  agency t o  admit t h e  u n c e r t a i n t i e s  bur ied  i n  
i t s  c a l c u l a t i o n s .  Only then  can t h e  a p p r o p r i a t e  ba lanc ing  
d e c i s i o n s  t a k e  p lace .  Our environmental  l a w s  recognize  t h a t  
t h e r e  i s  a p e r p e t u a l  t e n s i o n  between t h e  need f o r  nat ionwide 
un i fo rmi ty  and t h e  n e c e s s i t y  f o r  l o c a l  v a r i a t i o n s ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  
i n  a n a t i o n  as l a r g e  and as d i v e r s e  a t  t h e  United S t a t e s .  Risk 
management i s  r e a l l y  a new way of  working w i t h i n  t h i s  t r a d i t i o n .  
One way i n  which we a t  EPA "get  down t o  cases" a t  t h e  l o c a l  
l e v e l  i s  through a success fu l  workshop we have taken on t h e  road 
ac ross  t h e  United S ta tes .  In  i t ,  a r i s k  assessment game i s  
played by l e g i s l a t o r s ,  c i t i z e n s ,  members of t h e  p ress  -- a genuine,  
f a c t u a l  r i s k  a s sessment / r i sk  management s i t u a t i o n  of t h e  kind we 
f a c e  i s  resolved by group dec is ion  a t  t h e  end of t h e  day. Everyone 
cbmes away from t h e  exe rc i se  more conscious of t h e  u n c e r t a i n t y ,  
d e l i c a c y ,  and t r ade -o f f s  inherent  i n  any environmental decis ion.  
In  sum then,  we a r e  s t a r t i n g  t o  s e e  a new kind of environmental 
p r o t e c t i o n  tak ing  shape, forced on us  by t h e  ex i s t ence  of e x o t i c  
t o x i c s ,  and made p o s s i b l e  by our growing a b i l i t y  t o  handle complex 
messes of data .  In  t h i s  new s i t u a t i o n  w e  w i l l  f i r s t  cont inue t o  
stress t h e  fundamental sc i ence  t h a t  can r e f i n e  our r i s k  assessments,  
c l a r i f y i n g  r i s k s  and t h e i r  dimensions. Second, w e  w i l l  do b e t t e r  
a t  considering t h e  e f f e c t s  of our a c t i o n s  across  t h e  environmental 
media, so we don ' t  j u s t  s h u t t l e  p o l l u t a n t s  around t h e  environment, 
perhaps reducing one r i s k  while  perverse ly  imposing another  r i s k  
elsewhere. 
Third,  ins tead  of ga l loping  a f t e r  any and a l l  r i s k s ,  w e ' l l  
a t tempt  t o  p ick  our t a r g e t s ,  aiming t o  c u t  t h e  l a r g e s t  r i s k s  
f i r s t .  P r a c t i c a l l y ,  t h i s  w i l l  mean l e s s  focus on extremely 
t r i v i a l  r i s k s ,  o f t e n  from i n d u s t r i a l  po in t  sources ,  and g r e a t e r  
a t t e n t i o n  t o  a rea  sources of a i r  and water p o l l u t i o n ,  as w e l l  as 
t o  regions where m u l t i p l e  r i s k s  aggravate t h e  impacts of tox ics .  
Four th ,  ou r  a t t e n t i o n  w i l l  broaden. Moving beyond a s s e s s i n g  
cance r  r i s k s ,  which have dominated our  r e c e n t  a c t i o n s ,  we ' r e  
going t o  a t t a c k  r e p r o d u c t i v e ,  sys temic  and o t h e r  h e a l t h  hazards .  
F i f t h ,  main ta in ing  our  concern wi th  e c o l o g i c a l  damage t o  t h e  
n a t u r a l  systems t h a t  s u s t a i n  o u r  l i v e s  and ou r  l andscape ,  we need 
more c l e a r l y  t o  q u a n t i f y  and p l a c e  va lues  upon t h e  e c o l o g i c a l  
impacts t h a t  we can show. How much p o l l u t i o n  i n s u l t  causes  how 
much e c o l o g i c a l  damage? Because we a r e  more than  a p u b l i c  h e a l t h  
agency,  w e ' l l  con t inue  t o  make t h e  n a t u r a l  environment a major 
p a r t  of our  miss ion.  
In i t s  broades t  s e n s e ,  environmental  p r o t e c t i o n  means looking 
a t  - a l l  e f f e c t s  of p o l l u t i o n  and t o x i c s  from t h e  p e r s p e c t i v e  o f  
ba l anc ing  some d e f i n a b l e  improvement a g a i n s t  ou r  always f i n i t e  
r e s o u r c e s  -- whether i n  d o l l a r  c o s t s  o r  p u b l i c  p o l i c y  a t t e n t i o n .  
The e a r l y  EPA fought  a convent iona l  w a r  where heavy equipment 
r o l l e d  o u t  and vanquished ve ry  v i s i b l e ,  entrenched foes ,  Now we 
f a c e ,  i n  a m i l i t a r y  analogy t h a t ' s  hard t o  avoid ,  a s i t u a t i o n  more 
n e a r l y  resembling g u e r r i l l a  war fa re ,  w i t h  many of t h e  t a c t i c a l  
and psychologica l  problems t h a t  make such f i g h t i n g  a nightmare. 
Targe ts  a r e  e l u s i v e ,  and no t r a d i t i o n a l  weapon seems t o  work ve ry  
wel l .  Commanding g e n e r a l s  and t h e  p u b l i c  o f t e n  b i t t e r l y  d i s a g r e e  
about how t o  proceed. The popula t ion  i s  n o t  on ly  t e r r i f i e d  about  
i t s  own s a f e t y  -- i t ' s  deeply d iv ided  about  a p p r o p r i a t e  means and 
ends. 
We hope t h a t  wise ly  deploying r i s k  assessment and r i s k  
management w i l l  a t  l e a s t  b r ingus  t o  t h e  n e g o t i a t i n g  t a b l e  t o  
minimize t h e  harm done by t h i s  long-term c o n f l i c t .  J u s t  as a l l  
of  us  hope f o r  an overarching peace agreement t h a t  might l i m i t  
t h e  spread of  r e a l  m i l i t a r y  c o n f l i c t s  i n  t h e  yea r s  ahead,  so  w e  
may be permit ted t o  hope f o r  n o t  only n a t i o n a l ,  b u t  i n t e r n a t i o n a l ,  
p rogress  i n  f i n d i n g  t h e  most e f f e c t i v e  ways t o  a s s e s s  and manage 
t h e  environmental r i s k s  t h a t  t h r e a t e n  a l l  our coun t r i e s .  
Some yea r s  ago, when p o l l u t i o n  c o n t r o l  seemed an overwhelming 
t a s k ,  Rene Dubos s a i d  t h a t  t h e  way t o  cope wi th  such massive 
problems w a s  t o  " t h i n k  g l o b a l l y  and act l o c a l l y  ." To me, it 
s t i l l  seems e x c e l l e n t  advice  about managing t echno log ica l  r i s k s  
i n  democratic s o c i e t i e s .  
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I n t r o d u c t i o n  
The Federal  Environmental  Assessment and Review Process (EARP) i n  Canada 
i s  now over 12 yea rs  old.  I n  t h e  e a r l y  days o f  i t s  implementat ion t h e  
concept and a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  r i s k  were n o t  e x p l i c i t l y  inc luded  i n  env i ronmenta l  
impact assessment. Since about 1978, however, r i s k  ana l ys i s  has been 
i nc l uded  i n  EIA guide1 i nes f o r  c e r t a i n  c lasses o f  p ro j ec t s ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  
f r o n t i e r  o i l  and gas exp lo ra t i on ,  LNG developments and nuc lear  power p l an t s .  
The Federal Envi  ronmental Assessment Review O f f i c e  (FEAR0 ), t h e  agency 
adm in i s te r i ng  EARP, now has a number o f  years exper ience w i t h  r i s k  assessment 
and has i d e n t i f i e d  some main i ssues  and problems i n  i t s  a p p l i c a t i o n  i n  EIA. 
T h i s  exper ience i s  p a r t i c u l a r l y  r e l e v a n t  t o  t he  o b j e c t i v e s  o f  t h i s  workshop 
s ince  i t  r e f l e c t s  t h e  pe rspec t i ve  o f  an agency i n  " t he  f r o n t  l i n e s "  o f  
environmental  assessment and management. 
Al though EARP a l s o  i nc l udes  screening o f  sma l le r  p r o j e c t s  f o r  p o t e n t i a l  
environmental  e f f e c t s ,  t h i s  p resen ta t i on  focusses on t h e  use o f  r i s k  i n  
environmental  assessments o f  major p r o j e c t s  and t h e  d i f f i c u l t i e s  encountered 
by t h e  independent panels  e s t a b l i s h e d  - t o  conduct p u b l i c  reviews o f  such 
undertakings. 
The Qualitative Aspects of Risk 
In  most of the Environmental Impact Statements (EIS)  reviewed under EARP 
which have included a risk analysis, there has been confusion over the exact 
nature of the event at  issue, 
For example, in the EIS for the offshore oil and gas development in the 
Beaufort Sea in northern Canada (Dome Petroleum L t t d , ,  - e t  c,, 1982), the 
"event," at  various times during the hearings, was interpreted t o  be: 
a)  a blowout 
b )  a "major" blowout 
c )  a blowout involving oi 1 
d )  a blowout releasing more than 5,000 barrels of oil 
e )  a release of more than 5,000 barrels of oil near the end of the open- 
water drilling season, 
Of course, there was a wide range in probabilities associated with each 
of these interpretations. There was so much professional disagreement t h a t  
eventually the review panel had t o  ask the experts with government and the 
proponent t o  join forces and produce a report sumnarizeing the basic risk 
i ssues i nvol ved i ncl udi ng  areas of agreement. and di sagreement, 
The problem may be further confounded when there i s  no agreement on the 
resources a t  risk, For example, guide1 ines may call for a risk analysis on 
the effects of an oil blowout on marine organisms, I f  i t  subsequently 
becomes apparent, as i t  did in the Beaufort Sea case, that marine mammal s are 
the most vulnerable, the analysis may be deficient due to a lack of 
consideration of the avoidance behavior of the species involved and the time 
during which they frequent the development area, 
This question of more tightly defining risk poses two major problems in 
an EIA, First,  i t  i s  diff icult  to determine the events which have the 
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g r e a t e s t  p o t e n t i a l  f o r  environmental  damage u n t i l  t h e  f u l l  range o f  
a c t i v i t i e s  has been reviewed, i.e., t h e  EIS has been completed. Second, t h e  
more p r e c i s e l y  t h e  event o f  concern i s  def ined,  t he  l ess  l i k e l i h o o d  o f  da ta  
f rom prev ious  exper ience be ing  ava i  l a b l e  f o r  ana lys is .  
A l l  o f  t h i s  poses a se r i ous  problem f o r  t he  review panel s i n c e  
d e f i n i t i o n s  may change d u r i n g  t h e  course o f  t h e  hear ings l ead ing  t o  con fus ion  
and argument among a l l  p a r t i e s  invo lved.  It might  be wor thwh i le  t o  a t tempt  
t o  ge t  some agreement on t h e  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  t h e  ' r i s k y "  events be fo re  t h e  EIS 
i s  prepared by b r i n g i n g  expe r t s  f rom bo th  s ides t oge the r  i n  a  t e c h n i c a l  
d iscuss ion.  Th i s  approach i s  be ing  t r i e d  by FEAR0 f o r  s c i e n t i f i c  t o p i c s  i n  
general  and may have a p p l i c a t i o n  f o r  r i s k  ana l ys i s  as we1 1. 
The Q u a n t i t a t i v e  Aspects o f  R isk  
A p a r t i c u l a r  problem f a c i n g  EARP panels dea l i ng  w i t h  developments i n  
no r t he rn  f r o n t i e r  areas i s  t h e  l a c k  of  r e l evan t  data f o r  ana lys is .  Again, 
u s i n g  o f f s h o r e  o i l  and gas e x p l o r a t i o n  as t h e  example, most o f  t h e  da ta  f rom 
world-wide exper ience has t o  be mod i f i ed  t o  account f o r  t h e  extreme 
c o n d i t i o n s  i n  t h e  a r c t i c .  These c o n d i t i o n s  may d r a s t i c a l l y  a l t e r  t h e  r e s u l t s  
o f  t h e  ana l ys i s  based on t h e  t h r e e  major c o n t r i b u t o r s  t o  r i s k  - envi ronmenta l  
cond i t i ons ,  human e r r o r  and equipment f a i  1  ure. 
The l ack  o f  data o f t e n  r e s u l t s  i n  a  p ro fess iona l  disagreement over  
p r o b a b i l i t i e s  - whether t h e  t r u e  chance i s  one i n  one m i l l i o n  o r  one i n  two 
m i l  l i o n .  The i r o n y  i s  t h a t  a  rev iew o f  EARP panel r e p o r t s  suggests t h a t  
t h e i r  adv ice t o  decision-makers i s  more i n f l uenced  by t h e i r  pe rcep t i on  o f  
t h e  consequences o f  t h e  event r a t h e r  than t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  occurence. 
Therefore, beyond some l e v e l  o f  probabi 1  i t y  (which i s  d i f f i c u l t  t o  determine 
p r e c i s e l y )  t h e  arguments over probabi  1  i t y  are ma in ly  academic. T h i s  suggests 
t he  need f o r  t h e  development o f  some general guidel ines which could guide 
reviewers on the  "acceptabi 1  i t y "  o f  probabi 1  i t y  estimates fo r  various classes 
o f  events, 
Paradoxical l y ,  the  more r igorous and q u a n t i f i a b l e  approach t o  r i  sk 
assessment has resu l ted  i n  problems i n  t h e  pub l i c  arena, When the  ana lys is  
produces a  numerical r i s k  estimate, regardless o f  how small the  r i s k  t h e  
p u b l i c  focusses i t s  a t ten t i on  on the  number i t s e l f  as represent ing a  
measurable r i s k .  Under such circumstances they cannot be p lacated by 
comparing the  r i s k  f i g u r e  w i t h  o ther  r i s k s  t h a t  are taken f o r  granted i n  
d a i l y  l i v i n g .  
Some Major Problems 
There are a  number o f  more general problems .faced by those invo lved i n  
the  a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  r i s k  i n  E I A  beyond the  q u a n t i t a t i v e  and q u a l i t a t i v e  
aspects discussed above. They are sumnarized below. 
(1) Those faced w i t h  i nco rpo ra t i ng  r i s k  analys is  i n t o  E I A  and 
i n t e r p r e t i n g  and eva luat ing  the  r e s u l t s  need t o  have access t o  commonly 
accepted p ro toco ls  t o  guide t h e i r  e f f o r t s ,  These pro toco ls  need t o  be 
gener ic  enough t o  be appl icable t o  a  range o f  p ro jec ts  and s p e c i f i c  enough t o  
provide substant ive guidance, Cur ren t l y  panel members may have 1  i t t l e  
exposure t o  the t o p i c  beyond some general understanding o r  basic tex ts .  
(2 )  There i s  a  major problem i n  f i n d i n g  ways t o  ensure t h a t  t he  r i s k s  
as perceived by t h e  pub l i c  are incorporated i n t o  the  r i s k  analysis. Risk 
ana lys is  q u i c k l y  becomes a  t o p i c  f o r  discussion among experts a t  pub1 i c  
hearings w i t h  l i t t l e  o r  no i n p u t  from those who must l i v e  under the  p o t e n t i a l  
r i sk ,  This i s  p a r t i c u l a r l y  t r u e  when there  i s  lack o f  agreement on numerical 
estimates, The techn ica l  complexity o f  t he  t o p i c  poses serious chal lenges 
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f o r  p u b l i c  p a r t i c i p a t i o n ;  a  chal lenge which must be met s i nce  r i s k  i s  
becoming a major f ea tu re  o f  EIA. 
( 3 )  From t h e  experience of EARP so f a r ,  there  i s  a need t o  design r i s k  
an lays is  i n  a manner which a l l ows  panels t o  evaluate a l t e r n a t i v e  m i t i g a t i o n  
measures, i .e., t h e  costs and b e n e f i t s  o f  r i s k  reduct ion.  Th is  b a s i c a l l y  
requ i res  a comparative r i s k  ana l ys i s  i n v o l v i n g  op t ions  f o r  p r o j e c t  design and 
operat ions as opposed t o  a s i n g l e  es t imate  o f  r i s k .  
( 4 )  Much o f  the  i n fo rma t i on  a v a i l a b l e  on r i s k  i s  couched i n  conceptual 
o r  t h e o r e t i c a l  frameworks. There i s  a need t o  use ac tua l  environmental  
assessments as case s tud ies  i n  which var ious approaches t o  r i s k  assessment 
could be evaluated and f u r t h e r  modif ied. Such c o l l e c t i v e  p r a c t i c a l  
experience could p rov ide  t h e  bas is  f o r  t he  development o f  t h e  p r o t o c o l s  
mentioned above. 
Current I n i t i a t i v e s  
FEARO has taken a number o f  i n i t i a t i v e s  which w i l l  h o p e f u l l y  lead  t o  
subs tan t ive  improvements i n  t h e  a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  r i s k  ana lys is  t o  t h e  dec is ion-  
making process through environmental  impact assessment. 
I n  1984, t he  federa l  M i n i s t e r  o f  Environment, upon advice from FEARO, 
es tab l  ished the  Canadian Environmental Assessment Research Counci 1  (CEARC). 
The 12-member Counci l  was formed t o  advise on ways t o  improve t h e  s c i e n t i f i c ,  
t echn i ca l  and procedural  bases f o r  EIA i n  Canada. It advises FEARO on t h e  
expendi ture o f  a  $500,000 annual reseach budget which i s  seen p r i m a r i l y  as 
seed money t o  i n f l uence  developments i n  t h e  f i e l d .  
Risk assessment has been i d e n t i f i e d  by the  Counci l  as one of i t s  major 
areas o f  research i n t e r e s t  and i t  has supported a number of a c t i v i t i e s  
lead ing  towards t h e  development o f  a  research prospectus on t h e  t o p i c .  
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Dr. Grima w i l l  be present ing a sumary  o f  one aspect of t h i s  work l a t e r  i n  
t h i  s workshop. 
FEARO i s  c u r r e n t l y  designing a t r a i n i n g  session which w i l l  be a v a i l a b l e  
t o  EARP panel members before a p u b l i c  hear ing i s  undertaken. The o b j e c t i v e  
i s  t o  f a m i l i a r i z e  the  members w i t h  t h e  var ious aspects i nvo l ved  i n  t h e  
environmental assessment of major p r o j e c t s  and t o  acquaint them w i t h  bas ic  
approaches and a l t e r n a t i v e s  which have been developed through the  experience 
o f  previous panels. Considerat ion i s  being given t o  i n c l u d i n g  r i s k  
assessment as one of the  top i cs  i n  t he  t r a i n i n g  session. 
F i n a l l y ,  t he re  i s  a growing i n t e r e s t  i n  Canada i n  post-devleopment 
reviews o f  EIAs. A number of p r o j e c t - s p e c i f i c  reviews have a l ready been 
completed and FEARO i s  a lso l ook ing  a t  t h e  o v e r a l l  e f f ec t i veness  o f  t h e  
p u b l i c  hearing process i n  EIA. The r o l e  o f  r i s k  assessment i n  t h e  decis ion-  
making process w i l l  undoubtedly be an i n t e g r a l  p a r t  o f  such post-development 
audits.  
Concl us i  ons 
(1) Risk assessment i s  now recognized as an important component o f  EARP and 
w i l l  l i k e l y  see even greater  appl i c a t i o n  i n  f u t u r e  environmental impact 
assessments. 
(2)  I n  general, i n  low-probabi 1 i t y - h i g h  r i s k  s i t ua t i ons ,  t he  panels have 
been in f luenced more by the  p o t e n t i a l  consequence o f  t he  event than t h e  
associated probabi 1 i t y  of occurrence. 
(3)  There i s  a need fo r  t h e  r i s k  event and t h e  vulnerable resources t o  be 
more c l e a r l y  def ined a t  the  beginning o f  an EIA. 
(4)  One o f  the  major challenges fac ing  those d i r e c t l y  i nvo l ved  i n  r i s k  
assessment i s  t o  ensure t h a t  t he  analys is  r e f l e c t s  t he  r i s k s  as 
perceived by t h e  pub1 i c .  
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( 5 )  The a p p l i c a t i o n  of r i s k  ana l ys i s  i n  EIA needs t o  take more account o f  
t h e  i n t e r e s t  i n  e v a l u a t i n g  t he  cos ts  and b e n e f i t s  o f  r i s k  r e d u c t i o n  
through m i t i g a t i o n .  
( 6 )  There i s  an urgent  need f o r  a  s e t  of r i s k  assessment p r o t o c o l s  t o  
p rov ide  subs tan t i ve  d i r e c t i v e s  t o  those respons ib le  f o r  p repa r i ng  EIA 
gu ide l i nes  and rev iew ing  t h e  r e s u l t i n g  s tud ies.  
( 7 )  People g iven  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  i n t e r p r e t i n g  t h e  r e s u l t s  o f  r i s k  s tud ies  
and p r o v i d i n g  adv ice  t o  decision-makers need t o  be in formed of t h e  
s t r e n g t h  and l i m i t a t i o n s  of t h e  approach. 
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The purpose of t h i s  t a s k  f o r c e  meeting i s  t o  i d e n t i f y  
research needs f o r  r i s k  a n a l y s i s  under cond i t ions  of uncer ta in ty .  
To t h a t  end, t h i s  paper explores  t h e  p o t e n t i a l  f o r  f u l l e r  in t e -  
g r a t i o n  between r i s k  a n a l y s i s  and environmental impact assess-  
ment, a  c l o s e l y  r e l a t e d  form of appl ied  po l i cy  a n a l y s i s  which is  
al ready required by s t a t u t e  or  r e g u l a t i o n  i n  a  l a r g e  number of 
na t ions ,  subnat ional  j u r i s d i c t i o n s ,  and even t r a n s n a t i o n a l  i n s t i -  
t u t i o n s  such a s  t h e  European Economic Community (EEC) and World 
Bank. 
In  concept, environmental impact and r i s k  assessment have 
evolved a s  p a r a l l e l  and sometimes overlapping procedures f o r  
r a t i o n a l i s t  reform of policymaking. With each o the r  and with 
o ther  forms of pol icy  a n a l y s i s  (such a s  appl ied  systems a n a l y s i s ,  
and cos t -benef i t  and cos t -ef fec t iveness  a n a l y s i s ) ,  they sha re  a  
common presumption t h a t  pol icy  dec i s ions  can be improved by t h e  
a p p l i c a t i o n  of e x p l i c i t  a n a l y s i s  and documentation. Both a r e  
intended t o  provide reasoned p r e d i c t i o n s  of t h e  poss ib le  
consequences of pol icy  dec i s ions ,  and thus  t o  permit  wiser 
choices  among a l t e r n a t i v e  courses  of ac t ion .  
In  p r a c t i c e ,  however, these  two forms have been nurtured by 
d i f f e r e n t  d i s c i p l i n a r y  and p ro fess iona l  communities i n  l a r g e l y  
s e p a r a t e  pol icy  contexts .  AS a r e s u l t ,  they have evolved 
d i f f e r e n c e s  of emphasis, both i n  substance and i n  process ,  t h a t  
mer i t  no t i ce  and r e f l e c t i o n .  Some of t h e s e  d i f f e r e n c e s  may be 
appropr ia t e  t o  d i f f e r i n g  purposes or uses of t h e  analyses ,  but  
o t h e r s  suggest oppor tun i t i e s  t o  improve each of t h e  a n a l y t i c a l  
forms by borrowing f e a t u r e s  of t h e  o ther .  
Paper presented a t  t h e  Task Force Meeting on R i s k  and Policy 
Analysis under Conditions of Uncertainty,  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  I n s t i t u t e  
f o r  Applied Systems Analysis,  Laxenburg, ~ u s t r i a ,  November 25-27, 
1985. 
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Many of t h e  po l i cy  dec is ions  t h a t  most need e i t h e r  of these  
forms of a n a l y s i s  i n  f a c t  need some combination of both: a 
sys temat ic  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  of p o s s i b l e  environmental impacts, 
a r igorous a n a l y s i s  of t h e i r  magnitudes and p r o b a b i l i t i e s .  
Examples include off shore  hydrocarbon developments, environmental 
a p p l i c a t i o n s  of p e s t i c i d e s  a s  wel l  a s  new biotechnologies ,  s i t i n g  
of p o t e n t i a l l y  hazardous i n d u s t r i a l  f a c i l i t i e s ,  and a wide range 
of o thers .  Exactly what t h e  combination should be, and how 
breadth of impact i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  should be t raded of f  aga ins t  
depth of p r e d i c t i v e  a n a l y s i s  f o r  key impacts, is an important 
ques t ion  f o r  study. 
Both environmental impact assessment and r i s k  assessment 
could probably b e n e f i t ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  by l ea rn ing  from each o the r  
and by consol ida t ion  i n  many cases  i n t o  a un i f i ed  process.  The  
purpose of such a process  is not ,  however, merely t o  produce t h e  
most q u a n t i t a t i v e l y  s o p h i s t i c a t e d  es t ima te  of p a r t i c u l a r  risks,  
nor t h e  most comprehensive l i s t  of p o s s i b l e  environmental 
impacts. I t  is r a t h e r  t o  produce a r a t i o n a l e  f o r  making pub l i c  
pol icy  dec i s ions  t h a t  is both w e l l  reasoned, and recognized a s  
1egi. t imate and acceptable  by t h e  pub1 i c .  
T h i s  paper recommends two p a r t i c u l a r  t o p i c s  f o r  research. 
The f i r s t  is t o  develop pro tocols  f o r  un i f i ed  environmental 
impact and r i s k  assessment of proposed government ac t ions ,  
beginning wi th  a c t i o n s  f o r  which t h e r e  is al ready a recognized 
need f o r  both forms of a n a l y s i s  ( a s  examples, s i t i n g  of hazardous 
technologies  and environmental d i s p e r s i o n  of p o t e n t i a l l y  
hazardous subs tances ) .  Such pro tocols  should address  not  only 
t h e  substance of such assessments,  bu t  t h e  accoun tab i l i ty  of t h e  
process  by which they a r e  framed, executed, and l eg i t imized  f o r  
u s e  i n  pub l i c  dec is ions .  
The second research  need is t o  a t tempt  un i f i ed  assessments 
of e x i s t i n g  complexes of hazards t o  human h e a l t h  and ecologica l  
systems. Both environmental impact and r i s k  assessments now a r e  
appl ied  pr imar i ly  t o  new a c t i o n  proposals ,  such a s  government 
p r o j e c t s  and regula t ions .  Many of t h e  most s e r i o u s  hazards,  
however, arise from e x i s t i n g  condi t ions  and cumulative p a t t e r n s  
of urban and i n d u s t r i a l  development r a t h e r  than from new 
government ac t ions .  A prudent-approach t o  s e t t i n g  p r i o r i t i e s  f o r  
environmental p r o t e c t i o n  and r i s k  management should t h e r e f o r e  
address  e x i s t i n g  r i s k  p a t t e r n s  as w e l l - a s  new a c t i o n  proposals.  
PROFESSIONAL COMMUNITIES 
Both environmental impact and r i s k  assessments a r e  forms of 
appl ied  pol icy  a n a l y s i s ,  as opposed t o  s c i e n t i f i c  s tud ies .  That 
is, t h e i r  purpose is t o  provide an acceptable  b a s i s  f o r  making 
p u b l i c  dec is ions ,  r a t h e r  than t o  produce new s c i e n t i f i c  
knowledge; and t h e i r  r e s u l t s  a r e  acknowledged t o  be judgments 
wi th in  c o n s t r a i n t s  of time, money, and e x i s t i n g  knowledge. These 
judgments i n  t u r n  a r e  made by profess ional  p r a c t i t i o n e r s  of 
p a r t i c u l a r  forms of a n a l y s i s ,  whose approaches a r e  shaped both by 
t h e i r  experience and by t h e  norms and paradigms of t h e i r  
d i s c i p l i n e s ,  
Environmental impact assessment has developed a  l a r g e  but 
loose  community of p ro fess iona l  p r a c t i t i o n e r s ,  whose academic 
backgrounds a r e  drawn p r imar i ly  from ecology, n a t u r a l  resources,  
environmental sc i ences  and engineering,  and some from anthro- 
pology and sociology. The most s o p h i s t i c a t e d  environmental 
impact assessments, such a s  t h e  Trans-Alaska P i p e l i n e  System EIA, 
r ep resen t  t h e  results of ex tens ive  s t u d i e s  and i n t e r d i s c i p l i n a r y  
c o l l a b o r a t i o n  by teams of h i s h l y  q u a l i f i e d  exper t s ,  Most EIAs ,  
however, a r e  prepared by s m a l l  s t a f f s  of masters- level  
p ro fess iona l s  r ep resen t ing  a  few key d i s c i p l i n e s ,  
R i s k  assessment is a  s imi3ar ly  loose  l a b e l ,  bu t  appears t o  
r ep resen t  some half-dozen d i s c r e t e  d i s c i p l i n a r y  subgroups r a t h e r  
than a  s i n g l e  i n t e r d i s c i p l i n a r y  approach, These subgroups 
inc lude  t o x i c o l o g i s t s ,  ep idemiologis t s ,  end b i o s t a t i s t i c i a n s ,  a l l  
focuss ing  on hea l th  r i s k s  (mainly cancer m o r t a l i t y ) ;  engineers  
and s t a t i s t i c a l  dec i s ion  a n a l y s t s ,  both focuss ing  on techno- 
l o g i c a l  ca tas t rophes ;  economists, i n t e r e s t e d  i n  r i s k / b e n e f i t  
analyses;  a c t u a r i e s ;  an.d cogn i t ive  psychologis t s  exploring 
a s p e c t s  of human percept ion  and behavior towards r i s k .  More than 
environmental impact assessments,  r i s k  assessments t o  d a t e  appear 
t o  r e f l e c t  choices  of one or  another  of t h e s e  d i s c i p l i n a r y  
approaches by t h e i r  au thors ,  r a t h e r  than  an e c l e c t i c  o r  i n t e r -  
d i s c i p l i n a r y  s y n t h e s i s  of s e v e r a l  of them, 
Both t h e s e  p ro fess iona l  communities would b e n e f i t  from 
g r e a t e r  i n t e r a c t i o n  with each o t h e r ,  and from c e r t a i n  s t r e n g t h s  
and experiences t h a t  each has had but  t h e  o the r  has  not ,  As y e t  
f e w  papers have been w r i t t e n  on t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  between E I A  and 
RA (OIRiordan, 1979; Dooley, 1983; Beanlands, 1984a, b; Gi rou l t ,  
1984; Vlachos, for thcoming) ,  and only one of t h e s e  has  been 
published, An overview of f i v e  y e a r s 1  i s s u e s  of p i s k  JLnalvsia 
turned  up less than  h a l f  a dozen mentions of environmental impact 
assessment, and no a r t i c l e s  i n  which it was a c e n t r a l  topic .  
Journa l s  on EIA have perhaps paid more a t t e n t i o n  t o  r i s k  
assessment as an emergent form of a n a l y s i s ,  but  have done no more 
t o  develop subs tan t ive  i n t e g r a t i o n ,  
SUBSTANCE 
A s  pol icy  analyses ,  environmental impact and r i s k  
assessments should be compared i n  two ways, One is subs tant ive :  
what do such analyses  inc lude  i n  t h e i r  content ,  inc luding  what 
a c t i o n s  or  condi t ions they  assess, what a l t e r n a t i v e  a c t i o n s  they 
consider ,  what consequences they look f o r ,  what b a s i s  they use 
f o r  p red ic t ing  those  consequences and a t t r i b u t i n g  them t o  t h e  
ac t ion ,  and how they t r e a t  unce r t a in ty  and s u b j e c t i v e  judgments, 
The second c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n  is procedural:  how do such 
assessments funct ion  as admin i s t r a t ive  processes ,  inc luding  l e g a l  
b a s i s  and purpose, openness and accoun tab i l i ty ,  and r o l e  i n  
ensuing dec is ions ,  This  s e c t i o n  explores  subs tan t ive  
A n d m s .  R.N.L. 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s ;  t h e  fol lowing s e c t i o n  d i scusses  i s s u e s  of 
process.  
Tarse t  Actions 
Environmental impact assessments a r e  required f o r  a l l  major 
governmental a c t i o n s  t h a t  might ' s i g n i f i c a n t l y  a f f e c t  t h e  q u a l i t y  
of t h e  human environment.' I n  p r a c t i c e ,  t h e  major i ty  a r e  
prepared f o r  pub l i c  works proposals  such as highway segments, 
water resource and energy production p r o j e c t s ,  and pub l i c  land  
management a c t i v i t i e s .  I n  United S t a t e s  p r a c t i c e  E I A  
requirements do not apply t o  most environmental h e a l t h  regula tory  
a c t i o n s ,  which were exempted by s t a t u t e .  Nor does it include 
many major nongovernmental a c t i o n s ,  such a s  hazardous i n d u s t r i a l  
f a c i l i t i e s ,  f o r  which t h e  only government a c t i o n  involved is a 
permit under such regu la t ions ;  and it is not  enforced f o r  l e g i s -  
l a t i v e  proposals  and o t h e r  broad po l i cy  ac t ions .  I n  o the r  
na t ions  such a s  Canada, t h e  United Kingdom, and emerging European 
p r a c t i c e ,  i n d u s t r i a l  development p r o j e c t s  genera l ly  a r e  more 
c o n s i s t e n t l y  included under E I A  requirements. 
R i s k  assessment, i n  c o n t r a s t ,  is prac t i ced  ( a l b e i t  
s e l e c t i v e l y )  i n  both p u b l i c  and p r i v a t e  s e c t o r  dec i s ion  
processes.  It is inc reas ing ly  rout ine ,  f o r  ins tance ,  i n  both t h e  
insurance and t h e  chemicals i n d u s t r i e s ,  and is f r equen t ly  used i n  
energy production and e l e c t r i c  u t i l i t y  firms. Within t h e  pub l i c  
s e c t o r ,  r i s k  assessments have been prepared p r imar i ly  i n  
conjunct ion w i t h  proposals  t o  r egu la te  p a r t i c u l a r  substances as 
h e a l t h  hazards, and w i t h  some proposals  t o  s i t e  energy product ion 
and i n d u s t r i a l  chemical f a c i l i t i e s  t h a t  pose r isks of 
c a t a s t r o p h i c  acc idents .  
Unlike E I A s ,  r i s k  assessments a r e  not  g e n e r i c a l l y  requi red  
by s t a t u t e ,  and have no t  t h e r e f o r e  been produced under any common 
set of pro tocols  o r  admin i s t r a t ive  guide l ines .  The primary 
demands f o r  r i s k  assessments i n  pub l i c  dec i s ions  have a r i s e n  from 
s e v e r a l  p a r t i c u l a r  laws requ i r ing  r i sk -benef i t  balancing i n  
environmental hea l th  r egu la t ions ,  from mcommission of inquiry'  
proceedings i n t o  proposa ls  f o r  hazardous f a c i l i t i e s  i n  some 
coun t r i e s ,  and from more general  admin i s t r a t ive  p ressu res  f o r  
j u s t i f i c a t i o n  of proposed regula t ions .  
Both environmental impact and r i s k  assessments have been 
app l i ed  by and l a r g e  only t o  d i s c r e t e  proposals  f o r  f u t u r e  a c t i o n  
( o r  d i s c r e t e  hazards f o r  which government c o n t r o l s  might be 
warranted) ,  a s  p a r t  of t h e  admin i s t r a t ive  process  by which 
proposed dec i s ions  a r e  r a t i o n a l i z e d  and j u s t i f i e d .  They have 
only r a r e l y  been app l i ed  t o  e x i s t i n g  complexes or cumulative 
p a t t e r n s  of r i s k  t o  h e a l t h  and environment, such a s  an urbanized 
a r e a ,  even though such an a r e a  might provide a more r e a l i s t i c  
u n i t  of a n a l y s i s  f o r  a s sess ing  r e l a t i v e  r i s k s  and s e t t i n g  
p r i o r i t i e s  f o r  management response. One recent  exception is t h e  
Phi ladelphia  study conducted under t h e  U.S. EPA1s  In tegra ted  
Environmental Management Divis ion (Haemisegger e t  a l . ,  1985).  
The t reatment  of a l t e r n a t i v e s  is a c e n t r a l  i s s u e  f o r  any 
form of pol icy a n a l y s i s ,  f o r  it not  only a f f e c t s  t h e  scope and 
emphasis of t h e  a n a l y s i s  i t s e l f  but  a l s o  determines t h e  r e l a t i o n -  
s h i p  of t h e  ana lys i s  t o  t h e  ensuing d e c i s i o n  process.  I f  t h e  
assessment considers  only t h e  consequences of a s i n g l e  a c t i o n  
proposal,  it can perhaps produce more d e t a i l e d  q u a n t i t a t i v e  
estimates of poss ib le  consequences; bu t  it w i l l  a l s o  be 
fundamentally l i m i t e d  t o  j u s t i f y i n g  t h a t  proposal ,  o r  a t  most 
i d e n t i f y i n g  marginal changes i n  it t h a t  could m i t i g a t e  some 
undesireable  e f f e c t s .  I f  t h e  assessment is designed t o  compare 
a l t e r n a t i v e  courses  of a c t i o n ,  i n  c o n t r a s t ,  it becomes i n  e f f e c t  
a framework f o r  dec i s ion  r a t h e r  than merely j u s t i f i c a t i o n ;  but  t o  
se rve  t h i s  purpose, i ts design must focus  on comparing 
d i f f e r e n c e s  among t h e  consequences of a l t e r n a t i v e  courses  of 
ac t ion ,  r a t h e r  than on sys temat ic  t r a c i n g  of t h e  consequences of 
a s i n g l e  course of ac t ion .  
Environmental impact assessments a r e  required t o  d i scuss  
a l t e r n a t i v e s  t o  a proposed ac t ion ,  inc luding  t h e  a l t e r n a t i v e  of 
tak ing  no ac t ion ,  s o  t h a t  t h e  user  can compare t h e  f u l l  
consequences of a l t e r n a t i v e  courses  of ac t ion .  I n  p r a c t i c e ,  EIAs  
a r e  o f t e n  c r i t i c i z e d  f o r  f a i l u r e  t o  s e r i o u s l y  cons ider  opt ions  
p re fe r red  by some readers ,  bu t  t h e  requirement does allow them - 
f o r  ins t ance ,  i n  a r ecen t  E I A  on a l t e r n a t i v e  management p lans  f o r  
t h e  Bantahala National Fores t  - t o  in t roduce  new and sometimes 
super io r  a l t e r n a t i v e s  after reviewing those  proposed by t h e  
agency. More than this, it c r e a t e s  a hea l thy  p ressu re  on t h e  
a n a l y s t s  themselves t o  focus on d i f f e r e n c e s  among real choices ,  
and thus  makes t h e  a n a l y s i s  more l i k e l y  t o  provide a b a s i s  f o r  
t h e  u l t ima te  decis ion.  
Risk assessments are more heterogeneous i n  t h e i r  t rea tment  
of a l t e r n a t i v e s ,  probably because of t h e  absence of any gener i c  
guidance on t h e  sub jec t .  R i s k  assessments f o r  h e a l t h  regula- 
t i o n s ,  f o r  ins tance ,  o f t e n  inc lude  estimates of r i s k  under alter- 
n a t i v e  s tandards ,  and t h i s  is now requi red  i n  U.S. p r a c t i c e  f o r  
r egu la t ions  t h a t  may have s i g n i f i c a n t  economic consequences. 
Risk  assessments fox technologies  sys temat ica l ly  i d e n t i f y  alter- 
n a t i v e  cause and e f f e c t  sequences by which hazards could a r i s e ;  
they a l s o  have sometimes l e d  t o  t h e  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  of a l t e r n a t i v e  
measures t o  reduce r i s k s ,  e s p e c i a l l y  i n  cases such as Canvey 
I s l and  where reasonable .des ign  o r  opera t iona l  changes could 
s i g n i f i c a n t l y  m i t i g a t e  r i s k  f a c t o r s  (Cohen and Davies, 1981).  
But many r i s k  assessments s o  far are designed more t o  provide 
q u a n t i t a t i v e  estimates of t h e  r i s k  of a s i n g l e  proposed a c t i o n  
than  t o  compare d i f fe rences  i n  consequences among a l t e r n a t i v e s .  
One promising t a r g e t  f o r  f u t u r e  research ,  the re fo re ,  might 
be t h e  design of comparative r i s k  assessments t o  show t r a d e o f f s  
among a l t e r n a t i v e  courses  of a c t i o n ,  inc luding  eva lua t ion  of how 
such designs would need t o  d i f f e r  from other  approaches t o  r i s k  
assessment. 
Andtetus, R.N.L. 
Tarse t  E f f e c t s  
The s e l e c t i o n  of t a r g e t  e f f e c t s  f o r  a n a l y s i s ,  a long wi th  t h e  
s e l e c t i o n  of t a r g e t  a c t i o n s  and a l t e r n a t i v e s  a s  d iscussed  above, 
determines t h e  o v e r a l l  scope of a n a l y t i c a l  e f f o r t  i n  both 
environmental impact and r i s k  assessment. Environmental impact 
assessment i n  p r i n c i p l e  can include v i r t u a l l y  any c a t e g o r i e s  of 
impacts t h a t  a r e  of i n t e r e s t .  A s  Professor  Munn has def ined  it 
(1979), it is  
. . . an a c t i v i t y  designed t o  i d e n t i f y  and p r e d i c t  t h e  
impact on t h e  biogeophysical  environment and on man's h e a l t h  
and w e l l  being of l e g i s l a t i v e  proposals ,  p o l i c i e s ,  
programmes, p r o j e c t s ,  and opera t iona l  procedures, and t o  
i n t e r p r e t  and communicate information about t h e  impacts. 
In  p r a c t i c e ,  however, environmental impact assessments 
have emphasized p o s s i b l e  impacts on n a t u r a l  ecosystems and ( t o  some e x t e n t )  human communities, and have pa id  l i t t l e  
a t t e n t i o n  t o  hea l th  e f f e c t s  and some o the r  r i s k s  (Clark,  
1985; Beanlands, 1984a; G i r o u l t ,  1984).  More p r e c i s e l y ,  
even f o r  impacts whose u l t ima te  s i g n i f i c a n c e  might involve 
h e a l t h  ( f o r  ins tance ,  a i r  o r  water p o l l u t i o n ) ,  E I A  s t u d i e s  
t y p i c a l l y  p r e d i c t  only t h e  environmental f a t e  of contami- 
nants  r a t h e r  than e f f e c t s  on h e a l t h  end-points, 
Conversely, r i s k  assessments have emphasized human 
h e a l t h  e f f e c t s ,  e s p e c i a l l y  p o t e n t i a l  m o r t a l i t y  due t o  cancer 
o r  technologica l  c a t a s t r o p h i e s ;  only a few s t u d i e s ,  f o r  
ins t ance  on of fshore  o i l  r i g s ,  have attempted t o  a s s e s s  
o the r  environmental hazards (see e.g, Covello, 1985; 
National Research Council, 1983; Cohen and Davies, 1981).  
One important except ion is a recen t  study by t h e  U.S. 
National Science Foundation on environmental a p p l i c a t i o n s  of 
biotechnology, which recommends use of r i s k  assessment 
methods t o  a s s e s s  p o t e n t i a l  environmental e f f e c t s  of 
biotechnology a p p l i c a t i o n s  (Covello and F ikse l ,  1985) , 
These d i f fe rences  i n  t a r g e t  e f f e c t s  have no i n t r i n s i c  
b a s i s  i n  t h e  na tu re  of t h e  two a n a l y t i c a l  forms; they appear 
t o  have a r i s e n  simply as a r t i f a c t s  of t h e  admin i s t r a t ive  
contexts  and profess ional  communities a s soc ia ted  with each. 
Both environmental impact and r i s k  assessment would be 
improved by e l imina t ing  such d i f fe rences ,  incorpora t ing  
h e a l t h  e f f e c t s  i n t o  environmental impact assessment and 
conversely applying r i s k  assessment t o  p o t e n t i a l  environ- 
mental consequences o t h e r  than  simply human mor ta l i ty .  
P red ic t ion  
Both environmental impact and r i s k  assessments a r e  
forms of appl ied  p r e d i c t i v e  ana lys i s .  I n  p r a c t i c e ,  however, 
environmental impact assessment has much t o  l e a r n  from t h e  
more soph i s t i ca ted  approaches t o  p r e d i c t i o n  t h a t  have been 
developed i n  t h e  r i s k  assessment l i t e r a t u r e ,  
Environmental impact assessments e x h i b i t  genera l ly  
crude and s i m p l i s t i c  e s t ima tes  of t h e  magnitude, l ike l ihood ,  
and t ime d i s t r i b u t i o n  of impacts, P red ic t ion  is t y p i c a l l y  
l i m i t e d  t o  s t a t e d  judgments t h a t  p a r t i c u l a r  consequences a r e  
' l i ke ly8  o r  'unl ikely8 (Beanlands and Duinker, 1983 ; 
Paradine, 1984) -  Exceptions e x i s t  i n  which ( f o r  ins t ance )  
q u a n t i t a t i v e  modelling of p o l l u t i o n  d i spe r s ion  is included, 
but  f o r  most impacts E I A s  inc lude  few r igorous  p red ic t ions ,  
A study of t h e  s c i e n t i f i c  q u a l i t y  of 75 U,S, EIAS, f o r  
ins tance ,  found t h a t  over 82% never used well-developed 
not ions  of p r o b a b i l i t y  t o  e s t ima te  consequences, and t h a t  
none d id  s o  sys temat ica l ly  (Caldwell e t  a1 , 1982) . 
R i s k  assessment, i n  c o n t r a s t ,  stresses formal q u a n t i f i -  
c a t i o n  of p r o b a b i l i t y  and uncer t a in ty ,  By d e f i n i t i o n ,  a 
r i s k  assessment is a s tudy t h a t  provides ', , . q u a n t i t a t i v e  
measures of r i s k  l e v e l s ,  where r i s k  refers t o  t h e  
p o s s i b i l i t y  of uncer ta in ,  adverse consequences , , , most 
fundamentally estimates of p o s s i b l e  h e a l t h  and o the r  conse- 
quences , , . and t h e  uncer t a in ty  i n  those  consequencesm 
(Covello, 1985) .  A r i s k  assessment t y p i c a l l y  inc ludes  a 
determinat ion of t h e  types  of hazard posed, an es t ima te  of 
t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  of t h e  h a z a r d ( s ) ,  and es t ima tes  of t h e  popu- 
l a t i o n s  a t  r i s k  of exposure and of ensuing adverse 
consequences (Conservation Foundation, 1984);  and consider- 
a b l e  scho la r sh ip  has  been devoted t o  developing and r e f i n i n g  
methodologies f o r  producing such es t imates ,  
R i s k  assessments may, of course,  be based on q u i t e  
tenuous o r  debatable  assumptions, and i n  such cases  t h e i r  
p r e d i c t i o n s  may u l t i m a t e l y  be no more r e l i a b l e  d e s p i t e  t h e i r  
apparent  q u a n t i t a t i v e  r i g o r ,  H a t t i s  and Smith (1985)r f o r  
ins tance ,  warn t h a t  c u r r e n t  r i s k  assessment p r a c t i c e  r e l i e s  
on unduly narrow s t a t i s t i c a l  methods f o r  quant i fy ing  r i s k ,  
a t  t h e  expense of o t h e r  l i n e s  of reasoning t h a t  may be more 
v a l i d ,  Whatever i ts imperfect ions i n  p r a c t i c e ,  however, a 
b a s i c  v i r t u e  of r i s k  assessment is its normative commitment 
t o  improving t h e  methodologies of p r e d i c t i v e  es t imat ion ,  
Environmental impact assessment may have devoted s i m i l a r  
a t t e n t i o n  t o  procedures f o r  i d e n t i f y i n g  c a t e g o r i e s  of 
p o s s i b l e  consequences, bu t  by and l a r g e  it has lacked t h i s  
commitment t o  improving methods f o r  p red ic t ion ,  
Uncertainty 
C, S, Bol l ing  once a s s e r t e d  t h a t  t b e  core i s s u e  of 
environmental impact assessment is bow t o  cope with 
decisionmaking under unce r t a in ty  (Boll ing,  1978). The same 
is t r u e  of r i s k  assessment: both a r e  intended t o  reduce t h e  
u n c e r t a i n t i e s  a s soc ia ted  with pub l i c  pol icy  dec is ions ,  By 
t h e  same token, however, both must confront  powerful 
temptat ions - common t o  a l l  pol icy  analyses  - t o  discount  
i s s u e s  t h a t  remain uncer t a in  o r  disputed,  i n  order  t o  bui ld  
a confident  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  f o r  a dec is ion ,  The appearance of 
c e r t a i n t y  and consensus is welcome t o  p o l i t i c i a n s ,  but  where 
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it is not  well founded it tends not  t o  reduce oppos i t ion  t o  
t h e  outcome but  simply t o  promote cynicism about ana lys i s .  
Even a f t e r  t h e  most thorough assessment, a l l  p u b l i c  
dec i s ions  u l t i m a t e l y  must be made i n  t h e  f a c e  of 
uncertainty:  unce r t a in ty  about t h e  f u t u r e ,  about human 
behavior, about s t o c h a s t i c  events ,  about our own ignorance 
o r  imperfect ions i n  ana lys i s .  I t  is important t o  judge any 
po l i cy  a n a l y s i s ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  no t  only by how much it reduces 
uncer t a in ty  but  a l s o  by how e x p l i c i t l y  it acknowledges 
important sources  of unce r t a in ty  t h a t  remain. 
In  environmental impact assessment, acknowledgement of 
unce r t a in ty  is requi red  but  is r a r e l y  evident  i n  p r a c t i c e ,  
Caldwell e t  al. (1982) , f o r  i n ~ t a n c e ,  found t h a t  over 22% of 
t h e  impact s ta tements  they reviewed never acknowledged 
uncer t a in ty ,  and t h a t  none of them d i d  s o  sys temat ica l ly  o r  
even more than j u s t  occas ional ly ,  Reeve (1984) s i m i l a r l y  
r e p o r t s  t h a t  a s tudy of 242 d r a f t  E I A s  l e d  t h e  U,S. Council 
on Environmental Qual i ty  t o  conclude t h a t  E I A s  r a r e l y  
address  t h e  ques t ion  of . incomplete and unavai lab le  
information a s  requi red  by i t s  regula t ions .  
In  r i s k  assessment,  acknowledgement of unce r t a in ty  is  
s i m i l a r l y  expected, bu t  i n  p r a c t i c e  it is o f t e n  buried i n  
a r b i t r a r y  assumptions o r  ignored i f  it cannot be q u a n t i f i e d ,  
Despi te  its apparent  r i g o r ,  it is u l t ima te ly ,  l i k e  EIA, a 
very 'soft '  process  of ' a r t f u l  theor iz ing  t o  cons t ruc t  an 
appropr ia t e  p i c t u r e  of t h e  world f o r  informing s p e c i f i c  
choices' ( H a t t i s  and Smith, 1984)-  
An important t o p i c  of f u t u r e  research f o r  both forms of 
a n a l y s i s ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  is  t h e  refinement of methods f o r  
providing e x p l i c i t  and sys temat ic  t reatment  of unce r t a in ty ,  
Subiec t ive  Information 
s u b j e c t i v e  information r e f e r s  t o  s ta tements  of concern, 
value preference,  o r  judgment, coming from e i t h e r  exper t s  o r  
laymen, t h a t  cannot be o b j e c t i v e l y  va l ida ted ,  Such informa- 
t i o n  is unavoidably p resen t  i n  both forms of ana lys i s ,  
wherever unce r t a in ty  o r  disagreement e x i s t s  (Otway and 
Thomas, 1982);  and it is t h e r e f o r e  important t o  i d e n t i f y  how 
each t r e a t s  such information,  
Environmental impact assessment r equ i res  a t  l e a s t  t h r e e  
s p e c i f i c  procedures designed t o  a s s u r e  e x p l i c i t  i d e n t i f i c a -  
t i o n  of s u b j e c t i v e  concerns and d isputes .  These inc lude  a  
requirement f o r  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  of ' cont rovers ia l '  impacts,  
whether o r  not  t h e  agency cons iders  them s i g n i f i c a n t  on 
o b j e c t i v e  grounds; a process  of 'scoping,' i n  which al l  
concerned p a r t i e s  may formally p a r t i c i p a t e  a t  t h e  
prel iminary f e a s i b i l i t y  s tudy s t a g e  i n  def in ing  t h e  terms of 
re ference  f o r  t h e  assessment; and a  formal review of t h e  
d r a f t  a n a l y s i s  by a l l  r e l evan t  agencies  and i n t e r e s t e d  
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c i t i z e n s ,  comments r e s u l t i n g  from which must be made pub l i c  
and e x p l i c i t l y  answered by t h e  i n i t i a t i n g  agency. 
Risk assessment does not  incorpora te  any formal 
requirement f o r  i d e n t i f y i n g  s u b j e c t i v e  information o r  
divergence among judgments, and i n  p r a c t i c e  it f r equen t ly  
f a i l s  both t o  acknowledge such information and t o  t r e a t  i t s  
presence as a l e g i t i m a t e  issue.  Many r i s k  assessments,  f o r  
ins tance ,  d i sp lay  a s t rong  normative commitment t o  t h e  
concept of expected value,  and a corresponding d i s d a i n  f o r  
f e a r s  t h a t  exceed those  values.  Such f e a r s  a r e  regarded no t  
simply as d i f f e r e n c e s  i n  judgment t o  be acknowledged and 
discussed,  but  as groundless and t h e r e f o r e  i l l e g i t i m a t e  - 
even though t h e  expected va lue  c r i t e r i o n  is n e i t h e r  widely 
accepted by t h e  genera l  pub l i c  nor l e g i s l a t i v e l y  approved a s  
t h e  b a s i s  f o r  dec i s ions  ( s e e  e.g. Popper, 1983).  The U.S. 
National Research Council a l s o  has i d e n t i f i e d  a lengthy  l i s t  
of study design p o i n t s  i n  r i s k  assessments a t  which assump- 
t i o n s  must  be made; bu t  t h e r e  is no rou t ine  procedure f o r  
assur ing  e x p l i c i t  debate  of such judgments (Nat ional  
Research Council, 1982) .  
R i s k  assessment could probably be improved, t h e r e f o r e ,  
by t h e  development of e x p l i c i t  pro tocols  f o r  t h e  t rea tment  
of s u b j e c t i v e  and d isputed  information. The procedures used 
f o r  t h i s  purpose i n  environmental impact assessment may 
provide one set of use fu l  models. 
As s u b s t a n t i v e  forms of ana lys i s ,  environmental impact 
and r i s k  assessments have d i f f e r e d  i n  p r a c t i c e  bu t  a r e  
i n t r i n s i c a l l y  similar i n  concept. An i d e a l  example of 
e i t h e r  could i n  p r i n c i p l e  provide t h e  same information as 
t h e  other:  it would c l a r i f y  a decisionmaker 's  understanding 
of t h e  a l t e r n a t i v e  courses  of a c t i o n  t h a t  could be chosen, 
and it would provide t h e  b e s t  poss ib le  p red ic t ions  of t h e  
d i f f e r e n c e s  i n  s i g n i f i c a n t  consequences t h a t  would be l i k e l y  
t o  r e s u l t .  The d i f fe rences  between t h e i r  contents  i n  
c u r r e n t  p r a c t i c e  r ep resen t  d i f f e rences  i n  focus and 
emphasis, some of which are s t r e n g t h s  and some weaknesses on 
each s ide.  
Each f o m  of a n a l y s i s  could t h e r e f  o re  b e n e f i t  substan- 
t i v e l y  from t h e  adopt ion of some aspec t s  of t h e  o the r ,  and 
both would probably be improved by t h e  development of a 
un i f i ed  form of app l i ed  a n a l y s i s  t h a t  would combine t h e  
s t r e n g t h s  of both. 
R n d m s .  R.N.L. 
PROCESS 
The most important differences between environmental 
impact and risk assessment, however, are not differences of 
substance but of process, The two forms in practice have 
functioned not only separately but differently as 
administrative procedures, These differences are perhaps 
most pronounced in the U,S, setting, where they have 
developed in distinctly separate legal contexts, but they 
appear elsewhere as well, While substantive content is 
important, therefore, no less important is how well each 
functions as a process for framing and legitimizing public 
decisions, 
purpose 
Environmental impact assessment originated from a 
generic statutory requirement, enforceable by citizens in 
the courts and binding on all government administrative 
decisions (except environmental health regulations) . Its 
intent was not simply better analysis, but administrative 
reform: it was to be an 'action-forcing procedure,' to 
compel agencies to pay attention to the law's substantive 
purposes (Andrews, 1976) . 
The National Environmental Policy Act directed all 
Federal agencies to prepare a 'detailed statementm of 
environmental impacts, adverse effects, alternatives, and 
other matters to accompany every recommendation, report on 
legislative proposal, or other major Federal action that 
might significantly affect the quality of the human environ- 
ment, (National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 USC 
4321 et seq,). The statement must also be circulated for 
comment to all other agencies having relevant jurisdiction 
or special expertise, and be made available (with all 
comments) to the public, Similar requirements have since 
been adopted by over half the U,S. state governments, by 
some local authorities, and by many other nations and some 
transnational organizations, 
EIA was explicitly conceived as an administrative 
reform to force greater public accountability on government 
agencies, Its authors perceived agencies not as systematic 
rational decisionmakers, but as narrow advocates of 
particular missions at the expense of other values and 
consequences, While some of its authors believed that more 
complete information alone would lead to better decisions, 
in practice it has drawn its primary effectiveness from the 
threat of public embarrassment and judicial challenge 
(Andrews, 1976)- 
Like EIA, risk assessment grew out of a broad movement 
toward expanded use of rational techniques for analyzing and 
justifying government decisions, Unlike EIA, however, it 
developed first as a management technique in the hands of 
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exper ts ,  used i n  p a r t  t o  improve decisionmaking about 
engineering technologies  a n d ' i n  p a r t  t o  j u s t i f y  those  
dec i s ions  - a s  i n  t h e  case of t h e  well-known Rasmussen 
repor t  on nuclear  r e a c t o r  s a f e t y  - a g a i n s t  pub l i c  fears and 
opposi t ion,  
Risk assessment emerged as an a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  
requirement i n  t h e  mid t o  l a t e  19706, i n  t h e  form of both 
s t a t u t e s  and Executive o rde r s  r equ i r ing  more ex tens ive  
documentation t o  j u s t i f y  proposed r i s k  r egu la t ions ,  and 
requ i r ing  nbalancing' of risks a g a i n s t  economic c o s t s  and 
b e n e f i t s  (Atkissen e t  al,, 1985)-  Its p r a c t i c e  i n  t h e  U,S, 
has t h e r e f o r e  been l i m i t e d  l a r g e l y  t o  t h e  environmental 
hea l th  regula tory  agencies ,  and t o  t h e  environmental h e a l t h  
r i s k s  ( i n  p r a c t i c e  even more narrowly, t o  t h e  cancer 
mor ta l i ty  r i s k s )  of those  agencies1 dec i s ions ,  
While r i s k  assessment ls  s u b s t a n t i v e  purpose is n o t  
unl ike  EIA, t h e r e f o r e ,  i ts  p o l i t i c a l  uses  ( a t  least  i n  t h e  
U,S,) have been r a t h e r  d i f f e r e n t ,  Where E I A  was adopted t o  
inc rease  a c c o u n t a b i l i t y  t o  c i t i z e n  groups, RA was adopt'ed t o  
inc rease  i n t e r n a l  management con t ro l ,  t o  f o s t e r  consis tency 
ac ross  a c t i o n s  and programs ( U , S ,  EPA, 1984) ; and on the 
p a r t  of some advocates,  t o  inc rease  a c c o u n t a b i l i t y  t o  over- 
s i g h t  agencies  and bus iness  l o b b y i s t s  seek ing  t o  J i m i t  r i s k  
r egu la t ion ,  
Administrat ive Process 
To be use fu l  i n  dec i s ions  an assessment must be n o t  
only accura te  but  l eg i t ima te :  it must dea l  w i t h  t h e  f u l l  
range of dec i s ion  issues, i n  a process  t h a t  is open t o  
p u b l i c  s c r u t i n y  and debate  as wel l  a s  w e l l  reasoned, even- 
handed, and candid about unresolved u n c e r t a i n t i e s ,  Numerous 
s t u d i e s  have shown, f o r  ins t ance ,  t h a t  s t akeho lde r s  i n  t h e  
outcomes of pub l i c  dec i s ions  may hold q u i t e  d i f f e r e n t  views 
regarding any o r  all terms of reference  f o r  t h e  ana lys i s :  
problem d e f i n i t i o n ,  o b j e c t i v e s  and goal h i e r a r c h i e s ,  
environmental condi t ions  and expected consequences, and 
a l t e r n a t i v e s  (e,g, V a r i  et  al,, 1985; Mason and Mit rof f ,  
1981; Kleindorf e r  and Yoon, 1984)-  Susskind (1985) 
summarizes a s u b s t a n t i a l  body of research  shoving t h a t  j o i n t  
f a c t f i n d i n g ,  including n e g o t i a t i o n  both of t h e  scope and 
methods of a n a l y s i s  and even of t h e  group of exper t s  who 
w i l l  conduct it, is t h e r e f o r e  a c r u c i a l  s t e p  i n  producing 
l e g i t i m a t e  analyses  of c o n t r o v e r s i a l  dec i s ion  i s sues ,  Not' 
only E I A  but  t h e  r ecen t  l i t e r a t u r e s  on s t r a t e g i c  planning 
and f a c i l i t y  s i t i n g  provide va luable  i n s i g h t s  here  t h a t  
might en r i ch  t h e  p r a c t i c e  of r i s k  assessment, 
Environmental impact assessment funct ions  a s  an 
e x p l i c i t l y  open a n a l y t i c a l  process ,  w i t h  enforceable  oppor- 
t u n i t i e s  f o r  publ ic  involvement both i n  designing and 
c r i t i q u i n g  t h e  a n a l y s i s ,  and guarantees  t h a t  c o n f l i c t i n g  
views must be cons idered  on t h e  record ,  The scoping  
process ,  t h e  requirement  t h a t  c o n t r o v e r s i a l  impacts be 
e x p l i c i t l y  d i s c u s s e d ,  and t h e  review and comment p rocedure  
a l l  c o n t r i b u t e  t o  t h i s  openness,  and s e r v e  t o  make t h e  
r e s u l t i n g  a n a l y s i s  a reasonably  thorough and p u b l i c l y  t e s t e d  
record  of t he  i ss 'ues  involved i n  t h e  proposed d e c i s i o n ,  
Risk assessment ,  i n  c o n t r a s t ,  f r e q u e n t l y  f u n c t i o n s  as a 
more a rcane  e x p e r t  p roces s ,  couched i n  terms t h a t  have 
l i t t l e  meaning t o  most laymen ( r i s k  p r o b a b i l i t y ,  dose- 
response curve ,  expected v a l u e ) ,  and o f t e n  l a c k s  formal  
procedures  f o r  p u b l i c  involvement i n  des ign  and c r i t i q u e  of 
t h e  a n a l y s i s ,  
A common response t o  t h i s  o b s e r v a t i o n  is t h a t  r i s k  
i n fo rma t ion  is s imply t o o  t e c h n i c a l  t o  be understood by 
laymen, and t h a t  such d e c i s i o n s  t h e r e f o r e  are b e s t  l e f t  t o  
agency e x p e r t s ,  I t  h a s  been shown t h a t  laymen do p e r c e i v e  
risks d i f f e r e n t l y  from ' e x p e r t s t m  ove re s t ima t ing  some and 
underes t imat ing  o t h e r s  (see e,g. F i schhof f  e t  a l , ,  1981) .  
But ' expe r t sn  are a l s o  prone t o  c e r t a i n  t y p e s  of misjudg- 
ments, and such d e c i s i o n s  i n  any event  are n o t  merely 
t e c h n i c a l  cho ices ,  b u t  m a t t e r s  of p u b l i c  governance t h a t  
happen t o  be framed by t e c h n i c a l  assumptions.  OIRiordan 
(1979) warns, f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  t h a t  i n  many r i s k  assessments  
" s c i e n t i f i c  r a t i o n a l i t y  is overwhelming p o l i t i c a l  
r a t i o n a l i t y ; '  and Chauncey S t a r r  (1985) h a s  more r e c e n t l y  
argued t h a t  p u b l i c  accep tance  of proposed a c t i o n s  depends 
more on p u b l i c  conf idence  i n  r i s k  management t han  on any 
q u a n t i t a t i v e  estimte of r i s k  consequence, p r o b a b i l i t y ,  o r  
magnitude. 
Given t h e  u n c e r t a i n t y  of many of t h e  assumptions 
involved,  t h e r e f o r e ,  and t h e  fact t h a t  t h e  p u b l i c  does  n o t  
n e c e s s a r i l y  accep t  t h e  expected v a l u e  concept as a b a s i s  f o r  
r i s k  d e c i s i o n s ,  it is probably wiser t o  make . r i s k  d e c i s i o n s  
more unders tandable  t h a n  more q u a n t i t a t i v e l y  s o p h i s t i c a t e d ,  
and t o  f o c u s  deba te  on o p t i o n s  f o r  r i s k  minimizat ion r a t h e r  
t han  on t h e  ref inement  of r i s k  estimates. 
In f luence  on d e c i s i o n s  
Desp i t e  t h e i r  d i f f e r e n c e s  i n  subs tance  and p roces s ,  
environmental  impact and r i s k  assessment  appear t o  have had 
s i m i l a r l y  modest bu t  b e n e f i c i a l  effects on p u b l i c  dec i s ions .  
Both have produced f a r  more e x t e n s i v e  documentation r e l a t e d  
t o  proposed d e c i s i o n s  t han  was prev ious ly  a v a i l a b l e .  Both 
have se rved  t o  d e t e r  'extremem p roposa l s ,  i n  t h e  s e n s e s  both 
of h igh r i s k  and of high c o s t  f o r  t h e  amount of r i s k  
avoided; and both have a l s o  c r e a t e d  i n c e n t i v e s  t o  i d e n t i f y  
m i t i g a t i v e  measures t o  reduce t h e  r i s k s  of a c t i o n s  t h a t  a r e  
t o  be t aken ,  Both have g iven  b i r t h  t o  communities of 
p r o f e s s i o n a l  p r a c t i t i o n e r s ,  and t h e  gradua l  e n t r y  of t h e s e  
communities i n t o  h i t h e r t o  narrower,  miss ion-or iented 
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  agenc ies  has  probably se rved  t o  broaden 
p e r s p e c t i v e s  and moderate b i a s e s ,  
As w i t h  substance,  s o  with process,  t h e r e f o r e ,  both 
environmental impact and r i s k  assessment would probably 
b e n e f i t  from t h e  development of a u n i f i e d  form of a n a l y s i s  
t h a t  incorpora tes  t h e  best of both forms. Such a un i f i ed  
a n a l y s i s  must incorpora te  no t  only s u b s t a n t i v e  elements, 
however, but  a l s o  e x p l i c i t  procedural mechanisms f o r  
nego t i a t ing  t h e  terms of reference  of t h e  assessment, f o r  
openly debat ing its assumptions and judgments where 
uncer ta in ty  e x i s t s ,  and f o r  developing and l e g i t i m i z i n g  a 
consensus on its conclusions,  
PROSPECTS FOR UNIFIED AXALYSIS 
Only i n  a f e w  i n s t ances ,  al l  r ecen t ,  has  r i s k  assess- 
ment a c t u a l l y  been incorpora ted  i n t o  environmental impact 
assessment s t u d i e s ,  Beanlands (1984b) r e p o r t s  t h a t  r i s k  
assessment is now s t a t e d  as an E I A  requirement i n  Canada, 
and was conducted most r e c e n t l y  as p a r t  of a 1983 assessment 
of Beaufort  Sea o i l  and gas development. Paradine (1984) 
i d e n t i f i e s  Canadian a p p l i c a t i o n s  t o  hydrocarbon p r o j e c t s  , 
nuclear  power p l a n t s ,  f o r e s t r y  p r o j e c t s ,  and a few o t h e r s  
such a s  hazardous t r a i n  derailment.  
I n  t h e  U.S. a r i s k  assessment of a s o r t ,  r e f e r r e d  t o  as 
a "worst case analys is , .  is requi red  w i t h i n  t h e  context  of 
an environmental impact s ta tement  by U.S, a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  
r egu la t ions  i n  cases  where information about  p o s s i b l e  
impacts is necessary t o  an informed dec i s ion ,  is no t  
a v a i l a b l e ,  and would be t o o  c o s t l y  o r  impossible  t o  obta in ,  
To date only a few such analyses  have been prepared, bu t  
t h r e e  of them have been contes ted  i n  t h e  cour t s ,  and t h e  
U.S. Council on Environmental Qual i ty  has  r e c e n t l y  proposed 
- amid s u b s t a n t i a l  controversy - t o  drop t h e  requirement 
(Reeve, 1984; U.S. Council on Environmental Q u a l i t y ,  1985).  
The controversy over worst-case a n a l y s i s  i l l u s t r a t e s  
w e l l  t h e  c o n f l i c t  between substance and process  i n  evalua- 
t i n g  po l i cy  analyses ,  As substance,  worst-case a n a l y s i s  is 
no t  t h e  favored approach of t h e  p ro fess iona l  r i s k  assessment 
community, i n  t h a t  it emphasizes specu la t ion  about t h e  worst  
conceivable outcomes r a t h e r  than  p r e c i s e  e s t ima t ion  of t h e  
most probable ones. As process ,  however, it is one of t h e  
f e w  a v a i l a b l e  .action-forcing. mechanisms - l i k e  t h e  EIA 
i t s e l f  - by which an  unwil l ing agency can be compelled t o  
acknowledge r i s k s  and u n c e r t a i n t i e s  t h a t  it would r a t h e r  
ignore. 
I n  t h e  cases a t  i s s u e ,  f o r  ins t ance  - concerning 
proposals  f o r  aerial spraying  of chemical p e s t i c i d e s  by t h e  
Bureau of Land Management f o r  f o r e s t  i n s e c t  con t ro l  - t h e  
i n t e rvenors  c i t e  publ ished s c i e n t i f i c  s t u d i e s ,  not  mere 
specula t ion ,  as evidence f o r  poss ib le  adverse e f f e c t s ,  and 
they  po in t  out  t h a t  t h e  agency simply had no e x p e r t i s e  on 
such hea l th  e f f e c t s  and had made no at tempt  t o  acqu i re  it, 
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If  CEQ r e sc inds  t h e  requirement, the re fo re ,  and l eaves  t h e  
a n a l y s i s  t o  t h e  agency's d i s c r e t i o n a r y  judgment, t h e  r e s u l t  
may no t  be b e t t e r  r i s k  assessment but  no r i s k  assessment, 
s ince  t h e  b a s i s  f o r  l e g a l  challenge t o  i t s  absence w i l l  be 
removed (Northwest Coa l i t ion  f o r  A l t e r n a t i v e s  t o  P e s t i c i d e s ,  
1985).  
I f  no t  worst-case ana lys i s ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  some a l t e r n a t i v e  
aact ion-forcinga mechanism is necessary t o  provide an open 
and l e g i t i m a t e  forum f o r  debate,  and t o  compel t h e  acknow- 
ledgement of r i s k  and uncer t a in ty  by unwil l ing agencies.  
One mechanism might be t o  keep t h e  worst-case a n a l y s i s  
requirement i n  place,  but  t o  use t h e  scoping process  t o  
de f ine  what reasonable range of worst-case scenar ios  should 
be considered. Al t e rna t ive ly ,  one could r e q u i r e  some 
p r e f e r a b l e  procedure f o r  r i s k  assessment wi th in  EIA,  but  i n  
s u f f i c i e n t l y  e x p l i c i t  terms t o  keep open t h e  opportuni ty f o r  
ex te rna l  l e g a l  p ressu re  t o  demand it. 
Benef i t s  
On i n t e l l e c t u a l  grounds, environmental impact and r i s k  
assessment would both be improved by combining them i n t o  a 
u n i f i e d  a n a l y t i c a l  process,  
Subs tant ive ly ,  environmental impact assessment would 
b e n e f i t  from t h e  g r e a t e r  s o p h i s t i c a t i o n  of r i s k  assessment 
i n  t h e  t reatment  of p r e d i c t i v e  a n a l y s i s  and p r o b a b i l i t y ,  and 
should i n  any event incorpora te  more e x p l i c i t  cons ide ra t ion  
of h e a l t h  e f f e c t s ,  R i s k  assessment i n  t u r n  should be 
app l i ed  t o  a  broader range of r i s k s  than j u s t  mor ta l i ty  from 
cancer and c a t a s t r o p h i c  acc idents ,  
A s  a process ,  r i s k  assessment has  much t o  l e a r n  from 
experience with environmental impact assessment i n  such 
a r e a s  a s  scoping, comparative a n a l y s i s  of a l t e r n a t i v e s ,  
formal procedures f o r  incorpora t ing  s u b j e c t i v e  values,  and 
i n t e g r a t i o n  i n t o  non-regulatory dec i s ion  processes,  
P r a c t i c a l l y  speaking, moreover, many a c t i o n s  i n  f a c t  
need both environmental impact and r i s k  assessment, and one 
would g e t  more usefu l  ana lyses  by combining t h e  two. Among 
t h e  most obvious examples of such a c t i o n s  a r e  dec is ions  t o  
s i t e  energy production hazardous waste t reatment  and 
d i sposa l ,  and o the r  i n d u s t r i a l  f a c i l i t i e s ;  environmental 
a p p l i c a t i o n s  of biotechnology; and even more mundane 
programs such as p e s t i c i d e  a p p l i c a t i o n  f o r  a g r i c u l t u r a l  and 
f o r e s t  management. While U.S. f e d e r a l  gu ide l ines  may be 
slow t o  merge them, Canadian and European p r a c t i c e  a r e  
a l r eady  beginning t o  do so ,  as a r e  some s t a t e  and l o c a l  
governments i n  t h e  D,S, ( f o r  ins t ance ,  i n  a s sess ing  t h e  
p o s s i b l e  impacts of waste i n c i n e r a t o r s ) ,  
Substance,  Process ,  and Outcomes 
There is good reason f o r  optimism, t h e r e f o r e ,  about t h e  
prospects  f o r  i n t e g r a t i n g  environmental impact and r i s k  
assessments i n t o  a u n i f i e d  a n a l y t i c a l  process.  Research and 
experimental  a p p l i c a t i o n s  w i l l  be needed t o  develop such a 
process ,  but  t h e  idea  is both f e a s i b l e  and t imely.  A l l  t h a t  
i s  r e a l l y  needed is a few good cases t o  work ou t  t h e  i s s u e s  
i n  concre te  s e t t i n g s ,  and t h e  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  sponsorship - 
e i t h e r  by governments, o r  by a respected  i n s t i t u t i o n  of 
appl ied  research such as I IASA - t o  work o u t  p ro toco l s  f o r  
u n i f i e d  ana lys i s .  
One s u b t l e r  but fundamental i s s u e  remains unresolved by 
t h i s  recommendation, however, namely t h e  domain of s i t u a -  
t i o n s  t h a t  warrant  such ana lys i s .  Some promising t a r g e t  
a c t i o n s  have been suggested,  but  i n  a broader sense t h e  most 
important causes of hazards - both t o  human h e a l t h  and 
environmental processes  - o f t e n  l i e  i n  s i t u a t i o n s  where 
t h e r e  is not  y e t  a s p e c i f i c  proposal f o r  government a c t i o n  
t h a t  would t r i g g e r  such an assessment. Examples inc lude  
urban encroachment i n  f lood  p l a i n s ,  i n  o t h e r  areas of 
n a t u r a l  hazard, and around hazardous i n d u s t r i a l  p l a n t s ;  and 
some bus iness  uses of t o x i c  chemicals, both in i ndus t ry  and 
a g r i c u l t u r e ,  whose e f f e c t s  on groundwater, human hea l th ,  and 
o t h e r  outcomes a r e  now a t t r a c t i n g  i n c r e a s i n g  concern. 
I n  a d d i t i o n  t o  developing u n i f i e d  ana lyses  f o r  proposed 
a c t i o n s ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  an important s u b j e c t  f o r  research  is t h e  
a p p l i c a t i o n  of s i m i l a r  ana lyses  t o  e x i s t i n g  complexes of 
hazards t h a t  t h r e a t e n  human populat ions and ecosystems. The 
purpose of t h i s  s o r t  of a n a l y s i s  is n o t  simply t o  e v a l u a t e  a 
s i n g l e  proposed ac t ion ,  but  t o  set p r i o r i t i e s  f o r  hazard 
management. Given a h ighly  urbanized a r e a  o r  an eco log ica l  
region, f o r  ins tance ,  what a r e  t h e  important  hazards t h a t  
warrant  management response,  and how might one set 
p r i o r i t i e s  and develop a l t e r n a t i v e  management s t r a t e g i e s  t o  
m i t i g a t e  them? This t a s k  w i l l  r e q u i r e  development of a 
somewhat d i f f e r e n t  approach t o  assessment, b u t  such an 
e f f o r t  would have s u b s t a n t i a l  payoffs  both f o r  advancing t h e  
methods of r i s k  assessment and f o r  improving t h e  
e f f e c t i v e n e s s  of r i s k  management, 
d n d m s ,  R.N.L. 
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Environmental Impact Assessment ( E I A )  a s  we know i t  to-day o r i g i n a t e d  i n  
1969 wi th  t h e  Nat iona l  Environmental Pol icy  Act (NEPA), i n  t h e  United S t a t e s .  
The f o r m a l i z a t i o n  of t h e  p r o c e s s  i n  Canada t o o k  p l a c e  i n  1973 w i t h  t h e  
i n i t i a t i o n  of  t h e  E n v i r o n m e n t a l  Asses smen t  Review P r o c e s s  (EARP) and t h e  
e s t ab l i shmen t  of t h e  Fede ra l  Environmental Assessment Review O f f i c e  (FEARO). 
P r o v i n c i a l  governments soon fo l lowed with t h e i r  own l e g i s l a t i o n  and procedures  
f o r  EIA b e g i n n i n g  i n  1973  (Couch -- e t  a l .  1983) .  S i n c e  t h e n  t h e  l i t e r a t u r e  on 
and t h e  volume of environmental  impact s t a t emen t s  i n  Canada have grown r a p i d l y  
(Munn 1975; Beanlands and Duinker 1983; Whitney and Maclaren 1985). 
During t h e  same per iod  i n t e r e s t  i n  r i s k  concepts  a l s o  grew apace. The 
s u b s t a n t i a l  work on t e c h n i c a l  r i s k  a n a l y s i s  t h a t  was c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  of  t h e  
p e r i o d  up t o  t h e  1970s  began  t o  be  c o u p l e d  w i t h  e p i d e m i o l o g i c a l  and n a t u r a l  
h a z a r d s  r e s e a r c h ,  and a l s o  w i t h  t h e  more g e n e r a l  r e c o g n i t i o n  t h a t  t h e  r i s k  
ana lyses  of t h e  p o t e n t i a l  f a i l u r e  of complex t e c h n i c a l  f a c i l i t i e s  should be 
expanded t o  cope w i t h  t h e  c o n s e q u e n c e s  of t h o s e  f a i l u r e s  - t h a t  i s ,  a  " r i s k  
con tex tn  was now needed i n  a d d i t i o n  t o  r i s k  q u a n t i f i c a t i o n .  Impor tan t  s t i m u l i  
came f r o m  t h e  w r i t i n g s  of  S t a r r  (19721, Tve r sky  and Kahneman (19741, Rowe 
(19771, Lawless (19771, Lowrance (1976) a s  we l l  a s  t h e  l i t e r a t u r e  on n a t u r a l  
hazards  (Burton, Kates and White 19781, r i s k s  t o  h e a l t h  and s a f e t y ,  and r i s k s  
t o  ecosystem s t r u c t u r e  and func t ion  (Burton, Fowle and McCullough 1982). More 
r e c e n t l y ,  i n t e r d i s c i p l i n a r y  symposia have r e f l e c t e d  t h e  growing r ecogn i t i on  of 
t h e  p o t e n t i a l  f o r  c ros s - sec to ra l  a p p l i c a t i o n  of r i s k  concepts ,  and a l s o  of t h e  
many f a c t o r s  which f r u s t r a t e  o u r  a t t e m p t s  t o  cope  w i t h  r i s k s  (Warner  1982;  
Rogers and Bates 1983). 
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Even more than  these  t h e o r e t i c a l  and s c h o l a r l y  papers  however, t h e  main 
d r i v i n g  f o r c e  b e h i n d  t h e  i n c r e a s i n g  i n t e r e s t  i n  " r i s k "  h a s  been  t h e  g r o w i n g  
s o c i a l  and  p o l i t i c a l  c o n c e r n  o v e r  t h e  management and  mismanagement  of  a  
bewi lder ing  a r r a y  of p o t e n t i a l l y  h a z a r d o u s  s y s t e m s ,  p r o d u c t s ,  p r o j e c t s  and  
t e c h n o l o g i e s .  Many o f  t h e s e  " h a z a r d s "  a r e  a l r e a d y  s u b j e c t  t o  r i s k  a n a l y s e s  
e.g. t e s t s  on new d r u g s ,  f a u l t - t r e e  a n a l y s e s  f o r  n u c l e a r  r e a c t o r s  - and  t h e  
ex tens ion  of r i s k  a n a l y s i s  methodologies t o  more g e n e r a l  " r i s k  assessments"  i s  
a  n a t u r a l  development i n  t h e  a p p l i c a t i o n  of r i s k  theory. 
Given t h e s e  c i rcumstances ,  i t  is  perhaps t i m e l y  t o  i n q u i r e  whether o r  
no t  t h e  f i e l d s  of " r i s k  assessment"  and "environmental  impact  assessment"  can 
be mutua l ly  suppor t ive ;  both f i e l d s  have much i n  common and have evolved t o  
t h e  p o i n t  where  t h e i r  d i f f e r e n t  pa thways  t o w a r d s  a n  a p p r o p r i a t e  mix of  
s c i e n t i f i c  r i g o u r ,  s o c i a l  concern and p o l i t i c a l  judgement may be converging. 
I n  Sec t ion  1 we o u t l i n e  t h e  background a c t i v i t i e s  and p u b l i c a t i o n s  t h a t  
complement t h i s  paper. I n  Sec t ion  2 w e  argue t h e  advantages and l i m i t a t i o n s  
o f  r i s k  a s s e s s m e n t  a p p l i c a t i o n s  i n  EIA. We d e f i n e  some r i s k  c o n c e p t s  i n  
Sec t ion  3 be fo re  we provide t h e  underlying r a t i o n a l e  f o r  t h e  a p p l i c a t i o n  of 
r i s k  a s s e s s m e n t  i n  EIA ( S e c t i o n  4 )  and  t h e s e  d e f i n i t i o n s  a r e  a d a p t e d  a s  a  
f r amework  f o r  i d e n t i f y i n g  t h e  r e s e a r c h  n e e d s  i n  r i s k  a n a l y s i s  ( S e c t i o n  51 ,  
p u b l i c  involvement (Sec t ion  61, r i s k  assessment  and t h e  concept of "acceptab le  
r i s k "  ( S e c t i o n  7 )  and  managing  t h e  p r o c e s s  ( S e c t i o n  8) .  I n  S e c t i o n  9 w e  
sugges t  some r e sea rch  p r i o r i t i e s .  
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1. BACKGROUND ACTIVITIES 
I n  l a t e  1984 a  r i s k  assessment  (RA) p r o j e c t  was s t a r t e d  a t  t h e  I n s t i t u t e  
f o r  Environmental S tud i e s  (IES), Univers i ty  of Toronto, under t h e  l e a d e r s h i p  
of  Ted Munn, now a t  IIASA. The R A  p r o j e c t  i s  s u p p o r t e d  by t h e  U n i v e r s i t y  of  
T o r o n t o ,  H e a l t h  and W e l f a r e  Canada,  Envi ronment  Canada,  O n t a r i o  Hydro, t h e  
N a t i o n a l  R e s e a r c h  Council/SCOPE and t h e  F e d e r a l  E n v i r o n m e n t a l  Asses smen t  
Review Of f i ce  (FEARO). A workshop on Risk Assessment i n  EIA was convened i n  
Apr i l  1985 a t  Seneca College,  King City,  Ontario.  The workshop program i s  i n  
t h e  Appendix t o  t h i s  paper. A second workshop on Informat ion  Needs f o r  Risk 
Assessment was convened a t  t h e  Guild Inn, Scarborough, Ontar io  i n  September 
1985. A summary paper based on t h e  second workshop has  been prepared f o r  t h i s  
volume by P r o f e s s o r  C. David Fowle.  About 50 a c a d e m i c s ,  c o n s u l t a n t s  and 
government s c i e n t i s t s  a t tended  each workshop t o  review i n v i t e d  papers  which 
a r e  being r e v i s e d  f o r  publ ica t ion .  
I n  e a r l y  1985,  t h e  Canadian  Envi ronmenta l  Assessment Research Council  
(CEARC) asked IES t o  prepare  a  r e p o r t  t h a t  would i d e n t i f y  t h e  r e sea rch  needs 
and o p p o r t u n i t i e s  r e l e v a n t  t o  t h e  a p p l i c a t i o n  of r i s k  management concepts  i n  
EIA. I n  March 1985 a  p r e l i m i n a r y  m e e t i n g  was h e l d  a t  IES a t  which a  dozen  
e x p e r t s  d i scussed  r e sea rch  needs and p r i o r i t i e s .  A d r a f t  r e p o r t  was presented 
t o  CEARC i n  e a r l y  Oc tobe r :  a  f i n a l  d r a f t  on which t h i s  p a p e r  i s  based  was 
submi t ted  i n  January 1986. We have bene f i t ed  from a l l  t he se  p r e s e n t a t i o n s ,  
d i s cus s ions  and reviews. 
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2. RISK AND EU 
A s  Paradine (1985) no t e s ,  r i s k  assessment  has been used e x t e n s i v e l y  i n  
Canadian EIAs of hydrocarbon exp lo ra t i on  i n  t h e  Arctic and off-shore,  and i n  
EIAs o f  n u c l e a r  power p l a n t s  and r e l a t e d  t e c h n o l o g y  (e.g. u r an ium mining) .  
The r o l e  of r i s k  assessment  i n  EIA i s  l i k e l y  t o  i n c r e a s e  i n  p a r t  because of a  
growing concern on t h e  p a r t  'of t h e  publ ic ,  t h e  media and t h e  p o l i t i c i a n s  about 
t h e  f a i l u r e s  of complex technologies .  Bhopal, Seveso, Three Mile  I s l and ,  t o  
m e n t i o n  b u t  a  f ew  c e l e b r a t e d  examples ,  have  l e f t  a  d e e p  i m p r e s s i o n  on t h e  
publ ic ,  e s p e c i a l l y  t h e  p u b l i c  most exposed t o  t h e  consequences of technologi-  
c a l  f a i l u r e .  The a s s e s s o r s  o f  EIA may a l s o  be e x p e c t e d  t o  make more u s e  of  
r i s k  assessments ,  because r i s k  assessment  provides  a  s u i t a b l e  formal  framework 
f o r  recommending m i t i g a t i o n  m e a s u r e s  t h a t  c o u l d  r e d u c e  t h e  c h a n c e s  o f  
t e c h n o l o g i c a l  f a i l u r e  and  m i t i g a t e  t h e i r  c o n s e q u e n c e s  of  f a i l u r e .  The 
a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  r i s k  a s s e s s m e n t  p r i n c i p l e s  i n  EIA may, t h e r e f o r e ,  l e a d  t o  
b e t t e r  and a l s o  more widely understood - and t h e r e f o r e  more widely accepted - 
dec i s ions  i n  EIA. 
Whether t h e  a p p l i c a t i o n  of r i s k  p r i n c i p l e s  i n  EIA would r e s u l t  i n  b e t t e r  
dec i s ions  would depend i n  p a r t  on t h e  t e c h n i c a l  adequacy of t h e  a n a l y s i s  and 
i n  p a r t  on t h e  d e g r e e  t o  which  t h e  d e c i s i o n  i t s e l f  i s  amenab le  t o  t e c h n i c a l  
ana lys i s .  Th i s  q u a l i f i c a t i o n  i s  p a r t i c u l a r l y  r e l e v a n t  t o  ou r  s tudy because i t  
a p p l i e s  t o  EIA t o o .  We v i e w  r i s k  a s s e s s m e n t  a n d  EIA a s  p r i m a r i l y  
p l a n n i n g  t o o l s  o r  t e c h n i q u e s  f o r  s o r t i n g  o u t  d a t a  and  i n f o r m a t i o n .  The 
d e c i s i o n s  t h a t  f o l l o w  would depend p r i m a r i l y  on b o t h  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  c o n t e x t  
(i.e. which i n t e r e s t s  wie ld  more power) and on t h e  s o c i e t a l  commitment t o  such 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  a s  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  q u a l i t y ,  d i s t r i b u t i o n a l  e t h i c s ,  c u l t u r a l  
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i n t e g r i t y  and in t e r -gene ra t i ona l  equi ty .  I n  t h i s  regard  r i s k  assessment  and 
management could be u s e f u l  i n  EIA by emphasizing t h e  i n e x t r i c a b l y  r i sk- laden  
l i v e s  we l e a d  wi th  o r  without  formal  assessment1 
I n  b r i e f ,  t h e  r i s k  concept i s  u s e f u l  i n  po in t ing  ou t  both t h e  l i m i t s  of 
sc ience  ( s c i e n t i f i c  u n c e r t a i n t y )  and t h e  l i m i t s  of p u b l i c  consensus. However, 
we do not subsc r ibe  t o  t h e  view t h a t  r i s k  assessment  - o r  EIA - i s  designed t o  
f o r c e  a  s h i f t  i n  p u b l i c  a t t i t u d e s  t o w a r d s  t h e  e n v i r o n m e n t  o r  n e c e s s a r i l y  
t o w a r d s  more e q u i t a b l e  a l l o c a t i o n s  of r e s o u r c e s .  L i k e  o t h e r  t e c h n i q u e s  of  
p o l i c y  a n a l y s i s  i n  t h e  p a s t  (e.g. EIA, b e n e f i t - c o s t  a n a l y s i s ,  l o c a t i o n -  
a l l o c a t i o n  a n a l y s i s ) ,  r i s k  assessment  i s  an a n a l y t i c a l  t o o l  and could be used 
by d i f f e r e n t  i n t e r e s t s  t o  f u r t h e r  t h e i r  p u r p o s e s .  R i s k  a s s e s s m e n t  i s  n o t  
e x p e c t e d  t o  r e s o l v e  " v a l u e "  q u e s t i o n s  b u t  t o  c l a r i f y  t h e  i m p l i c a t i o n s  of  
a l t e r n a t i v e  d e c i s i o n s  f o r  value-groups. To us ,  t h a t  i s  a  powerful  argument 
f o r  t h e  more s p e c i f i c  t r e a t m e n t  of  r i s k .  We s h o u l d  add t h a t  no a n a l y t i c a l  
t o o l  i s  e n t i r e l y  v a l u e - n e u t r a l :  a n o t h e r  r e a s o n  t o  i n s i s t  on t h e  explicit 
t r ea tmen t  of r i s k  i n  EIA. 
3 .  WORKING DEFINITIONS 
We argued above t h a t  t h e  e x p l i c i t  t r ea tmen t  of " r i s k "  concepts  i n  EIAs 
could h e l p  t o  c l a r i f y  and cod i fy  some of t h e  e x i s t i n g  a spec t s  of t h e  process  
and could a l s o  po in t  t h e  way t o  new developments i n  t h e  e x i s t i n g  process.  A s  
a  p re l imina ry  s t e p ,  it  i s  necessary  t o  exp la in  what we mean by r i s k  assessment  
and management and how t h e y  r e l a t e  t o  EIA. The d e f i n i t i o n s  i n  t h e  
l i t e r a t u r e  v a r y  c o n s i d e r a b l y ;  however ,  we assume t h a t  a s  l o n g  a s  we a r e  
r e a s o n a b l y  c l e a r  a b o u t  what we mean, and  t h e  d e f i n i t i o n s  we o f f e r  a r e  
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r e l a t i v e l y  f r e e  from ambigui ty ,  we need no t  become involved i n  a  deba te  about 
semantics.  
We d e f i n e  r i s k ,  a f t e r  Lowrance (1976:8) a s  [ a  judgement  a b o u t  t h e 1  
measure of p r o b a b i l i t y  and s e v e r i t y  of harm t o  human h e a l t h  land t h e  h e a l t h  of  
human ecosystems,  b roadly  defined].  Most of t h e  r i s k  l i t e r a t u r e  d e a l s  w i th  
r i s k s  t o  p e o p l e ,  and  r i s k  i m p a c t s  a r e  g e n e r a l l y  measured  i n  terms of  
m o r t a l i t y ,  p r e m a t u r e  d e a t h  and  m o r b i d i t y .  We have ,  howeve r ,  a l s o  i n c l u d e d  
environmental  r i s k s  such a s  impacts  on ecosystem s t r u c t u r e  and func t ion ,  on 
amenity and h e r i t a g e  va lues  and on economic well-being. 
R i s k  a n a l y s i s ,  i s  t h e  measurement  of t h e  l i k e l i h o o d  and s e v e r i t y  o f  
harm. R i s k  a n a l y s i s  i s  u s u a l l y  made up  of r i s k  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  and r i s k  
e s t i m a t i o n ;  t h e  l a t t e r  i s  t h e  a t t e m p t  t o  e s t i m a t e  s c i e n t i f i c a l l y ,  
m a t h e m a t i c a l l y ,  s t a t i s t i c a l l y ,  o r  by some o t h e r  r i g o r o u s  p r o c e d u r e  t h e  
p r o b a b i l i t i e s  of an event  and t h e  consequences a s s o c i a t e d  wi th  it. General ly ,  
r i s k  a n a l y s i s  i s  t h e  mos t  t ime-consuming ,  c o s t l y  and t e c h n i c a l l y  d i f f i c u l t  
p a r t  of r i s k  a s s e s s m e n t ,  r e q u i r i n g  d a t a  c o l l e c t i o n  and a n a l y s i s ,  i n  a r e a s  
where needed d a t a  o f t e n  do not  e x i s t  and where a n a l y s i s  of t h e s e  d a t a  can be 
more of  an  a r t  t h a n  a  s c i e n c e .  Because  r i s k  a n a l y s i s  o f t e n  i n v o l v e s  
p r o b a b i l i t i e s ,  s t a t i s t i c s  and  e p i d e m i o l o g i c a l  d a t a ,  i t  may be d i f f i c u l t  t o  
convey t h e  r e s u l t s  of an a n a l y s i s  t o  t h e  pub l i c  and t o  non-spec ia l i s t s .  
Next comes r i s k  e v a l u a t i o n .  I n  t h i s  volume we u s e  r i s k  a s s e s s m e n t  
i n t e r c h a n g e a b l y  w i t h  t h e  t e r m  r i s k  e v a l u a t i o n .  It i s  a t  t h i s  s t a g e  t h a t  
v a l u e s  and  judgemen t s  e n t e r  t h e  p r o c e s s  e x p l i c i t l y  o r  i m p l i c i t l y  by t h e  
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i n c l u s i o n  of  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  of t h e  i m p o r t a n c e  of t h e  a s s e s s e d  r i s k s  and t h e  
a s s o c i a t e d  s o c i a l ,  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  and economic  c o n s e q u e n c e s  i n  o r d e r  t o  
i d e n t i f y  a  r a n g e  o f  a l t e r n a t i v e s  f o r  managing t h e  r i s k s ,  and t o  c o n s i d e r  
w h e t h e r  o r  n o t  t h e  p roposed  change  a s  a  whole i s  a c c e p t a b l e .  E v a l u a t i o n  
r e q u i r e s  t h e  de t e rmina t ion  of t h e  t r a d e o f f s  between t h e  var ious  b e n e f i c i a l  and 
a d v e r s e  i m p a c t s  a n d . f o r  t h i s  r e a s o n ,  t h e  v i e w s  of  v a r i o u s  i n t e r e s t  o r  v a l u e  
groups need t o  be s o l i c i t e d  and considered. 
We use risk management a s  t h e  o v e r a l l  term t o  i nc lude  t h e  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  
and q u a n t i f i c a t i o n  of r i s k s  a s s o c i a t e d  wi th  a  proposa l /ac t ion ,  t h e  eva lua t ion  
o f  a l t e r n a t i v e  s t r a t e g i e s  and d e s i g n s  t h a t  m i t i g a t e  t h e s e  r i s k s  o r  t h e i r  
c o n s e q u e n c e s ,  and t h e  d e c i s i o n  and i m p l e m e n t a t i o n  of a  p r e f e r r e d  c o u r s e  of  
ac t ion .  Risk management i nc ludes  t h e  e n t i r e  range of methods of coping wi th  
r i s k  r a t i o n a l l y  and s y s t e m a t i c a l l y .  
Next we d i s c u s s  o u r  u n d e r l y i n g  r a t i o n a l e  f o r  t h e  u s e  of  " r i s k n  i n  EIA: 
t h e  use of r i s k  focusses  a t t e n t i o n  on one of t h e  fundamental i s s u e s  of making 
p r e d i c t i o n s  - t h e  ques t i on  of unce r t a in ty ,  s c i e n t i f i c  and s o c i e t a l .  
4. UNDERLYING RATIONALE: TEE QUESTION OF UNCERTAINTY 
We be l i eve  t h a t  t h e  f i r s t  b e n e f i c i a l  e f f e c t  of t h e  a p p l i c a t i o n  of r i s k  
t o  EIA would be t o  i n f u s e  t h e  whole process  with t h e  r i s k  philosophy. That i s  
t o  s a y ,  we would r e j e c t  t h e  d i c h o t o m y  of  s a f e  and u n s a f e  w i t h  i t s  i m p l i e d  
-
c e r t a i n t i e s ,  and e x p l i c i t l y  recognise  t h a t  we a r e  always dea l ing  wi th  a  range 
of  r i s k s ,  and t h a t  w h i l e  i t  i s  t r u e  t h a t  by a  c o m b i n a t i o n  of s c i e n t i f i c  and 
s o c i e t a l  j u d g m e n t s  we may a r r i v e  a t  a  l e v e l  of  " a c c e p t a b l e  r i s k n ,  we a r e  
c o n s t a n t l y  dea l ing  wi th  some range of p r o b a b i l i t y  and consensus and no t  i ron-  
c l a d  c e r t a i n t y  o r  u n i v e r s a l  a c c e p t a b i l i t y .  I n  t h i s  s e c t i o n  we f o c u s  on 
unce r t a in ty :  t h e  s o c i e t a l  judgements and range of consensus ( o r  c o n f l i c t )  a r e  
d i s c u s s e d  i n  a  l a t e r  s ec t i on .  
S c i e n t i f i c  Unce r t a in ty  
P r a c t i t i o n e r s  of EIA have c o n s t a n t l y  t o  d e a l  w i th  two pe r spec t ives  on 
s c i e n t i f i c  u n c e r t a i n t y  r e l a t i v e  t o  i m p a c t s :  u n c e r t a i n t y  a s  p e r c e i v e d  by  
s c i e n t i s t s ,  and u n c e r t a i n t y  a s  perceived by laymen (i.e. non - spec i a l i s t s  and 
t h e  p u b l i c  and s o m e t i m e s  by  s c i e n t i s t s  who do n o t  s h a r e  t h e  same m i n d s e t ) .  
Uncer ta in ty  i s  a  fundamental component of t h e  s c i e n t i f i c  method: ques t ion ing ,  
doubt,  c r i t i c i s m  and c l a r i f i c a t i o n  a r e  b a s i c  f u n c t i o n s  of good science.  The 
progress  of t h e i r  d i s c i p l i n e  depends upon s c i e n t i s t s  c o n s t a n t l y  a t t empt ing  t o  
undermine - and go beyond - t h e i r  most cher i shed  l aws  and paradigms. However, 
t h i s  i n t r i n s i c  u n c e r t a i n t y  o f t e n  comes a c r o s s  t o  t h e  p u b l i c  a s  a  l a c k  of 
c o n t r o l ,  o r  a  l a c k  of understanding. 
Th i s  p re sen t s  t h e  au thors  of EIAs wi th  a  f a m i l i a r  dilemma. I f  they  make 
c a t e g o r i c a l  s t a t emen t s  o r  make d e f i n i t i v e  pronouncements  w i t h o u t  q u a l i f i c a -  
t i o n ,  t h e y  a r e  open  t o  c r i t i c i s m  by t h e i r  p e e r s .  I f  t h e y  make q u a l i f i e d  
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s ,  t h e y  a r e  open  t o  a t t a c k  a s  b e i n g  "wishy-washy", "non- 
committal"., o r  "buck-passing" s i n c e  a l l  t h e  p re s su re  i s  on making t h e  " r i g h t "  
dec i s ion  f r e e  from u n c e r t a i n t y  a s  t o  t h e  consequences. 
I n  an EIA contex t  t hose  p r e d i c t i o n s  about which t h e r e  i s  gene ra l  agree- 
ment do n o t  r e q u i r e  e x t e n s i v e  r i s k  a n a l y s i s  b e f o r e  m i t i g a t i v e  m e a s u r e s  a r e  
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considered;  of course,  t h e r e  may o r  may not  be a s  much gene ra l  agreement about 
which  m i t i g a t i v e  m e a s u r e s  a r e  b e s t  (e.g. b u i l d i n g  a  dam t o  r e d u c e  f l o o d s  
v e r s u s  l a n d  u s e  zon ing ) .  Those  p r e d i c t i o n s  a b o u t  which  t h e r e  a r e  no r o b u s t  
hypotheses o r  d a t a  would b e n e f i t  from r i s k  assessment  on ly  t o  t h e  e x t e n t  t h a t  
r i s k  a n a l y s i s  would provide an organiz ing  framework f o r  looking  f o r  d a t a  and 
t e s t a b l e  r e l a t i o n s h i p s .  Meanwhile only s u b j e c t i v e  a n a l y s i s  i s  possible .  
There a r e  even t s  of low p r o b a b i l i t y  and high consequences (LOPHIC) such 
a s  Seveso, Bhopal. M i t i g a t i v e  measures f o r  LOPHIC r i s k s  tend  t o  be very c o s t l y  
a s  i n  t h e  ca se  of nuc lear  p l a n t s  and hazardous waste  d i s p o s a l  f a c i l i t i e s  whi le  
t h e  da t a  a r e  l i m i t e d  and s u b j e c t  t o  var ious  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s .  I n  t h e s e  ca se s  
r i s k  a s s e s s m e n t ,  even  i n  t h e  a b s e n c e  of h i s t o r i c a l  d a t a  p r o v i d e s  a  u s e f u l  
o rganiz ing  framework f o r  conduct ing r a t i o n a l  d i s cou r se  and f o r  improving t h e  
information base.  
Uncertainty about Societal Futures 
Tomorrow's  s o c i e t y  i s  shaped  by t o d a y ' s  d e c i s i o n s .  For  example ,  EIAs 
a r e  a  d e v i c e  f o r  e n s u r i n g  t h a t  t h e  f u t u r e  w i l l  n o t  be c a t a s t r o p h i c a l l y  
s u r p r i s i n g  a s  a  r e s u l t  of some new endeavour. Although an EIA i s  s p e c i f i c a l l y  
r e l a t e d  t o  some p a r t i c u l a r  p r o j e c t  o r  a r ea ,  it  i s  a l s o  worth keeping i n  mind 
t h a t  an EIA i s  a  l i g h t n i n g  rod f o r  a  whole range of s o c i a l  concerns,  s imply  by 
v i r t u e  of  i t s  a t t e m p t i n g  t o  d i s c u s s  t h e  f u t u r e  s y s t e m a t i c a l l y .  S i m i l a r l y ,  
" r i sk"  i s  a  p o l a r i s i n g  word, s i nce ,  l i k e  a  s t r o n g  magnet, it  s e t s  up f i e l d s  of 
concern w i t h i n  which people o r i e n t  t h e m s e l v e s  t o  p r o t e s t  a g a i n s t  o r  f i r m l y  
e s p o u s e  t h e  k i n d  o f  f u t u r e  t h a t  i s  p e r c e i v e d  t o  f o l l o w  a  d e c i s i o n .  P a r t  of  
t h e  a n s w e r  i s  t o  u n d e r s t a n d  b e t t e r  s o c i e t a l  u n c e r t a i n t y  i .e.  t h e  d e g r e e  of  
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consensus regarding societal futures - including the kind of economy and 
institutions we want or are likely to have in the future (e.g. a centrally 
planned economy versus a more loosely knit market economy). For example, 
some of the controversy in EIAs revolves around whether certain technologies 
favour the evolution of more centralized, larger institutions and whether such 
institutions are deqirable. We would like to make it clear that the issue is 
a political one and is more amenable to dialogue among value-groups than to 
technical information exchanges (cf. public hearings). However, the implica- 
tions of project development on institutional structures should be part of 
EIA. In addition some of the potential mitigative measures may be changes in 
institutional structures (e.g. compulsory, non-subsidized insurance for 
automobiles). 
One way of coping with this situation, as we have said, is to take both 
public concerns about societal uncertainty and scientific uncertainty into 
account, and subject them to equivalent seriousness in terms of future 
research on how to improve EIAs. In terms of social impacts, we are not just 
referring to alterations in the perception of various risks, but also 
referring to such issues as: given the range of risks that people already 
face, are additional risks worth taking on?; how will they fit into the 
overall spectrum of risk?; the question of equity: who is to be saddled with 
what risks, for how long, and for what benefits?; and the question of accept- 
ability: what is an acceptable risk, and what is an acceptable process for 
coming to that determination? The use of risk assessment in EIA would clarify 
the need to solicit a range of societal judgements so as to arrive at a 
pragmatic consensus among conflicting values and interests. 
Grima,  A.P. et  al. 
I n  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  s e c t i o n s ,  we l o o k  a t  t h e  r e s e a r c h  t h a t  may a s s i s t  i n  
answering t h e s e  and o t h e r  ques t i ons  we have r a i s e d  i n  our  in t roduc t ion .  We 
adopt a  v a r i a t i o n  of t h e  conceptual  models t h a t  a r e  reviewed by Krewski and 
Birkwood i n  t h i s  volume because 
"These models a r e  of g r e a t  va lue  i n  c l a r i f y i n g  t h e  main e lements  
of r i s k  assessment  and management, and have served t o  e s t a b l i s h  a  
w e l l  def ined  framework w i t h i n  which r e sea rch  may be addressed." 
These models d i s t i n g u i s h  among t h e  r i s k  concepts  t h a t  we def ined  above: r i s k  
a n a l y s i s ,  r i s k  eva lua t ion  and assessment ,  and r i s k  management. These s t a g e s  
of r i s k  assessment  and management p a r a l l e l  t h e  well-known s t e p s  of r a t i o n a l  
d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g  ( M c A l l i s t e r  1 9 8 0 )  and s e r v e  a s  u s e f u l  check  p o i n t s  i n  t h e  
i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  and  c l a r i f i c a t i o n  of  many i m p o r t a n t  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  i n  t h e  
complex process  of r i s k  management. 
5 .  TECBHICAL RISK ANALYSIS 
One o f  t h e  c r i t e r i a  f o r  j u d g i n g  t h e  q u a l i t y  of  a  r i s k  a n a l y s i s  i s  t h e  
e x t e n t  t o  which  e x i s t i n g  i n f o r m a t i o n  h a s  been  u t i l i z e d .  Because  of  t h e  
cont inu ing  problem of us ing  in fo rma t ion  gathered f o r  one purpose i n  o rde r  t o  
perform r i s k  ana lyses  f o r  another  purpose, t h e  e s t ab l i shmen t  of " t r a n s l a t i o n  
c r i t e r i a "  and s t anda rds  i s  c r u c i a l  i n  ensur ing  t h e  v i a b i l i t y  of r i s k  assess -  
ment. Among t h e  f i r s t  of t h e s e  c r i t e r i a  would be an e x p l i c i t  understanding 
about t h e  confidence ba r s  t o  be ass igned  t o  analyses .  Another c r i t e r i o n  would 
h e l p  d e f i n e  t h o s e  c a s e s  where  a  r i s k  a n a l y s i s  would p e r h a p s  be r u l e d  o u t ,  
s i n c e  t h e  i n f o r m a t i o n  a v a i l a b l e  was of  i n s u f f i c i e n t  q u a l i t y  o r  q u a n t i t y  t o  
make an a n a l y s i s  worthwhile. Can we devise  c r i t e r i a  f o r  what would c o n s t i t u t e  
s u f f i c i e n t  in format ion  of a p p r o p r i a t e  q u a l i t y ?  
Gttma, RP. et al. 
The b e s t  known p rob lem r e l a t e d  t o  u n c e r t a i n t y  i n  r i s k  e s t i m a t i o n  and 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  i s  t h a t  of low p r o b a b i l i t y  h i g h  consequence  (LOPHIC) r i s k .  
"Low p r o b a b i l i t y "  i s  o f t e n  a  euphemism f o r  no known p robab i l i t y :  t h e  l a c k  of a  
t r a c k  record makes t h e  p r e d i c t i o n  of t h e  event and t h e  consequences un re l i -  
able. Another d i f f i c u l t y  i s  t h a t  i n  o rde r  t o  p a i n t  a  r e a l i s t i c  " r i s k  p ic ture '  
we o f t e n  have  t o  u n d e r t a k e  c u m u l a t i v e  and  combined r i s k  a n a l y s e s .  Both of 
t h e s e  may be s u s c e p t i b l e  t o  s e r i o u s  e r r o r  through a d d i t i v e  o r  m u l t i p l i c a t i v e  
e f f e c t s  . 
R e l i a b i l i t y  i n  e s t i m a t e s  depends not  on ly  on t h e  q u a l i t y  of in format ion  
a v a i l a b l e ,  b u t  a l s o  on c a t c h i n g  t h e  ways i n  which  e r r o r s  c r e e p  i n t o  r i s k  
e s t ima t ions ,  e i t h e r  by t h e  a d d i t i v e  and m u l t i p l i c a t i v e  process ,  o r  by h e r o i c  
a s s u m p t i o n s  a b o u t  s u c h  p r o b l e m s  a s  human e r r o r .  How r e l i a b l e  do e s t i m a t e s  
need t o  be i n  o rde r  t o  be u s e f u l  f o r  r i s k  assessment  and management? 
One method of  r e d u c i n g  t e c h n i c a l  and i n t e r p r e t a t i v e  u n c e r t a i n t y  t o  a  
minimum i s  "worst-case" ana lys is .  This  kind of a n a l y s i s  while  exhaus t ive  - 
and e x h a u s t i n g  - may n o t  i l l u m i n a t e  t h e  r e a l  s i t u a t i o n  a s  r e g a r d s  r i s k .  
Rather t han  spending t ime  on examining h igh ly  imp laus ib l e  r i s k s ,  it might be 
worth ana lys ing  "worst  p l a u s i b l e  cases",  i.e. those  scena r ios  which a r e  b u i l t  
up by t e c h n i c a l  e x p e r t s ,  pane l  members, and t h e  p u b l i c  i n  o rde r  t o  ske tch  ou t  
a c c e p t a b l e  p i c t u r e s  of  what  t h e  f u t u r e  m i g h t  ho ld .  P u b l i c  i n p u t  i n t o  
d e v e l o p i n g  g u i d e l i n e s  ( a s  i n  Lepreau  11) c o u l d  i n c l u d e  t h e  b u i l d i n g  of  
p l a u s i b l e  scenarios .  Research i n  t h i s  a r ea  might address  t h e  s t r e n g t h s  and 
weaknesses of worst-case a n a l y s i s  and worst-plausible-case a n a l y s i s  i n  te rms  
of t h e  minimum n e c e s s a r y  t e c h n i c a l  i n f o r m a t i o n ,  t h e  a p p r o p r i a t e  l e v e l s  of  
understanding by non-spec ia l i s t s  and a c c e p t a b i l i t y  by i n t e r e s t e d  publics.  
Grtma, A.P. et  al. 
The p r e s e n t a t i o n  of t e c h n i c a l  in format ion  i s  a  g r e a t  p o t e n t i a l  s tumbl ing  
block i n  t h e  a p p l i c a t i o n  of r i s k  a n a l y s i s  t o  EIA. The unce r t a in  and probabi- 
l i s t i c  na tu re  of much of t h e  in format ion  provided, a s  w e l l  a s  t h e  mathematical  
l a n g u a g e  o f t e n  u sed  i n  r i s k  c a l c u l a t i o n s ,  c a n  make r i s k  a s s e s s m e n t  
t h r ea t en ing  r a t h e r  than en l igh t en ing  t o  t h e  layman. This  i s  a  c e n t r a l  i s s u e ,  
n o t  j u s t  f o r  t h e  a s s e s s o r s  and d e c i s i o n - m a k e r s  who must  make t h e  f i n a l  
a s s e s s m e n t s ,  b u t  a l s o  i n  o r d e r  t o  make p u b l i c  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  m e a n i n g f u l  and 
r e l e v a n t .  We need  t o  know w h e t h e r  n o n - s p e c i a l i s t s  f i n d  m a t h e m a t i c a l  r i s k  
a n a l y s i s  usefu l .  I f  no t ,  what e l s e  could one use?  
The manner of p r e s e n t a t i o n  should i d e a l l y  convey both what i s  known and 
what i s  not  known about t h e  r i s k  i n  quest ion.  i s  needed i n t o  t h e  development 
of an app rop r i a t e  language f o r  p r e sen t ing  r i s k  analyses .  We need t o  develop 
a i d s  (e.g. maps, t a b l e s ,  compu te r  s i m u l a t i o n  games )  t o  convey  t h e  n a t u r e  of  
d i f f e r e n t  types  of r i s k s .  How can we b e s t  t r a n s l a t e  t e c h n i c a l  r i s k  ana lyses  
i n t o  l aymen ' s  l a n g u a g e ?  How do we b e s t  convey  t h e  r e l i a b i l i t y  o f  r i s k  
e s t i m a t e s ?  We need t o  c l a r i f y  without  overs impl i fy ing .  We be l i eve  t h a t  t h e  
major r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  improving t e c h n i c a l  p r e s e n t a t i o n  - i.e. t r a n s l a t i n g  
t h e  r e s u l t s  and i m p l i c a t i o n s  of ana lyses  - l i e s  w i th  t h e  t e c h n i c a l  a n a l y s t s  
themselves.  
6 .  PUBLIC INVOLVEMENT 
The i n t e g r a t i o n  o f  t h e  c o n c e r n s  of t h e  p u b l i c  i n  r i s k  a s s e s s m e n t  i s  a  
c l e a r  p r i o r i t y  a r e a .  The d i f f i c u l t y ,  a s  we have  n o t e d  e l s e w h e r e  (e.g. Grima 
1985; Timmerman 19841, i s  t o  make those  concerns f e l t  i n  a  t ime ly ,  e q u i t a b l e ,  
e f f i c i e n t  and u s e f u l  f a s h i o n .  One v i t a l  p a r t  of  making any  fo rm of  r i s k  
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accep tab l e  i s  t h a t  t h e  process  by which t h e  dec i s ion  t o  assume (o r  impose) a  
b u r d e n  of  new r i s k  i s  made s h o u l d  i t s e l f  be  a c c e p t a b l e .  T h i s  p r o c e s s  i s  a  
very impor t an t  r e sea rch  area.  
The Pe rcep t ion  of  Risk 
The term " p e r c e p t i o n  of  r i s k "  c a r r i e s  w i t h  i t  t h e  s l i g h t l y  p e j o r a t i v e  
connota t ion  t h a t  t he  p u b l i c  has  "percept ions"  which a r e  mostly i l l u s o r y  and 
e m o t i o n a l l y  b a s e d ,  w h i l e  s c i e n t i s t s  and o t h e r  e x p e r t s  have  a  monopoly on 
o b j e c t i v e  r e a l i t y .  It would p e r h a p s  b e  b e t t e r  i f  we spoke  a b o u t  d i f f e r e n t  
"concept ions of r i s k "  he ld  by d i f f e r e n t  s t akeho lde r s ,  which would remind us  
t h a t  p e o p l e ' s  p e r c e p t i o n s  of  r i s k  a r e  o f t e n  a  f u n c t i o n  of t h e i r  e x p e r i e n c e s  
and concept ions of l i f e .  
I n  r e c e n t  yea r s ,  d i f f e r e n c e s  between what is  considered e x p e r t  opinion 
and t h e  views of t h e  p u b l i c  on m a t t e r s  of r i s k  (e.g. t h e  nuc l ea r  power debate)  
have  c r e a t e d  a  s u b s t a n t i a l  l i t e r a t u r e ,  much of wh ich  i s  r e f e r r e d  t o  a s  " t h e  
p e r c e p t i o n  o f  r i s k "  (Tve r sky  and Kahneman 1973:  Otway and Pahne r  1976: 
Kahneman -- e t  a 1  1982: Timmerman 1985). Con t rove r s i a l  i s s u e s ,  e s p e c i a l l y  ones 
which pose p o t e n t i a l  t h r e a t s  t o  human h e a l t h  and well-being, t end  t o  p o l a r i s e  
t h e  va r ious  p l a y e r s  i n  t h e  e v a l u a t i v e  process ,  and b r i n g  t o  t h e  s u r f a c e  many 
d i f f e r e n t  views, no t  j u s t  on t h e  s p e c i f i c  r i s k s  be ing  eva lua ted ,  bu t  a l s o  on 
t h e  i m p l i c a t i o n s  of t hose  r i s k s ,  on t h e  l e v e l s  of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  and account- 
a b i l i t y  of e l e c t e d  and non-elected p u b l i c  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s ,  and sometimes on 
t h e  whole f u t u r e  of s o c i e t y  and i n s t i t u t i o n s  (c f .  some of t h e  p r e s e n t a t i o n s  t o  
t h e  P o r t e r  Commission on E l e c t r i c a l  Power Planning i n  Ontario). 
Grtma, A.P. et al. 
Human beings have, over m i l l e n i a ,  l e a r n t  t o  use  "judgementn i n  dea l ing  
w i t h  r i s k .  They have  d e v e l o p e d  l a r g e l y  i n t u i t i v e  methods  of  s c a n n i n g  and 
s i m p l i f y i n g  t h e  v a s t  a r r a y  of  i ncoming  s t i m u l i  and i n f o r m a t i o n  i n  o r d e r  t o  
concen t r a t e  on those  phenomena which a r e  adap t ive ly  s i g n i f i c a n t :  methods which 
c a n  s o m e t i m e s  be s y s t e m a t i c a l l y  m i s l e a d i n g .  This  human conserva t i sm i n  t h e  
f a c e  of  u n c e r t a i n t y  u s e d  t o  be r e f e r r e d  t o  a s  "wisdom", and  s i n c e  wisdom i s  
n o t  a  q u a l i t y  much i n  abundance  t h e s e  d a y s ,  we s h o u l d  be c a r e f u l  a b o u t  
d i smi s s ing  it  ou t  of hand. 
I n  a  broader  pe r spec t ive ,  t h e  publ ic  m i s t r u s t  of expe r t  assessments  of 
r i s k  has  t o  do wi th ,  among o t h e r  t h ings ,  people 's  l o s s  of a  sense of s t a b i l i t y  
o r  c o n t r o l  o v e r  t h e i r  own l i v e s .  I n  a d d i t i o n  t h e r e  have  been o c c a s i o n s  when 
sc i ence  and e x p e r t i s e  have increased ,  r a t h e r  than  decreased, t h e  r i s k s  w i th  
which  some s e c t o r s  o f  s o c i e t y  have  t o  l i v e  (e.g. Love Cana l  r e s i d e n t s  and 
Bhopal  v i c t i m s ) .  F i n a l l y ,  a  l a r g e  s egmen t  of  t h e  p u b l i c  do n o t  f i n d  
q u a n t i t a t i v e  ana lyses  pe r suas ive  when t h e  i s s u e s  a r e  e s s e n t i a l l y  q u a l i t a t i v e  
e.g. t h e  o v e r r i d i n g  p r i o r i t y  t h a t  p e r s o n a l  h e a l t h  and  t h e  c a r e  of  c h i l d r e n  
have i n  both household and government budget-making i n  s p i t e  of c o n s t r a i n t s  
and m u l t i p l e  ob jec t ives .  
Public Participation 
The a c c e p t a b i l i t y  of  t h e  p r o c e s s  i t s e l f  i s  a n  i n t e g r a l  p a r t  of  t h e  
a c c e p t a b i l i t y  of t h e  r e s u l t s  of t h e  process.  The "due process"  of EIA i s  one 
of t h e  b e s t  ways of ensu r ing  t h a t  u n c e r t a i n t i e s  about f u t u r e  consequences a r e  
not  ignored,  bu t  a r e  s p e c i f i c a l l y  considered,  c l a r i f i e d  and communicated t o  
t h e  s t a k e h o l d e r s .  P r e s e n t a t i o n  of  d a t a  i n  c o m p e l l i n g  and c l e a r  f o r m s  i s  a  
f u n d a m e n t a l  r e s e a r c h  p r i o r i t y  i f  t h e  complex  t e r m i n o l o g y  of  much of  r i s k  
a n a l y s i s  i s  t o  be e a s i l y  and c o r r e c t l y  t r a n s l a t e d ,  r a t h e r  t han  s imply adding 
another  l a y e r  of f r u s t r a t i o n  t o  t h e  pub l i c  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  process. 
Research i s  needed i n t o  when, dur ing  t h e  process ,  e x p l i c i t  pub l i c  focus 
on r i s k  s h o u l d  take .  p l a c e .  The p r a c t i c e  o f  h a v i n g  p u b l i c  i n p u t  b e f o r e  t h e  
g u i d e l i n e s  f o r  t h e  EIS a r e  p r o m u l g a t e d  i s  t o  be  encouraged .  T h i s  h e l p s  t o  
ensure t h a t  some p a r t s  of t h e  pub l i c  concern a r e  p o t e n t i a l l y  r e s o l v a b l e  with- 
o u t  h a v i n g  t o  u n d e r t a k e  new s t u d i e s  i n  mid -p roces s .  FEAR0 i s  c u r r e n t l y  
e v a l u a t i n g  t h i s  p r a c t i c e  i n  t h e  Lep reau  I1 c a s e ;  t h i s  t y p e  of  r e s e a r c h  i s  
e s s e n t i a l  i f  w e  a r e  t o  l e a r n  from experience. 
P a r t i c i p a t i o n  mus t  be  h a n d l e d  s o  t h a t  d i f f e r e n c e s  o f  o p i n i o n  o v e r  t h e  
compe tence  o f  t e c h n i c a l  a n a l y s e s  a r e  c l e a r l y  i d e n t i f i e d .  The c r u c i a l  
i m p o r t a n c e  o f  t h i s  i s  t h a t  f a i l u r e  t o  p r o v i d e  a d e q u a t e  o r  c o m p e l l i n g  
r a t i o n a l e s  f o r  c e r t a i n  a s p e c t s  of  r i s k  a n a l y s i s  s u g g e s t s  t h a t  p r e d i c t i v e  
competence over  what w i l l  happen i n  t h e  f u t u r e  i s  l e s s  than  adequate ,  and t h i s  
very r a p i d l y  t r a n s l a t e s  i n t o  a  l o s s  of confidence i n  t h e  o v e r a l l  s t a t u s  of t h e  
EIA process .  
7. RISK EVALUATION AND ASSESWENT 
The eva lua t ion  and assessment  of r i s k  i n  an EIA comes a t  t h a t  po in t  i n  
t h e  p r o c e s s  when c o n f l i c t i n g  i n t e r e s t s  and v a l u e s  b e g i n  t o  b e  e x p l i c i t y  
f ac to red  i n t o  t h e  " r i s k  equation".  For any eva lua t ion  o r  assessment  t o  work 
s m o o t h l y  t h e r e  mus t  be  c o n f i d e n c e  on t h e  p a r t  of  a l l  s t a k e h o l d e r s  t h a t  " a l l  
bases  have been covered", and t h a t  t h e  a r r a y  of evidence before  t h e  decis ion-  
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maker  i s  a d e q u a t e  fo . r  some d e c i s i o n  t o  be  made. It i s  h e r e  t h a t  we need  
r e sea rch  i n t o  developing t h e  b e s t  and most manageable g u i d e l i n e s  f o r  i d e n t i -  
f y ing  t h e  f u l l  range of pos s ib l e  r i s k s  and b e n e f i t s ,  and then  eva lua t ing  and 
a s se s s ing  t h e i r  s i gn i f i cance .  And it  i s  h e r e  t h a t  w e  need t o  l e a r n  from p a s t  
experience,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  good experience. 
There a r e  s e v e r a l  assessment  methodologies (benef i t -cos t  a n a l y s i s ,  r i s k -  
b e n e f i t  a n a l y s i s ,  mu l t i -ob j ec t i ve  a n a l y s i s ,  m u l t i - a t t r i b u t e  u t i l i t y  a n a l y s i s )  
t h a t  a t t empt  t o  c l a r i f y  t h e  t rade-of fs  between r i s k s  and c o s t s  and t o  organize  
in format ion  and gaps i n  in format ion .  Should t h e  g u i d e l i n e s  f o r  EIA ask t h a t  
t h e  p r o p o n e n t  and a s s e s s o r s  a t t e m p t  t o  g e n e r a t e  and p r e s e n t  d a t a  on 
" w i l l i n g n e s s  t o  pay" o r  " w i l l i n g n e s s  t o  r e c e i v e  c o m p e n s a t i o n "  i n  o r d e r  t o  
e x e m p l i f y  t h e  n e c e s s a r y  t r a d e - o f f s ?  T h i s  t y p e  o f  a n a l y t i c a l  a p p r o a c h  i s  
p a r t i c u l a r l y  impor tan t  when community compensation, guaran tees  about l i a b i l i t y  
and r i s k  m i t i g a t i o n  a r e  c o n s i d e r e d  a s  p a r t  of t h e  recommended c o u r s e  o f  
a c t i o n .  How d o e s  one  o b t a i n  a c c u r a t e  b u t  q u i c k  e s t i m a t e s  of p u b l i c  a c c e p t -  
a b i l i t y  and g u a r a n t e e s ?  The i n f o r m a t i o n  i s  r e q u i r e d  n o t  o n l y  a s  p a r t  of  
p u b l i c  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  b u t ,  more i m p o r t a n t l y ,  a s  p a r t  o f  e v a l u a t i o n  and 
assessment.  
The decision-makers have even tua l ly  t o  balance o f f  t h e  va r ious  concerns 
and presented in fo rma t ion  and dec ide  i f  t h e  r i s k s  a s soc i a t ed  wi th  going ahead 
on a  p r o j e c t  a r e  accep tab l e ,  given every th ing  e l s e .  "Given every th ing  e l s e "  
i s  a  way of  s a y i n g  t h a t  some form of w e i g h t i n g  i s  e v e n t u a l l y  c a r r i e d  o u t ,  
however  much one  may d i s l i k e  compar ing  a p p l e s  and o ranges .  An a d d i t i o n a l  
c o m p l i c a t i o n  i s  t h a t  t h e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  of  t h e  bu rden  of  r i s k s ,  and of t h e  
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benef i t s  accruing from those r i s k s  i s ,  i n  pa r t ,  an e t h i c a l  concern (Schultze 
and Kneese 1981). 
An acceptable risk i s  a  r i s k  whose p robab i l i ty  of occurrence i s  so  
s m a l l ,  whose consequences  a r e  s o  s l i g h t ,  o r  whose b e n e f i t s  
(perceived o r  r e a l )  a r e  so  g rea t  t h a t  a  person, group, o r  soc ie ty  
i s  w i l l i n g  t o  take  t h a t  r i s k  (Munn, pets. comm.). 
The d i f f i c u l t y ,  of course, i s  t h a t  the  combination of elements out l ined 
above r a r e l y  occurs. Much more usual  a r e  those r i s k s  where some combinations 
a r e  pos i t ive ,  and some a r e  negative: f o r  example, t h e  p robab i l i ty  may be low, 
t h e  consequences  h igh ,  and t h e  b e n e f i t s  high. Even more complex a r e  t h o s e  
o f t en  recurr ing  s i t u a t i o n s  where the  persons put a t  r i s k  a r e  l i k e l y  t o  rece ive  
some l e v e l  of b e n e f i t s ,  b u t  t h e  bulk  of t h e  b e n e f i t s  a r e  t o  go t o  a  l a r g e r  
group of o thers ,  o r  t o  some s p e c i f i c  beneficiary. Pecu l i a r ly  i n t r a c t a b l e  a r e  
those cases where the re  i s  an a r b i t r a r y  assumed increase  i n  r i s k  t o  one group, 
even though the  b e n e f i t s  a r e  universa l  and s u b s t a n t i a l  (e.g. hazardous waste 
f a c i l i t y  s i t i n g )  (Timmerman 1984; Singer 1979; Bare 1981). One so lu t ion  f o r  
t h i s  t y p e  of problem i s  t o  engage t h e  p u b l i c  i n  fo rms  of s c e n a r i o  con- 
s t r u c t i o n ,  w i t h  v a r i o u s  compensatory  s t r a t e g i e s  a t t a c h e d  t o  s u r p r i s e s  and 
f a i l u r e s  t h a t  might ensue. Another i s  t o  conduct much more focussed research 
i n t o  t h e  way t h a t  t h e  p u b l i c  v a l u e s  and e v a l u a t e s  i t s  own concerns ,  l i f e -  
s t y l e s ,  and o ther  elements of i t s  "well-being". 
8. W A G I N G  TBE PROCESS 
I n  . t h i s  s e c t i o n  we l o o k  a t  t h e  EIA p r o c e s s  i n  i t s  own r i g h t  a s  a  
s i g n i f i c a n t  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  arrangement f o r  monitoring, reducing o r  containing 
r i s k .  We examine a  few i s s u e s  t h a t  have ve ry  broad i m p l i c a t i o n s  f o r  t h e  
content and scope of EIA. 
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Exper t s  a s  Hired Guns 
S c i e n t i s t s ,  l a w y e r s ,  e n g i n e e r s ,  s o c i o l o g i s t s ,  e c o n o m i s t s  and o t h e r  
e x p e r t s  p l a y  a  ma jo r  r o l e  i n  EIA and r i s k  manageme.nt. The NRC (1982:34) 
Committee on Risk and Decis ion Making pointed ou t  t h a t  "While it  may b a f f l e  
l a y  p e o p l e ,  a s s e s s o r s  o f t e n  c l a s h  on f a c t s n .  They g i v e  a  l o n g  l i s t  on what  
e x p e r t s  d i s a g r e e  a b o u t :  t h e y  may d i s a g r e e  on t h e  r e l i a b i l i t y  o f  d a t a ,  t h e i r  
import ,  t h e i r  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ,  and t h e i r  syn thes i s .  Whether t h e  i s s u e  i s  t h e  
b i o l o g i c a l  e f f e c t s  of low-level  r a d i a t i o n ,  t h e  s a f e t y  of food a d d i t i v e s ,  t h e  
l i k e l i h o o d  what chlorof luoromethanes d imin i sh  ozone i n  t h e  s t r a to sphe re ,  o r  
t h e  h e a l t h  e f f e c t s  of d i f f e r e n t  components of automobile  exhaust ,  t h e  process  
o f  r e a c h i n g  a  c o n s e n s u s  on what  i s  known and i s  u s e f u l  f o r  t h e  e v a l u a t i o n  
component  o f  d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g  i s  i n v a r i a b l y  d i f f i c u l t  and o f t e n  conten t ious  
(NRC 1982:34). What ought t o  be done about i t ?  
Inc lud ing  a r t i c u l a t e  and competent laymen on pane ls ,  s t a t i n g  c o n f l i c t s  
of i n t e r e s t  and b i a se s ,  s e t t i n g  up "science cour t s" ,  e tc .  a r e  on ly  some of t h e  
s u g g e s t i o n s  f o r  i n c r e a s i n g  t h e  o r d e r l i n e s s  and c l a r i t y  o f  t h e  s c i e n t i f i c  
i n p u t .  It i s  t h e r e f o r e  i m p o r t a n t  t o  c o n s i d e r  o t h e r  a l t e r n a t i v e s  such  a s  
a d v i s o r y  p a n e l s  and s c i e n t i f i c  r e v i e w s  (e.g. t h o s e  c o n d u c t e d  f o r  t h e  U.S. 
Academy of Sciences and t h e  Royal Soc ie ty  of Canada). It would be u s e f u l  t o  
do r e s e a r c h  i n t o  t h e  r e l a t i v e  m e r i t s  o f  t h e s e  e x p e r i e n c e s  i n  o r d e r  t o  l e a r n  
how t o  d e a l  b e t t e r  wi th  t h e  i s s u e  of managing expe r t i s e .  
A l t e r n a t i v e  I n s t i t u t i o n a l  In s t rumen t s  f o r  H i t i g a t i n g  Risks 
A d j u s t m e n t s  and  a d a p t a t i o n s  t o  r i s k  i n c l u d e  i n s u r a n c e  ( c o m p u l s o r y  o r  
v o l u n t a r y ,  s u b s i d i z e d  o r  n o t  s u b s i d i z e d ) ,  m e d i c a l  c a r e  s e r v i c e s ,  emergency  
Grtma, A.P. et a& 
s e r v i c e s ,  educa t iona l  campaigns, s c i e n t i f i c  r e sea rch  (e.g. ep idemiologica l  and 
t o x i c o l o g i c a l  r e s e a r c h ) ,  p o l i c y  r e s e a r c h ,  and  e n g i n e e r i n g  and economic  
analyses .  However, t h e  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  response t o  acceptab le - r i sk  ques t i ons  
i s  t y p i c a l l y  much narrower.  The two most common responses  a r e  l e g i s l a t i o n  
about l i a b i l i t y  (e.g. compulsory l i a b i l i t y  insurance  f o r  c a r s )  and r e g u l a t i o n  
(e.g. o c c u p a t i o n a l  h e a l t h  and  s a f e t y  r e g u l a t i o n s ,  c o m p u l s o r y  c a r  b e l t s ,  
emiss ion  s tandards ,  compulsory product l a b e l l i n g ) .  Some p o l i c y  choices  about  
acceptab le  r i s k s  a r e  no t  mutua l ly  exc lus ive :  compulsory insurance  and h e a l t h  
r e g u l a t i o n s  complement  e a c h  o t h e r  ( c f .  workmen's compensation insurance  and 
s a f e t y  r e g u l a t i o n s ) .  
I n  r i s k  management ,  e x p e r i m e n t i n g  w i t h  i n n o v a t i v e  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  
t e c h n i q u e s  o f f e r s  management t h e  o p p o r t u n i t y  t o  l e a r n  f rom e x p e r i e n c e .  
However, we can b e n e f i t  from t h i s  l e a r n i n g  process  on ly  i f  r e g u l a r  assessments  
a r e  made of  t h e  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  mechanisms  c u r r e n t l y  i n  use .  It would be  
u s e f u l :  ( a )  t o  compare  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  c o n t e x t s  and  mechanisms  t h a t  a r e  
a l r e a d y  i n  u s e  i n  Canada,  U.S. and Europe:  and  ( b )  t o  d i s c u s s  o t h e r  
p o t e n t i a l l y  u s e f u l  l e g a l - e c o n o m i c  mechanisms  t h a t  would more e f f e c t i v e l y  
manage t h e  r i s k s  a s s o c i a t e d  wi th  t h e  hazardous f a c i l i t i e s ,  hydrocarbon energy 
development, phases of t h e  nuc l ea r  power cyc le .  e t c .  
Assessing Economic Risk 
Beanlands ( t h i s  volume) no t e s  t h a t :  
"The a p p l i c a t i o n  of r i s k  i n  EIA needs t o  t a k e  more account of t h e  
i n t e r e s t  i n  e v a l u a t i n g  t h e  c o s t s  and b e n e f i t s  of r i s k  r e d u c t i o n  
through mi t iga t ion . "  
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One needs t o  a s s e s s  t h e  e f f e c t s  of mandated changes on t h e  performance 
o f  f i r m s  and marke t  s h a r e s ;  t h e  e f f e c t s  o f  r e g u l a t o r y  u n c e r t a i n t y  on s i t e  
s e l e c t i o n  and i n v e s t m e n t  d e c i s i o n s ;  t h e  e f f e c t s  ( p o s i t i v e  o r  n e g a t i v e )  o f  
mandated  m e a s u r e s  on economic  p e r f o r m a n c e  (e.g. p r o d u c t i v i t y ,  employment ,  
p r o f i t a b i l i t y ,  investment) .  We agree  wi th  t h e  NRC (1982:60) Committee on Risk 
and Decision-making ' t h a t  " r e l i a b l e  economic r e sea rch  does not  c u r r e n t l y  e x i s t  
t o  r e f u t e  o r  e s t a b l i s h  [va r ious ]  claims". For example, S t a f f o r d  (1985) argues 
from e m p i r i c a l  evidence t h a t  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  q u a l i t y  r e g u l a t i o n s  do n o t  r a n k  
among l e a d i n g  l o c a t i o n  f a c t o r s  o f  i n d u s t r y  and a r e  f a r  l e s s  i m p o r t a n t  t h a n  
labour  and market access .  A l i t e r a t u r e  s ea rch  and b r i e f  review would provide 
t h e  r e sea rch  community w i t h  an i n i t i a l  understanding of r e sea rch  f i n d i n g s  and 
o p p o r t u n i t i e s  i n  t h i s  somewhat  n e g l e c t e d  f i e l d  and i t  c o u l d  be  a  f i r s t  s t e p  
f o r  a  working group and workshop t o  a s s e s s  what i s  known and what needs t o  be 
known i n  a s s e s s i n g  t h e  economic component of r i s k .  
9. RESEARCH PRIORITIES 
I n  t h i s  s e c t i o n  we s e l e c t  some of t h e  r e sea rch  needs and o p p o r t u n i t i e s  
t h a t  w e  t h i n k  ought t o  be given p r i o r i t y .  Most of t h e s e  p r i o r i t i e s  a r e  based 
on t h e  arguments of t h e  prev ious  s ec t i ons ,  but we have a l s o  kept  i n  mind o t h e r  
c o n s i d e r a t i o n s :  what  we b e l i e v e  would p roduce  u s e f u l  r e s u l t s  i n  t h e  s h o r t -  
t e r m ;  what  n e e d s  t o  be  c a r r i e d  o u t  u r g e n t l y ;  and what would be p a r t i c u l a r l y  
impor tan t  i n  improving E I A :  
1. Research is needed into the presentation of technical information on 
risks to non-experts ( S e c t i o n  5 ) .  
2. The next full-scale EIA should have associated with it a social science 
research component which would trace and track the various expressions of 
'risk strategies' on the part of the scientists, experts, project proponents, 
and the public (Sections 5, 6, 7, 8). 
3. We need to investigate the appropriateness of including economic risk 
into a risk assessment (Section 8). 
4. We need to explore various methodologies for making 'trade-offs' so as to 
achieve acceptable levels of tisk (Sect ion 7 1. 
5. Scenario building (particularly worst-case analysis) as a method of 
prediction needs to be examined further (Section 3). 
6.  Guidelines calling for risk analyses and evaluations in an EIA need to 
include criteria on when the data and the scientific understanding are deemed 
adequate (Section 5). 
7. Guidelines for carrying tisk assessments should be developed (Sections 4, 
5, 6, 7). 
8. Existing uses of risk assessment in EIA should be codified and 
systematised. Some envirmental sectors would immediately benefit from the 
systematic application of risk assessment, We recommend that these be 
identified, and used as potential 'initial experiments' for the further 
implementation of risk assessment in EIA. 
9. Retrospective and comparative case studies of previous Canadian and 
international EUs should be undertaken. 
Our l a s t  two, more gene ra l  recommendations r e f l e c t  our  convic t ion  t h a t  
t h e r e  is  much t o  be l ea rned  about r i s k  from c u r r e n t  and p a s t  experience w i th  
EIA. One way t o  t ake  advantage of o p p o r t u n i t i e s  f o r  improving t h e  use of r i s k  
assessment  i n  EIA would be t o  examine and cod i fy  c u r r e n t  a p p l i c a t i o n s  of what 
a r e  " r i s k  c o n c e p t s "  i n  e v e r y t h i n g  b u t  name o n l y  (Recommendat ion 8) .  The 
i n t e r i m  evidence c o l l e c t e d  by Paradine (1985) sugges ts  t h a t  r i s k  concepts  have 
a l r e a d y  been a p p l i e d  i n  a  l i m i t e d  f a s h i o n  i n  EIAs. R e s e a r c h  would f o c u s  on 
when r i s k  a n a l y s i s  i s  u s e f u l ,  w h e t h e r  i t s  u t i l i t y  h a s  been  r e c o g n i s e d ,  and  
w h e t h e r  o r  n o t  more e x p l i c i t  u s e  of  r i s k  c o n c e p t s  would make EIAs more 
comprehensive and re levant .  
Compara t ive  e v a l u a t i o n s  ~ f ' ~ a s t  a n a l y s e s  a r e  p r o b a b l y  t h e  most  c o s t -  
e f f e c t i v e  way of l e a r n i n g  how t o  do b e t t e r  i n  t h e  f u t u r e  (Recommendation 9). 
Case s t u d i e s  f rom a  v a r i e t y  of  j u r i s d i c t i o n s  i n  Canada, t h e  U.S. and  o t h e r  
c o u n t r i e s  would be p a r t i c u l a r l y  i l l u m i n a t i n g ,  s i n c e  t h e y  c o u l d  s u g g e s t  why 
some r i s k s  a r e  t o l e r a t e d  i n  some c o u n t r i e s ,  c u l t u r e s ,  and polit ico-economic 
systems r a t h e r  than  i n  o t h e r s  and whether d i f f e r e n t  c o u n t r i e s ,  c u l t u r e s ,  o r  
p o l i t i c o - e c o n o m i c  s y s t e m s  have  d e v i s e d  d i f f e r e n t  mechanisms a r e  f o r  coping 
wi th  r i sk .  C r i t i q u e s  could po in t  ou t  omissions and i n a p r o p r i a t e  methodologies; 
b u t  p e r h a p s  more i m p o r t a n t l y ,  t h e y  c o u l d  i d e n t i f y  "good" s t u d i e s ,  and t h e  
f e a t u r e s  t h a t  made them s t and  out  a s  successes.  
I n  o r d e r  f o r  t h e s e  t o  be more t h a n  j u s t  i n t e r e s t i n g  s t o r i e s ,  r e t r o -  
s p e c t i v e  "debr ie f ings"  should be c a r r i e d  ou t  by s e n i o r  s c i e n t i s t s ,  experienced 
p a n e l  members,  and  o t h e r  e x p e r t s  work ing  a s  an i n t e r d i s c i p l i n a r y  team. We 
view r e t r o s p e c t i v e ,  comparat ive ca se  s t u d i e s  a s  a way t o  pu t  i n t o  e f f e c t  t h e  
i t e r a t i v e  and p o t e n t i a l l y  open-ended n a t u r e  of t h e  EIA process.  
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appreciated.  We thank t h e  members of CEARC, f o r  t h e i r  t hough t fu l  ques t ions  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose o f  t h i s  paper i s  t o  d i s t i n g u i s h  r i s k  assessment f rom 
o t h e r  environmental  assessment a c t i v i t i e s ,  d e f i n e  t h e  r o l e  o f  unce r ta in t y  
i n  r i s k  assessment, e x p l a i n  and i l l u s t r a t e  t h e  u t i l i t y  o f  environmental  
r i s k  assessment, and present  research recomnendations. 
Environmental impact assessment i s  a broad f i e l d  t h a t  inc ludes  a l l  
a c t i v i t i e s  invo lved  i n  ana lyz ing  and eva lua t i ng  t h e  e f f e c t s  o f  man's 
a c t i v i t i e s  on n a t u r a l  and anthropogenic environments. As i n d i c a t e d  i n  a 
number o f  reviews (Munn 1975; Beanlands and Ouinker 1983; Westman 1985), 
impact assessment can conceivably  cons ider  t h e  f u l l  range o f  man's 
a c t i v i t i e s ;  it i nc ludes  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  and p r i o r i t i z a t i o n  o f  issues, 
p r e d i c t i o n  and comparison o f  e f f e c t s ,  cons idera t ion  o f  a c c e p t a b i l i t y ,  and 
t r a n s l a t i o n  o f  conclus ions i n t o  p o l i c y  recomnendations. 
Risk ana l ys i s  i s  a much narrower f i e l d  t h a t  deals  w i t h  t h e  
q u a n t i f i c a t i o n  o f  r i s k s .  Risk i s  gene ra l l y  de f ined  as t h e  unce r ta in t y  
concerning an undesired event, where unce r ta in t y  i s  expressed as 
p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  occurrence (Rowe 1977; ASTH 1985;, Whyte and Bur ton 
1980). Therefore, r i s k  ana l ys i s  i s  app l i ed  when t h e r e  i s  a 
q u a n t i t a t i v e l y  d e f i n a b l e  end p o i n t  about which t h e r e  i s  some unce r ta in t y  
as t o  whether ( o r  how o f t e n )  it w i l l  occur. The percent  reduc t i on  i n  
f o r e s t  p roduc t ion  due t o  a new a i r  p o l l u t i o n  source i s  a s u i t a b l e  t o p i c  
S u t e t ,  G.W. et al. 
f o r  r i s k  analysis because there i s  uncerta inty concerning the  
re la t ionsh ip  between po l l u t an t  emissions and f o res t  p roduc t i v i t y .  
However, i f  the  ac t ion  being assessed involves c lea r ing  the  f o res t  t o  
make way f o r  a  new shopping mal l ,  then there i s  no uncer ta in ty  concerning 
t he  loss of  f o r e s t  p roduc t i v i t y  and the  concept of r i s k  i s  i r r e l evan t .  
However, the  e f f e c t  of  the  shopping mall  on f o res t  p roduc t i v i t y  i s  a  
su i tab le  top ic  f o r  environmental impact assessment because the 
s ign i f icance of  the  e f f ec t s  and a comparison w i t h  e f f ec t s  of  a l t e rna t i ve  
act ions must be considered. Thus, environmental r i s k  analysis i s  a  
subset o f  environmental impact assessment. 
I n  the  fo l low ing  sections we discuss the r o l e  o f  r i s k  analysis i n  
environmental impact assessment i n  terms of  the nature and sources of  
uncerta inty.  We then present examples of  the treatment of  uncerta inty i n  
environmental assessments, show how the  p r o b a b i l i s t i c  r esu l t s  of  r i s k  
analyses can be in te rp re ted  and used, and suggest areas needing f u r t h e r  
research. 
2. TYPES OF UNCERTAINTY 
Primary uncer ta in ty  i s  uncerta inty about the  s ta te  o f  t he  world, 
whereas secondary uncer ta in ty  i s  uncerta inty about our actual  l eve l  of  
ignorance (Fig. 1) .  Secondary uncerta inty i s  inheren t l y  unknowable and 
cannot be e x p l i c i t l y  incorporated i n  a  r i s k  assessment, bu t  an awareness 
o f  i t s  existence contr ibutes a  wholesome humi l i t y .  
The two fundamentally d i f f e r e n t  types of primary uncerta inty t h a t  
can cont r ibute  t o  r i s k  are i d e n t i t y  uncerta inty and ana l y t i ca l  
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uncer ta in ty .  I d e n t i t y  uncer ta in ty ,  t he  uncer ta in ty  concerning the  
i d e n t i t y  o f  f u t u r e  v ic t ims,  i s  t h e  fundamental unknown i n  s tud ies  o f  
human r i s k s .  An insurance actuary may know r a t h e r  exac t l y  t h e  
p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  death o f  a  p a r t i c u l a r  c lass  o f  people, bu t  a  new insurance 
company could be bankrupt by t h e  unt imely death o f  i t s  f i r s t  c l i e n t ,  
hence t h e  i d e n t i t y  r i s k .  S i m i l a r l y ,  a  person l i v i n g  adjacent t o  a 
f a c i l i t y  t h a t  w i l l  cause cancer i n  0.01% o f  t h e  comnunity may agree t h a t  
t h e  f a c i l i t y  i s  acceptable t o  t h e  soc ie ty  as a  whole and y e t  move h i s  
f a m i l y  t o  another l oca t ion .  I n  contrast ,  t h e  i d e n t i t y  o f  t h e  v i c t i m  i s  
n o t  o f  concern i n  eco log ica l  r i s k  ana lys is .  Therefore, t h e  statement 
t h a t  a  p a r t i c u l a r  f a c i l i t y  wi 11 k i l l  30% o f  the  f i s h  i n  a  rece iv ing  r i v e r  
i s  a  d e t e r m i n i s t i c  statement o f  hazard o r  impact and does n o t  c o n s t i t u t e  
a  statement o f  r i s k .  
The o the r  p o t e n t i a l  t ype  o f  pr imary uncer ta in ty  i s  a n a l y t i c a l  
uncer ta in ty .  Because o f  t h e  uncer ta in ty  i n  the  ana lys i s  (i.e., i n  
es t imat ing  t h e  l e v e l  o r  frequency o f  e f f e c t s )  t he re  i s  a  r i s k  t h a t  the  
e f f e c t  w i l l  exceed some predef ined th resho ld  o f  a c c e p t a b i l i t y .  The 
p r o b a b i l i t y  dens i t y  f u n c t i o n  f o r  t h e  pred ic ted l e v e l  o f  e f f e c t  can be 
used t o  c a l c u l a t e  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  (i.e., r i s k )  t h a t  a  c e r t a i n  l e v e l  o f  
e f f e c t  w i l l  occur, g iven t h e  t o t a l  unce r ta in t y  i n  t h e  analys is .  For 
example, due t o  t h e  uncer ta in ty  i n  eco log ica l  r i s k  ana lys is ,  a  p o l l u t a n t  
may pose a  r i s k  o f  0.2 o f  a  30% reduct ion  i n  game-fish biomass (an e f f e c t  
t h a t  may be both measurable and s i g n i f i c a n t )  even though the  expected 
reduct ion  i n  game-fish biomass i s  on l y  10% (an unmeasurable and probably 
i n s i g n i f i c a n t  e f f e c t ) .  
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While t h e  a v a i l a b i l i t y  o f  a c t u a r i a l  and ep idem io log i ca l  da ta  makes 
a n a l y t i c a l  u n c e r t a i n t y  a  m inor  component o f  some human r i s k  ana l ys i s ,  
such u n c e r t a i n t y  i s  i n v a r i a b l y  l a r g e  i n  e c o l o g i c a l  analyses. There a r e  
no co rone r ' s  records  f o r  f i s h  o r  b i r d s .  I n  a d d i t i o n ,  m i l l i o n s  o f  species 
o f  nonhuman b i o t a  e x i s t  i n  a  web o f  food-chain and c o m p e t i t i v e  
r e l a t i o n s h i p s  t h a t  determine popu la t i on  s i zes  and e f f e c t  t o x i c  responses 
i n  ways t h a t  a r e  l a r g e l y  unknown. Absolute p r e d i c t i o n s  o f  t h e  f u t u r e  
s t a t e  o f  e c o l o g i c a l  systems a r e  n o t  c r e d i b l e  (Go lds te i n  and R i c c i  1981). 
The cons ide ra t i on  o f  a n a l y t i c a l  u n c e r t a i n t y ,  which has been t r e a t e d  as an 
o p t i o n  i n  analyses o f  r i s k s  t o  humans (e.g., Hami l ton 1980; Feagans and 
B i l l e r  1981). i s  a  n e c e s s i t y  i n  e c o l o g i c a l  r i s k  a n a l y s i s .  
3. SOURCES OF UNCERTAINTY 
The a n a l y t i c a l  u n c e r t a i n t y  assoc ia ted  w i t h  p r e d i c t i n g  environmental  
e f f e c t s  o f  s t r e s s  has independent components t h a t  a f f e c t  t h e  c a l c u l a t i o n  
o f  r i s k  i n  q u a l i t a t i v e l y  d i f f e r e n t  ways and t h a t  va ry  i n  t h e  e x t e n t  t o  
which t h e y  can be reduced by a d d i t i o n a l  i n f o rma t i on .  We d i s t i n g u i s h  t h r e e  
, 
sources o f  u n c e r t a i n t y :  e r r o r s  r e s u l t i n g  f rom ou r  concep tua l i za t i ons  
(models) o f  t h e  wor ld ,  s t o c h a s t i c i t y  i n  t h e  n a t u r a l  wor ld ,  and 
u n c e r t a i n t i e s  assoc ia ted  w i t h  measuring model parameters. Model e r r o r  
corresponds t o  Rowels (1977) d e s c r i p t i v e  u n c e r t a i n t y ,  and n a t u r a l  
s t o c h a s t i c i t y  and parameter u n c e r t a i n t y  correspond t o  Rowe's measurement 
u n c e r t a i n t y ,  a l though ou r  d e f i n i t i o n s  a r e  broader .  
3.1 . Model E r r o r  
Computing a  r i s k  es t ima te  n e c e s s a r i l y  i nvo l ves  some s o r t  o f  
mathematical  o r  s t a t i s t i c a l  model. A r e d u c i b l e  source o f  u n c e r t a i n t y  i s  
Suter, G.W. et  al. 
t h e  lack  o f  correspondence between model and r e a l i t y .  Ha jor  types o f  
model e r r o r  t h a t  have been studied a re  (a) using a  small number o f  
var iab les  t o  represent  a  l a rge  number o f  complex phenomena [def ined as 
aggregation e r r o r  (OINei l l  1973)], (b) choosing i n c o r r e c t  f unc t i ona l  forms 
f o r  i n t e r a c t i o n s  among var iables,  and ( c )  s e t t i n g  i napprop r ia te  boundaries 
f o r  t h e  components o f  t h e  wor ld t o  be inc luded i n  t h e  model. Because t h e  
complexity o f  t h e  na tu ra l  wor ld g r e a t l y  exceeds our a b i l i t y  t o  model it, 
model e r r o r s  can never be completely e l iminated.  The most ser ious 
problem associated w i t h  model e r r o r  i s  t h a t  t h e  e r r o r s  f requen t l y  i nvo lve  
biases whose magnitudes and d i r e c t i o n s  may be d i f f i c u l t  t o  determine. 
3.2. Natura l  S tochas t i c i  t y  
Although phi losophers may argue whether t h e  na tu ra l  wor ld i s  
u l t i m a t e l y  d e t e r m i n i s t i c  o r  s tochast ic ,  t h e  quest ion i s  o f  l i t t l e  
p r a c t i c a l  i n t e r e s t .  A t  a l l  scales o f  reso lu t i on ,  s p a t i a l  heterogenei ty  
and temporal v a r i a b i l i t y  a re  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  o f  na tu ra l  systems. For 
example, t h e  concentrat ion o f  a  contaminant i n  a i r  o r  water var ies  
unpred ic tab ly  i n  space and t ime  because o f  e s s e n t i a l l y  unpredictable 
v a r i a t i o n s  i n  meteorological  parameters such as p r e c i p i t a t i o n  and wind 
d i r e c t i o n .  The s p a t i a l  and temporal d i s t r i b u t i o n s  and s e n s i t i v i t i e s  t o  
s t ress  o f  organisms i n  nature  a re  s i m i l a r l y  var iab le .  L im i t s  on t h e  
p rec i s ion  w i t h  which v a r i a b l e  p roper t i es  o f  t h e  environment can be 
q u a n t i f i e d  de f ine  t h e  upper l i m i t  o f  t h e  p rec i s ion  w i t h  which i t  i s  
poss ib le  t o  p r e d i c t  t h e  eco log ica l  e f f e c t s  o f  a  s t ressor .  Out o f  t h e  
universe o f  s i m i l a r  environmental systems, a  g iven percentage would be 
expected t o  show an e f f e c t .  This percentage t r a n s l a t e s  d i r e c t l y  i n t o  an 
est imate o f  r i s k .  
Suter, G. W. e t  al. 
3.3. Parameter Unce r ta in t y  
E r ro rs  i n  parameter est imates i n t roduce  a d d i t i o n a l  u n c e r t a i n t i e s  
i n t o  eco log i ca l  r i s k  est imates. Laboratory measurements o f  bo th  t h e  
chemical and b i o l o g i c a l  p r o p e r t i e s  o f  hazardous chemicals a re  sub jec t  
t o  ( f r e q u e n t l y  unreported) e r r o r s .  Many eco log i ca l  va r i ab les  a re  
e x t r a o r d i n a r i l y  d i f f i c u l t  t o  measure and can be est imated t o  o n l y  
order-of-magnitude p rec i s i on .  Parameter values o f  i n t e r e s t  o f t e n  have 
n o t  been measured and have t o  be est imated f rom s t r u c t u r e - a c t i v i t y  
r e l a t i o n s h i p s  (e.g., Kenaga and Goring 1980; Ve i t h  e t  a l .  1983) o r  
taxonomic c o r r e l a t i o n s  (e.g., Su ter  e t  a l .  1983; Suter  e t  a l . ,  i n  press; 
Calabrese 1984). 
4. QUANTIFYING UNCERTAINTY 
To vary ing  degrees, i t i s  poss ib le  t o  q u a n t i f y  a l l  t h r e e  types o f  
unce r ta in t y .  
S t o c h a s t i c i t y  can be q u a n t i f i e d  f o r  many c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  o f  t h e  
phys ica l  environment. Long-term meteoro log ica l  and hyd ro log i ca l  records 
can be used t o  es t imate  p r o b a b i l i t y  d i s t r i b u t i o n s  o f  wind speeds, 
s t reamf low ra tes ,  e t c .  Other v a r i a b l e  aspects o f  t h e  environment, 
i n c l u d i n g  d i s t r i b u t i o n s ,  abundances, and s e n s i t i v i t i e s  o f  organisms, a re  
i n  p r i n c i p l e  q u a n t i f i a b l e ,  a l though t h e  necessary da ta  a re  d i f f i c u l t  and 
expensive t o  c o l l e c t .  As i n  a l l  aspects o f  r i s k  ana lys is ,  exper t  op in ion  
can be employed when da ta  a r e  n o t  s u f f i c i e n t .  
Parameter u n c e r t a i n t i e s  a r e  a l s o  r e l a t i v e l y  easy t o  address. 
Parameter e r r o r s  u s u a l l y  t ake  t h e  form o f  s t a t i s t i c a l  d i s t r i b u t i o n s  
r a t h e r  than biases. The parameters o f  these d i s t r i b u t i o n s  can f r e q u e n t l y  
Suter, G.W. et a1. 
be e i t h e r  c a l c u l a t e d  d i r e c t l y  o r  r e a l i s t i c a l l y  bounded, i f  proper  da ta  
c o l l e c t i o n  and r e p o r t i n g  procedures have been fo l lowed.  For  
expe r imen ta l l y  measured parameters, such as LCSO1s and p a r t i t i o n  
c o e f f i c i e n t s ,  a  complete account ing  o f  measurement e r r o r  would i n c l u d e  
t h e  var iance  between r e p l i c a t i o n s  o f  an exper iment  w i t h i n  a  l abo ra to r y ,  
between l a b o r a t o r i e s  us ing  t h e  same p r o t o c o l ,  and, i f  app rop r i a te ,  
between p ro toco l s .  More i n f o r m a t i o n  concern ing t h e  magnitudes o f  these  
var iances i s  becoming a v a i l a b l e  f r om t h e  p r o t o c o l  development and 
e v a l u a t i o n  a c t i v i t i e s  o f  t h e  U.S. Environmental  P r o t e c t i o n  Agency, t h e  
Organ i za t i on  o f  Economic Cooperat ion and Development, and t h e  American 
S o c i e t y  f o r  Tes t i ng  and M a t e r i a l s  (e.g., Lemke 1981). and has been 
i nco rpo ra ted  i n  r i s k  a n a l y s i s  methods (Su te r  e t  a l . ,  i n  p ress ) .  
Parameter u n c e r t a i n t y  a l s o  r e s u l t s  f r om t h e  use o f  regress ions  t o  
e x t r a p o l a t e  between a v a i l a b l e  da ta  and needed parameter values. Su te r  e t  
a l .  (1983, i n  p ress)  used a  reg ress ion  a n a l y s i s  t o  es t ima te  t h e  e r r o r s  
assoc ia ted  w i  t h  e x t r a p o l a t i o n  o f  acu te  LCS0 va lues between species o f  
f i s h  and i n v e r t e b r a t e s  and e x t r a p o l a t i o n  o f  ch ron i c  t o x i c  e f f e c t s  
t h resho lds  f r om LCSO1s. S i m i l a r  analyses a r e  p o s s i b l e  f o r  
e x t r a p o l a t i o n s  among chemicals based on s t r u c t u r e - a c t i v i t y  r e l a t i o n s h i p s .  
Model e r r o r s  c o n s t i t u t e  t h e  l e a s t  t r a c t a b l e  source o f  u n c e r t a i n t y  i n  
r i s k  ana l ys i s .  The most s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d  method i s  t o  t e s t  t h e  model 
a g a i n s t  independent f i e l d  da ta  ( M i l l e r  and L i t t l e  1982). However, t h e  
da ta  necessary t o  per form such t e s t s  a r e  exceeding ly  d i f f i c u l t  t o  c o l l e c t  
and, when c o l l e c t e d ,  a r e  d i f f i c u l t  t o  i n t e r p r e t .  No m a t t e r  how w e l l  a  
model per forms f o r  one s e t  o f  env i ronmenta l  cond i t i ons ,  it i s  never  
p o s s i b l e  t o  determine w i t h  c e r t a i n t y  i t s  a p p l i c a b i l i t y  t o  a  new s e t  o f  
S u t e t ,  G.W. et  al. 
cond i t ions .  Empi r i ca l  t e s t i n g ,  a l though c r u c i a l  f o r  improv ing t h e  models 
used i n  r i s k  ana l ys i s  (Mankin e t  a l .  1975; NRC 1981). i s  c l e a r l y  
unsu i t ab le  as a  r o u t i n e  method o f  assessing model e r r o r s .  However, it i s  
s t i l l  poss ib le  t o  eva lua te  model assumptions by comparisons o f  d i f f e r e n t  
models (Gardner e t  a l .  1980). By comparing models t h a t  use d i f f e r e n t  
se ts  o f  assumptions, i t i s  poss ib le  t o  assess how assumptions a l t e r  model 
output .  Al though t h i s  procedure does n o t  ensure t h a t  model r e s u l t s  w i l l  
correspond t o  e f f e c t s  i n  t h e  f i e l d ,  it can be used t o  d i s t i n g u i s h  between 
p r e d i c t i o n s  t h a t  a re  robus t  t o  model assumptions and those t h a t  a re  
h i g h l y  s e n s i t i v e  t o  assumptions and hence suscep t i b le  t o  ser ious  model 
e r r o r s  (Gardner e t  a l .  1980; Levins 1966). 
5. IMPLICATIONS OF UNCERTAINTY 
Re la t ionsh ips  among t h e  components o f  r i s k  a re  i l l u s t r a t e d  i n  
Fig. 2. Suppose we a re  i n t e r e s t e d  i n  es t ima t i ng  t h e  r i s k  t h a t  t h e  
environmental concent ra t ion  o f  a  t o x i c  contaminant w i l l  cause a  valued 
species t o  f a l l  below a  s p e c i f i e d  th resho ld  abundance. The dashed curve 
(F ig .  2a) i s  t h e  " t r u e "  d e n s i t y  func t ion ,  determined by t h e  i n t r i n s i c  
hazard o f  t h e  contaminant and t h e  s t o c h a s t i c i t y  o f  t h e  environment. The 
s o l i d  curve i s  t h e  d e n s i t y  f u n c t i o n  est imated us ing  a  r i s k  model. The 
curve i s  s h i f t e d  because o f  model e r r o r ;  i t s  var iance i s  increased 
because o f  parameter e r r o r .  
F igure  2(b) presents t h e  cumulat ive r i s k  d i s t r i b u t i o n s  f o r  t h e  
d e n s i t y  f unc t i ons  i n  F ig.  2(a) .  When t h e  model d i s t r i b u t i o n  i s  s h i f t e d  
t o  t h e  l e f t ,  as shown i n  t h e  f i g u r e ,  t h e  model i s  conservat ive, 
p r e d i c t i n g  h ighe r  p r o b a b i l i t i e s  o f  r i s k  than t h e  " t r u e u  d e n s i t y  
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Figure 2 Relationships between t r u e  r lsk  (dashed line) and estimated r isk  (solid Ilne) as functions of con- 
centra t ion f o r  a hypothetical  envlronmental contamfhant. Relatlve to t r u e  r l sk ,  t h e  estimated 
r isk  density function (a) i s  shifted and Its var iance Is increased because of model biases  and 
paramete r  e r r o r s .  Depending on t h e  re la t ive  magnltudes of biases  and e r r o r s ,  t h e  cumulative 
estimated r i sk  function corresponding t o  t h e  density function in (a) may e l t h e r  overes t imate  t r u e  
r lsk  at all  concentra t ions  (b) o r  may overestimate l r u e  r isk  at low concentratlons and underesli-  
mate 11 at h l ~ h  concentra t lons  (c). 
S u t e t ,  G.W. e t  at. 
f unc t i on .  Unfor tunate ly ,  i t  i s  o f t e n  d i f f i c u l t  o r  impossib le t o  guarantee 
t h a t  t h e  model d i s t r i b u t i o n  w i l l  be s h i f t e d  t o  t h e  l e f t  r a t h e r  than t o  
t h e  r i g h t .  I n  F ig .  2 (c )  we show t h e  cumulat ive r i s k  d i s t r i b u t i o n s  when 
t h e  r i s k  model i s  conserva t ive  b u t  t h e  parameter e r r o r  i s  very la rge .  I n  
t h i s  case, t h e  r i s k  model overest imates r i s k  a t  low concent ra t ions  and 
underestimates r i s k  a t  h igh  concentrat ions.  Th is  r e s u l t  has r e a l  
p r a c t i c a l  importance because inc reas ing  t h e  complex i ty  o f  a  model i s  o f t e n  
viewed as a  d e s i r a b l e  goal .  However, bo th  d isaggregat ing  t h e  va r i ab les  
and i nc reas ing  t h e  complex i ty  o f  process func t i ons  inc rease t h e  number o f  
model parameters and t h e  p o t e n t i a l  f o r  parameter e r r o r .  Therefore, 
i nc reas ing  model complex i ty  may increase t h e  chance t h e  model w i l l  
underest imate t h e  r i s k  associated w i t h  h igh  contaminant concentrat ions.  
The r e l a t i o n s h i p  between model complex i ty  and u n c e r t a i n t y  i s  
r e f e r r e d  t o  by Rowe (1977) as t h e  l l information paradox." The more 
complex t h e  model becomes ( i .e . ,  t h e  more one knows about t h e  s t r u c t u r e  
o f  t h e  wor ld ) ,  t h e  g r e a t e r  t h e  unce r ta in t y  because o f  t h e  g rea te r  number 
o f  parameters t o  be est imated, t h e  g rea te r  number o f  s tochas t i c  processes 
t h a t  must be inc luded,  and t h e  g rea te r  number o f  model func t ions .  I n  
general ,  t h e  number o f  model parameters w i l l  i nc rease exponen t i a l l y  w i t h  
t h e  number o f  environmental  components e x p l i c i t l y  inc luded i n  t h e  model; 
t he re fo re ,  as model complex i ty  increases, e i t h e r  t h e  cos ts  o f  t e s t i n g  and 
parameter measurement o r  t h e  t o t a l  u n c e r t a i n t y  w i l l  q u i c k l y  become 
excessive (Suter  e t  a l .  1985). 
One conc lus ion  t h a t  can be drawn f rom t h i s  i s  t h a t  assessment models 
should be as simple as poss ib le  w h i l e  a t  t h e  same t i m e  i n c l u d i n g  t h e  
c r i t i c a l  components and processes (Barnthouse e t  a l .  1984). I n  many 
Suter, G. W. et aL. 
cases, s impler  models w i l l  tend t o  be conservat ive. A complete model o f  
e f f e c t s  o f  t o x i c  chemicals on game-fish biomass would i nc lude  ecosystem- 
l e v e l  e f f e c t s  caused by food-chain i n t e r a c t i o n s  and popu la t ion  processes 
such as density-dependent m o r t a l i t y .  A l t e r n a t i v e l y ,  one could perform 
t h e  assessment a t  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  l e v e l  o f  organizat ion,  p ro tec t i ng  
game-fish biomass by es t imat ing  (us ing taxonomic d i s t r i b u t i o n s  o f  
s e n s i t i v i t y )  a t o x i c a n t  concentrat ion t h a t  would be nontoxic t o  a l l  o f  
t h e  organisms i n  t h e  system. The i n d i v i d u a l - l e v e l  assessment would have 
less  uncer ta in ty  because i n t e r a c t i o n s  do n o t  have t o  be modeled, b u t  it 
would be conservat ive because popu la t ion  and ecosystem processes, such as 
prey swi tch ing  and compensatory m o r t a l i t y ,  can compensate f o r  t o x i c  
e f fec ts .  However, t h i s  reduced uncer ta in ty  i s  obtained by changing t h e  
assessment t o  a l ess  ambit ious form-the prevent ion o f  d i r e c t  t o x i c  
e f f e c t s  r a t h e r  than t h e  prevent ion o f  a p a r t i c u l a r  l e v e l  o f  combined 
d i r e c t  and i n d i r e c t  e f fec ts .  S i m i l a r l y ,  most s i m p l i f i c a t i o n s  o f  chemical 
f a t e  models are  conservat ive because they ignore  removal processes such 
as biodegradation o r  photodegradation f o r  which ra tes  a re  t y p i c a l l y  
unknown. However, it i s  n o t  always poss ib le  t o  s i m p l i f y  assessment 
models i n  such a way as t o  be conservat ive. For example, models o f  a c i d  
r a i n  e f f e c t s  on f i s h  cannot ignore  c a t i o n  leaching from watersheds. 
6. USES OF RISK ANALYSIS 
It i s  no t  u s u a l l y  poss ib le  t o  accura te ly  p r e d i c t  t h e  l e v e l s  o f  
environmental e f f e c t s  caused by man's a c t i v i t i e s .  However, w i thou t  
p r e d i c t i o n  of absolute magnitudes o f  e f fec ts ,  a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  t h e  concept 
o f  r i s k  can lead t o  subs tan t ia l  improvements i n  environmental assessment 
S u t e t ,  G.W. et at. 
and p r o t e c t i o n .  By (1 )  emphasizing p r o b a b i l i t i e s  and f requencies o f  
events and ( 2 )  e x p l i c i t l y  q u a n t i f y i n g  unce r ta in t y ,  r i s k  ana l ys i s  can 
prov ide  a more r a t i o n a l  bas is  f o r  dec is ions  t h a t  may otherwise be h i g h l y  
sub jec t i ve .  
Risk analyses can be app l i ed  t o  eva lua t i ng  compliance w i t h  
environmental standards. Frequency d i s t r i b u t i o n s  o f  ambient contaminant 
concent ra t ions  can, f o r  example, be used t o  f o r e c a s t  water  qua1 i t y  
impacts. For  any g iven  benchmark concent ra t ion  (e-g.,  an ambient a i r  o r  
water q u a l i t y  c r i t e r i o n ) ,  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  exceeding t h e  benchmark can 
be read f rom t h e  cumulat ive d i s t r i b u t i o n  f u n c t i o n  i n  F ig .  3 (a) .  The 
p resen ta t i on  o f  such f u n c t i o n s  would enhance t h e  q u a l i t y  o f  environmental  
impact assessments, which f r e q u e n t l y  a re  based on worst-case analyses i n  
which t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  occurrence o f  t h e  wors t  case i s  n o t  considered. 
A l t e r n a t i v e l y ,  t h e  benchmark concent ra t ion  might  be t h e  l e v e l  above which 
contaminant d ischarge would n o t  be permi t ted .  I n  t h i s  case, a curve 
s i m i l a r  t o  t h a t  i n  Fig. 3(a) migh t  be used t o  es t imate  t h e  frequency o f  
days on which a c t i o n  would have t o  be taken. P r o b a b i l i s t i c  models (e.g., 
Parkhurst  e t  a l .  1981; Barnthouse, i n  press)  would be used t o  generate 
t h e  curves. The models should i n c l u d e  est imates o f  both v a r i a b i l i t y  i n  
r e l e v a n t  environmental  parameters and u n c e r t a i n t y  i n  contaminant-speci f ic  
parameters such as p a r t i  t i o n  c o e f f i c i e n t s  and degradat ion ra tes .  
Risk ana l ys i s  can a l s o  be used t o  s e t  standards based on 
p r o b a b i l i t i e s  o f  exceeding e f f e c t s  thresholds.  Suter  e t  a l .  (1983, i n  
press)  descr ibed a method f o r  c a l c u l a t i n g  probabi 1 i t y  d i s t r i b u t i o n s  f o r  
t o x i c o l o g i c a l  benchmarks such as LCSO1s and ch ron i c -e f f ec t s  thresholds.  
Such a d i s t r i b u t i o n ,  p l o t t e d  as a cumulat ive p r o b a b i l i t y  f unc t i on ,  i s  
Suter ,  C.W. et a1. 
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Figure 3 Four applications of ecological risk functions. In (a), a cumulative fre- 
quency function is used to estimate the frequency with which the 
environmental concentration of a contaminant w i l l  exceed an "action" 
concentration. In (b), a cumulative probability function for  the effects 
threshold concentration of a hypotehtical organism is used to select an 
action concentration of a hypotehtical organism is used to select an 
action concentration with an XX chance of exceeding the t rue effects 
threshold. In (c), probability density functions for  two components of a 
risk estimate a r e  compared to identify the component w i t h  the greater 
uncertainty. In (d), the risks of adverse effects of different magnitudes 
are compared for  two alternative facility designs (A and B). The 
expected effects of the two alternatives are the same, but alternative B 
presents greater risks of severe adverse effects. 
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presented i n  Fig. 3 (b ) .  Using t h i s  curve, t h e  a l l owab le  ambient 
concent ra t ion  migh t  be s e t  so t h a t  t h e  r i s k  o f  exceeding t h e  th resho ld  
l e v e l  i s  5%. Figure  3(b) could a l s o  be used t o  d e f i n e  t h e  d e c i s i o n  
p o i n t s  i n  t i e r e d  hazard assessment schemes. 
Another major  a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  r i s k  ana l ys i s  i s  i n  a l l o c a t i n g  research 
e f f o r t  t o  maximize t h e  u n c e r t a i n t y  reduc t i on  per  d o l l a r  inves ted  i n  
research r e l a t e d  t o  eco log i ca l  hazards. I f  t h e  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  t o  t o t a l  
u n c e r t a i n t y  o f  severa l  d i f f e r e n t  components o f  a  r i s k  es t imate  can be 
compared, then  research e f f o r t  can be concentrated on t h e  component(s) 
c o n t r i b u t i n g  t h e  g r e a t e s t  unce r ta in t y .  For example, i n  F ig.  3 (c ) ,  
u n c e r t a i n t y  about t h e  environmental  concent ra t ion  o f  a  t o x i c  contaminant 
i s  compared t o  u n c e r t a i n t y  concerning i t s  e f f e c t s  th resho ld .  The 
r e l a t i v e  var iances o f  t h e  two d i s t r i b u t i o n s  correspond rough ly  t o  those 
est imated by Suter  e t  a l .  (1983) f o r  largemouth bass exposed t o  mercury 
re leased f rom a  hypo the t i ca l  i n d i r e c t  coal  l i q u e f a c t i o n  p l a n t .  A d d i t i o n a l  
r e l e v a n t  da ta  would decrease t h e  spread o f  these curves. The p red i c ted  
reduc t ion  i n  over lap  between t h e  curves cou ld  be used as a  measure o f  t h e  
value o f  t h e  data.  
Decisions concerning a l t e r n a t i v e  p l a n t  s i t e s  and m i t i g a t i n g  
technologies can a l s o  be f a c i l i t a t e d  by us ing  r i s k  curves such as those 
shown i n  F ig .  3 (d ) .  Such curves prov ide  i n fo rma t i on  about both t h e  
expected e f f e c t s  o f  an a c t i o n  (e.g., b u i l d i n g  a  p l a n t  o r  l i c e n s i n g  a  
chemical)  and t h e  r i s k  o f  ext remely l a r g e  e f f e c t s .  
More soph i s t i ca ted  a p p l i c a t i o n s  o f  r i s k  ana l ys i s  t o  environmental 
dec i s i on  making a re  a l s o  poss ib le .  For example, F ig .  4 presents a  
dec i s i on  t r e e  comparing two a l t e r n a t e  courses o f  a c t i o n  f o r  a  dec i s i on  
ALTERNATIVE 8: 
COST Of EXPECTED COST 
ACTION Of ALTERMAT lVE 
MlTlQATE / IMMEDIATELY X 
/ AT COST X 
r pdod PROBABILITY 
THAT MlTlQATlON 
MlTlQATlON 
Q / NECESSARY X+Y 
ALTERNATIVE b: \ DELAY MITIQATION / 
PERFORM RESEARCH \ 
'A MITICIATION 
UNNECESSARY - Y 
Figure 4 A risk estimate used a s  a aomponent of a declsion analysis regardlng a potentlal envlronmental 
impaot. Whether it Is economical to delay mitigation whlle performing research concerning the 
potentlal impact depends on the a prior4 probabillty (p), estlmated using a risk model, that 
research will show mitlgation to be necessary. 
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maker confronted w i t h  a p o t e n t i a l  environmental problem. It has been 
estimated, us ing  a r i s k  model, t h a t  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  i s  p  t h a t  t h e  
environmental impact o f  some i n d u s t r i a l  f a c i l i t y  i s  ser ious  enough t o  
r e q u i r e  m i t i g a t i o n .  The dec i s ion  maker has a choice o f  o rde r i ng  
imnediate m i t i g a t i o n ,  a t  c o s t  X, o r  o f  de lay ing  m i t i g a t i o n  w h i l e  a 
research program, a t  c o s t  Y, i s  performed t o  e l i m i n a t e  t h e  u n c e r t a i n t y  
about whether m i t i g a t i o n  i s  necessary. Whether i t would be economical t o  
delay m i t i g a t i o n  depends on t h e  c o s t  o f  t h e  research r e l a t i v e  t o  t h e  cos t  
o f  m i t i g a t i n g  and on t h e  a p r i o r i  p r o b a b i l i t y  (p )  t h a t ,  f o l l o w i n g  
research, m i t i g a t i o n  wi 11 s t i  11 be necessary. 
7. EXAMPLES 
7.1. I n d u s t r i a l  E f f l u e n t s  
The e f f l u e n t s  f rom t h e  proposed syn fue ls  i n d u s t r y  present  a 
p a r t i c u l a r  chal lenge t o  environmental  assessment because t h e i r  
composit ion i s  o n l y  rough ly  p r e d i c t a b l e  and i s  expected t o  be h i g h l y  
complex. The U.S. Environmental P r o t e c t i o n  Agency's Synfuels  Risk 
Analys is  Program developed r i s k  assessment methods and app l i ed  them t o  
t h e  problem o f  research p r i o r i t i z a t i o n  f o r  t h e  a n t i c i p a t e d  i n d u s t r y  
(Barnthouse e t  a l .  1985; Suter  e t  a l .  1984). E f f l u e n t  streams and 
components were i d e n t i f i e d  as being i n  need o f  a d d i t i o n a l  research i f  
t hey  appeared t o  pose a s i g n i f i c a n t  hazard and t h e i r  environmental 
behavior  was i n  some way p o o r l y  spec i f i ed .  Risk assessment prov ided a 
means o f  s imul taneously  i d e n t i f y i n g  t h e  r e l a t i v e  hazard and t h e  
u n c e r t a i n t y  associated w i t h  t h e  e f f l u e n t  components. 
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E f f l u e n t  compositions were def ined i n  terms o f  chemical classes t o  
minimize t h e  e f f l u e n t  cha rac te r i za t i on  problem and t o  reduce t h e  
assessment task  t o  a  manageable scale. The need f o r  cons idera t ion  o f  t h e  
e f  f 1 uent t o x i c i t i e s  was es tab l  i shed by using an addi ti v i  t y  mode; t o  
est imate t h e  acute t o x i c i t y  o f  t h e  whole e f f l u e n t s  from t h e  t o x i c i t i e s  o f  
t h e i r  component chemical classes. Only one o f  t h e  e f f l u e n t s  was pred ic ted 
t o  be acu te l y  t o x i c ,  b u t  a l l  e f f l u e n t s  had s u f f i c i e n t l y  h igh  t o x i c i t y  and 
uncer ta in ty  concerning t h e i r  ac tua l  e f f e c t s  t o  j u s t i f y  a d d i t i o n a l  
research. Some s p e c i f i c  research needs were imned ia te ly  i d e n t i f i a b l e  
because c e r t a i n  categor ies of chemicals f o r  which no environmental 
t o x i c i t y  data were a v a i l a b l e  (such as n i t roaromat ics)  were expected t o  
occur i n  t h e  e f f l u e n t s .  Some categories, such as amnonia and cadmium, 
cont r ibu ted s i g n i f i c a n t l y  t o  aquat ic  t o x i c i t y  but,  because they are  w e l l  
s tudied and narrowly def ined, t h e  uncer ta in ty  concerning t h e i r  e f f e c t s  i s  
r e l a t i v e l y  small. O f  t h e  chemical classes t h a t  have some aquat ic  
t o x i c i t y  data, on l y  t h e  phenol ics had both t h e  h igh  apparent hazard and 
t h e  h igh  uncer ta in ty  t h a t  would j u s t i f y  a d d i t i o n a l  research. 
7.2. Acid Deposi t ion 
The issue o f  a c i d  depos i t ion  invo lves  a  v a r i e t y  o f  complex processes 
operat ing a t  scales ranging from t h e  organismal t o  t h e  cont inenta l .  The 
f o l l o w i n g  two examples show how t h e  issue can be made more manageable by 
broadly d e f i n i n g  t h e  problems and emphasizing uncer ta in ty .  
Horgan e t  a l .  (1985) considered t h e  problem o f  hea l th  e f f e c t s  o f  
s u l f a t e  aerosols. They independently e l i c i t e d  models and judgments 
concerning parameter izat ion and uncer ta in ty  from experts on atmospheric 
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processes and h e a l t h  e f f e c t s .  These were used t o  generate p r o b a b i l i t y  
d e n s i t y  f unc t i ons  on est imated s u l f a t e  exposure and e f f e c t s .  They found 
t h a t  t h e  u n c e r t a i n t y  concerning exposure was r e l a t i v e l y  smal l  because 
atmospheric s c i e n t i s t s  have r e l a t i v e l y  well-developed models which were 
w e l l  supported. I n  con t ras t ,  t h e r e  was l i t t l e  agreement about models o r  
assumptions among t h e  h e a l t h  e f f e c t s  exper ts .  The r e s u l t s  o f  t h i s  
exerc ise  p rov ide  est imates o f  e f f e c t s  f rom a s i n g l e  c o a l - f i r e d  p l a n t  t h a t  
range f rom 0 t o  a few thousand excess deaths pe r  year. Hore c l e a r l y ,  
t hey  i n d i c a t e  t h a t  f u r t h e r  research i n  atmospheric science would 
c o n t r i b u t e  l i t t l e  t o  improv ing t h e  est imates o f  h e a l t h  e f f e c t s .  
The hypothesized e f f e c t s  o f  a c i d  depos i t i on  on f o r e s t s  have ra i sed  
considerable cont roversy  because e f f e c t s  mechanisms are  n o t  understood 
and because f i e l d  s tud ies  a t  d i f f e r e n t  s i t e s  p rov ide  apparent ly  
c o n f l i c t i n g  evidence. Dale and Gardner (submit ted)  used a f o r e s t  stand 
model t o  examine t h e  i m p l i c a t i o n s  f o r  f o r e s t  p roduc t ion  o f  d i f f e r e n t  
assumptions about t h e  l e v e l  and d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  e f f e c t s .  Unce r ta in t y  
ana l ys i s  o f  t h e  model showed t h a t  a g iven  l e v e l  o f  d i r e c t  e f f e c t s  on 
growth r a t e s  o f  i n d i v i d u a l  t r e e s  could cause w ide l y  vary ing  decrements i n  
stand p r o d u c t i v i t y ,  depending on t h e  i n i t i a l  s i z e  d i s t r i b u t i o n s  o f  t h e  
species. T h e i r  r e s u l t s  suggest t h a t  standard reg iona l  f o r e s t r y  
s t a t i s t i c s  may n o t  revea l  e f f e c t s  on growth and t h a t  a t t e n t i o n  must be 
d i r e c t e d  t o  c r i t i c a l  s i z e  c lasses and species. 
7.3. Engineered Organisms 
Engineered organisms p o t e n t i a l l y  c o n s t i t u t e  t h e  most d i f f i c u l t  
problem f a c i n g  environmental  assessment. Although some o f  t h e  techniques 
developed f o r  assessment o f  t o x i c  chemicals a re  a l s o  a p p l i c a b l e  t o  novel 
organisms, the  f a c t  t h a t  organisms reproduce, evolve, and have s p e c i f i c  
h a b i t a t  requirements complicates t h e  problem o f  p r e d i c t i n g  t h e i r  f a t e  and 
e f fec ts .  Because t h e  f i e l d  i s  new and t h e  number of organisms t o  be 
assessed i s  small, assessments have n o t  used r i s k  ana lys is .  Rather they 
have r e l i e d  on t h e  i n fo rma l  judgments o f  exper t  panels. However, because 
o f  t h e  overconfidence o f  experts  (F i scho f f  e t  a l .  1981). t h e  
inconsistency o f  ad hoc procedures, and t h e  eventual need t o  assess 
hundreds o r  thousands o f  new organisms pe r  year, formal assessment 
procedures must eventual l y  be developed. Because o f  t h e  l ess  p red ic tab le  
behavior o f  organisms and t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e i r  reproduct ive  c a p a b i l i t y  
a l lows them t o  p e r s i s t  i n d e f i n i t e l y ,  it i s  p a r t i c u l a r l y  impor tant  t h a t  
assessment o f  organisms inc lude  e x p l i c i t  t reatment  o f  uncer ta in ty .  
Suter  ( i n  press) presented a conceptual framework f o r  environmental 
r i s k  ana lys i s  o f  engineered organisms. Major sources o f  unce r ta in t y  
i nc lude  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t i e s  o f  movement between hab i ta t s ,  c o l o n i z a t i o n  o f  
new hab i ta t ,  pa thogen ic i ty  by a nominal ly  f r e e - l i v i n g  organism, extension 
o f  a pathogen's host  range t o  non t a r g e t  species, d i s r u p t i o n  o f  
ecosystem processes, exchange o f  genet ic  ma te r ia l  between organisms, and 
evo lu t i on  t h a t  reduces cons t ra in ts  on t h e  organisms behavior. Because o f  
t h e  s p e c i f i c i t y  o f  h a b i t a t  requirements, it i s  d i f f i c u l t  t o  genera l ize  
from t e s t s  o f  t h e  pers is tence o r  e f f e c t s  o f  an organism i n  a p a r t i c u l a r  
system. A bacterium t h a t  goes e x t i n c t  i n  one so i  1 may p r o l i f e r a t e  i n  a 
s o i l  one meter away. Therefore, it would be na ive  t o  accept t e s t  r e s u l t s  
as p r e d i c t o r s  o f  t h e  environmental behavior o f  organisms as i s  u s u a l l y  
done f o r  chemicals. Only a risk-based assessment s t ra tegy  w i l l  be 
capable of dea l ing  w i t h  t h i s  problem i n  an appropr ia te  manner. 
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8. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Risk ana lys is ,  because o f  i t s  e x p l i c i t  t rea tment  o f  unce r ta in t y ,  
prov ides two s i g n i f i c a n t  b e n e f i t s  f o r  environmental  impact assessment. 
The f i r s t  i s  t h a t  i t e l im ina tes  t h e  need f o r  worst-case scenarios and 
analyses by p r o v i d i n g  p r o b a b i l i t y  d e n s i t i e s  on t h e  expected e f f e c t  t h a t  
can be used t o  est imate t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  any worse e f f e c t .  Worst-case 
analyses are  o f t e n  u n r e a l i s t i c  and, because t h e r e  i s  no abso lu te  wors t  
case and no sca le  o f  badness, t hey  should n o t  be used t o  compare 
a l t e r n a t i v e  ac t i ons .  The second advantage i s  t h a t  i t prov ides an 
o b j e c t i v e  means o f  dec id ing,  based on reduc t i on  i n  unce r ta in t y ,  what 
research would most improve t h e  assessment. 
Regardless o f  i t s  i n t e l l e c t u a l  appeal, environmental r i s k  ana l ys i s  
w i l l  soon be f o r g o t t e n  unless t h e  concepts can be t r a n s l a t e d  i n t o  
opera t iona l  techniques. Steps i n  t h i s  d i r e c t i o n  have a l ready  been taken 
(Barnthouse and Suter,  i n  press).  Host o f  t h e  necessary components o f  
ope ra t i ona l  r i s k  ana l ys i s  methodologies (e.g., a i r  and water q u a l i t y  
models, eco log i ca l  e f f e c t s  models, and t o x i c o l o g i c a l  data bases) a l ready  
e x i s t .  The o n l y  c o n s t r a i n t s  on t h e  usefulness o f  e x i s t i n g  models and 
data a re  t h a t  (1)  t h e  models must be mod i f ied  so t h a t  ou tpu t  can be 
expressed i n  probabilistic terms, and ( 2 )  e r r o r  var iances i n  experimental  
s tud ies  and i n  data e x t r a p o l a t i o n s  must be repor ted  so t h a t  parameter 
u n c e r t a i n t i e s  can be q u a n t i f i e d .  
As i n  o t h e r  types o f  r i s k  analyses, t h e  most d i f f i c u l t  problem 
fac ing  t h e  environmental  r i s k  a n a l y s t  i s  t h a t  o f  demonstrat ing t h a t  h i s  
r i s k  model prov ides reasonable est imates o f  eco log i ca l  r i s k s  i n  t h e  r e a l  
wor ld .  A t  l e a s t  f o r  environmental  contaminants, many o f  t h e  same 
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physical .  chemical. and b i o l o g i c a l  processes under ly  both eco log i ca l  and 
human h e a l t h  r i s k s .  Thus, progress made i n  one f i e l d  can d i r e c t l y  
b e n e f i t  t he  other .  
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RISK ASSESSMENTS FOR ENERGY SYSTEMS AND ROLE OF 
PRELIMINARY DEGREE-OF-HAZARD EVALUATlONS 
L.J. Habegger and D.J. Fingleton 
AFgonne National Laboratory 
AFgonne, Illinois, USA 60439 
Risk assessment can be defined broadly as the process of developing qualitative 
and quantitative information on the health, safety, and environmental risks of 
technological systems, which can then be weighed against the perceived benefits of the 
systems. Through a variety of direct and indirect legal, institutional, and economic 
mechanisms, societies use these assessments t o  accept or  reject deployment of these 
systems or  t o  place constraints on their operation. Many examples exist of the 
constraints societies have placed on technologies, based on evaluations of associated 
risks. These examples range from limits on the speed a t  which automobiles are driven 
and constraints on the use of pesticides, to  requirements for elaborate safety devices for 
nuclear power plants. 
Three conceptually different, but interrelated, processes of risk assessment and 
their contribution t o  public decision making are  discussed in this paper. These processes 
and their interrelationships are illustrated using applications to  the risk assessment of 
energy systems. 
At the most comprehensive level of technology assessment, illustrated in Sec. 2, 
the cumulative risks associated with a range of energy technology alternatives are 
estimated. These assessments provide input to  decisions to  continue or redirect research 
and development of these technologies. 
Another major focus of risk assessment is the detailed evaluation of more 
narrowly defined risks, such as those associated with a single pollutant or activity tha t  is 
part of the overall technology. These component risk assessments, illustrated in Sec. 3, 
support the broader technology assessments and also provide input t o  decisions on the 
need to  prescribe specific controls on the source of the risk under consideration. 
As the level of scientific and public awareness of the range of hazards presented 
by an increasingly technological society continues t o  expand rapidly, the ability to  
accurately quantify all identified potential risks decreases. Thus, the need is growing for 
procedures to  set priorities in choosing to  conduct certain resource-extensive technology 
assessments or  component risk assessments. Section 4 discusses a priority-setting, or 
degreeof-hazard, screening procedure being used a t  AFgonne National Laboratory t o  
support more quantitative risk assessments. 
2 COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENTS OF ENERGY TECHNOLOGIES 
As an example of the application of risk assessment a t  the broadest level used 
for decision making on major technology alternatives, an overview is provided of a study 
Habegger, L.J., Fingleton, D.J. 
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conducted a t  Argonne National Laboratory to evaluate the health and safety risks of 
seven electrical generation systems having potential for deployment af ter  the year 
2000.' The systems were compared on the basis of expected public and occupational 
deaths and lost workdays associated with average generation of 1000 MW(e)  per year. 
Risks and associated uncertainties were estimated for all phases of the energy production 
cycle, including the risks of direct and indirect component manufacture and materials 
production and energy inputs, all of which are major contributors to  the risks of the more 
capital intensive solar technologies. The potential significance of the major health and 
safety issues that remain largely unquantifiable is also considered. 
The technologies assessed included (1) a light-water fission reactor system 
without fuel reprocessing (LWR), (2) a low-Btu coal gasification system with an open- 
cycle gas turbine combined with a steam topping cycle (CG/CC), (3) a liquid-metal fast 
breeder fission reactor system (LMFBR), (4) a central-station terrestrial photovoltaic 
system (CTPV), (5) a decentralized "roof-topt1 photovoltaic system with a 6 kW(e) peak 
capacity and battery storage (DTPV), (6) a satellite power system (SPS) having a large 
array of photovoltaic collectors in earth orbit and using a microwave beam to  direct 
electrical energy to  a terrestrial antenna, and (7) a first-generation fusion system 
(Fusion) with magnetic confinement. Table 1 gives the basic design parameters for the 
seven systems. 
Detailed descriptions of the alternative generation systems were compiled on a 
consistent basis for comparison.293 The design of the coal s stem with low-Btu 
gasification was based on an SO2 emission factor of 86 kg S02/101' J for gas or  140 kg 
so2/1012 J for coal. The light-water reactor considered was typical of U.S. commercial 
designs using enriched uranium without reprocessing. The fusion system was based on a 
preliminary design using a tokamak reactor with a deuterium/tritium fuel cycle. Silicon 
photovoltaic cells, a t  an array cost of $35/m2, were assigned to  each of the solar energy 
systems. The design of the decentralized solar energy system included 20 kWh(e) of 
storage capacity and advanced lead-acid batteries with a 10-year lifetime. System 
storage and utility system backup were not included for any of the other systems. 
From the technology characterizations and other related information, all major 
known and potential health and safety issues that could be unambiguously defined and 
discussed were identified. Each segment of the energy cycle was considered, including 
component fabrication, plant construction, fuel extraction and processing, operation and 
maintenance, and waste disposal. Table 2 summarizes estimated fatalities per year per 
1000 MW(e) of average generation. 
A range of estimated impacts was included in each quantification, reflecting the 
uncertainty associated with the magnitude of impact. For some potential health and 
safety issu'es, i t  was not possible to  provide any quantification. Estimation of risk 
magnitudes for these issues was limited to  qualitative discussion of potential severity or 
possible mechanisms for occurrence of the risk because of a lack of information in such 
areas as dose-response relationships a t  low-dose levels, siting patterns, populations 
exposed, uncertainties regarding probability of event occurrence, and characterizations 
of advanced technologies. 
Compared t o  the more conventional coal and fission technologies, the advanced 
solar and fusion technologies present a tradeoff between reduced fuel requirements and 
TABLE 1 Major Characterlstlcs of the Seven Electrical Generation Technologies 
Characterist ic LUR CC/CC LHFBR CTPV DTPV SPS Fun i  on 
U n i t  capacity ( H U ~ )  1250 1250 1250 200 0.0006 5000 1320 
Total d i rec t  commodi y  E 333.7 356.2 535.2 90.1 0.00717 13,421 1253.8 cost per unit  ($10 la 
Average annual load 70 7 0 7 0 25 .8. 12.2 9  0  7 0 
factor  ( X I  
Indirect  capi ta  6 koSt 197.1 132.7 262.6 20 .O - - 628.6 per u n i t  ($10 ) 
On-site construction 13.1 15.2 14.5 1.7 0.6 x c 22.1 
labor per unit (10 6  
person-hr) 
a ~ e l  ivered costs  fo r  components, s t ruc tures ,  and materials .  Land and labor costs  excluded. 
Values a re  given i n  1978 dol lars .  
b~emporary s i t e  construction f a c i l i t i e s ,  payroll insurance and taxes, and other construc- 
t ion  services such as home and f i e ld  o f f ice  expenses, f i e l d  job supervision, and 
engineering services. Specif ical ly  excluded a re  fees for  permits, taxee, in te ree t  on 
cap i t a l ,  and price escalat ion.  Values a re  given in 1978 dollare.  
'~ece iv ing  antenna -- 15.0; construction in  o rb i t  -- 0.7; launch-area maintenance -- 4.2; 
and launch-area operations -- 2.8. 
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higher initial capital and construction requirements. Furthermore, the industries 
producing the energy system components in turn require certain commodity inputs (e.g., 
copper for electrical equipment), and the risks associated with the production of these 
indirect requirements must be considered in the overall risk analysis. 
The analysis indicated that for every $lo6 of direct industrial output required to 
supply system components to  each of the energy systems considered, a combined indirect 
output of S 0.5-0.9 x l o 6  is required from other industries. 
The procedure for estimating direct and indirect occupational risks of com modity 
production contains various uncertainties, including use of U.S. Bureau of Labor 
Statistics data for occupational injury and i ~ n e s s . ~  Although these data are considered 
the best available for these factors, they reflect large error bounds because of 
underreporting and misdiagnosis. In particular, these statistics do not adequately reflect 
chronic disease. Other areas where large uncertainties may exist include the use of the 
historic input-output structure of the economy to estimate indirect requirements for 
facilities to be constructed af ter  2000, plant construction requirements, potential 
changes in employee productivity, and potential changes in risk levels per worker. 
Table 2 does not include the risk from production of energy used in component 
manufacturing. The electrical energy requirement for direct and indirect component 
manufacture for the coal and nuclear systems is equivalent to  a small fraction of the 
equivalent energy produced in one year of operation of those systems. On the other 
hand, the input energy for component manufacture for the centralized and decentralized 
photovoltaic systems is equivalent to 2.8 years and 6.5 years of output, respectively, 
from these systems. These large "energy-payback-timen estimates can in large part be 
attributed to the electrical energy requirements for production of silicon photovoltaic 
cells.' The risks associated with production of this quantity of electrical energy are 
highly dependent on the generation technology assumed. 
Of the various systems considered, the coal technology has the largest overall 
quantified risk, primarily due to  coal extraction, processing and transport, and a i r  
pollutant emissions, although large uncertainties remain in the actual effect  of the air 
pollution, as is discussed in the following section. The decentralized photovoltaic system 
has large associated risks because of the large labor and material requirements of small, 
dispersed units. The quantified risks from the remaining technologies (fission, fusion, 
satellite, and centralized terrestrial photovoltaic) are comparable, within the range of 
quantified uncertainty. The occupational risks for component production, both direct and 
indirect, are a substantial fraction of the total risks, but particularly for the advanced, 
capital-intensive solar and fusion technologies. The energy requirements for component 
production can also be associated with substantial risks, depending on the source of 
energy. 
Table 3 lists the potentially major issues not quantified in this study. Of 
potential significance as far  as public acceptance of new energy systems, but not 
included in the quantification, is the possibility of catastrophic incidents associated with 
the fission and fusion systems. Unique unquantified issues of concern also exist for the 
satellite system related to the use of microwave transmission of energy and extensive 
TABLE 3 Potentially Major Unquantified Issues 
S o l a r  t e c h n o l o g i e s  (CTPV, DTPV, SPS) 
Exposure  t o  e m i s s i o n s  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  
t h e  p r o d u c t i o n  o f  p h o t o v o l t a i c  c e l l s  
Exposure  t o  h a z a r d o u s  w a s t e s  f rom t h e  
d i s p o s a l  o r  r e c y c l i n g  o f  p h o t o v o l t a i c  
c e l l  m a t e r i a l s  
C h r o n i c  l ow- l eve l  e x p o s u r e  o f  l a r g e  
p o p u l a t i o n s  t o  microwaves (SPS o n l y )  
Crash  of s p a c e  v e h i c l e  i n t o  a n  u r b a n  
a r e a  (SPS o n l y )  
Exposure  t o  e m i s s i o n s  from l a u n c h  
v e h i c l e s  (SPS o n l y )  
N u c l e a r  t e c h n o l o g i e s  (LWR, LHFBR, f u s i o n )  
H a j o r  p u b l i c  r a d i a t i o n  e x p o s u r e  r e l a t e d  
t o  s y s t e m  f a i l u r e  
O c c u p a t i o n a l  e x p o s u r e  t o  c h e m i c a l l y  
t o x i c  m a t e r i a l s  t h a t  a r e  p a r t  o f  t h e  
f u e l  c y c l e  
D i v e r s i o n  of  f u e l  o r  by -p roduc t s  f o r  
m i l i t a r y  o r  s u b v e r s i v e  u s e s  (LWR and 
LMFBR o n l y )  
L iqu id -me ta l  f i r e  (LMFBR and f u s i o n  o n l y )  
Coal  t e c h n o l o g i e s  
Long-term e f f e c t s  of  C02 e m i s s i o n s  
A l l  t e c h n o l o g i e s  
Long-term e f f e c t s  of  by-product  s o l i d  
w a s t e s  
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space travel. For each of the energy technologies, the long-term impact of by-product 
waste disposal remains largely unquantified. 
In general, the more defined technologies (e.g., CG/CC and LWR) have more 
quantifiable risks and fewer unquantifiable risks. The opposite is true for the less- 
defined technologies (e.g., fusion and SPS). Table 3 does not rank the unquantified issues; 
however, the potential for radiation release from fission is probably greater than that 
from fusion, for example. 
3 RISK ASSESSlKENTS OF TECHNOLOGY SYSX'EM COMPONENTS 
An objective of the overall technology assessments of the sort illustrated in Sec. 
2 is identification of the system components that contribute significantly to total risk. A 
frequent sequel to  this type of assessment is the more detailed evaluation of major risk 
components, including the development of a more complete understanding of the 
uncertainties. Depending on the setting for the analysis, this more detailed component 
risk assessment can be used, for example, to develop regulatory guidelines, to obtain a 
better understanding of the source of risks, or to establish the need to consider other 
overall technology systems. 
Detailed assessments of narrowly defined components of technology risk (e.g., 
from a single pollutant or waste stream) are also frequently called for in the face of 
large cumulative risk from many sources. However, a potential problem with isolated 
component risk assessments within an overall system is that reduction of one risk (e.g., 
air pollutants) may exacerbate other risks (e.g., solid waste disposal). It is frequently the 
case, therefore, that regulatory mechanisms require individual consideration of many 
potential risk components. 
This section illustrates a risk assessment constrained to consider a narrow 
component of the overall risks of a nuclear-fueled electrical generation system. The 
risks evaluated were those associated with the atmospheric release of coal-combustion 
particulates from a power plant supplying the electrical energy required to produce the 
annual average nuclear fuel requirements of a 100 0-MW(e) light-water reactor.6 This 
case study is a clear example of the utility of risk assessments in regulatory proceed- 
ings. The results of the analysis, which were in responsq to a legal ruling, were presented 
as part of the public testimony regarding the licensing of the Harris nuclear power plant 
in the U.S. 
The exposure analysis conducted in this risk assessment included characterizing 
the particulate emissions from three existing coal-fired power plants generating 
electricitycfor use in uranium gaseous diffusion plants. A dispersion model was used to  
estimate resulting ambient concentrations of particulates within an 80-km radius of the 
emission source. Population exposures from these concentrations were based on the 
surrounding population distributions obtained through the U.S. Bureau of the Census. The 
ambient concentrations of those particulates associated with pr duction of fuel for the 3 
reference power plant r e r e  estimated to be less than 0.015 um/m for the annual average 
and less than 0.75 ug/m for the 24-hour maximum. 
Habegger, L.J., F.Ingleton, D.J; 
Various morbidity and mortality health outcomes from the population exposure 
were considered, including both chronic and acute effects.* Data from respiratory 
disease incidents and hospital respiratory disease emergency  admission^'^^ were the basis 
for morbidity health effects analysis. For chronic morbidity, data on chronic respiratory 
disease prevalence were considered,g910 but were determined not to be applicable to the 
conditions present in this case study. 
To quantify the acute and chronic exposure mortality effects of airborne 
particles, mortality coefficients derived from time-series and cross-sectional analysis 
reported by Harvard ~ n i v e r s i t ~ l l ~ l ~  and Mathtech, 1nc.,13 were chosen. In addition, 
upgraded cross-sectional mortality analysis was analyzed using the 1980 census and vital 
statistics data in conjunction with data for the same period on fine particles with 
aerodynamic diameters smaller than 2.5 um. 
Table 4 gives the range of estimated cumulative health effects within the 80-km 
radius. Both in terms of absolute numbers and in terms of relative proportions compared 
to baseline health impacts in the areas analyzed, the projected impacts a re  very small. 
Furthermore, the concentrations and health impacts are so small that  they could not 
even be detected with state-of-the-art monitoring, survey-design, and analysis 
techniques. 
Although the assessment was limited to  a very narrow issue, i t  illustrates a 
direct application of risk assessment in formal regulatory proceedings. In this and other 
similar applications, careful anaysis  and clear interpretation of levels of uncertainty are 
needed to avoid misuse of the results. 
4 PRELIMINARY DEGREE-OF-HAZARD EVALUATIONS 
Ideally, detailed risk assessments that include quantitative evaluation of 
uncertainty levels should be performed for each risk component of any energy (or other 
technological) system being considered as an alternative for introduction or increased 
deployment. Section 4 discusses a proposed procedure for preliminary hazard evaluation 
for use in situations where more detailed and quantitative evaluations of risk components 
are not feasible for various reasons. 
Such comprehensive risk assessments are not feasible, for example, when many 
potential risk components have been identified and the requisite resources and data are 
not available to  evaluate each one in detail within the required time limit. This situation 
clearly exists with regard to the chemical by-products produced in modern technical 
societies. The number of such by-products is rapidly increasing, and the growing 
awareness'of the potential risks a t  chronic low levels of exposure requires evaluation of 
pollutants formerly thought to  be of li t t le concern. 
*Acute (respiratory) morbidity indicates short-term illnesses such as pneumonia, 
influenza, and common coughs, while chronic (respiratory) morbidity indicates persis- 
tent long-term illnesses such as chronic bronchitis, bronchial asthma, or other 
obstructive lung disease. 
TABLE 4 Uncertainty Limits (95% confidence) for the Pro- 
jected Health Effects from Combustion Particulates from a 
Coal-Fired Power Plant Providing the Electrical Energy 
Required to Produce Fuel for a 1000-MW(e) Nuclear Power 
Plant 
Acute Morbidity Effects 
Annual Number Annual Number 
Emergency Room Acute Mortality Effects 
Visits for Respiratory 
Respiratory Disease Daily Annual 
Disease Incidents kforta1itya Mortality 
a ~ h e  possibility of zero as a lower limit is included 
when nonsampling errors are included, that is, errors 
caused by confounding factors and collinearities with 
other pollutants. 
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With respect to  energy systems, a new class of t race organic and inorganic 
pollutants, as well as their transport in air, surface waters, groundwaters, and soil media, 
has  been the subject of intense investigation. Because of the large number of these 
potentially harmful pollutants, a procedure w a s  needed for initial ranking of substances 
on the basis of limited, but readily accessible, information. With such a procedure, 
resources for detailed studies could be allocated to the substances that are most likely to  
pose the greatest health impact. These substances will have the greatest probability of 
future requirements for regulation or  testing. 
To meet this need, the Multi-Attribute Hazard Assessment System (MAHAS) was 
developed by Argonne National Laboratory. I t  assigns the degree of hazard associated 
with multi-constituent waste streams produced by various energy technologies. The 
waste stream degree of hazard (DOH) is based on the toxicological and physiochemical 
properties of each stream's constituents. l 4  MAHAS first calculates the DOH of 
constituents using a scoring procedure that considers available information on the 
following six factors: oncogenicity, mutagenicity, reproductive and developmental 
toxicity, acute lethality, effects other than acute lethality, and bioaccumulation. 
MAHAS then develops scores for each of these factors based on 5 to  13 criteria 
selected on the basis of judgments from experts in relevant disciplines. The criteria for 
oncogenicity are given, as an example, in Table 5. An artifact of this system is that 
chemicals about which little is known will have low DOH values. To compensate for this, 
the "no datat' entries for each chemical are flagged. The number of flagged entries is 
then used as  a measure of the uncertainty of the DOH for a given constituent. 
MAHAS then calculates the DOH of a constituent by proceeding through three 
levels, beginning with the most detailed level and aggregating a t  successive levels to  
provide a final score for  each substance. The most detailed level scores substances on 
each of the six factors. At the second level, the scores of closely related factors are 
combined into group scores. For example, oncogenicity and mutagenicity are  combined 
to  form the Carcinogenicity Group, while acute lethality and effects other than acute 
lethality are combined to  form the Toxicity Group. Finally, the group scores are 
combined to give the overall DOH of the constituent. 
The final step in a MAHAS analysis is to  determine the DOH for a mixture of 
waste-stream constituents. However, few data exist on the toxicity of various waste 
streams or chemical mixtures. Furthermore, l i t t le quantitative information is available 
on the potential interactions among waste-stream components. For these reasons, the 
effects of such waste-stream constituents are assumed to be additive, with a weighting 
based on the mass fraction of each constituent. 
An inherent aspect of any risk or DOH assessment is the need to use large 
amounts of data. The information necessary to  complete a MAHAS analysis can be 
gathered from seven basic references. Toxicological information and some physical and 
structural properties are obtained from the Toxicological Data ~ank."  The status of 
compounds within the National Toxicological Program (NTP) is available from the NTP 
Carcinogenesis Testing Program list of chemicals on standard protocol16 or NTPfs annual 
plan.17 The s ta te  of the matter (solid, liquid, or gas) and its vapor pressure are  obtained 
either from the Merck index1' or the CRC Handbook o f  Chemistry and ~ h ~ s i c s , ' ~  while 
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TABLE 5 Criteria for ~nco~en i c i  tya 
Index Criteria 
1 Evidence of oncogenicity in humans by oral or inhalation 
route 
2 Evidence of oncogenicity in humans by other than oral or 
inhalation route 
3 Evidence of oncogenicity in two or more animal species by 
any route of administrationb 
4 Evidence on oncogenicit~ in one animal species by any 
route of administration 
5 Compound scheduled for or currently undergoing oncogeni- 
city testing 
6 Negative or equivocal results from oncogenicity testing 
8 No data 
'~ost of the available data will relate to carcinogenicity. 
b ~ f  the data satisfy the criteria for index 3, index 4 should 
not be considered. 
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octanol/water partition coefficients are from Leo et al.20 Waste-stream data can be 
obtained from many sources; however, much of this information is from the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency's waste-stream data base. 2 1 
Currently, information is available on more than 200 waste steams; physio- 
chemical and toxicological data are available on over 100 chemical constituents. These 
data have been computerized to facilitate rapid analysis of a given waste stream. 
Table 6 illustrates DOH scores obtained using the MAHAS procedure for selected 
waste streams, including several related to energy technologies. Such results have been 
used at Argonne National Laboratory to provide direction concerning development of 
detailed risk assessments for a much narrower range of waste streams. Also, an earlier 
version of MAHAS dealing with inhalation routes only2' has been used by the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency to identify toxic air pollutants for further review as a 
possible prelude to regulatory actions. 
How-ever, results such as those illustrated in Table 6 have limited usefulness in 
public debates on the need for regulatory action or the selection of alternative 
technologies on the basis of risk. The level of uncertainty associated with relative 
rankings provided by the MAHAS procedure can only be discussed qualitatively. MAHAS 
is best applied in support of the detailed assessments discussed in Secs. 2 and 3. 
5 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The appropriate approach to risk or hazard assessment can vary considerably, 
depending on various factors, including the intended application of the results and the 
time and other resources available to conduct the assessment. This paper illustrates 
three types of interrelated assessments. Although they can be mutually supportive, they 
have fundamentally different objectives, which require major differences in approach. 
The example of the overall risk assessment of alternative major energy technologies 
illustrates the compilation of a wide range of available risk data applicable to these 
systems. However, major uncertainties exist in the assessments, and public perception of 
their importance could play an important role in final system evaluations. 
A more narrowly defined risk assessment, often focusing on an individual com- 
ponent of a larger system, is the most commonly used approach in regulatory applica- 
tions. The narrow scope allows in-depth analysis of risks and associated uncertainties, 
but it may also contribute to a loss of perspective on the magnitude of the assessed risk 
relative to that of the unassessed risks. 
In some applications, it is useful to conduct semiquantitative degree-of-hazard 
evaluations as a means of setting priorities for detailed risk assessment. The MAHAS 
procedure described in this paper provides a means of rapidly ranking relative hazards 
from various sources using easily accessible data. However, these rankings should not be 
used as definitive input for selecting technology alternatives or developing regulations. 
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TABLE 6 Selected M A H A S  -f-Hazard Rankings for 
Selected Waste Streams 
Waste Stream Range Median 
Energy production waste streamsa 
Geothermal brine 
Wet flue gas desulfurization sludge 
Coal combustion ash (all types and 
geographic regions ) 
Eastern coal ash (all types) 
Hidwestern coal ash 
Western coal ash (all types) 
Bottom ash (all regions) 
Mechanical hopper ash (all regions) 
Fly ash (all regions) 
Oil combustion bottom ash 
Oil combustion fly ash 
Oil rerefining industry waste streams b 
Used oilC - 290 
Waste bio-sludge - 0 
API separator sludge - 4 
Spent clay - 5,500 
Acid tar - 3,900 
Caustic sludge - 9,100 
Spent solvent and still bottoms from 
solvent recovery b 
Dichloromethane spent solvent - 150,000 
Dichloromethane spill bottoms - 37,000 
l,l,l-Trichloroethane spent solvents - 120,000 
l,l,l-Trichloroethane still bottoms - 30,000 
Soil 1-300 11 
a ~ a t a  are f tom Ref. 22. 
b~xcept where noted, all data are from Ref. 21. 
'~ata are f tom Ref. 23. 
d ~ a t a  are f tom Ref. 24. 
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STRUCTURED APPROACHES TO RISK ASSESSMENT AND RISK MANAGEMENT 
D. Krewski  P.L. Birkwood 
Hea l t h  P r o t e c t i o n  Branch F a c u l t y  o f  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  
H e a l t h  & We1 f a r e  Canada U n i v e r s i t y  o f  Ottawa 
Ottawa, On ta r i o  Ottawa, O n t a r i o  
CANADA KIA OL2 CANADA KIN 905 
The r a t i o n a l  management o f  h e a l t h  and env i ronmenta l  r i s k s  i d e a l  l y  
r e q u i r e s  a  we1 1  d e f i n e d  s t r u c t u r e d  approach i n  o rde r  t h a t  r i s k  may be 
d e a l t  w i t h  i n  a  complete and e q u i t a b l e  fash ion.  I n  t h i s  paper,  formal 
models o f  t h e  process o f  r i s k  assessment and r i s k  management which have 
been proposed i n .  t h e  l i t e r a t u r e  i n  r ecen t  years  are reviewed. Common 
elements amongst these model s  ' a r e  i d e n t i f i e d ,  and t h e  p o t e n t i a l  impact  
o f  these  approaches on p r a c t i c a l  dec i s i on  making i s  examined. 
1  . INTRODUCTION 
The se l  e c t i  on of env i  ronmental  hazards f o r  government a t t e n t i  on has 
o f t e n  been handled i n  an -- ad hoc f a s h i o n  i n  t h e  pas t ,  u s u a l l y  i n  a  
r e a c t i v e  manner r a t h e r  t han  as p a r t  o f  a  c a r e f u l l y  p lanned s t ra tegy .  
I ssues  which a t t r a c t  t h e  pub1 i c ' s  i n t e r e s t  have o f t e n  been t h e  focus o f  
s o c i e t a l  resources a t  t h e  expense o f  more s e r i o u s  b u t  l e s s  popu la r  
p r o b l  ems. 
Desp i te  t h e  pressures on r e g u l a t o r y  agencies t o  respond t o  e x t e r n a l  
i n i t i a t i v e s  and s h i  f t i n g  p r i o r i t i e s ,  severa l  f a c t o r s  i n d i c a t e  t h e  need 
f o r  a  more pragmat ic  approach t o  t h e  management o f  h e a l t h  r i s k s .  These 
i n c l  ude t h e  des i  r a b i  1  i t y  o f  ba l  anc i  rlg r i  sks and b e n e f i t s  across s o c i e t y  
i n  an acceptable way, and t h e  t r e n d  towards more openness i n  d e c i s i o n  
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making using consistent and explicit decision criteria. The need for an 
orderly and systematic approach t o  risk assessment ar,d risk managsment 
i s  further supported by the existence of resource constraints, which 
prevent maximum control of a l l  risks. Such an approach can lead t o  
greater objectivity and completeness, consistency of decisions, and 
public accountability. 
A number of formal models for risk assessment and risk management 
have been proposed in recent years. These models are of great value in 
clarifying the main elements of risk assessment and risk management, and 
have served t o  establish a well defined framework within which risk may 
be addressed. 
In section 2 of this article, we discuss the different models which 
have been proposed in the literature. These models are then compared 
and a number of common elements identified (section 3) .  We conclude 
with a brief discussion of the key components of the models and their 
role in understanding and improving the overall process of risk 
assessment and risk management (section 4) .  
2. RISK ASSESSMENT AND RISK MANAGEMENT 
The risk posed by a particular agent depends on bo th  the nature of 
the hazard presented and the probability of i t s  occurrence. Health 
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hazards may be c h a r a c t e r i z e d  i n  terms o f  t h e  h e a l t h  consequences o r  
adverse e f f e c t s  induced. These e f f e c t s  may be more o r  l e s s  se r i ous  
depending on f a c t o r s  such as t h e i r  na tu re ,  s e v e r i t y ,  and degree o f  
r e v e r s i b i l  i t y .  The p r o b a b i l i t y  o r  chance o f  a  g i ven  e f f e c t  o c c u r r i n g  
depends on t h e  potency o f  t h e  agent, t h e  s u s c e p t i b i l  i t y  o f  t he  hos t ,  and 
t h e  l e v e l  o f  exposure (Krewski  & Somers, 1984).  
S c i e n t i f i c  Committee on Problems o f  t h e  Environment (SCOPE). The 
f i r s t  formal model o f  t he  r i s k  assessment and management process appears 
t o  have been f o rmu la ted  by SCOPE (Kates, 1978; White & Burton,  1980).  
A t h r e e  stage r i s k  assessment process c o n s i s t i n g  o f  r i s k  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n ,  
r i s k  e s t i m a t i o n  and r i s k  e v a l u a t i o n  was proposed. The f i r s t  s tep  
i n v o l v e s  s imply  r e c o g n i z i n g  t h a t  a  hazard e x i s t s .  A q u a n t i t a t i v e  
e s t i m a t e  o f  t h e  magnitude o f  t h e  assoc ia ted  r i s k  i s  then  prepared by 
s c i e n t i  f i c a l  l y  de te rmin ing  i t s  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s .  T h i s  i s  f o l l  owed by 
j udgemen ts  abou t  t h e  s i g n i f i c a n c e  and a c c e p t a b i l i t y  o f  r i s k  
p robab i  1  i t i e s  and consequences. Fo l  1  owi ng r i s k  assessment, some 
d e c i s i o n  rega rd ing  whether o r  no t  t o  i n t e r v e n e  t akes  p lace.  Th i s  l a s t  
s tage may be termed r i s k  management. 
Na t i ona l  Research Counci l  (1983). The NRC (1983) model c o n s i s t s  o f  
two stages: r i  sk assessment and r i s k  management. R i  sk assessment 
r e f e r s  t o  t h e  use o f  a  f a c t u a l  base t o  d e f i n e  t he  h e a l t h  e f f e c t s  of  
exposure o f  i n d i v i d u a l s  o r  popu la t i ons  t o  hazardous m a t e r i a l s  o r  
s i t u a t i o n s .  Risk management i s  t h e  process o f  e v a l u a t i n g  regu l  a t o r y  
op t i ons  and s e l e c t i n g  among them. 
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Risk assessment i s  subdivided i n t o  four  components: hazard 
i d e n t i f i c a t i o n ,  dose response assessment, exposure assessment, and r i s k  
cha rac te r i za t i on .  Hzzard i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  i s  t h e  determi na t i on  o f  a 
cause-ef fect  re1 a t i o r i sh i  p between a p a r t i c u l  a r  chemical and a decl i ne i n  
h e a l t h  s t a t u s  us ing  cpidemi o log i ca l  s tud ies  o f  human popul a t ions ,  animal 
bioassay data, mutagen ic i ty  t e s t s ,  and examinat ion of mol ecul a r  
s t ruc tu re .  Dose response assessment i nvol ves examination of t h e  
re1  a t i o n  o f  magnitude o f  exposure and probabi 1 i t y  o f  occurrence of the  
h e a l t h  e f f e c t s  i n  quest ion. Exposure assessment i s  the  study of t he  
ex ten t  o f  human exposure before o r  a f t e r  appl i c a t i  on o f  regul  a to ry  
con t ro l s .  Risk c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n  inc ludes hazard i d e n t i f i c a t i o n ,  dose 
response assessment and exposure assessment, and i n v o l  ves a d e s c r i p t i o n  
o f  t he  na ture  and magnitude o f  human r i s k ,  i n c l u d i n g  a t tendant  
unce r ta in t y .  
A t  t h e  r i  sk management stage, a1 t e r n a t i  ve regu l  a t o r y  op t ions  are 
developed and evaluated. Se lec t i on  o f  a p a r t i c u l  a r  regu l  a to ry  op t i on  
i nvol  ves cons ide ra t i on  o f  t he  pub1 i c heal th ,  economic, soci  a1 , and 
p o l  i t i c a l  consequences o f  imp1 ementation. Other f a c t o r s  o f  s i gn i f i cance  
i n c l  ude t h e  t e c h n i c a l  f e a s i  b i  1  i t y  o f  t he  proposed so lu t i on ,  des i red  
1 eve1 o f  c o n t r o l  , ab i  1 i t y  t o  enforce regu l  a t ions ,  u n c e r t a i n t y  i n  
s c i e n t i f i c  data and t h e  corresponding i n f e r e n t i  a1 br idges  used t o  f i l l  
gaps i n  knowledge, and t h e  p u b l i c ' s  percept ion  and l e v e l  o f  in fo rmat ion .  
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The implementat ion of a  s p e c i f i c  course o f  a c t i o n  should be accompanied 
by t h e  communication o f  i n f o r m a t i o n  concern ing t h e  bas i s  o f  t h e  dec i s i on  
t o  a f f e c t e d  p a r t i e s .  
The NRC model was subsequent ly adopted by t h e  U n i t e d  S ta tes  
Environmental  P r o t e c t i o n  Agency (1  984) w i t h  no s i g n i f i c a n t  s t r u c t u r a l  o r  
d e f i n i t i o n a l  changes. The Department o f  Hea l th  and Human Serv ices  
(DHHS) (DHSS, 1985) has expanded t he  NRC model t o  i n c l u d e  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  
o f  nonregul a t o r y  o p t i o n s  f o r  r i s k  management. These i n c l u d e  adv isory  
o p t i o n s  as w e l l  as r i s k  r e d u c t i o n  through t echno log i ca l  means. DHHS 
a l s o  recommends expansion o f  research so as t o  reduce t h e  u n c e r t a i n t i e s  
assoc ia ted  w i t h  s c i e n t i f i c  know1 edge. 
The Royal Soc ie ty .  The Royal Soc ie ty  model (Royal Soc ie t y  Study 
Group, 1983) i s  a l s o  composed o f  two stages: r i s k  assessment and r i s k  
management. The former i s  f u r t h e r  subd iv ided  i n t o  r i s k  e s t i m a t i o n  and 
r i s k  eva lua t ion .  
R isk  assessment i s  t h e  general  term used by t h e  Royal Soc ie t y  t o  
desc r i be  t h e  study o f  dec i  s i ons  hav ing u n c e r t a i n  consequences. R isk  
e s t i m a t i o n  r e f e r s  t o  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  and e s t i m a t i o n  o f  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  
and magnitude o f  t h e  consequences o f  a  hazardous event. Risk e v a l u a t i o n  
i s  t h e  complex process o f  de te rmin ing  t h e  s i g n i f i c a n c e  o r  va lue  o f  t h e  
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i d e n t i f i e d  hazards and est imated r i s k s  t o  those concerned w i t h  or  
a f f e c t e d  by the  decision. Embedded w i t h i n  t h i s  stage are t h e  
i n t e r r e l  ated processes o f  devel oping a1 t e r n a t i  ve courses o f  ac t i on  and 
deci s i  on ana lys i  s. These components take i n t o  consi de ra t i on  publ i c 
awareness and percept ion,  a c c e p t a b i l i t y  o f  r i s k ,  and the ana lys is  o f  
r i s k s ,  costs, and benef i ts .  These l a t t e r  f ac to rs  i nc lude  cons idera t ion  
o f  t he  l e v e l  o f  j u s t i f i a b l e  r i s k ,  economic and technical  f e a s i b i l i t y ,  
and resource requirements. 
Based on t h e  eva luat ion  o f  r i s k ,  r i s k  management r e f e r s  t o  the  
mak ing o f  d e c i s i o n s  c o n c e r n i n g  r i s k s  and t h e i r  subsequent  
imp1 ementation. Decis ion making i t s e l  f involves consul t a t i o n s  between 
i ndustry , government, t h e  publ i c ,  and other  speci a1 i n t e r e s t  groups 
a f f e c t e d  by t h e  decis ion.  Implementation o f  a decis ion,  along w i t h  i t s  
moni tor ing,  eval u a t i o n  and r e v i  s ion  are considered an i n t e g r a l  p a r t  o f  
t h e  process. 
Interdepartmental  Committee on Toxic Chemical s ( ICTC) . The ICTC 
model developed by t h e  Interdepartmental  Working Group on Toxic 
Chemicals (1984) represents an e labora t i on  o f  t h e  SCOPE model. The 
f i r s t  step i n  t h e  process i s  hazard i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  which i s  based on 
case reports ,  epidemiological  s tud ies  o f  human populat ions,  and 
t o x i c o l o g i c a l  experiments conducted i n  t h e  1 aboratory . Another poss ib le  
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approach f o r  t h e  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  o f  chemical r i s k s  i s  t o  compare t h e  
mol ecu l  a r  s t r u c t u r e  and b i o l o g i c a l  a c t i v i t y  o f  t h e  substance under study 
w i t h  t h a t  o f  known t o x i c a n t s .  
The n e x t  s tep  i s  t o  o b t a i n  an es t ima te  o f  t h e  magnitude o f  t h e  r i s k  
i n  quest ion.  Th i s  i n v o l  ves t h e  s t a t i s t i c a l  ana l ys i s  o f  ep idem io log i ca l  
and t o x i c o l o g i c a l  da ta  t o  determine t h e  l e v e l  o f  r i s k  assoc ia ted  w i t h  
s p e c i f i c  hazards and t o  e s t a b l i s h  acceptable c r i t e r i a  f o r  exposure t o  
env i ronmenta l  hazards. Th i s  process i s  s u b j e c t  t o  cons ide rab le  
u n c e r t a i n t y  and may r e q u i r e  s t r o n g  assumptions, as i n  t h e  convers ion  o f  
animal r e s u l t s  t o  t h e  human s i t u a t i o n .  
The f i r s t  s tep  towards s e l e c t i n g  a  s t r a t e g y  f o r  d e a l i n g  w i t h  a  
g i ven  env i ronmenta l  r i s k  i s  t h e  development o f  a  number o f  a1 t e r n a t i v e  
courses o f  ac t ion .  A v a i l a b l e  op t i ons  can range f rom adv i so ry  t o  
economic t o  s t r i c t  r e g u l a t o r y  c o n t r o l .  I n  o rde r  t o  ensure a  c o n s i s t e n t  
approach t o  r i s k  management, t h e  s e t  o f  op t i ons  se lec ted  f o r  f u r t h e r  
e v a l u a t i o n  shou ld  be compat ib le  w i t h  e x i s t i n g  env i ronmenta l  h e a l t h  
program o b j e c t i v e s  and remain cogn izan t  o f  any o v e r a l l  r i s k  management 
p o l i c y  gu ide l i nes .  
The d e c i s i o n  as t o  t h e  most app rop r i a te  course o f  a c t i o n  depends on 
a  hos t  o f  f a c t o r s ,  i n c l u d i n g  a  ba lanc ing  o f  h e a l t h  r i s k s  a g a i n s t  h e a l t h  
b e n e f i t s  i n  some cases. Cons ide ra t i on  may a l s o  be g iven  t o  t h e  p u b l i c ' s  
p e r c e p t i o n  of r i s k ,  which may n o t  always correspond t o  t h e  ac tua l  r i s k  
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determined by objective analysis. The technical feasibility of each 
proposed course of action shoul d be demonstrated, including the abi 1 i ty 
t o  enforce any proposed regul ations. Economic effects  are often 
important in eval uati ng a1 ternati ves, both in terms of program-re1 ated 
costs and the impact on productive output. Socio-pol i t ica l  factors 
involving equity considerations and repercussions a t  the international 
level should not be overlooked. 
Imp1 ementation of the selected r i  sk management strategy will 
usual ly require some co.mi tment of resources and shoul d be accompanied 
by attempts t o  communicate the nature of the chosen control mechanism t o  
al l  affected parties. Once the control mechanism i s  in place, continued 
monitoring i s  recommended. Continual eval uati on and review of new 
health ri  sk information may suggest modification t o  the ri sk management 
strategy currently in place. 
Leiss (1985) has modified the original ICTC model in two ways. 
Firs t ,  Leiss introduces a separate pathway for consideration of benefits 
(benefit identification and net benefit assessment) para1 lel  t o  hazard 
iden t i f i ca t ion  and r i sk  assessment. Second, Leiss recommends 
incorporation of new consultative and communicative procedures in the 
risk management process. Specifically, i t  i s  suggested t h a t  risk and 
benefit assessments be avai 1 abl e as pub1 i c documents for exami nation by 
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a1 1  i n t e r e s t e d  p a r t i e s ;  t h a t  standard procedures be developed t o  n o t i f y  
i nteres ted  p a r t i e s  about the  avai 1  abi  1  i t y  o f  publ i c  documents and about 
t h e  r e s u l t s  o f  dec i s ion  making; and t h a t  r e g u l a t o r y  decis ions be 
accompanied by an e x p l a n a t i o n  o f  t h e i r  i n h e r e n t  reason ing .  
World Hea l th  Organizat ion (WHO). The WHO (1985) model i s  a  fou r  
stage process c o n s i s t i n g  o f  hazard i d e n t i f i c a t i o n ,  r i s k  es t imat ion ,  r i s k  
eva lua t ion ,  and r i s k  management. The process as a  whole i s  in f luenced 
by a  number o f  p a r t i c i p a t i n g  bodies i n c l u d i n g  s c i e n t i s t s ,  indus t ry ,  
specia l  i n t e r e s t  groups, publ i c ,  the  media, and po l  i t i c i a n s .  
Hazard i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  requ i res  the  co l  1  e c t i o n  o f  chemical, 
t ox i c01  o g i c a l  , eco tox i co l  og i ca l  , c l  i n i c a l  and epidemiological  data. 
T o x i c i t y  and exposure i n fo rma t ion  are ob ta ined a t  t h i s  f i r s t  stage. 
R i s k  e s t i m a t i o n  c h a r a c t e r i z e s  t h e  e x t e n t  o f  harm and t h e  
probabi  1  i t y  o f  i t s  occurrence. This  stage u t i  1  i z e s  the  in fo rmat ion  
gained i n  hazard i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  t o  p r e d i c t  t h e  seve r i t y ,  extent ,  and 
d i  s t r i  b u t i  on o f  t h e  increased inc idence o f  disease, d i  sabi  1 i t y  , o r  
de fec ts  caused by exposure t o  a  given hazard. 
The r i s k  eva lua t i on  stage i nvo l ves  comparative ana lys is  between the  
r i s k  i n  quest ion and accepted r i s k s ,  vo lun ta ry  r i s k s ,  and o the r  r i s k s .  
Considerat ion i s  a l so  g iven t o  p o l i t i c a l  f ac to rs ,  p u b l i c  percept ion,  and 
i n d u s t r i  a1 and publ  i c  1  i a b i  1  i t y .  
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The risk management stage consists of decision making with the aim 
of reducing or eliminating the risk in question. Decision making must 
take into account cultural , socio-economic, and pol i tical factors, and 
the type and  nature of the risk in question. The possibility of 
reducing or el i m i  n a t i n g  the risk through control measures, techno1 ogy 
changes, prevention or reduction of exposure, and product substitution 
must be considered i n  terms of feasi bi 1 i t y  , costs/benef i t and magnitude 
and distribution. The decisions resulting from such an analysis form 
the basis for regulatory action. 
Other Model s. Various individual s have a1 so proposed model s for 
risk assessment and risk management. Baram's ( 1  981 ) framework consists 
of six steps: hazard identification, risk measurement, risk management 
options selection, economic and technical feasibility analysis, ordering 
of risk management initiatives, and deployment of ri sk management 
options. 
Lave's ( 1  982) model contains eight stages: hazard identification, 
risk assessment, identification of regulatory a1 ternatives, decision 
analysis, regul atory decision, legal or pol  i t i c a l  chall enge, 
imp1 ementation, and monitoring. This model closely resembles t h a t  
adopted by the ICTC. 
Rodricks Tardiff (1984) consider only two broad stages: risk 
assessment and risk management. The former i s  subdivided into three 
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phases: hazard i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  and eva lua t i on ,  dose response eva lua t i on ,  
and i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  o f  c o n d i t i o n s  o f  exposure. The l a t t e r  stage a l so  
c o n s i s t s  of t h r e e  phases: examinat ion o f  a l t e r n a t i v e  courses o f  ac t i on ,  
dec i  s i o n  a n a l y s i  s, and imp1 ementat ion. 
Shrader-Frechet tc  ' s (1  985) framework i nc l udes  t h r e e  stages: r i s k  
i d e n t i f i c a t i o n ,  r i s k  es t ima t i on ,  and r i s k  eva l  c lat ion, which c l  o s e l y  
para1 l e l  those i n  t h e  SCOPE Model. 
3. COMPARISON OF MODELS 
The models f o r  r i s k  assessment and r i s k  management p resen ted  i n  
s e c t i o n  2 f o l l o w  t h e  general  framework dev ised by SCOPE (1978, 1980), 
a1 though t h e  degree o f  s i m i l a r i t y  and l e v e l  o f  d e t a i l  presented i n  each 
o f  t h e  models v a r i e s  ( F i g u r e  1 ) .  I n  a d d i t i o n  t o  d e l i n e a t i n g  t h e  s teps 
compr i s i ng  t h e  r i s k  assessment and r i s k  management process, each model 
d i  s t i  ngu i  shes between t h e  s c i e n t i f i c  and e x t r a - s c i e n t i  f i c  components o f  
t h e  o v e r a l l  process. 
Wi th  t h e  excep t i on  o f  t h e  Royal Soc ie t y  model, each of these models 
exp l  i c i t l y  des ignates hazard i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  as t he  i n i t i a l  step. The 
NRC/EPA model emphasizes t h e  use o f  s c i e n t i f i c  research as t h e  bas i c  
t o o l  f o r  i d e n t i f y i n g  r i s k s .  Several  models more c o r r e c t l y  r e f e r  t o  t h e  
i n i t i a l  phase as hazard i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  r a t h e r  than r i s k  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  
F i  u r e  1 A C o m p a r i s o n  o f  M o d e l s  f o r  R i s k  A s s e s s m e n t  a n d  R i s k  Management  
(&; n e  i n d i c a t e s  d i v i s i o n  b e t w e e n  r i s k  a s s e s s m e n t  a n d  r i s k  management )  
I SCOPE (1980) 
IDENT lF lCAT lON 
ROYAL SOCIETY ( 1 9 8 3 )  
R l S K  
ESTIMATION 
RISK 
NRC/EPA ( 1 9 8 3 / 1 9 8 4  ) 
IDENTIF ICATION 
R l  SK DOSE-RESPONSE 
EXPOSURE I ASSESSMENT I 
CHARACTERIZATION 
....................... 
ICTC ( 1 9 8 4 )  
HAZARD I 1 IDENTIF ICATION 
RISK I ESTIMATION I 
I 
WHO ( 1 9 8 5 )  
I HAZARD 1 
IDENTIF ICATION 
ESTIMATION 
I o?kl::EE 1 
COURSES W ACTION 
......................... 
1 IWLEMENTATION I 
 MONITORING ANDI 
EVALUATION 
...................... I MANAGEMENT I IISK I 
1 E v A K h o N  1 
......................... 
EVALUATION I W OPTIONS I 
DECISIONS 
AND 
ACTIONS 
...................... 
MANAGEMENT 1 1 
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s i n c e  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  t h e  occurrence o f  an adverse e f f e c t  i s  
g e n e r a l l y  n o t  c a l c u l a t e d  a t  t h i s  stage. I n  c u r r e n t  usage, t h e  term 
hazard i s  used t o  desc r i be  t h e  na tu re  o f  t h e  adverse e f f e c t ,  whereas 
r i s k  i n v o l v e s  bo th  t h e  hazard and t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  i t s  occurrence 
(Kapl an & Gar r i ck ,  1981 ; Krewski -- e t  a1 . , 1982). 
Wi th  t h e  excep t i on  o f  t he  Royal Soc ie t y  model, t h e r e  a1 so appears 
t o  be general  agreement t h a t  hazard i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  should be f o l l o w e d  by 
r i  sk es t ima t i on .  (The Royal Soc ie ty  i nc l udes  bo th  hazard i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  
and r i s k  e s t i m a t i o n  i n  t h e i r  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  r i s k  es t ima t i on ,  b u t  does no t  
c l e a r l y  i d e n t i f y  these  as d i s t i n c t  sequent ia l  steps.) I n  t h e  NRC/EPA 
framework, t h e  te rm r i s k  c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n  i s  e f f e c t i v e l y  e q u i v a l e n t  t o  
r i s k  es t ima t i on .  
A l l  models c i t e  t h e  use o f  t o x i c o l o g i c a l  and ep idem io log i ca l  data 
as t h e  p r imary  sources o f  i n f o r m a t i o n  f o r  heal  t h  hazard i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  
a n d  r i s k  e s t i m a t i o n .  I n  t h e  c a s e  o f  c h e m i c a l  h a z a r d s ,  
s t r u c t u r e / a c t i v i t y  a n a l y s i s  may a1 so be used. 
As w i t h  t h e  o r i g i n a l  SCOPE model, a1 1  models then  proceed t o  some 
fo rm  o f  r i s k  eva lua t i on .  A t  t h i s  stage, s c i e n t i f i c  method i s  subsumed 
by p u b l i c  p o l i c y  cons ide ra t i ons .  The subsequent models a re  g e n e r a l l y  
desc r i bed  i n  more d e t a i l  than  i s  t h e  SCOPE model, and, w i t h  t h e  
e x c e p t i o n  o f  t h e  Royal S o c i e t y  model , d i  f f e r e n t i  a t e  between a1 t e r n a t i v e  
courses o f  a c t i o n  and t h e  d e c i s i o n  a n a l y s i s  t o o l s  used t o  choose amongst 
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them. A1 t e r n a t i v e  opt ions  may be o f  an advisory, economic o r  regu la to ry  
nature, and many f a c t o r s  need t o  be considered i n  s e l e c t i n g  a p re fe r red  
management s t ra tegy .  These inc lude the  use of formal economic t o o l s  f o r  
program eval u a t i o n  (Torrance L Krewski , 19851, tempered by t h e  pub1 i c ' s  
percept ion o f  t h e  r i s k  i nvo lved  as we1 1 as preva i  1 i n g  socio-pol i t i c a l  
fac tors .  A1 though not high1 igh ted  as d i s t i n c t  components, simi 1 a r  
cons idera t ions  are inc luded w i t h i n  the  Royal Soc ie ty ' s  r i s k  management 
phase. 
The f i n a l  r i s k  management stage invo lves  the  implementation o f  the 
se lec ted c o n t r o l  s t ra tegy .  Each o f  t he  models, except those o f  t he  
NRC/EPA and WHO, stresses the  need f o r  r i s k  moni to r ing  and follow-up, 
so as t o  modify t h e  r i s k  management s t ra tegy  c u r r e n t l y  i n  p lace i f  t h i s  
i s  considered inappropr ia te .  A l l  models except the  SCOPE model a lso  
s t ress  the  importance o f  communication a t  t he  implementation stage so 
t h a t  a f f e c t e d  p a r t i e s  are proper ly  informed as t o  both the  r i s k s  and 
r i s k  management s t ra tegy  adopted. The Royal Soc ie ty  model i n  p a r t i  cu l  a r  
emphasizes the  importance o f  p rov id ing  a f f e c t e d  p a r t i e s  w i t h  an 
oppor tun i t y  t o  i n t e r a c t  i n  the  decision-making process i n  an informed 
way. 
The s i g n i f i c a n c e  o f  unce r ta in t y  i n  dec is ion  making cannot be 
overlooked, as po in ted o u t  by the  NRC/EPA and Royal Society. S c i e n t i f i c  
data, which serves as a bas is  f o r  decis ion making, may be incomplete o r  
p l a g u e d  w i t h  u n c e r t a i n t y  r e g a r d i n g  e s t i m a t e s  o f  t h e  types,  
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Although the re  i s  general agreement t h a t  the  r i s k  assessment/risk 
management framework can be d i v i d e d  i n t o  s c i e n t i f i c  and p o l i c y  concerns, 
Davis (1983) mainta ins t h a t  both science and values p l a y  a  r o l e  i n  r i s k  
assessment and t h a t  the  steps i n  the  r i s k  c o n t r o l  process are more 
i n t e r a c t i v e  than sequenti  a1 . During the  r i s k  assessment process, 
ana lys ts  may overlook hazards, deem them unimportant,  o r  ignore  them 
because they are d i f f i c u l t  t o  assess. Decisions are o f t e n  i n f l uenced  by 
judgements o r  p o l i c y  due t o  gaps i n  s c i e n t i f i c  i n fo rma t ion .  
The NRC (1 983) has developed in fe rence qui  del i nes  t o  es t imate  human 
r i s k  l e v e l s  i n  s i t u a t i o n s  where the  data i s  inadequate f o r  d i r e c t  
c a l c u l a t i o n  from human observat ions. Such guide1 ines  are e x p l i c i t  
statements which pragmati ca l  l y  se lec t  one o f  several i n fe rence  opt ions  
f o r  a  p a r t i c u l a r  r i s k  assessment s i t u a t i o n .  The NRC a l s o  notes tha t ,  
desp i te  t h e i r  s c i e n t i f i c  o r i e n t a t i o n ,  pol i c y  cons idera t ions  v i r t u a l l y  
always i n f l u e n c e  t h e  s e l e c t i o n  o f  an in fe rence opt ion .  The nature  o f  
t h e  in ference opt ions  f o r  any r i s k  i s  a  .mixture o f  s c i e n t i f i c  f a c t  and 
consensus, informed s c i e n t i f i c  judgement, and p o l i c y  determinat ions.  
4. CONCLUSIONS 
I n  t h i s  a r t i c l e ,  we have reviewed the  major models o f  t he  process 
of r i s k  assessment and r i s k  management. A1 1  o f  these models r e f l e c t  the  
bas i c  elements o f  o r i g i n a l  SCOPE mode1 ( r i s k  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n ,  r i s k  
est imat ion,  r i s k  eva lua t ion ,  and r i s k  management) as descr ibed by Whyte 
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p r o b a b i l i t i e s ,  and magnitudes o f  the  hea l th  e f f e c t s  associated w i t h  a  
p a r t i c u l a r  hazard. O f  p a r t i c u l a r  concern i s  t h e  u n c e r t a i n t y  inherent  i n  
t h e  assumptions made du r ing  the  e x t r a p o l a t i o n  o f  animal t e s t  data t o  the  
human s i t u a t i o n  and the  determinat ion o f  c u r r e n t  and f u t u r e  exposure 
l eve l s .  There i s  a1 so unce r ta in t y  regard ing  the  economic and soc ia l  
impacts o f  a  proposed decision. 
One p o i n t  which remains obscure i s  t he  separa t ion  between r i s k  
assessment and r i s k  management. The o r i g i n a l  SCOPE model seems t o  
consider  r i  sk assessment as encompassing both the  s c i e n t i f i c  en te rp r i ses  
e n t e r p r i s e s  o f  hazard i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  and r i s k  es t ima t ion  as we l l  as the  
more p o l i t i c i z e d  f u n c t i o n  o f  r i s k  evaluat ion.  I n  t h i s  model, t he  term 
r i s k  management i s  reserved f o r  the  f i n a l  imp1 ementat ion and f o l  1  ow-up 
stage. Th is  p o i n t  o f  view i s  a lso  adopted i n  t h e  Royal Society ,  ICTC 
and WHO models. The NRC/EPA, on the  o ther  hand, de f ine  r i s k  assessment 
as c o n s i s t i n g  on ly  o f  hazard i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  and r i s k  es t imat ion .  
Taking i n t o  account d i f f e rences  i n  t e r m i  no1 ogy, a1 1  model s  
e s s e n t i a l l y  agree on the  d i v i s i o n  o f  t he  s c i e n t i f i c  and soc ia l  aspects 
o f  t h e  r i s k  assessment and r i s k  management p rocess .  Hazard  
i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  and r i s k  es t imat ion  are c l e a r l y  i n  t h e  s c i e n t i f i c  realm, 
whereas r i s k  eva lua t i on  and r i s k  management f a l l  w i t h i n  the  domain o f  
soc i  a1 dec is ion  making. Thus, t he  responsi b i  1  i t y  f o r  r i s k  ana lys is  
r e s t s  1  a rge l y  w i t h  t h e  s c i e n t i f i c  community, whereas those responsib le 
f o r  t h e  establ ishment  and implementation o f  r i s k  management decis ions 
p lay  t h e  l ead ing  r o l e  i n  e x t r a s c i e n t i f i c  mat te rs  (Ruckel shaus, 1983). 
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& Burton (1980). Subsequent models more correctly refer to the initial 
step as hazard rather than risk identification, reflecting the fact that 
risk estimation requires a quantitative rather than qua1 itative 
description of adverse health effects. 
Although a1 1 models involve scientific and pub1 ic pol icy 
considerations, the only model which equates these two dimensions with 
those of risk assessment and risk management is that of the NRC/EPA. In 
the remaining models, the social evaluation is included in the risk 
assessment phase, 1 eavi ng only the imp1 ementation of the chosen control 
strategies to the risk management phase. 
The application of the models of risk assessment and risk 
management discussed here to practical decision making situations shoul d 
facilitate identification and clarification of the many important 
considerations in the complex process of risk assessment and risk 
management. This is particularly true of some of the more recent models 
which describe the component steps in detai 1 , including the development 
of a range of viable risk management options and the criteria and tools 
to be applied in choosing among these options. Other considerations 
which may otherwise be overlooked include the need for continual 
monitoring and review as well as communication of information on risks 
and risk decisions to all affected parties. 
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INTRODUCTION 
INFORMATION NEEDS FOR CONFIDENT DECISIONS 
Ind iv idua l s ,  i n s t i t u t i o n s  and government agencies  must have information 
of  v a r i o u s  k i n d s  i n  o r d e r  t o  cope  r a t i o n a l l y  w i t h  t h e  r i s k s  t h a t  c o n f r o n t  u s  
eve ryday .  Wi thou t  i n f o r m a t i o n  on t h e  n a t u r e ,  magn i tude  and p r o b a b i l i t y  of 
occurrence of hazardous events  it i s  imposs ib le  t o  dev i se  s t r a t e g i e s  t o  manage 
r i s k s .  In format ion  se rves  t o  reduce unce r t a in ty ;  t h e  more i n fo rma t ion  we have 
t h e  more c o n f i d e n t  we a r e  t h a t  we w i l l  be  a b l e  t o  r e d u c e  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  
o c c u r r e n c e  and t h e  c o n s e q u e n c e s  of  a n  a d v e r s e  e v e n t  and ,  t h e r e b y ,  r e a c h  a  
" b e t t e r "  d e c i s i o n .  A b e t t e r  d e c i s i o n  i s  one  i n  which  c o n f i d e n c e  a b o u t  i t s  
outcome i s  increased.  
R i s k  managers  and  d e c i s i o n  makers  would c e r t a i n l y  a g r e e  t h a t  we n e v e r  
have a l l  t h e  i n fo rma t ion  needed t o  make an a b s o l u t e l y  conf ident  dec i s ion  t h a t  
would reduce a  r i s k  t o  an accep tab l e  l eve l .  There i s  always some u n c e r t a i n t y  
and sometimes t h e  u n c e r t a i n t y  component i s  very la rge .  
THE PROBLEM OF UNCERTAINTY 
U n c e r t a i n t y  a r i s e s  f rom many s o u r c e s ,  a l l  of which r e l a t e s  t o  v a r y i n g  
degrees  of de f i c i ency  i n  information.  When t h e  s c i e n t i f i c  method i s  used t o  
i n v e s t i g a t e  a  hazard o r  t h r e a t  t h e r e  i s  an element  of unce r t a in ty  i n h e r e n t  i n  
t h e  method. The s c i e n t i f i c  method i s  always open-ended and i t s  a p p l i c a t i o n ,  
w h i l e  y i e l d i n g  i n f o r m a t i o n ,  may r a i s e  more q u e s t i o n s  t h a n  it  a n s w e r s ;  
s c i e n t i f i c  f i nd ings  a r e  always s u b j e c t  t o  mod i f i ca t i on  o r  o u t r i g h t  r e j e c t i o n  a s  
a  r e s u l t  of  c o n t i n u i n g  i n v e s t i g a t i o n .  A s  s c i e n t i f i c  in format ion  accumulates 
and c o n v e r g e s  we become i n c r e a s i n g l y  c o n f i d e n t  t h a t  we a r e  i m p r o v i n g  o u r  
u n d e r s t a n d i n g  of n a t u r a l  phenomena b u t  we r e c o g n i z e  t h a t  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  of 
e r r o r  i s  always there. The e r r o r  may be due t o  a  l ack  of some e s s e n t i a l  b i t  of 
information o r  t o  t h e  use of an incor rec t  paradigm o r  hypothesis. Many long- 
e s t ab l i shed  s c i e n t i f i c  concepts have been discarded. Thus, our primary method 
f o r  apprehending t h e  world always gives us uncer ta in  information. 
In addi t ion  t o  t h e  uncer t a in t i e s  r e l a t e d  t o  method, t h e r e  a r e  numerous 
o ther  f a c t o r s  and circumstances cont r ibut ing  t o  uncertainty.  For example, we 
may suddenly be confronted with a previously unrecognized hazard with which we 
have l i t t l e  o r  no e x p e r i e n c e  o r  we have i n f o r m a t i o n  abou t  t h e  n a t u r e  and 
magnitude of hazardous events  such a s  earthquakes and f loods  but have no way of 
predic t ing  them. I n  s i t u a t i o n s  of t h i s  kind r i s k  management c o n s i s t s  mainly of 
educated guessing, an t i c ipa to ry  precautions and emergency standby measures. 
KINDS OF INFORMATION NEEDED 
In most cases ,  however, de f i c i enc ies  i n  information a r i s e  from: 
- neglect :  
- f a i l u r e  t o  s e t  c l e a r  objec t ives  f o r  the  use of information: 
- l a c k  of comprehensive  p l a n n i n g  t o  e n s u r e  t h e  c o l l e c t i o n  of a l l  
relevant  information: 
- s o c i e t a l  and l e g a l  r e s t r a i n t s  a s  t o  what d a t a  can  be c o l l e c t e d  
w i t h o u t  i n v a s i o n  of p r i v a c y  a n d  p e r s o n a l  f r e e d o m  o r  t h e  
r eve la t ion  of propr ie tary  information; and 
- a t  t h e  most pragmatic l e v e l ,  lack  of time, money and manpower. 
In  many cases we do not recognize t h e  need f o r  information u n t i l  it i s  too l a t e  
o r  we a r e  i n  a  c r i s i s  s i tua t ion .  A l l  these  de f i c i enc ies  were wel l  i l l u s t r a t e d  
i n  the  papers and discusions a t  the  Workshop. 
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Moreover ,  r i s k  management i n v o l v e s  a  g r e a t  d e a l  more t h a n  c a r e f u l  
a n a l y s i s  of s c i e n t i f i c  i n f o r m a t i o i n  and s t a t i s t i c s .  While sound f a c t u a l  and 
q u a n t i t a t i v e  d a t a  a r e  e s s e n t i a l ,  d e c i s i o n s  l e a d i n g  t o  management measu re s  
a lways r e q u i r e  a  s y n t h e s i s  of o b j e c t i v e  and s u b j e c t i v e  assessments  of a  wide 
r a n g e  o f  " i n f o r m a t i o n n  f rom a  v a r i e t y  of s o u r c e s .  Thus, t h e  d e f i n i t i o n  of  
information a s  app l i ed  t o  r i s k  management goes f a r  beyond fo rma l  s c i e n t i f i c  
f a c t s  and f i g u r e s .  I n  some c a s e s  t h e  l a r g e l y  s u b j e c t i v e  judgement  of 
experienced a d m i n i s t r a t o r s  o r  p o l i t i c i a n s  p lays  t h e  paramount r o l e  i n  br ing ing  
t h e  s c i e n t i f i c  f i n d i n g s  t oge the r  wi th  t h e  p r e v a i l i n g  socio-economic-political 
frame of r e f e r ence .  
It i s  a p p a r e n t  t h a t  i n  a t t e m p t i n g  t o  d e f i n e  t h e  i n f o r m a t i o n  needed  f o r  
r i s k  management we mus t  t a k e  a  v e r y  c o m p r e h e n s i v e  v iew t h a t  b e g i n s  w i t h  t h e  
e s s e n t i a l  s c i e n t i f i c  i n f o r m a t i o n  on t h e  n a t u r e ,  m a g n i t u d e  and  o c c u r r e n c e  of  
h a z a r d o u s  e v e n t s  and  e x t e n d s  t o  t h e  socio-economic-political s e t t i n g ,  
e s t i m a t i o n  of b e n e f i t s  and c o s t s  and s o  on. I n  dea l ing  wi th  t h e s e  a s p e c t s  it 
i s  a l m o s t  i m p o s s i b l e  t o  d e f i n e  n e e d s  b e c a u s e  t h e y  v a r y  s o  g r e a t l y  w i t h  t h e  
k i n d  of  r i s k  and t h e  c i r c u m s t a n c e s  u n d e r  which  i t  i s  t o  be managed. I n  
a d d i t i o n ,  we have  t o  c o n s i d e r  t h e  d i f f e r e n t  k i n d s  of i n f o r m a t i o n  needed  a t  
v a r i o u s  l e v e l s  i n  t h e  a s s e s s m e n t  and d e c i s i o n  p r o s e s s e s  ( S a s s e v i l l e  and  
2 Crowley; Torrance and Oxman 1. The s c i e n t i s t ,  f o r  example, o r  o t h e r  a s s e s s o r  
needs comprehensive i n fo rma t ion  which i s  based on adequate sampling and i s  a s  
f r e e  a s  p o s s i b l e  f r o m  c o n f o u n d i n g  f a c t o r s .  Such  i n f o r m a t i o n  i s  r a r e l y  
a v a i l a b l e  bu t  even wi th  imper f ec t  d a t a  s c i e n t i s t s  g e n e r a l l y  have an e a s i e r  t a s k  
Names i n  paren theses  r e f e r  t o  au tho r s  l i s t e d  i n  Appendix 1. 
t h a n  a d m i n i s t r a t o r s  o r  p o l i t i c a l  d e c i s i o n  makers. The s c i e n t i s t  can 
concentrate on "the f a c t s n  a s  they may be perceived, and render a  profess ional  
judgement which may include an es t imate  of the  degree of uncer ta in ty  without 
n e c e s s a r i l - y  b e i n g  concerned abou t  t h e  problems of t h e  management d e c i s i o n .  
A d m i n i s t r a t o r s  and p o l i t i c i a n s ,  on t h e  o t h e r  hand,  g e n e r a l l y  a r e  handed a 
concentrated d i s t i l l a t i o n  of t h e  s c i e n t i f i c  information a s  only one component 
i n  a  complex of f a c t o r s  t h e y  may use  i n  s e l e c t i n g  an  o p t i o n  t o  a r r i v e  a t  an 
a c c e p t a b l e  recommendation f o r  coping w i t h  a r i s k .  Although d e l i n i a t i n g  
information needs a t  t h i s  l e v e l  i s  extremely d i f f i c u l t ,  a  comprehensive s e t  of 
i n f o r m a t i o n  i s  n e v e r t h e l e s s  e s s e n t i a l  t o  d e c i s i o n  makers. Th i s  must  o f t e n  
i n c l u d e  c r o s s - s e c t o r a l  i n f o r m a t i o n  from j u r i s d i c t i o n s  o u t s i d e  t h e  d e c i s i o n  
maker's a r e a  of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y ,  up-to-date i n f o r m a t i o n  on p u b l i c  a t t i t u d e s ,  
c o s t s  and b e n e f i t s ,  e q u i t y  i n  t h e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  of r i s k s  and b e n e f i t s ,  t h e  
p o l i t i c a l  c l i m a t e  and s o  on. When we speak of information needs for risk 
management we genera l ly  mean the  " f a c t s  and f igures"  bas ic  t o  an understanding 
of t h e  r i s k  but  we should not  fo rge t  t h a t ,  important a s  these  may be, they may 
have very l i t t l e  inf luence  i n  reaching a recommendation f o r  the  management of a  
r i s k .  
How can the  information base f o r  r i s k  management be made more useful  f o r  
r i s k  a s s e s s m e n t  and f o r  d e c i s i o n s l e a d i n g t o  management s t r a t e g i e s ?  I f  t h e  
i n f o r m a t i o n  was s u b s t a n t i a l l y  improved would t h a t  l e a d  t o  " b e t t e r " ,  more 
r e l i a b l e  decis ions?  
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THE USES OF INFORMATION I N  RISK MANAGEMENT 
The process  l ead ing  t o  r i s k  management may be descr ibed  i n  t h e  fo l l owing  
s t e p s  : 
Risk a n a l y s i s  and e s t i m a t i o n  
1. I d e n t i f i c a t i o n  of a  t h r ea t en ing  s i t u a t i o n .  
2. C h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n  of  t h e  t h r e a t  o r  h a z a r d  i n  t e r m s  of  
p r o c e s s e s  i n v o l v e d  a n d  p o t e n t i a l  m a g n i t u d e  o f  
undes i r ab l e  consequences.  
3. Es t ima t ion  of p r o b a b i u t y  of occurrence (exposure) and 
consequent e s t i m a t i o n  of r i s k  by combining p r o b a b i l i t y  
w i th  consequences. 
Risk  management 
4 .  Evaluat ion of 1, 2 and 3 i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  o t h e r  r e l e v a n t  
parameters  t o  a r r i v e  a t  a  s t r a t e g y  t o  con ta in  t h e  r i s k  
wi th in  acceptab le  l i m i t s .  
The f i r s t  t h r e e  of  t h e s e  s t e p s  s h o u l d  be l a r g e l y  o b j e c t i v e ,  s c i e n t i f i c  
procedures and a r e  t h e  one wi th  which informat ion  needs a r e  u sua l ly  a s soc i a t ed  
(Byer ) .  The f o u r t h  s t e p  i n v o l v e s  t a k i n g  t h e  f i n d i n g s  f rom 1, 2 and 3 and 
cons ider ing  them toge the r  wi th  o t h e r  f a c t o r s  t h a t  i n f luence  t h e  a l t e r n a t i v e s  
a v a i l a b l e  t o  cope wi th  t h e  r i s k .  Contrary t o  what we sometimes t h ink ,  t h i s  i s  
t h e  s t e p  wi th  t h e  most demanding requirements  f o r  in format ion  and, a t  t h e  same 
t ime,  t h e  one i n  which needs a r e  t h e  most d i f f i c u l t  t o  a n t i c i p a t e  and supply. 
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IDENTIFYING THE TRREAT 
Most of the environmental risks of current concern took us by surprise. 
We did not go looking for them. Acid precipitation, impacts of persistent 
chemicals (PCB's; "dioxins"), AIDS (Acquired immune deficiency syndrome), 
Legionaire's Disease, nuclear winter, the Greenhous Effect, health risks of 
asbestos, loss of tropical forests, desertification and pollution of the Great 
Lakes, either suddenly confronted us or developed slowly under casual 
observation but were generally neglected until they reached serious 
proportions. 
In hazard identification the primary information need is to establish 
that there really is a significant risk and to evaluate it as quickly as 
possible in the perspective of other risks. The initial perception of a risk 
is generally followed by a crisis of ignorance and a more or less prolonged 
controversy regarding its nature, significance and methods of investigation, 
all of which tends to confuse and alarm the public and the politicians and 
often leads to unnecessary expenditure of effort and money (Fowle; Arnold and 
Krewski). It is at this stage that the public perception of a risk is 
established, often as a result of media coverage. Much effort is usually 
required to narrow the gap between public perception and the perception 
emerging from the scientific investigation of the risk. As investigation 
continues there is a gradual reduction in uncertainty which tends to alter the 
original perception of the risk and often at the same time reduces its 
significance and reveals unexpected complexity and ramifications. 
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There i s  a  s p e c i a l  problem i n  hazard i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  when t h e  consequences 
a r e  l o n g  d e l a y e d  a s  i n  t h e  c a s e  o f  some c a r c i n o g e n s  s i n c e  r e t r o s p e c t i v e  
c o l l e c t i o n  of r e l e v a n t  information i s  v i r t u a l l y  impossible .  
CHARACTERIZING THE HAZARD 
This  process  begins  t h e  moment a  hazard i s  i d e n t i f i e d .  We begin t o  f i n d  
ou t  what in format ion  w e  need only a f t e r  w e  have i d e n t i f i e d  a  t h r e a t  and begin 
t o  c h a r a c t e r i z e  it. The e x t e n t  of  t h e  needs  w i l l  depend upon t h e  d e g r e e  of  
s i g n i f i c a n c e  w e  a t t a c h  t o  t h e  r i s k  a s  w e  move t h r o u g h  S t e p s  3 and 4. 
S c i e n t i f i c  s tudy  g e n e r a l l y  reduces unce r t a in ty  a s  t o  t h e  na tu re  and p o t e n t i a l  
magnitude of t h e  t h r e a t .  I n  e s t a b l i s h i n g  magnitude it i s  impor tan t  t o  i d e n t i f y  
c l e a r l y  t h e  "end p o i n t s "  o r  m e a s u r e s  of  s e v e r i t y  t o  be  employed i n  a s s e s s i n g  
consequences. The common measures a r e  human m o r t a l i t y ,  morbidi ty  and i n c r e a s e  
i n  premature deaths .  More r e c e n t l y  reproduct ive  e f f e c t s  such a s  mutagenici ty  
a n d  t e r a t o g e n i c i t y  h a v e  b e c o m e  s i g n i f i c a n t  c r i t e r i a  f o r  e v a l u a t i n g  
environmental  chemicals.  So f a r  l i t t l e  a t t e n t i o n  has  been given t o  o the r  end 
p o i n t s  such  a s  measu re s  of  t h e  g e n e r a l  s t a n d a r d  of  h e a l t h  of t h e  p o p u l a t i o n ,  
e x t i n c t i o n  of  s p e c i e s ,  l o s s  of  s o i l ,  d e t e r i o r a t i o n  of a m e n i t y  and h e r i t a g e  
v a l u e s ,  l o s s  of  n a t u r a l  r e s o u r c e s  and g e n e r a l  d e c l i n e  i n  t h e  s t a n d a r d  o f  
l i v i n g .  
I n  t h e  i n i t i a l  s t a g e s  of  S t e p  2 a  m a j o r  s o u r c e  of  i n f o r m a t i o n  i s  t h a t  
which c a n  be  r e l i a b l y  "bo r rowedn  f rom t h e  s k i e n t i f i c  l i t e r a t u r e ,  s t u d i e s  
c a r r i e d  o u t  e l s e w h e r e  i n  t h e  w o r l d ,  and f rom t h e  e x p e r i e n c e  of  o t h e r s  i n  
dea l ing  wi th  apparen t ly  s i m i l a r  hazards.  Such in fo rma t ion  r e l a t e s  t o  gene ra l  
p r i n c i p l e s  and concepts which would be app l i cab l e  anywhere. This  ca tegory  of 
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information i s  genera l ly  f a i r l y  r e a d i l y  ava i l ab le  and simply has t o  be brought 
together  and applied t o  the  p a r t i c u l a r  s i tua t ion .  However, it i s  usual ly  not 
s u f f i c i e n t l y  s p e c i f i c  o r  has not been co l l ec ted  under circumstances comparable 
t o  the  l o c a l  se t t ing .  This means t h a t  information has t o  be co l l ec ted  o r  drawn 
from l o c a l  da ta  bases, a requirement which t akes  t ime and delays moving on t o  
the  management s t e p  (Tof t  e t  a l . ;  Frank -- e t  a l . ) .  
ESTIMATING PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE 
When we speak of "information needs" f o r  r i s k  assessment we usual ly  have 
t h i s  s t e p  i n  mind. Est imation of t h e  magnitude of undesirable consequences of 
a hazard together  with e s t ima tes  of t h e  p robab i l i ty  of occurrence leads  t o  the  
e s t i m a t i o n  of risk. There  i s  no r i s k  u n t i l  we i n c l u d e  t h e  n o t i o n  of 
p r o b a b i l i t y .  When p r o b a b i l l i t y  i s  0 o r  1 t h e r e  i s  no r i s k  f o r  we a r e  d e a l i n g  
with cer ta in ty .  
T h i s  i s  u s u a l l y  t h e  most d i f f i c u l t  s t e p  and t h e  major  s o u r c e  of 
u n c e r t a i n t y .  I n f o r m a t i o n  needs  h e r e  a r e  ma in ly  s t a t i s t i c a l  and u s u a l l y  can 
only be accumulated over t ime o r  from wide sampling. We can es t ima te  magnitude 
on t h e  bas i s  of experience, and perhaps modelling, and reasoning from p a r a l l e l  
c a s e s  by ana logy  i f  we have c o m p a r a t i v e  i n f o r m a t i o n .  I n  t h e  absence  of 
e x p e r i e n c e  a s ,  f o r  example,  i n  t h e  c a s e  of a c o r e  melt-down i n  a n u c l e a r  
r eac to r  o r  i n  t h e  epidemiology of AIDS we depend on modelling and analogy. A s  
f o r  p r o b a b i l i t y  of o c c u r r e n c e ,  a g a i n  t h e  o n l y  r e a l  b a s i s  f o r  judgement i s  
accumulated s t a t i s t i c s :  f o r  example, from epidemiological  s tud ies  o r  records of 
t r a f f i c  f a t a l i t i e s .  From data of t h i s  kind we can es t ima te  incidence but  not  
time of occurrence. 
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SELECTION OF A RISK MANAGEMENT STRATEGY 
T h i s  i s  t h e  management s t e p  i n  which t h e  i n f o r m a t i o n  coming  f rom t h e  
o t h e r  t h r e e  i s  eva lua ted  t o  determine i f  a  s i g n i f i c a n t  r i s k  e x i s t s .  I f  it  i s  
deemed t o  be  s i g n i f i c a n t ,  t h e  n e x t  s t e p  i s  t o  e v a l u a t e  t h e  a l t e r n a t i v e s  t o  
c o n t a i n  i t  w i t h i n  a c c e p t a b l e  l i m i t s .  W h i l e  s c i e n c e  may c o n t r i b u t e  
s u b s t a n t i a l l y  t o  t h i s  s t e p ,  a  h igh  degree of i n t e g r a t i v e  s u b j e c t i v e  judgement 
i s  needed  i n  w e i g h i n g  and  b a l a n c i n g  a l l  t h e  f a c t o r s  - s c i e n t i f i c ,  s o c i e t a l ,  
p o l i t i c a l ,  economic, moral and so  on ( S a s s e v i l l e  and Crowley). The demand f o r  
i n f o r m a t i o n  a t  t h i s  l e v e l  i s  c o m p r e h e n s i v e  and o f t e n  m u l t i d i s c i p l i n a r y  and 
m u l t i - j u r i s d i c t i o n a l .  S c i e n t i f i c  da t a ,  which i s  g e n e r a l l y  predominant i n  S t eps  
1, 2 and 3, become l e s s  s i g n i f i c a n t  i n  Step 4 and may, i n  some cases ,  play only 
a  minor r o l e  i n  s e l e c t i n g  among a l t e r n a t i v e s .  Some s u b j e c t i v e  components may 
be a l m o s t  i n t u i t i v e ,  a s  i n  t a k i n g  a c c o u n t  of  t h e  c o n f l i c t i n g  p e r c e p t i o n s  o f  
s e v e r a l  pub l i c s  i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  a  perceived r i s k  o r  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  f e a s i b i l i t y  of 
a  management measure. 
PROBLEMS RELATING TO INFORMATION NEEDS 
The p a p e r s  a t  t h e  Workshop c i t e d  numerous p r o b l e m s  r e l a t i n g  t o  t h e  
improvement of t h e  amount, q u a l i t y  and use of i n fo rma t ion  f o r  r i s k  assessment  
and management. There was gene ra l  agreement t h a t  in format ion  was inadequate  
but  t h e  reasons f o r  t h e  d e f i c i e n c i e s  va r i ed  w i th  t h e  d i s c i p l i n e  and t h e  t o p i c  
under d i s cus s ion  (Toft  -- e t  al.; Matthews and Grochowalski). The problems ranged 
a l l  t h e  way from a  s imple  l a c k  of in format ion  through t h e  d i f f i c u l t i e s  which 
a r i s e  i n  t h e  complex  p r o c e s s i n g  and t r a n s f e r  of  i n f o r m a t i o n  i n  h i e r a r c h i c a l  
o r g a n i z a t i o n s  ( S a s s e v i l l e  and Crowley) .  Some d i f f i c u l t i e s  were t r a c e a b l e  t o  
f a u l t y  m e t h o d o l o g i e s  ( F r a n k  e t  a l . ) ,  o t h e r  r e l a t e d  t o  f a i l u r e s  i n  i n t e r -  
-- 
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s e c t o r a l  and inter-agency communication (Matthews and Grochowalski),  and o t h e r  
t o  l a c k  o f  s t a n d a r d i z a t i o n  ( S p i e l b e r g  -- e t  81.1. A few e x a m p l e s  a r e  d i s c u s s e d  
below. 
INSUFFICIENT DATA 
It need  h a r d l y  be s a i d  t h a t  t h e r e  a r e  no e n t i r e l y  a d e q u a t e  d a t a  banks  
( F r i e n d ) .  I n  some c a s e s  t h e r e  i s  v i r t u a l l y  no  r e l i a b l e  i n f o r m a t i o n  even  f o r  
s u b j e c t i v e  judgements. Hence, a pr imary conclusion of t h e  Workshop was t h a t  
t h e r e  i s  an urgent  need f o r  more sys t ema t i c  and b e t t e r  i n fo rma t ion  i f  w e  a r e  t o  
formal ly  a s s e s s  and manage environmental r i s k s .  
IDENTIFYING THE RISKS 
The f i r s t  r e s p o n s e s  t o  newly  i d e n t i f i e d  r i s k s  a r e  u s u a l l y  i n e f f i c i e n t ,  
was t e fu l  and prone t o  provoke unnecessary anxiety.  This  happens f o r  s e v e r a l  
reasons:  t h e  s i t u a t i o n  may be new and we have no in fo rma t ion  t o  guide us;  w e  
have  i n f o r m a t i o n  and  manpower t o  d e a l  w i t h  i t  b u t  t h e y  a r e  n o t  m a r s h a l l e d  
promptly and d e c i s i v e l y ;  t h e  f i r s t  response is  made by persons who a t e  r e a l l y  
no t  q u a l i f i e d  t o  a s s e s s  t h e  s i t u a t i o n ;  o r  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  s i t u a t i o n  may be such 
t h a t  response i s  delayed o r  a response i s  made premature ly  be fo re  t h e  hazard 
has  been a s se s sed  a s  w e l l  a s  p o s s i b l e  a t  t h i s  e a r l y  s t a g e  (Fowle: Rogers). The 
b e s t  response i s  a considered response based on sound informat ion  and made by 
people who have o r  can g a i n  t h e  confidence of t h e  public.  Obviously, t h e  need 
i s  f o r  ready acces s  t o  i n fo rma t ion  and s p e c i a l i s t s  t o  i n t e r p r e t  it t o  dec i s ion  
makers and t o  t h e  p u b l i c  by way of  t h e  media. 
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MONITORING 
I f  t h e r e  i s  t o  be e a r l y  d e t e c t i o n  of t h r e a t s  and p o t e n t i a l  r i s k s  we must 
be  on t h e  a l e r t  ( T o f t  e t  a l . ) .  The i d e a l  s i t u a t i o n  would be  one  i n  which  
m o n i t o r i n g  of  a n t h r o p o g e n i c  i m p a c t s  on e n v i r o n m e n t a l  p r o c e s s e s  and o f  
e n v i r o n m e n t a l  changes  were  s u f f i c i e n t l y  c o m p r e h e n s i v e  t o  e n a b l e  u s  t o  
a n t i c i p a t e  hazards  and d e t e c t  and respond t o  them a s  soon a s  they  appeared. It 
would be  v e r y  u s e f u l  t o  have  e a r l y  warn ing  s y s t e m s  i n  p l a c e  t o  h e l p  u s  a v o i d  
su rp r i s e s .  However, a p a r t  from t h e  p r a c t i c a l  d i f f i c u l t i e s  of t r y i n g  t o  dec ide  
what t o  m o n i t o r ,  s u c h  a  scheme would p r o b a b l y  n o t  be  c o s t  e f f e c t i v e .  
Experience t e l l s  us  t h a t  t h e  most u s e f u l  i n fo rma t ion  i s  t h a t  which i s  c o l l e c t e d  
w i t h  c l e a r  o b j e c t i v e s  f o r  i t s  u s e ;  t h i s  was a  p o i n t  which was s t r o n g l y  
emphasized a t  t h e  Workshop. 
N e v e r t h e l e s s ,  i n  s p i t e  of  d i f f i c u l t i e s ,  we do need more c o m p r e h e n s i v e  
monitor ing ( see ,  f o r  example, Swedish Nat ional  Environmental P r o t e c t i o n  Board 
19851, more c o o p e r a t i o n  among a g e n c i e s ,  and c r o s s - s e c t o r a l  d a t a  c o l l e c t i n g ,  
improved acces s  t o  government and p r i v a t e  d a t a  banks and c r i t i c a l  examinat ion 
of  a v a i l a b l e  i n f o r m a t i o n  s o  a s  t o  b e g i n  t o  move t o w a r d s  s t a n d a r d i z a t i o n ,  
reduc t ion  of redundancy, g r e a t e r  comprehensiveness and c l e a r e r  o b j e c t i v e s  f o r  
t h e  u s e  of  d a t a  (F rank  -- e t  a l . ;  S p i e l b e r g  e t  a l . ) .  Many o f  t h e  p r e s e n t  d a t a  
-- 
bases  were c o l l e c t e d  f o r  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  purposes o r  t o  conform t o  l e g i s l a t i v e  
requi rements ,  not  f o r  r i s k  assessment.  For t h i s  reason they  o f t e n  l a c k  c r u c i a l  
i n f o r m a t i o n .  Fo r  example ,  v i t a l  s t a t i s t i c s  and e p i d e m i o l o g i c a l  d a t a  f i l e s  
o f t e n  l a c k  in fo rma t ion  on occupat ion,  economic s t a t u s ,  use of tobacco, a l coho l  
and drugs,  and gene ra l  l i f e  s t y l e ,  a l l  of which may be confounding f a c t o r s  when 
it  comes t o  a s s e s s i n g  r i s k s .  The cu r r en t  debate  about t h e  kind of i n fo rma t ion  
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which shou ld  be r e c o r d e d  r e g a r d i n g  pe r sons  s u f f e r i n g  from AIDS i s  a  c a s e  i n  
point .  
As has  been p o i n t e d  o u t ,  i t  i s  n o t  f e a s i b l e  t o  mount d a t a  c o l l e c t i o n  
programs i n  which information i s  gathered more o r  l e s s  a t  random i n  the  hope of 
p i c k i n g  up someth ing  which may be u s e f u l .  It i s  b e t t e r  t o  have a focus .  I n  
t h e  case of environmental pol lu tants ,  f o r  example, the  focus i s  of t e n  provided 
by t h e  l i s t  of s u b s t a n c e s  f o r  which s t a n d a r d s  have been s e t  o r  which a r e  
s u s p e c t e d  t o  be hazardous.  For example, i n  s p i t e  of t h e  f a c t  t h a t  ove r  800 
chemicals had been i d e n t i f i e d  i n  the  Great Lakes system by 1983, Metropolitan 
Toronto cur ren t ly  conducts chemical tests t h r e e  t ime per year f o r  170 chemicals 
s e l e c t e d  from t h e  U.S. EPA's l i s t  of " p r i o r i t y  p o l l u t a n t s " .  F i f ty -one  have 
been i d e n t i f i e d  i n  d r i n k i n g  w a t e r  i n  v e r y  minu te  amounts. For some y e a r s  
p e s t i c i d e s  were emphasized presumably  because  t h e y  were p e r c e i v e d  t o  be 
hazardous  (Davies) .  Such a s e l e c t i v e  approach i s  i n e v i t a b l e  and we shou ld  
s t r i v e  wherever poss ib le  t o  broaden t h e  scope of monitoring and not  concentrate 
exclus ively  on suspected t h r e a t s  which have already been iden t i f i ed .  We r i s k  
missing new ones. 
Monitoring data  i s  sometimes d i f f i c u l t  t o  evaluate  because of a  l ack  of 
h i s t o r i c a l  "baseline" information which would p e r m i t  e v a l u a t i o n  of  c o n d i t o n s  
b e f o r e  a r i s k  was d e t e c t e d .  T h i s  was a problem i n  t h e  c a s e  of a c i d  
p r e c i p i t a t i o n  where t h e r e  i s  s t i l l  u n c e r t a i n t y  r e g a r d i n g  t h e  "normal" 
u n p o l l u t e d  pH of r a i n  and snow p r e v a i l i n g  p r i o r  t o  t h e  i n f l u e n c e  o f  
a n t h r o p o g e n i c  i n p u t s  of p o l l u t a n t s  (Turner:  ' B u r n e t t  e t  al.) .  The l a c k  o f  
-- 
ecologica l  mapping i s  a l s o  an impediment t o  adequate environmental sampling, 
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r a t i o n a l  a l l o c a t i o n  o f  r e s o u r c e s  f o r  s a m p l i n g  and i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of  
information.  
It i s  apparent  t h a t  long-term monitor ing i s  necessary  i n  many a r e a s  i n  
o rde r  t o  provide base l ine  d a t a  and t h e  in format ion  needed f o r  r i s k  assessment  
bu t  a  s i n g l e  a l l - i n c l u s i v e  scheme i s  imprac t i ca l .  We w i l l  s t i l l  have t o  depend 
on t h e  va r ious  d i s c i p l i n e s  and s p e c i a l t i e s  t o  develop t h e i r  own programs. But 
i f  w e  a r e  going t o  g e t  a  r ea sona l e  r e t u r n  on inves tment  more a t t e n t i o n  must be 
given t o  c a r e f u l  planning f o r  t h e  use  of i n fo rma t ion  and t o  coopera t ive  sha r ing  
of i n f o r m a t i o n  among a g e n c i e s  and c o m m e r c i a l  o r g a n i z a t i o n s .  The r o u t i n e  
procedures f o r  c o l l e c t i n g  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  s t a t i s t i c s  should be examined t o  s ee  
how they  might be adapted t o  providing informat ion  f r e e  of confounding f a c t o r s  
f o r  r i s k  assessment  purposes. The needs f o r  i n fo rma t ipn  f o r  r i s k  assessment  of 
t r a n s p o r t a t i o n  of d a n g e r o u s  goods  i s  a  good example .  Governments  and t h e  
t r a n s p o r t a t i o n  i n d u s t r i e s  both have records  of s p i l l s ,  acc idents ,  numbers of  
v e h i c l e s ,  f r e q u e n c y  of  t r a v e l  and s o  on,  b u t  t h e  r e c o r d s  a r e  n o t  c o o r d i n a t e d  
and  some o f  them a r e  c o n f i d e n t i a l  and u n a v a i l a b l e .  Hencz, i t  i s  e x t r e m e l y  
d i f f i c u l t  t o  a p p l y  r i s k  a s s e s s m e n t  methods  t o  t h e  management of  t h e  
t r a n s p o r t a t i o n  of dangerous goods (Matthews and Grochowalski). There i s  a l s o  
p o t e n t i a l  f o r  c o o p e r a t i o n  i n  s t a n d a r d i z a t i o n  and c o d i n g  i n  t h e  p r o v i n c i a l  
h e a l t h  records  i n  Canada so a s  t o  i n c r e a s e  t h e  pool of i n fo rma t ion  and pe rmi t  
ready access  (Sp ie lbe rg  e t  a l l .  
FAILURE TO USE THE INFORMATION WE HAVE 
Whi le  f a i l u r e  t o  r e c o g n i z e  a  t h r e a t  o r  l a c k  of  i n f o r m a t i o n  may be t h e  
common problem, t h e r e  a r e  some cases  i n  which we have had evidence of a  t h r e a t  
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o r  have had i n f o r m a t i o n  bu t  f a i l  t o  a c t  upon it. For example,  t h e  h a z a r d s  of 
asbestos have been known f o r  a t  l e a s t  50 years and t h e r e  were c l e a r  ind ica t ions  
of r i s k s  t o  h e a l t h  d u r i n g  t h e  p r e v i o u s  25 y e a r s  (Meek). Yet i t  i s  o n l y  
recen t ly  t h a t  we have taken s t eps  t o  con t ro l  exposure and reduce r isk.  Radon 
i s  another example (Chambers and Low). The universa l  d i s t r i b u t i o n  of radium i n  
r o c k s  and s o i l s  h a s  l o n g  been known a s  h a s  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  r adon ,  a  gaseous  
p r o d u c t  of t h e  r a d i o a c t i v e  decay of radium-226, i s  one of t h e  c a u s e s  of l u n g  
cancer. Yet, v i r t u a l l y  a l l  research  and regula tory  ac t ions  taken with respect  
t o  t h e  r i s k s  of  radon have been c o n f i n e d  t o  mines and miners.  Only r e c e n t l y  
has t h e  exposure of t h e  genera l  population t o  radon i n  confined spaces i n  homes 
and o the r  bui ld ings  been inves t iga ted  and found t o  be s ign i f i can t .  This i s  an 
example of a  narrow r a t h e r  t h a n  comprehensive  a p p l i c a t i o n  of a  g e n e r a l  
p r i n c i p l e  t o  t h e  management of r isk.  
THE PROBLEM OF DELAYED CONSEQUENCES 
We a r e  beginning t o  recognize an increas ing number of environmental r i s k s  
i n  which consequences  a r e  l o n g  delayed.  The e f f e c t s  of c a r c i n o g e n s  and 
mutagens a r e  we l l  known examples of s i t u a t i o n s  where r i s k  assessment i s  very 
d i f f i c u l t  and f r a u g h t  w i t h  a  h i g h  degree  of  u n c e r t a i n t y .  Other  examples 
include: d e s e r t i f i c a t i o n ,  erosion and l o s s  of s o i l  f e r t i l i t y  fol lowing removal 
of t r o p i c a l  f o r e s t s  f o r  ag r i cu l tu re ,  f u e l  and timber, and leaking waste s torage  
dumps. The r i s k s  involved a r i s e  mainly from human a c t i v i t i e s ,  and while t h e  
consequences of some of them a r e  immediate, o the r s  a r e  ins id ious  and ramifying 
i n  t h e i r  disturbance of ecosystem function o r  i n  threa tening human health. I n  
cases such as these  more information on ecosystem funct ion  and r e s i l i e n c e  i s  
required.  
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HUMAN ERROR 
I n  a t t e m p t i n g  t o  m i n i m i z e  r i s k  we go t o  g r e a t  l e n g t h  t o  d e v e l o p  v e r y  
r e l i a b l e  and f a i l  s a f e  engineer ing  systems f o r  s t r u c t u r e  and machines, and y e t  
r i s k s  r e m a i n  and d i s a s t e r s  o f  v a r i o u s  m a g n i t u d e s  o c c u r  r e g u l a r l y .  I n  many 
c a s e s  f a i l u r e s  i n  human judgement, p a r t i c u l a r l y  i n  emergency s i t u a t i o n s ,  a r e  
o f t e n  major c o n t r i b u t o r s  t o  events  such a s  a i r l i n e  d i s a s t e r s ,  a c c i d e n t s  w i th  
n u c l e a r  r e a c t o r s ,  h ighway a c c i d e n t s  and p r o c e s s  and o p e r a t i n g  f a i l u r e s  i n  
chemical  i n d u s t r i e s .  E r r o r s  i n  judgements i n  s e t t i n g  p u b l i c  p o l i c y  might a l s o  
be included under t h i s  heading. 
We need more r e sea rch  on t h e  e x t e n t  t o  which human e r r o r  f o i l s  our  b e s t  
a t t e m p t s  t o  manage r i s k s  and w e  need r e s e a r c h  on methods  o f  t r a i n i n g  t h o s e  
r e spons ib l e  f o r  t h e  ope ra t i on  of a c t i v i t i e s  wi th  a  p o t e n t i a l  f o r  d i s a s t e r  and 
f a i l u r e  (Ahearne 1984 1. 
INFORMATION FOR EDUCATION 
Much money and e f f o r t  a r e  o f t e n  expended i n  a t t e m p t i n g  t o  cope  w i t h  a  
perceived t h r e a t  o r  r i s k  i n  o rde r  t o  reduce p u b l i c  anx ie ty  and s a t i s f y  demand 
f o r  s a f e ty .  There a r e  many examples of unwarranted o r  misplaced a l l o c a t i o n  of 
r e sou rces  r e s u l t i n g  from i n c o m p l e t e  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  o f  p a r t i c u l a r  t h r e a t s  and 
r i s k s  (Fowle; Meek). There i s  a  need f o r  in format ion  programs t o  encourage a  
more genera l  understanding of t h e  i n e v i t a b l e  presence of r i s k s  i n  our  l i v e s  and 
t h e  l i m i t s  of our  a b i l i t y  t o  ensure  sa fe ty .  The i n c l u s i o n  of t h e  concepts  of 
r i s k  i n  school  c u r r i c u l a  should be considered. Government news r e l e a s e s  and 
announcements  r e g a r d i n g  h e a l t h  and e n v i r o n m e n t a l  r i s k s  should be couched i n  
te rms  of reducing r i s k  i n s t e a d  of emphasizing "safety" .  
A s p e c i a l  e f f o r t  i s  needed  t o  encourage  t h e  media t o  a d o p t  a  r i s k  
v o c a b u l a r y  and t o  r e d u c e  t h e  s e n s a t i o n a l  s t r e s s  on d a n g e r  and s a f e t y .  S i n c e  
they  a r e  t h e  p r i n c i p a l  sources of in format ion  t o  t h e  publ ic ,  p o l i t i c i a n s  and 
p u b l i c  o f f i c i a l s ,  a s  w e l l  a s  b e i n g  t h e  c h a n n e l  u sed  by t h e  r e s p o n s i b l e  
a u t h o r i t i e s  t o  convey informat ion  t o  t h e  publ ic ,  t h e  media a r e  o f t e n  t h e  ch i e f  
c a u s e  of t h e  gap  be tween  " o b j e c t i v e "  measu res  of  r i s k  and t h e  " p e r c e i v e d "  
assessment  of r i s k s .  They a r e  a l s o  t h e  main gene ra to r s  of anxiety.  The media, 
t h e r e f o r e ,  b e a r s  a heavy r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  i n  t h e  r i s k  management p r o c e s s  and 
s h o u l d  be encouraged  t o  a d o p t  a  more r a t i o n a l  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of r i s k y  
s i t u a t i o n s .  
HOW USEFUL I S  RISK ASSESSMENT I N  SELECTING MANAGEMENT OPTIONS? 
Proponents of t h e  a p p l i c a t i o n  of sys t ema t i c  assessment  t o  t h e  management 
of r i s k s  be l i eve  it would a i d  dec i s ion  makers i n  t h e  s e l e c t i o n  of a l t e r n a t i v e s  
and improve t h e  r e l i a b i l i t y  of management decis ions.  While it seems obvious 
t h a t  a  comprehensive a n a l y s i s  of any problem i n  t h e  p u b l i c  po l i cy  a r e a  would 
improve dec i s ions ,  it may be doubt fu l  t h a t  dramat ic  improvements would r e s u l t  
i f  t h e  informat ion  base was improved. For example, t h e r e  i s  much evidence t o  
show t h a t  comparisons of t h e  r i s k s  among var ious  energy opt ions  has l i t t l e  t o  
do w i t h  t h e  s e l e c t i o n  of  t h e  chosen  o p t i o n .  F a c t o r s  such  a s  economics  and  
s e c u r i t y  of f u e l  supply outweigh cons ide ra t ion  of r i s k s  (Whipple). 
Many people i n  t h e  world, bu t  by no means a  major i ty ,  l i v e  longer  l i v e s  
i n  a  more r e l i a b l e ,  low r i s k  world and enjoy a  b e t t e r  s tandard  of l i v i n g  than 
was t h e  case  100 years  ago. Obviously, we make and have made some unfor tuna te  
dec i s ions  about environmental  r i s k s  but ,  on t h e  whole, we a r e  doing p r e t t y  we l l  
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i n  c o m p a r i s o n  w i t h  t h e  p a s t .  On t h e  o t h e r  hand ,  it  can  be a r g u e d  t h a t  t h i n g s  
a r e  d i f f e r e n t  now and we a r e  c o n f r o n t i n g  an  e v e r  i n c r e a s i n g  a r r a y  o f  
s i m u l t a n e o u s  r i s k s  which  a r e  c e r t a i n l y  t a x i n g  o u r  management s k i l l s .  The 
a p p l i c a t i o n  of r i s k  assessment can only  be h e l p f u l .  
But t h e  hard-headed  d e c i s i o n  maker who b e a r s  t h e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  
minimizing r i s k s  a s  w e l l  a s  f o r  t h e  resources  f o r  s tudying  them may w e l l  ask: 
- How much improvement i n  r e l i a b i l i t y  and r educ t ion  i n  unce r t a in ty  
may be expected from t h e  a p p l i c a t i o n  of r i s k  management? 
- Would it  be b e t t e r  i f  t h e  information base was improved? 
- What w i l l  it c o s t  i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  t h e  r e t u r n ?  
En thus i a s t s  f o r  improving t h e  i n f o r m a t i o n  b a s e  f o r  r i s k  a s s e s s m e n t  would do 
w e l l  t o  cons ider  ques t i ons  l i k e  these.  The gene ra l  u t i l i t y  of more and b e t t e r  
i n fo rma t ion  i n  po l i cy  dec i s ions  needs t o  be c l e a r l y  argued and demonstrated. 
The s i t u a t i o n  i s  w e l l  i l l u s t r a t e d  by t h e  r e c e n t  comments of  a  s e n i o r  
Canad ian  o f f i c i a l  who l i s t e d  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  q u e s t i o n s  a s  t h e  ones  he  had t o  
a n t i c i p a t e  i n  a d v i s i n g  h i s  s u p e r i o r s  regard ing  newly perceived environmental  
problems : 
1. What i s  t h e  problem? 
2. Who w i l l  be a f f e c t e d ?  
3. How w i l l  they  be a f f e c t e d ?  
4. What can be done? ( A l t e r n a t i v e s )  
5. What a r e  t h e  c o s t s ?  
6. What a r e  t h e  consequences of being wrong? 
7. What i s  your recommendation? 
C l e a r l y  t h e  r e s p o n s e s  t o  each of t h e s e  q u e s t i o n s  a r e  l i k e l y  t o  be 
u n c e r t a i n  t o  v a r y i n g  d e g r e e s  and each r e q u i r e s  i t s  own mix of " o b j e c t i v e w  
s c i e n t i f i c  information and "subjective" judgement. Where can r i s k  assessment 
play i t s  most useful  r o l e ?  
SOME CONCLUDING THOUGHTS 
1. The i n f o r m a t i o n  base  f o r  r i s k  a s s e s s m e n t  and management i s  g e n e r a l l y  
inadequate. Systematic, comprehensive assessment i s  possible i n  only a  
very few cases. 
2. It i s  inev i t ab le  t h a t  decisions w i l l  have t o  be made under uncertainty,  
regardless  of how much information we have. The c e n t r a l  problem i n  r i s k  
management i s  coping with uncertainty.  
3. While more i n f o r m a t i o n  i s  needed i n  many a r e a s ,  a  l a r g e  d a t a  base  i s  
a l r e a d y  on hand b u t  much of it i s  n o t  r e a d i l y  a v a i l a b l e  because of 
i g n o r a n c e  of i t s  a v a i l a b i l i t y ,  l a c k  of c o o p e r a t i o n ,  u n w i l l i n g n e s s  t o  
s h a r e ,  l a c k  of s t a n d a r d i z a t i o n  and f a i l u r e  t o  r e c o r d  i n f o r m a t i o n  on 
confounding fac to r s .  
4 .  Risk a n a l y s i s  based on e x t e n s i v e  " o b j e c t i v e "  i n f o r m a t i o n  might  n o t  be 
used as much a s  we might hope. "Subjective" considerat ions which must be 
taken i n t o  account i n  a r r iv ing  a t  management decisions of ten  overshadow 
the  formal assessment process. The general  u t i l i t y  of r i s k  analys is  i n  
improving t h e  r e l i a b i l i t y  of d e c i s i o n s  and r e d u c i n g  u n c e r t a i n t y  below 
e x i s t i n g  l e v e l s  remain t o  be demonstrated. 
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SYSEMS ANALYSIS IN NATURE MAIUAGEXENT 
S.A. Pegov 
The study into society-nature interaction engenders an 
unusually wide and diverse range of problems requiring solution. 
What is more, even the long discussed problems, sometimes solved 
in principle, still remain the subject matter of discussions due to 
their internal complexity. 
The dynamics of the current man-nature interaction results in 
rapid changes requiring not only accumulation of knowledge and 
partial decision making, but also the definition of a general 
development strategy for a complex tangle of arising problems. 
The changes in environmental chernism brought about by new 
technologies, and the social aspects of man-nature interaction 
require the application of a comprehensive, interdisciplinary 
approach to the analysis of emerging problems. The classical 
theoretical-experimental approaches are less applicable due to an 
explicit scarcity of knowledge of the natural dynamic changes and, 
as a rule, the limited feasibility of experimentation. 
Systems analysis involves a combination of methods, ways and 
means of systems study and design as well as their management. 
The major emphasis in systems analysis is placed on solution of 
real problems faced by management agencies, research and other 
organizations. "Systems analysis is, in the first place, a tool for 
improving organizational, management, marshalling its structure 
and functions, its orientation toward problem situations, and 
accomplishment of goals at earlier dates and lower costs" [2]. 
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The earlier applications of systems analysis to ecology were 
mostly dominated by mathematical modelling, i.e. a research 
determined the major components of a problem and tried to 
represent them in a model. This led to construction of a huge 
number of environmental mathematical models. In particular, [3] 
lists over 1,500 rmdels of ecological processes and nature-society 
interactions. Nevertheless, there is no information on practical 
application of the majority of the models. This is probably 
associated with the fact that  the problems relating to man-nature 
interaction are characterized by insufficient objective information 
which, in the process of model formulation, can be enlarged only 
with subjective ideas of the researcher about the system variable 
relationships. In complex models, such as those attempting to 
describe man-nature interactions, this subjective information 
influences the results in an unpredictable manner. As a result, 
complex models are unacceptable for decision makers and do not 
affect the decision process. 
At  the same time, the significance of systems analysis is 
especially great in decision making. It would be appropriate here 
to recall the A. Enthoven definition: "Systems analysis is a 
reasonable approach to decision making explicitly defined as 
"quantitative common sense" [6]. The author is not going to 
compare systems analysis and decision methods. This question is 
thoroughly and competently discussed in Larichev [14]. We are 
interested, in the first place, in the systems approach pattern 
given in that  publication: 
Define Determine Compare the Select the 
goals and * problem so- * alternatives * most pre- 
resources lution al- analytically ferable al- 
ternatives ternative 
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In considering this basic pattern, one may come to a 
conclusion that  a t  least three stages employ informal procedures. 
Systems analysis of a problem assumes the availability of data on 
its essence, structure, its relationships with other problems, 
availability of resources for the problem solution, etc. Many of 
these factors do not lend themselves to quantitative evaluation, 
and hence they may be accounted for only on the basis of 
howledge, experience, and intuition of experts in the given or a 
similar problem So the purpose of systems analysis is to marshal 
the diverse information as well as to identify the trends in system 
dynamics both a t  'present (descriptive) and in the future 
(forecast). 
In the application of systems analysis to ecological-economic 
systems (a far from adequate term, just like socio-ecological 
systems - the point is of a system describing nature-society 
interaction on a certain spatial basis), i t  is generally the case that, 
on the one hand, we are quite familiar with physical laws governing 
the evolution of natural systems but are not always aware of their 
manifestations. On the other hand, the pattern of natural impacts 
on the part of the society is often of purely forrnalizable character. 
Provided that  anthropogenic influences on natural systems always, 
sooner or later, lead to structural and functional changes of the 
systems, and the changes, in their turn, affect management of the 
economic system (primarily through demographic and social 
characteristics) i t  becomes clear that  we deal with purely 
structured systems having both quantitative and qualitative 
variables where the latter dominate in most cases. 
The complexity of nature-society interaction has given rise to 
a number of approaches to decision problems in the area of nature 
management. There are well known models of global and regional 
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ecological problems [9, 191. Sometimes, the nature management 
processes are successfully studied on ecological-economic models 
[4, 8, 101. Wide acceptance in the USSR has been gained lately by 
the so-called territorial complex schemes of nature protection 
\ 
(Terksop) [13] employing for the most part informal heuristic 
methods (scenarios, expert judgment, relevance trees, etc.) and 
quantitative techniques associated with statistical and 
econometric analysis of information, etc. The analysis techniques 
employed in Terksop are close to the approaches, currently in use 
abroad, to the solution of nature management problems 
encompassed by the term 'Environmented Impact Assessment' [7, 
211. Wide-scale application of methods such as the Leopold matrix, 
cost-effectiveness, adjusted map analysis flow diagrams, the 
Battelle method and the like, made i t  possible to solve a number of 
serious practical problems and develop some methods for 
environmental assessment and its interaction with economic 
systems. It is worth mentioning, however, a general shortcoming 
of this approach to the solution of ill-structured problems: there 
are considerable difficulties in its application for the analysis of 
long-range consequences of nature-society interaction. 
To some extent, this difficulty is eased by the approach 
developed by a team of researchers of IIASA [I]. The work suggests 
the application of an adaptive decision procedure in nature 
management. Given the emergence or identification of AEAM* 
aspects of man-nature interaction, not accounted for in the first 
study, an AEAM procedure of the interaction analysis and 
assessment is carried out, account is taken of AEAM factors 
specifying the interaction processes both in structural and 
SAEAM - A d a p t i v e  Environmental  A s s e s s m e n t  and Management. 
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spatial-temporal dimensions. The expert opinions provide the basis 
for a specified interaction model and AEAM decision alternatives 
are generated. This adaptive decision procedure seems most close 
methodologically to the requirements of systems analysis of 
nature-society interaction. 
I t  is worth pointing out, however, that it would be wrong both 
to exaggerate or underestimate the simulation methods of man- 
nature interaction in the study of ecological problems and decision 
making in nature management. 
The point is that simulation of processes in a pristine 
environment is based on fundamental natural laws and, given their 
correct application, cannot but generate substantive results. The 
major human influences on natural systems are determined by the 
level of technological development, and hence, their assessment is 
based on strict engineering calculations. The difficulty is to 
correctly account for anthropogenic impacts on natural physical 
and chemical processes. Where such changes have been 
sufficiently studied (by observation or experimentally, on occasion) 
it becomes possible to construct adequate models of nature-society 
interaction. Note, that the overwhelming majority of "successful" 
ecological models were constructed precisely for such studied 
interaction cases. Should the consequences of man's impacts be 
not studied or, moreover, not clear enough, the significance of 
non-formalizable procedures of systems analysis grows. The role of 
expert judgment, heuristic simulation, the above-mentioned 
adaptive approach, etc. also increases in significance. 
A t  the same time, the problems of environmental quality 
management, decision making, economic assessment of nature 
management cannot be solved only by forrnalizable analysis 
techniques. Especially important here is a reasonable approach t o  
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decision making, the very "quantitative common sense" A. 
Enthoven wrote about [6]. 
Hence, i t  would be wrong to place emphasis on and exaggerate 
the significance of either formalizable or nonforrnalizable 
procedures of problem analysis in exploring nature-society 
interaction. It is only the dialectical unity of these methodological 
approaches that allows one to decompose a complex ecological- 
economic system into separate elements-into a set of simpler 
interactions, express them in quantitative terms, and hence, make 
a correct decision with greater probability. 
Consider one of the possible schemes of systems analysis of 
nature-society interaction which "represents the problem solution 
as a process of design, manufacture, and utilization of systems" 
[201. 
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The purpose of the first phase of analysis is t o  form an idea of 
and assess the state of the environment of the region under study 
with due account of the changes caused by the existing 
anthropogenic factors, the goals of economic development and 
ways to their accomplishment. Evaluation of the technological 
resources needed to implement feasible regional development 
makes i t  possible t o  single out and identify opportunities for 
intervention, and reject unacceptable ecodevelopment 
alternatives. 
The second phase is devoted t o  ecological examination and 
forecasting. I t  is a prerequisite for a general 'assessment of 
ecodevelopment alternatives. Generally speaking, the conception 
(first phase) of the current environmental state in the studied 
region is of prognostic value. But the point is that any human 
activity may affect natural systems for a long time. As a rule, for 
large geographic areas - provinces, economic regions - this time 
corresponds t o  the characteristic periods of succession processes - 
tens and sometimes hundreds of years. At  the same time, the 
characteristic cycles in technological and economic conditions 
within the same region last up to 5, seldom up t o  10 years. The 
consequences of anthropogenic impact accumulate for many years 
and serious disturbances in natural systems may be of sudden 
avalanche character following the gradual overwhelming of 
ecological capacity (stability limits) of the natural system These 
specifics of man-nature interaction must be taken into account of 
when assessing and forecasting environmental state. 
The concept of ecological stability (capacity) is for the 
timebeing a nonforrnalized notion, though for some simple cases it 
can be defined [12, 221. I t  is clear, however, that this fundamental 
notion gives rise t o  both formal and nonformal methods of 
- 197 - Pegov, S.A. 
research into the nature-society interaction. 
A set  of first and second phase problems can most effectively 
be solved within the framework of an expert system (a system of 
ecological examination) [3]. The purpose of an expert system of 
environmental assessment and forecast is the synthesis of the 
formal and heuristic knowledge of experts in the field of man- 
nature interactions and the subsequent utilization of the acquired 
knowledge. 
The economic effectiveness analysis of natural region 
development alternatives is regarded as a separate phase despite 
the fact that  traditionally i t  has not involved a systems approach 
[14]. Application of the systems approach to the study of man- 
nature interactions has encountered some fundamental problems. 
First, the analytical comparison of ecodevelopment alternatives 
requires some common unit of measurement for ecological and 
socioeconomic systems. A second important problem is the 
socioeconomic evaluation of ecodevelopment, i.e. ways of 
interaction between nature, population, resources, and economic 
mechanisms in the region. 
The utilization of monetary untis as a common equivalent is 
not always possible and justifiable. This has considerably lowered 
the enthusiasm of researchers who considered the cost- 
effectiveness technique [21] as most suitable for such problems. 
As for Soviet scientists, they use a more adequate category of the 
second differential rent  [8] for the socioeconomic assessment of 
natural region development effectiveness. A t  the same time, 
economic estimates are, generally, applicable to individual 
components of the natural environment such as soil, vegetation, 
water, etc. Hence, it  is highly desirable to develop an integrated 
estimate of environmental state as a whole that  could be easily 
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interpreted by economists and decision makers. 
Any kind of technological activity is usually hazardous for 
environment and health. Naturally, i t  is always necessary 
(sometimes quite hypothetically) to take technical and economic 
measures for protecting human health and environment. The main 
principle of safety provision, suggested as a basis in decision 
making, boils down to providing "absolute safety" [16]. Is it 
possible to secure "absolute safety" by increasing investments in 
environmental control? Experience shows that it may be possible, 
but far from always. Fig. 2 gives two different dependencies of risk 
R on protection cost P [16]. 
Fig. 2. Dependence of risk R on protection cost P. There are 
two options of direct risk 4 characterized by the possibility 
(1) and impossibility (2) to secure zero risk. An indirect risk 
Ri and aggregate risk R, relate to (2). 
Curve (1) corresponds to the case when "absolute safety" is 
achievable, for certain P=P, risk R from harmful impact becomes 
equal to zero. Examples of such technologies are provided by 
operations whose harmful discharges or impacts contain factors 
with threshold values. It is possible to achieve "absolute safety" by 
establishing standards (e.g. maximum tolerable concentration) 
providing for a harmful factor not exceeding the threshold value. 
Curve (2) corresponds to the case when it is impossible to achieve 
"absolute safety" in principle. Such behavior of environmental 
control cost effectiveness is characteristic of operations exerting 
long-range anthropogenic impact on environrmnt (atomic power 
stations, biological operations, transport, etc.). A desire to 
achieve, in the second case, the maximum possible safety (ALAPA 
principle - as low as practically achievable) [18] results in the final 
count in ineffective investment of resources in environmental 
protection and health care. This is due to the fact that  the 
indirect risk Ri associated with construction, maintenance, 
manufacture of protection technology starts growing. Hence, as 
safety costs increase the direct risk Rd decreases and indirect 
risks R, increase. Starting from a certain level of expenses P, 
additional investments will be accompanied by a growing aggregate 
risk R, =Rd +R, (Fig. 2). 
There are many publications [18] and a host of suggestions on 
the problem of admissible risk. The questions of risk analysis are a 
standing topic of international conferences and mass media. The 
purpose of this paper, however, is not to give an overview of risk 
analysis concepts. This has been done expertly by other authors 
e.g. [16, 181. We are interested in the fact that  the risk level 
analysis of changes in environmental state and population health 
allows one to interpret the notion of ecological risk as a measure 
of natural system change under man's influence. A t  the same 
time, the currently available economic estimates of risk 
dependence on environment and human health protection costs 
permit an adequate socioeconomic analysis of the effectiveness of 
regional development alternatives. I t  is even possible to offer a 
risk estimate scale of environmental changes. Thus, maximum risk 
(100%) for a specific alternative of socioeconomic development as 
regards a natural system implies that  implementing this strategy 
imposes a risk of destroying the natural system completely 
(disturb the stability state, exceed the marginal rate of sichess,  
etc.). On the other hand, if the socio-economic development 
strategy does not change the structural and functional properties 
of the natural environment and its demographic characteristics 
then the risk level equals zero. I t  is also possible to consider the 
probability of disturbing the ecological system stability through 
anthropogenic impact. Then, the above mentioned estimate scale 
will operate within the range of 0-1. 
The use of such extraeconomic estimates for ecosystem 
stability will probably make it possible to considerably simplify 
socioeconomic effectiveness analysis of natural region 
development alternatives. 
The assessment of ecodevelopment alternatives and the 
subsequent decision making (alternative choice) involve the 
rrieasurement of qualitative characteristics inherent in ill- 
structured problems as well as problems of collective decision 
making taking into account the opinions of the different groups 
influencing the decision. Here we deliberately integrate the two 
last phases of the systems approach: alternative assessment and 
choice of a development alternative. This is associated with the 
fact that these questions are central to decision theory, hence, 
can be solved with the methods specifically developed for this 
purpose [15]. Nevertheless, it is necessary to note some specifics 
of ecodevelopment and decision alternative assessment in the area 
of nature management and environmental control. 
Environmental and ecodevelopment problems are among the 
global issues of the present [ I l l ,  i.e. problems concerned with all 
facets of human activity. Therefore, the interests involved in the 
solution of ecodevelopment problems may be in direct conflict. It is 
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clear that  no procedures can help a correct assessment of 
alternatives and decision making given well thought out, 
conflicting policies (e.g. the environment protector versus the 
proponent of industrial development). What is needed is the 
development of evaluation criteria and scales permitting trade-off 
decisions based on the probability assessment of the extent to 
which each development alternative is correct or incorrect. Each 
alternative can be estimated from economic, social, political, 
utility, or unprofitability points of view and the estimates can be 
expressed both in quantitative form (risk analysis, losses, etc.) or 
a t  least by the degree of significance. For example, it  is suggested 
[7] to estimate alternatives in terms of relative indicators: 
(1) probable unprofitability (probability of failure multiplied by 
its cost); 
(2) probable utility (probability of favorable consequences 
multiplied by benefits); 
(3) maximum probability of pure gain (probable utility minus 
probable unprofitability. 
The choice of the best development alternative is made 
possible by the use of several criteria for defining the term "best". 
Consider another example. The analysis of "desirability" of 
individual possible development alternatives, where each one is 
characterized by a certain degree of meeting the interests of 
problem solution contributors, makes i t  possible to  have more 
explicit ideas about the comparative importance of individual 
aspects of the considered ecological problem, the extent of 
realized and not realized interests of the participants, and, finally 
about the ecodevelopment trade-off. Equally important is that  i t  
becomes possible to quantitatively estimate the level of ecological 
risk, and illustrate to each participant the profitability or 
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unprofitability of solution alternatives of ecodevelopment 
problems, as well as present them graphically in the form of event 
development lines. 
These relative indicators can be measured only on ordinate 
scales with verbal definitions of quality levels. Future research 
may make it possible to use qualititative measurement in the 
analysis of alternatives, and therefore the measurement 
techniques should employ the factor description language decision 
makers are accustomed to [14]. 
One of the possible approaches to alternative and decision 
analysis, especially for problems with explicitly conflicting 
objectives, as in nature management, is the development and use 
of business games [17]. Here the game participants have to view 
the problem solution from a wider perspective, "feel the elbow" of 
his or her partner and accept the necessity of trade-off. 
What then must be the actual assessment procedures of 
environment state, alternative analysis, and decision making in 
problems of nature-society interaction? Most probably these must 
be iterative adaptive procedures taking account of changes in the 
goals of economic development and environmental state, and basic 
principles of state policy in nature management and 
environmental control. Of course, the nonformalizable elements in 
such procedures will be central but the development of formal 
methods of nature assessment and forecast, development of 
quantitative scales of socioeconomic effectiveness analysis of 
natural-region development alternatives, and formalization of 
some aspects of alternatives and decision analysis will make it 
possible to solve the man-nature interaction problems on a higher 
level. 
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INTEGRATED ASSESSBENT OF ACID DEPOSITION 
IN EUROPE 
Leen Hordijk 
International Institute f o r  Applied Systems Analysis, 
Laxenburg, Austria. 
PROJECT S m A R Y  
A model system known as RAINS (Regional Acidification Information and Simu- 
lation) is being developed in o r d e r  t o  support integrated assessments of the  com- 
plex problem of acid deposition. The flexible, modular design of t h e  system 
enables RAINS t o  be used f o r  policy and scientific analyses of both near- and 
long-term environmental impacts of acidification. The system, when complete, will 
account fo r  sulfur and nitrogen emissions and the i r  effect on the  environment, 
measured in terms of the  acidity of lakes and groundwater, fores t  soils, and the  
forest  directly. The model user  will also be able  t o  undertake analyses of t he  costs 
and benefits of various control and mitigation strategies.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Issues 
A s  the  public debate  on acid deposition escalates, governments and industry 
are ha rd  pressed t o  decide whether t o  install additional controls on power plants 
and o the r  potential sources of pollution; t o  take s teps  to mitigate possible effects 
of acid deposition (e.g., liming of waterways and soils, development of resistant 
species of biota); o r  t o  w a i t  perhaps five o r  ten years  until t h e r e  is more con- 
clusive scientific information about the  complex relationship o r  emissions and 
environmental effects. However, acting now to reduce emissions carries t he  r isk 
tha t  large expenditures wil l  be made with little o r  no advantages. For example, a 
common policy being implemented in Europe f o r  controlling acidification impacts is 
a thir ty  percent  reduction of sulfur emissions by 1993 relative t o  t h e  1980 level. 
Although such a policy will be costly f o r  virtually dl of the  countries 
concerned,the actual benefits t o  t he  natural environment a r e  not w e l l  defined. Y e t  
hesitation poses the  serious th rea t  of i r reversible  ecological damage tha t  might 
have been prevented by prompt action. 
Research aimed at improving scientific understanding of the  acidification 
problem has increased drastically ove r  the  past  few years.  In many countries of 
North America and Europe la rge  amounts of money are being spent  t o  broaden the  
understanding of emissions, atmospheric transformation and t ransport ,  deposition, 
biological and chemical effects. evaluation of damages to the  environment and the  
costs of control s t rategies  f o r  acidification [1,2,3,4,5,6,?,8,9,10,11J. 
But augmenting scientific information about t he  problem of acidification will  
not necessarily lead t o  t he  identification of suitable policies f o r  controlling acidif- 
ication of the  environment. This information must be s t ructured in a form tha t  can 
be used f o r  decision-making based on available scientific evidence and credible 
judgements about t he  probability of future events. 
The design of methods f o r  addressing the  acidification problem must take into 
account both the  temporal and spatial dimensions of t he  problem. Countries differ 
in the  levels of a i r  pollutants and acidifying compounds they produce, as well as in 
the i r  susceptibility t o  a i r  pollution deposition. The OECD estimates that  at least 
one-half of the  sulfur deposition in Nordic countries is due t o  foreign sources,  with 
some contributions coming from as f a r  as 1000 kilometers away [1,12]. Moreover, 
the  t ravel  time of a i r  pollutants from one country t o  another  may vary from a f e w  
hours t o  a few days; snowmelt releases acidity to  lakes over  a few weeks; i t  may 
take years  o r  even decades f o r  soils t o  acidify. Control s t rategies  also have dif- 
fe ren t  time scales: some control policies may be  effective within a year  o r  two 
a f t e r  the i r  adoption, while o thers  will requi re  decades. 
In t he  United States,  f o r  example, the  National Acid Precipitation Assessment 
Program (NAPAP) commissioned a n  interdisciplinary team of Carnegie-Mellon 
University t o  develop a conceptual framework f o r  a n  integrated assessment of t he  
acidification problem (see [13,14]). In Europe a similar task is being performed at 
IIASA in close collaboration with the  United Nations Economic Commission f o r  
Europe (ECE), which oversees t he  European joint effor ts  in abating effects of aci- 
dification (the Geneva Convention on Long Range Transboundary Air Pollution). 
Objectives 
IIASA has developed a model system known as RAINS (Regional Acidification 
Information and Simulation) tha t  can be used fo r  synthesizing the  vast amount of 
unstructured information on the  acidification problem and f o r  dealing with the  
many crucial uncertainties associated with pollution emissions and the i r  environ- 
mental effects [15,16,17]. The ultimate goal of the Pro jec t  is a be t te r  understand- 
ing of the  near- and long-term (up t o  2030) effects of acid deposition in Europe. 
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2. PROJECT DEYELOPMENT 
Model Design: Current Status 
The model system consists of th ree  linked components representing the  rela- 
tionship between pollution generation. These compartments are: pollutant genera- 
tion, atmospheric processes, and environmental impact. (See Figure 1.) Because of 
the  relatively r ich database on sulfur emissions and the  established link between 
these emissions and acidification, RAINS is now sulfur-based and measures impacts 
in terms of changes in the  level of acidity of forest  soils and lake water. Since the  
cumulative impacts of the  steady acidification process represents a long-term 
phenomenon, the  time horizon of RAINS is fifty years. Time resolution is one 
month, in order  to simulate seasonal differences. 
As a starting point the  model user  has a choice of th ree  possible pathways for  
each of 27 European countries considered (including the  European pa r t  of the  
Soviet Union) based on ECE data [18]. Sulfur dioxide emissions are computed on a 
mass balance basis by summing the  emissions in nine energy sectors  in each coun- 
try, together with the contribution from non-combustion industrial processes in 
these countries: 
where 
S: ,i = sulfur emissions in country i , energy sector  k (t yr 
SF,,c, ,* = sulfur emissions from non-combustion industrial processes in country 
i (t yr -I). 
A procedure fo r  model use is shown in Figure 2. 
Sulfur emissions in each energy sector  (s:) are computed from: 
where 
EL 
s: 
Ck 
=k 
= energy used in energy sec tor  k (PJ  y r  -I) 
= sulfur content of fuel p e r  energy unit in sec tor  k (PJ  y r  -I) 
= coefficient of sulfur removed by fuel cleaning in sec tor  k (fraction) 
= coefficient t o  account f o r  sulfur removed by flue gas desulfurization 
devices in sec tor  k (fraction) 
= coefficient t o  account f o r  amount of sulfur retained in energy sec tor  
k (fraction). 
The sulfur content of fuel in energy units (s;) i s  computed from estimates of 
the  sulfur content of fuel in weight units and fuel hea t  value, as w e l l  as t he  relative 
amounts of hard  and brown coals and light and heavy oils used in each energy sec- 
to r .  Annual sulfur emissions, S: in equation (2). are converted t o  monthly emissions 
by using the  character is t ic  variation of seasonal emissions repor ted  in [I]. 
Anthropogenic sulfur emissions in Europe have been repor ted  in various pub- 
lications (e.g. [19,20,21,22,23,24,25]). Similar estimates f o r  North America are 
contained i n t e r  a l i a  in [26,27,28,29]. 
Atmospheric Submodel 
This submodel of RAINS incorporates resul ts  from a model developed under 
EhiEP, t he  UN sponsored Cooperative Programme f o r  Monitoring and Evaluation of 
Long Range Transmission of Air Pollutants in Europe. Results of this program have 
been repor ted  in [30,31,32,23,33,34]. These resul ts  are in t he  form of source- 
receptor  matrices f o r  w e t  and dry  sulfur deposition. Elements of these matrices 
represent  t he  unit monthly deposition at a particular grid location in Europe due 
t o  unit emissions from each European country. Sulfur deposition i s  computed in 
some 800 grid elements, each with a dimension of 150 x 150 kilometers. To obtain 
the  monthly wet o r  d ry  sulfur deposition at time t and location j due t o  t he  sulfur 
emissions 
in country i s  the  source receptor  matrices are multiplied by the monthly sulfur 
emissions in each country. That is 
d w i j  = S: AWi,j 
and 
d 4 . j  = s: rPDIj (3b) 
where 
dwi l j  and d d i j  = w e t  and dry deposition in location j , respectively, a t  time 
t due to  source country i (g m -'mo -I) 
~ , f  = sulfur emission in source country i (t  mo -I) at time t 
Awl. j and 4 ,  j = w e t  a d  dry source receptor  matrices, respectively. 
This approach assumes that  deposition at j is proportional t o  emissions at i . 
All contributions at location j a r e  summed t o  obtain the  total monthly suLfur 
depositions dw and dd (g m -'mo ") at time t : 
27 
dwf = c d w i j  
i =l 
and 
27 
ddf = d d i j  
i =1 
The source receptor  matrix used in the  RAINS system was  provided t o  IIASA 
through the courtesy of EMEP's Meteorological Synthesizing Center-West at the  
Norwegian Meteorological Institute in Oslo. For routine calculations, RAINS uses 
average matrices from a four-year (October 1978-September 1982) model run. 
However, the  model user  has the  option to  use matrices from any particular year 
in this four-year period r a t h e r  than use the  four-year average. 
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Eventually source-receptor matrices from European regional a i r  quality 
models o ther  than EMEP will b e  implemented in RAINS, so  tha t  a model user  can 
compare resul ts  f o r  different sulfur t ransport  models. (See e.g. 
[35,36,37,38,39,40,41].) 
Forest Soil Acidi ty  Submodel 
Environmental effects are presently represented by submodels f o r  forest soil 
ac id i t y  and lake a c i d i t y .  Initially, t he  dominant theory f o r  explaining tree dam- 
age  w a s  t he  soil acidification theory advanced by Ulrich and his co-workers (see 
[42,43,44,45,46,47]). Recently, a l a rge  amount of alternative hypotheses have 
been put forward. Some exper t s  have attempted t o  classify the  different 
hypotheses. For example, ~ i h l g a r d  1481 has identified t h r e e  main classes of 
hypotheses: t h e  acid ra in  hypothesis, t he  ozone hypothesis, t he  stress hypothesis; 
t o  this he  adds a fourth category: the  ammonia/ammonium and n i t ra te  hypothesis. 
A more detailed evaluation of effects  of a i r  pollution on fores t s  can b e  found in 
McLaughlin 1491. His extensive review does not lead t o  one conclusion as t o  which 
pollutant o r  combination of pollutants i s  responsible f o r  t he  recent  increase in 
fores t  damage. Other important contributions t o  t he  scientific l i t e ra ture  in this 
field include [50,51,52,53,54,55,56,57,58]. 
In view of the  above w e  stress tha t  the  IIASA fores t  soil acidity submodel 
described below should be  interpreted only as a n  ind ica tor  of potential fores t  
impact of acidification. Some definitions are useful at this stage. 
Soil acidiJ%cation has been defined as a decrease in t he  acid neutralization 
capacity of the  soil [52]. Such a decrease may coincide with a decrease in soil pH. 
I t  may also take  place in conditions of a relatively constant pH, assuming efficient 
buffering processes. In such a case the  buffering of the  soil counteracts the  fac- 
t o r s  tending t o  decrease the  soil pH, so  tha t  over  long periods of time the  soil pH 
stabilizes a t  a constant level. Yet the neutralization capacity is consumed and the 
soil is subject to acidification. 
Acid stress is defined as the input of hydrogen ions (protons) into the top soil. 
Acid stress can result from acidic deposition of air pollutants, from biomass utili- 
zation, and from the natural biological activity of ecosystems [44,52]. 
Soil reaction to the acid stress depends on the soil properties. Acid stress 
implies the flux of hydrogen ions into the soil, and in the corresponding way the 
bunering properties of the soil imply the consumption of hydrogen ions within the 
soil profile. Buffering is described using two variables, one for the gross poten- 
tial and the other for  the ra te  of the reaction. 
m e t  capacity, the gross potential, is the total reservoir of the buffering 
compounds in the soil. The unit for the buffer capacity is the same as that for the 
amount of acid stress (kmol ha-'). 
W e r  rate, the ra te  variable, is defined as the maximum potential ra te  of the 
reaction between the buffering compounds and the hydrogen ions. This variable is 
needed because the reaction kinetics is sometimes important. Although the buffer 
capacity is high, the ra te  sometimes limits hydrogen ion consumption. The buffer 
ra te  is expressed in units which a r e  comparable to those of the stress ra te  
(kmol ha ' ~ / r  -I). 
The proton consumption reactions in soils have been systematically described 
by Ulrich [42,45]. A consecutive series of chemical reactions has been docu- 
mented in soils in which the acidification proceeds. Information regarding the 
dominant reactions has been used for  defining categories, called b w e r  ranges. 
They a r e  briefly described in the following paragraphs and summarized in Table 1. 
The name of each buffer range refers to the dominant buffer reaction and the typi- 
cal pH ranges given refer  to the pH of a soil/water suspension (pH(H20)). 
sufficient t o  buffer the  acid stress completely. 
C a t i o n  E x c h a n g e  R a n g e .  When cation exchange reactions play the  major role  
in t he  acid buffering, it is  necessary t o  classify the  soils into the  cation exchange 
buffer range. The excess  s t ress ,  not buffered by the  reactions of the  silicate 
buffer range, is absorbed in t he  form of H+- o r  Al-ions at t he  exchange sites,  thus 
displacing the  base cations. The cation exchange reactions are fas t  and, there- 
fore ,  the buffer rate of soils in this range effectively counteracts any occurring 
rates of t he  acid stress. The total buffer capacity (= cation exchange capacity, 
CECtOt) i s  generally low, depending mainly on the  soil texture.  The remaining 
buffer  capacity at any given time is quantified by b a s e  s a t u r a t i o n ,  t he  percentage 
of base cations of t he  total  CEC. A s  long as t he  base saturation stays above 5-10 
percent,  the  excess stress i s  buffered by the  cation exchange reactions and the  
soil pH takes a value between 5.0 and 4.2, t he  actual value depending on the  base 
saturation. 
ALuminum a n d  I r o n  R a n g e s .  Below the  crit ical value of the  base 
saturation, soils are classified into the  aluminum buffer range. Hydrogen ions are 
consumed in releasing aluminum mainly from clay minerals. These reactions merely 
change the  form of acidity from hydrogen ions t o  A L ~ ' .  The leachate thus has a 
potential of acidifying the  adjacent ecosystems. High aluminum ion concentrations 
character ize t he  soil solution and may cause toxic effects t o  bacter ia  and plant 
roots. 
Aluminum compounds a r e  abundant in soils, so  tha t  the  buffer capacity hardly 
eve r  r e s t r i c t s  the  reaction. The soil pH is determined by the  equilibrium with 
solid phases of aluminum compounds. A s  long as t he  soil pH stays within the  range 
4.2-3.8,  t he  soil is  classified into the aluminum buffer range. 
A t  t he  extreme stage of acidification (pH < 3.8)  soil may be  classified into the  
iron buffer range. Increasing solubility of iron oxides is observed. This leads to  
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Table 1. Classification of the acid buffering reactions in forest soils 142,451. 
Carbonate h . e r  Range. Soils containing CaC03 in their fine earth fraction 
(calcareous soils) are classified into the carbonate buffer range (pH r 6.2). ca2+ 
is the dominant cation in the soil solution and in the exchange surfaces of the soil 
particles. The buffer capacity of soils in this range is proportional to the amount 
of CaC03 in the soil. In case CaC03 is evenly distributed in the soil, the buffer 
rate,  i.e. the dissolution ra te  of CaC03, is high enough to  buffer any occurring 
rate of acid stress. 
Buff e r  
range 
Carbonate 
Silicate 
Cation 
exchange 
Aluminum 
Iron 
Silicate m e t  Range. If there is no CaC03 in the fine earth fraction and the 
carbonic acid is the only acid being produced in the soil, the soil is classified into 
the silicate buffer range (6.2 > pH Z 5.0). In this range the only buffer process 
acting in the soils is the weathering of silicates and the associated release of base 
cations, since the dissolution of aluminum compounds does not start  in significant 
amounts until a t  pH less than 5.0. The buffer ra te  is often quite low. The buffer 
capacity, in turn, is high a s  it  is formed by the massive storage of the silicate 
material. The weathering of silicates occurs throughout all buffer ranges. The 
switch to lower buffer ranges implies that the weathering ra te  of silicates is not 
PH 
range 
8.0-6.2 
6.2-5.0 
5.0-4.2 
4.2-3.0 
C3.8 
Base 
saturation 
1.00 
0.70-1.00 
0.05-0.70 
0.00-0.05 
0.00 
Buff e r  reaction 
CaC03 + H2C03 -> ca2+ + 2HCOC 
CaAl$i208 + 2H2C03 + H20 -> 
ca2+ + 2HC03 + Al$i205(OH), 
clay mineral=Ca + 2 ~ '  - > 
H-clay mineral-H + ca2+ 
AlOOH + 3 ~ + - >  A13+ + 2H20 
FeOOH + 3 ~ '  -> l?e3+ + 2H20 
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visible (color) symptoms in the  soil profile. This is not the case f o r  aluminum, 
although in quantitative terms aluminum may still a c t  as a dominant buffer com- 
pound. The pH values as low as 3.8 indicate toxicity and nutrient deficiency t o  liv- 
ing organisms. 
The IIASA submodel describes soil acidification in terms of the  sequence of 
the  buffer ranges. It  compares t he  amount of stress (cumulative value over  the  
time period of interest)  t o  t he  buffer capacity, and the  stress r a t e  (year-to-year 
basis) to  the  buffer rate. The comparisons are made separately f o r  t he  carbonate,  
silicate and cation exchange buffer ranges. The submodel assumes tha t  values f o r  
the  buffering variables -- buffer capacity and buffer r a t e  - are determined 
separately f o r  each of these buffer ranges [59,60]. 
All of the  buffering variables do not have t o  be considered in t he  model. The 
buffer rates of t he  carbonate  range and the  cation exchange range  are so  high 
tha t  in pract ice they can not be exceeded by any occurring rate of acid stress. 
Moreover, t h e  buffer capacities of silicate and aluminum ranges can not b e  
exhausted in the  time scale of hundreds of years.  For the  aluminum and iron 
ranges, an  equilibrium approach was chosen. The soil pH i s  assumed to stay in 
equilibrium with solid phases of aluminum compounds. Thus a buffer rate is  not 
needed. The iron range  is also assumed to  be  quantitatively i r relevant  f o r  buffer- 
ing at pH-values above 3.0. In this way the  number of buffering variables actually 
included into the  model reduces t o  three:  buffer capacity of the carbonate  range 
(BCc,), buffer rate of t he  silicate range (bra)  and buffer capacity of the  cation 
exchange range (e). 
The submodel is used by taking the given pat tern of acid stress as the  input 
variable. The program compares t he  (annual) acid stress t o  the  buffer rate deter-  
mined f o r  the  prevailing buffer range. I t  also compares the  accumulated amount of 
acid s t r e s s  t o  t h e  buffer capacity. With these comparisons the  program calculates 
which buffer range prevails each year, and then computes the approximation of 
t h e  prevailing soil pH. 
Acid stress to the top soil is partly o r  fully neutralized by the weathering of 
carbonate o r  silicate minerals. It  is assumed that  soils containing free carbonates 
(calcareous soils) always have a buffer rate high enough to neutralize any rate of 
acid stress. In this case the soil pH is assumed to remain at 6.2 as long as the 
buffer capacity of this range is not exhausted. In non-calcareous soils, neutraliza- 
tion depends on the  intensity of silicate weathering (silicate buffer rate).  As long 
as this buffer rate is larger than the acid stress, no decrease in soil pH is assumed 
t o  occur. 
If the acid stress exceeds the actual buffer r a t e  of the silicates, the soil 
shifts into the  cation exchange buffer range. Then the hydrogen ions gradually 
replace the base cations on the  exchange sites of the soil particles, thus decreas- 
ing the base saturation of the  soil. The capacity of the cation exchange buffer 
system is depleted with a rate equal to  the difference between the acid stress rate 
and the buffer rate of silicates. This has to  do with the equilibrium between the 
ions attached to  the soil particles and those dissolved in the soil solution. The gra- 
dual character  w a s  introduced also fo r  the recovery. The soil pH is then estimated 
on the  basis of the prevailing base saturation within the cation exchange range and 
the upper aluminum range at pH from 5.6 to 4.0. If the cation exchange capacity is 
totally exhausted, the hydrogen ion concentration is assumed to be determined by 
equilibrium with solid phases aluminum; this implies dissolution or precipitation of 
aluminum until an equilibrium state is reached. 
The specific equations incorporated in this model are as follows. The capacity 
of the cation exchange buffer system, BCk, is depleted with the rate of acid 
stress, a s t ,  minus the buffer rate of silicates, bra (see equation 6). A non-linear 
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relationship is assumed between the base saturation and the  soil pH within the  sili- 
cate, cation exchange and the  upper aluminum buffer range, a s  long as BC& 2 0, 
at pH from 5.6 t o  4.0 (see equation 7): 
The shape of the pH - base saturation relationship has been adopted from results 
of an equilibrium model by Reuss [ 6 1 ] .  
If B& = 0, equilibrium with gibbsite is  assumed. As precipitation infil- 
trates into the  soil and mixes with the  soil solution, disequilibrium concentrations 
[AL3+], and [ H + ] ,  a r e  obtained in the following equations, respectively: 
[A13'], = vf [A13+]"' / [yf + (P -E)] (8) 
[xC],  = [vf [R+]' " + (ast - brgc)] / [yf + ( P  -E)] (9) 
where Vf is  the volume of soil solution at field capacity and P and E mean annual 
precipitation and evapotranspiration respectively. On annual basis the  infiltrating 
water volume is assumed t o  equal P -E. The soil solution volume is simply defined 
by 
Vf = Ofz (10) 
The soil thickness, z ,  is fixed to 50 c m  and the  volumetric water content value at 
field capacity, e f ,  is estimated separately fo r  each soil type based on the  grain 
size distribution in soil. Aluminum is dissolved o r  precipitated until the gibbsite 
equilibrium state (equation 11) is reached. This process involves a change from 
disequilibrium concentrations a s  defined in equation (12): 
3[ [A13+! ,  - [A13*]']  = [HI]'  - [ H t ] ,  . (12) 
Combining equations 11 and 12 w e  obtain a third-order equation which has a single 
real root: 
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3 
3K,, [ [ H ' ] ~  ] + [ITClt - 3[Al '+I, - [ I T f ] ,  = 0 . (13) 
The model developed in this study can be  used f o r  quantifying some aspects of 
t he  acidification problem of fores t  soils which have ear l ie r  been discussed using 
qualitative terms. The soil acidification model and the  application t o  the  European 
overview are simplifications, which necessarily include uncertainties. Many solu- 
tions, as they stand now, are crude approximations which need clarification. 
Lake Acidity Submodel 
The harmful effects  on surface waters of acidic deposition have been wel l  
documented in various pa r t s  of the  Northern Hemisphere. The causal relation- 
ships leading t o  freshwater acidification a r e ,  however, complex and difficult t o  
quantify. Hydrochemical models are one way of quantifying and integrating various 
processes in t he  en t i re  catchments. Models have been used f o r  simulating daily 
variations of water quality in streams, caused by variations in deposition, as w e l l  
as in catchment hydrology and meteorology [62]. However, many of these modeling 
approaches have been regarded as tools f o r  data  evaluation r a t h e r  than as tools 
f o r  predicting long-term acidification of t he  catchments. 
Recently t h e  need f o r  estimates of potential future impacts of acidic deposi- 
tion has been emphasized. Scientific information can assist  in making policies f o r  
emission control by describing quantitative consequences of alternative scenarios. 
There are at present  t h r e e  basic methods f o r  projecting future water chemistry 
f o r  sensitive areas. The f i r s t  i s  an empirical approach which allows the  estimation 
of future steady-state chemical composition of lakes resulting from changes in 
loading of strong acids on the  basis of observed relationships in present  conditions 
[63]. The second method utilizes complex, process oriented submodels f o r  catch- 
ment hydrology, canopy chemistry, soil chemistry as wel l  as fo r  stream and lake 
water quality t o  provide a scientific link between acidic deposition and Lake acidif- 
ication [ 6 4 ] .  The third method defines predictive algorithms tha t  largely retain 
the  simplicity of the  empirical models but tha t  have mechanistic process  oriented 
explanations incorporated in the i r  s t ruc ture ,  to allow a theoretical basis f o r  
establishing confidence in the  estimates 1651. 
Simple models can be  applied as p a r t  of a regionalized model s t ructure.  At 
the  time of developing IIASA's lake acidification submodel, no suitable models were 
available f o r  this  purpose. Therefore,  a number of existing process  descriptions 
were simplified, modified t o  monthly time s tep  and finally linked together  t o  form a 
simple working method f o r  t he  evaluation of lake acidification 1661. 
One underlying principle of IIASA's work has been t o  use a simplified 
approach which is warranted f o r  a broad geographical scope. The objective has 
been t o  retain t he  simplicity of t he  model but t o  have only a few p h y s i d y  realis- 
t i c  processes incorporated in i t s  s t ruc ture  so  as to allow a theoret ical  basis f o r  
assessing confidence in t he  scenarios. The model  consists of four  modules tha t  are 
linked together  as shown in Figure 3. The processes considered in each module are 
summarized in Table 2. The meteorologic module regulates t h e  input flows of water 
and deposition to t he  soil and directly t o  t he  lake. The hydrologic and soil chernis- 
t r y  modules together  determine the  flow of ions leaching from the  t e r r e s t r i a l  
catchment to the  lake. New equilibrium concentrations in the  lake water are then 
computed in the  lake module. 
The purpose of t he  meteorologic module is to determine the  volume of water 
and proportion of deposition entering the  catchment within one t ime  step,  T .  The 
division of t he  total  precipitation, P z t ,  into rain,  Pq, and snow, P z ,  is accom- 
plished by Eqs. 1 4  and 15 [67,68]. 
Table 2. Processes  considered in t he  IIASA lake acidity model. 
Process  Reference 
Meteorology : 
Partitioning between snow and ra in  Shih et aL. [67] 
Snow melt Chow [69] 
Release of deposition from snowpack Johannessen and Henriksen [70] 
Hydrology : 
Evapotranspiration Christophersen et aL. [68] 
Percolation from upper  to lower reservoi r  Chen et at. [71] 
Lateral  flow Chen et aL. [71] 
Soil chemis t ry  : 
Carbonate weathering Ulrich 1451 
Silicate weathering Ulrich [45] 
Cation exchange ~ l r i c h  [45] 
Aluminum equilibrium with gibbsite Christophersen et a l .  [62] 
Lake : 
Inorganic carbon equilibrium Stumrn and Morgan [72] 
P&, PyT, PST ... precipitation r a t e s  ( m  mo - I ) ;  
T~ ... mean monthly temperature (OC); 
T,, T, ... threshold temperatures (T, = 2 C .  T, = -1 O C ) .  
Snow accumulates, whereas all ra in  during the  winter is assumed to run  through 
t h e  snowpack and en te r  t h e  soil. Also, t h e  melting of t he  snowpack is set t o  be pro- 
portional t o  t h e  mean monthly temperature above t h e  threshold temperature,  T, 
m .. . temperature induced melting rate (m  mo - I ) ;  
B . . . melting r a t e  coefficient f o r  forested area 
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The snowpack, SPT,  is obtained by summing the  individual Pz-values and subtract- 
ing the mT-values. as long as SPT stays above zero  (Eqs. 17,  18; h e r e  and 
thereaf te r  primes refer t o  an intermediate s tep,  which is used f o r  computational 
purposes only): 
SP' = spT-I + P,T (17) 
SPT = SP' - mT . (18) 
Deposition is assumed t o  accumulate when snow accumulates. The same frac- 
tion of total  deposition as of total  precipitation is retained in the  snowpack each 
month: 
DLt . . . total  deposition rate (keq ha -'mo -I); 
D z  ... deposition retained in t he  snowpack (keq ha -'?no -I); 
DPT . . . accumulated deposition (keq ha -I). 
During the  snowmelt, the  rate f o r  the release of deposition from the  snowpack, D z ,  
is assumed t o  be  two times higher than meltwater (Eqs. 21, 22). The "fractionation" 
effect observed during the  snowmelt [70] implies tha t  most of the  impurities in the 
snowpack are found in t he  f i r s t  meltwater: 
PT = DP' - D,T . (22) 
The deposition entering the  soil o r  the  lake w i l l  be called acid stress .  usT,  in the 
sequel 
asT = DLt - D,T + D z  . (23) 
The flowpaths of rain and snowmelt water through the  terrestrial system a r e  
important in determining the  susceptibility of lakes t o  acidification by atmospheric 
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deposition [?I]. To provide a method f o r  simulating the routing of internal flows, a 
simple hydrologic model is applied. A combined version of hydrologic models, Birk- 
enes model and ILWAS model, presented by Christophersen et aL. [62] and Chen et 
al. [?I] respectively, is used. 
The IIASA framework sets the  prerequisite of a large spatial scale. The ILWAS 
model is  highly mechanistic and contains descriptions of the  processes both in the  
canopy and in several soil layers. There is  thus r a t h e r  little curve-fitting 
involved. The Birkenes model is very si te  specific and must be calibmted against 
the  typical features of a given catchment before i t  can be applied. For the  IIASA 
context, the  simple two-layer s tructure of the  Birkenes model is applied. Most of 
the  physical descriptions of the  processes for  routing the  water through these two 
layers and out of the  system are simplified from the  ILWAS model. 
The terrestrial catchment is vertically segmented into snowpack and two soil 
layers (A- and B-reservoirs; Figure 4). The A-reservoir is defined as being identi- 
cal with the  uppermost 0.5 meter soil layer modeled by the  soil impact model which 
is  used later t o  account fo r  soil solution chemistry. Physically, the  flow from the 
upper reservoir can be  thought of as qz~ickfloul , which W n s  down the  hillsides 
as piped flow o r  fast throughflow and enters  the  brooks directly [73]. This water 
is mainly in contact with humus and the  upper mineral layer. The B-reservoir in the  
model provides the  basef low,  which presumably comes largely from deeper (> 0.5 
m) soil layers (see [73]). 
The basic assumption governing the soil hydraulics is tha t  m i n f d l  o r  meltwa- 
ter infiltrates as a whole into the  A-reservoir (see [73]). Evapotranspiration is 
set proportional t o  the  mean monthly temperature, TT, above 0°C (c.f. Christopher- 
sen et al. 1683) 
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ET . .. evapotranspiration r a t e  (m mo - I ) ;  
E . . . evapotranspiration coefficient (0.0039 m (O C )  -lmo - I ) .  
The actual evapotranspiration rate is assumed to  be equal t o  the potential from the 
A-reservoir; if A becomes empty, i t  is  from the  B-reservoir. The intermediate 
water balance is given by Eq. 25,  which considers the  water fluxes between the A- 
reservoir,  the  atmosphere and the  snowpack: 
5' = T - l + m r + p ; - ~ T  . (25 )  
The percolation of water into the  B-reservoir is controlled by the maximum 
possible percolation rate. Q:'). the water volume available in the A-reservoir, 
Q/), and the  space left  in the  B-reservoir, QT). Any one of these th ree  factors 
can be a limiting factor fo r  percolation. Therefore the actual percolation rate. 
Qc, is set equal t o  the minimum: 
and 
where 
Ks is hydraulic conductivity (m mo - I )  
e j 4 ,  e j g  is soil moisture content at field capacity in A- and B-layer, resp. 
@s@ @ s 3  is soil moisture content at saturation in A- and B-layer, resp. ( m )  
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Lateral flow, w, is  the  limiting factor  f o r  t he  rate at which the  water i s  
discharged from t h e  B-reservoir t o  streams and lakes. I t  is  a function of hydraulic 
conductivity, Ks, surface slope, S, soil moisture content above field capacity, 
catchment width, W, and t h e  t e r r e s t r i a l  catchment a r e a ,  A, [?I]: 
Quickflow is  formed from t w o  fractions: (i) if t h e  soil moisture exceeds t h e  
saturation value, t he  exceeding volume is assumed to en te r  t he  brooks directly, 
pP(1); and (ii) if t h e  soil moisture exceeds the  field capacity value, a fract ion of the  
exceeding volume i s  discharged from the  A-reservoir as lateral flow, pi2) .  The 
total quickflow at time s tep  r i s  t h e  sum of these two: 
4,' = pi1' + Q?' . (36) 
The volume of w a t e r  retained in both reservoirs is t he  balance between incom- 
ing and outgoing water volumes: 
= + m T - p ; - ~ T - ~ < - ~ ;  (37) 
VJ = v;-~-Q;+Q< . (38) 
A s  a result ,  t he  hydrologic module simulates discharges from aIl reservoirs: 
snowpack and soil reservoirs A and B. The water from these t h r e e  reservoi rs  
mixes in t he  lake within t h e  mixing volume before running out from t h e  outlet. 
IIASA's soil acidification submodel is applied as a component of this lake aci- 
dity submodel in o r d e r  t o  compute the  ion concentrations of t he  internal flows. 
The lake module computes the  time pat tern of water quality in the  lake. The 
impact on aquatic life wil l  be  estimated on the  basis of simple threshold pH-values 
and aluminum concentrations. These character is t ics  are most likely t o  indicate 
damage t o  fish populations and o ther  aquatic organisms. 
The change in lake water chemistry will be predicted by means of t i tration of 
the  base content of the  lake with strong acid originating from the  atmosphere. The 
initial conditions - the  preacidification water quality - has to be  determined f o r  a 
given lake. The water quality variable of great importance i s  alkalinity, which 
expresses  t he  total  buffering capacity of t he  lake water. 
In preacidification conditions the  only affecting process  is assumed to be  the  
weathering of carbonates  o r  silicates. In case the  soil contains f r e e  carbonate 
bearing minerals, t he  lake water can be assumed to be very high in alkalinity (> 
1500 peq I - ' ) .  For silicate rocks, Ulrich [45] has  defined weathering rates 
between 0.2-2.0 keq ha -'m l y r  -'. The original alkalinity, [HCO<], , of the  lake 
water can be  computed by the  available information on: the annual weathering r a t e  
of the  mineral matter ( b r ) ;  the  volume of soil through which the  incoming water 
drains (A, (zA + z B ) )  ; the  mean  annual runoff t o  which produced HCO; is mixed 
(P-E) .  The following steady-state bicarbonate concentration in the  outlet of the  
lake may be  calculated on the  basis of tha t  information. The bicarbonate concen- 
tration obtained is used as the  initial alkalinity f o r  the  mode1 runs: 
In clearwater lakes the  carbonate alkalinity can be assumed t o  be the  only signifi- 
cant buffering agent, mainly with reaction (Eq. 40). Reaction (Eq. 41) can be 
neglected since the  naturally sensitive surface waters contain only negligible 
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concentrations of carbonate ions: 
Reaction (Eq. 40) yields an expression fo r  the equilibrium (Eq. 42). where 
[ H ~ C O ~  ] represents  the  sum of [ C 0 2 ]  and [H2C03].  
Combining this with Henry's Law 1721 
[ H ~ C O ~  1 = K .  ' PC& 
w e  obtain 
K 1 .  KH Pco, 
[HCO;] = [ H + I  
where K1 and KH are thermodynamic equilibrium constants, which depend on t em-  
perature. When the  drainage water. Q l +  @. and the  direct water input. Q z ,  
enter  the  lake and mix within the  mixing volume, V&. disequilibrium concentra- 
tions result: 
Ms+ + [H+lT" . V T  mtz 
[H+]'  = Q ; + ~ + Q ; + V , ~  
+ [ H C O < ] ~ - ~  v mtz 
C 
The buffer reaction (Eq. 40) continues until a new equilibrium state according 
t o  Eq. 42 is accomplished. Equal mounts  of hydrogen and bicarbonate ions are 
consumed: 
[H+lT - [H+]' = [HC0<IT - [HC0<Ir . (47) 
The new equilibrium concentrations, [H+IT and [HCO<JT, can be obtained by 
solving Eqs. 44-46. A second order  equation is obtained, from which the positive 
root fo r  bicarbonate concentration is accepted. The equilibrium hydrogen ion con- 
centration is then calculated from Eq. 47. 
( [ H C O < ] ~ ~  + ([HI]' - [HCO<]')[HCO<IT - K'.K1.pC02 = 0 . (48) 
The incoming acidity is mixed in the  lake within the mixing layer. During the  
snowmelt that  Layer is assumed t o  be  the  top 2.0 m water layer. The meltwater is 
colder than most of the  lake volume and therefore lighter than the  4OC water at the  
bottom. In this way the  episodic spring time alkalinity and pH declines in the epi- 
limnion can be  estimated. The two water layers are then mixed together a f t e r  there 
is  no snow left in the  catchment. During the summer, the  incoming acidity is mixed 
with the whole water body. 
Uncertaint  y Analys i s  
Long-range transport  models play an important role in the  assessment of aci- 
dification effects. How credible are these models? What is the  uncertainty of 
model results when they are used t o  evaluate future pollution control strategies? 
In this sense model uncertainty is the  departure of model calculations from 
current  o r  future "true values". 
The foLlowing illustrates the  step-wise approach taken for  the  evaluation of 
uncertainty in the  atmospheric submodel of RAINS. (For other  examples of sensi- 
tivity and uncertainty analysis in atmospheric models, see 
[74,75,76,77,23,3,78,79,80].) 
1. Inventory of Uncertainty .  To assist in identifying and classifying sources 
of uncertainty for fur ther  analysis, w e  propose the  following taxonomy: model 
s t ruc ture:  uncertainty due to the  particular collection of model variables in a 
model and how they are related; model variables:  uncertainty of parameters 
which are constant in time o r  space and forcing functions which inherently 
change with time o r  space; i n i t i a l  s tate:  uncertainty due to boundary and initial 
conditions; model operation: uncertainty due t o  solution techniques of model 
equations, pre-processing and post-processing of model information. A further  
distinction is made between diagnostic and forecasting uncertainty: diagnostic 
uncertainty concerns model use to  simulate past o r  present conditions, and fore- 
casting uncertainty arises when the  model is used to make forecasts. 
2. Screening and Ranking of Uncertainty. The goal is t o  reduce the  
number of sources of uncertainty that  need to be quantitatively evaluated in step 
3. This is accomplished through conventional sensitivity analysis or qualitative 
judgement and need not have the  identical tirne-space scales specified in step 
number one. 
3. Evaluation of Uncertainty. The sources of uncertainty which remain 
a f t e r  step 2 or 3 can be  evaluated by a number of different quantitative tech- 
niques. Table 3 lists some approaches being taken at IIASA to evaluate the EMEP 
model. 
Table 3. Examples of techniques used to evaluate EMEP model uncertainty. 
TYPE OF UNCERTAINTY TECHNIQUE 
Model Structure Model comparisons 
Forcing functions, Panmeters, Monte Carlo Analysis 
and Initial State 
(Estimation and Approximation 
Errors)  
Forcing Functions Matrix Analysis 
(International Meteorological Statistic& Analysis of 
Variability) "Grosswetterlagen" 
Forcing Functions 
(Climate Change) 
Historical data correlation 
4. Application to Decision-Making. One example of how to apply uncer- 
tainty information to decision-making is illustrated by the  RAINS model output in 
Figures 5 and 6. The RAINS model Links a source receptor  matrix from EMEP with 
other  submodels describing the  production of sulfur emissions and how the  terres- 
trial and aquatic environment is affected by sulfur deposition. The model user  can 
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select a number of ind ica tors  to assess the impact of user-specified pollution con- 
t ro l  program. One such indicator, featured in Figures 5 and 6. is sulfur deposition. 
In these figures w e  have also indicated the  influence of a i 13% confidence interval 
in forecasted sulfur deposition. I t  is interesting that  despite an  assumed constant 
confidence interval, the  importance of uncertainty significantly varies spatially 
(Figure 5) and temporally (Figure 6). This is due to background deposition and the  
spatial temporal pattern of sulfur emissions interacting in a complicated manner. 
Direct Forest Impact Submodel 
In 1985 work began on the development of a model for  direct  impacts on 
forests. Initially, this model wil l  describe the impacts of atmospheric sulphur on 
the  state of forests  in terms of the foliage. The methods developed will also allow 
for  the  incorpomtion of other  pollut%nts, when the  required atmospheric submo- 
dels become available. 
The direct forest  impact model has to provide an operational linkage between 
two different spatial scales. To be informative fo r  the  assessment of transboundary 
impacts, the  RAINS framework applies a regional scale with a rough spatial resolu- 
tion. However, the  appropriate scale f o r  forest impact description is not larger  
than a f e w  hectares, covering a single forest stand. This is due to the  great varia- 
tion in such environmental factors  as soil type and altitude which affect the  growth 
and pollutant tolerance of the  forest.  
A hierarchical approach has therefore been adopted t o  properly aggregate 
the  high-resolution information on a regional scale. The basic unit a t  the lower 
level is forest  stand, limited in size by the  requirement that the important environ- 
mental factors  (e.g. soil type, effective tempemture sum, annual precipitation) and 
species composition be uniform. This system is described by means of a stand 
growth model originally developed to cover a variety of environmental conditions 
and t r e e  species [813; immediate pollutant impacts a r e  incorporated as e i ther  
steady o r  acute  random reductions in the  growth r a t e  of individual trees. The 
stand model applies a n  annual time step. 
The lower level model i s  used f o r  generating simple 1/0 relations f o r  the  
higher level model (regional model) in the  hierarchy. The input consists of the  
pollutant load and the  environmental factors;  the  output i s  an  indicator of t he  s ta te  
of the  forest.  The estimation and validation of the  regional model will be car r ied  
out in collaboration with r e sea rche r s  monitoring sulphur dioxide and fores t  dam- 
age  over  t he  past decades in Europe 1821. Meteorological and fores t ry  da ta  f o r  
t he  description of t he  cu r r en t  state of environment and fores t s  in the  European 
countries have been obtained from o the r  international organizations, (e.g. FAO). 
Control Cost Submodel 
In 1986 a submodel f o r  evaluation of t h e  costs of control policies will be  
added. This submodel is regarded as crucial f o r  the  planned application of RAINS 
to policy analyses. Early in 1986 a cost expe r t  group of t he  ECE-Geneva Conven- 
tion will meet at IIASA to assist  in the  fu r the r  development of this  submodel. Colla- 
boration with t h e  Argonne National Laboratory (USA) is under discussion (see 
i n t e r  a l i a  Streets [28] f o r  an  overview of t he  work at Argonne). There will also 
be collaboration with OECD. 
Groundwater Acidmcat ion  
This is becoming an  important issue in European research  on acidification. 
During the  summer of 1985 one of t h e  participants of IIASA's Young Scientists Sum- 
mer Program surveyed the  Literature on this  problem, leading t o  a proposed 
modeling approach. Development work f o r  such a submodel in RAINS i s  expected 
to s tar t  in 1986. 
Nitrogen M d e  Emissions 
A European nitrogen oxide emission inventory fo r  a base year  wil l  be con- 
structed, in ter  a l ia ,  through collaboration with the OECD and the  joint FRG- 
Netherlands PHOXA project. A model fo r  calculation of future nitrogen oxide 
emissions w i l l  be added t o  the  inventory. Current work in Denmark and Norway is 
expected t o  lead t o  a nitrogen oxide transport and deposition model, which will  be 
eventually added to RAINS. Existing environmental impact submodels w i l l  be modi- 
fied t o  include nitrogen effects. These submodels will also be  subjected t o  
thorough vaLidation tests using measurements made available to IIASA from insti- 
tutes in Norway, Sweden, and Finland. 
merational  Modes 
Currently RAINS is  a model fo r  scenario analysis. To increase the  utility of 
RAINS, other  operational modes wil l  be added. As a start an algorithm developed 
by Shaw [83] and applied by Young and Shaw [84] has been added to RAINS [85]. 
Collaboration with IIASA's Program fo r  Systems and Decision Sciences and the  
Academy of Sciences of the  German Democratic Republic in Berun is expected to 
yield an optimization algorithm fo r  RAINS. 
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THE APPLICATION OF RISK BSSSONT PRINCIPLES 
TO AGRICULTURAL, MANAGENENT 
SX. Pi tovranov  
Introduction 
In many countries of t h e  world, total agricultural production and, 
more specifically, c rop  yields have increased markedly over time 
during the  postwar period (see, for example, Parry e t  al., 1986). This 
increasing t rend can be  mainly attr ibuted to  improved technologies 
and management practices in agriculture (e.g. t he  introduction of more 
productive crop varieties, increased mechanization, more intensive 
fertilizer applications, pest  and disease control, etc.). 
Simultaneously, increases in t he  fluctuation of agricultural 
production around the  t rend  have, in a large number of these 
countries, kep t  pace with increases in mean levels (Hazell, 1906). 
According t o  one assessment, t he  coefficient of variation relative t o  
rend of total world grain production is close t o  10% (Borisenkov, 1985). 
To illustrate t he  large fluctuations in production tha t  a re  possible 
in successive years, total USSR grain production for two pairs of 
consecutive years a r e  shown in Table 1. 
Such fluctuations can be largely explained by  the  influence of 
seasonal weather on crops. Losses of total income resulting from 
Table 1. Total USSR grain production in consecutive years 1975-76 and 
1978-79 (million metric tons) (UAanova, 1984). 
YEARS 
Production I 140.0 227.7 237.4 179.2 
can be expressed in terms of monetary value. According to Thompson (1972) 
the losses of total income from agriculture in the USA are approximately 8 
billion dolars per year. However, a proportion of losses such as these could 
be prevented by adopting management practices based on the use of climatic 
and weather forecast data. In this way, the value of lost production that 
could have been avoided in the USA has been assessed by Thompson (1972) as 
3.5 billion dollars (about 44% of the total losses). Borisenkov (1985) asserted 
that future insights into the stabilization of agricultural production might be 
gained, not from improved agro-technologies per se, but rather through the 
optimal use of more reliable weather and climatic information. 
The goal of this paper is to apply some approaches of risk theory to the 
problem of agricultural decision-making in the face of fluctuating weather 
conditions. 
Basic Strategies 
Let us consider the benefit (loss) function 
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Basic Strategies 
Let us consider t he  benefit (loss) function 
B =B(WJ) (1) 
This function is defined for  all pairs W ,Dl where W €nw , and D €OD , 
and Clw and CID are sets of all possible weather conditons (W) and 
agricultural decision (D), respectively. Three strategies t ha t  a r e  
often used in risk theory can be  listed as follows: 
1. The Maximin (Minimax) s t ra tegy defined as: 
max min B (W,D) 
D€nD W c Q W  (2) 
This s t ra tegy is designed t o  maximize t h e  minimum benefit 
(alternatively expressed as  minimizing t h e  maximum loss). 
2. The strategy minimizing t h e  deviations (benefit o r  losses) from 
average values. 
Ew is an operator t ha t  denotes statistical averaging over t h e  set of all 
possible weather conditions (Rw). 
3. The Baiesian strategy 
This strategy maximizes (minimizes) t h e  s tatistically-derived average 
benefit (loss). 
where there is high probability of dry weather conditons during the growing 
season, and thus a high risk of crop damage. 
The analysis will focus on a single administrative district, the Marx 
district. This is situated in the central part  of the Saratov region, adjacent 
to  the lef t-bank of the Volga river (Figure 1). 
The total area of arable land in the district is 201.7 thousand hectares. 
The whole se t  of weather conditons during the growing season can be roughly 
classified into 3 main types: years with a severe deficiency of water for crop 
growth, years with a deficiency of water, and years with sufficient water 
supply. Statistics of the water supply for each category of years are shown 
in Table 2. 
Pttovtanvo, SE. 
Figure 1. Map of Saratov region of the USSR. 
Table 2. Types of years classified by water supply in the Marx district. 
Spring water 
storage in the 
top one-meter 
water suppiy 
Total precipitation 
in the spring- 
summer growing 
season (mm). 
Rainless period 
during April- 
June (weeks). 
severely deficient 
The yields of the main commercial crops in the district in three recent years 
typical of each category are given in Table 3. 
deficient I sufficient 
- 244 - Pitovtanov, SX. 
Table 3. Yields of seven major crops in the Marx district for three  re- 
cent years with different moisture characteristics (t/ha) (A. Maximov 
personal communication). 
1 - crop yields on unirrigated land 
2 - crop yields on irrigated land 
The allocation of land for different crops during this period was 
practically unchanged in this district. In order to test whether output 
could have been increased by altering this allocation pattern, i t  is 
possible to formulate an optimization problem for land allocation, 
which optimizes the total district output for single years with 
water 
supply 
Crops 
winter wheat 
winter rye 
spring wheat 
barley 
millet 
corn for grain 
Pea 
1981 
severe water 
deficiency 
1 2 
0.5 2.54 
0.88 2.6 
0.35 1.07 
0.44 2.6 
0.27 0.83 
- 2.03 
0.8 - 
1982 
water deficiency 
1 2 
0.77 1.93 
1.31 2.17 
0.95 2.19 
1.8 2.5 
0.99 1.48 
- 1.81 
1.3 - 
1978 
sufficient 
1 2 
0.72 1.52 
0.94 1.73 
1.96 2.34 
2.04 2.56 
1.42 1.62 
- 2.68 
1.67 - 
characteristics. (F), the optimal allocation requires the  solution of the 
problem: 
F=maxF(S,s) 
S . s  
(5) 
where F (S , s )  =C (KC 3% --di )SC +(& 2% -BC )sC {KC is purchase prices, dC and 
C 
BC are the costs of production of i- th  crop on irrigated and unirrigated land, 
respectively, yC and zC are corresponding yields, St and st are the 
corresponding land allocations. 
The optimization problem has been solved using the  above criteria, with 
added constraints involving requirements for certain essential management 
strategies (e.g. crop rotations) and minimum planned quotas. The results are 
given in Table 4 are  compared with the recorded value of output for each 
year. 
Table 4. Optimal and recorded value of district output in 1981.1982 and 1978 
(million rubles). 
1981 198i 1978 
actual optimal actual optimal actual optimal 
With this information on the optimal allocation of land for different types of 
years, we can construct a benefit function for computing the total output for 
each weather type. 
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The benefit function for yields is the following matrix: 
1 4.3 2.0 0.6 1 
I I ptj 1 = 1 10.6 14.0 11.4 1 
1 14.9 20.6 23.9 1 
Each element Bcj of the matrix is the  total district output (in million rubles) 
under weather type j if w e  have the allocation which is optimal for weather 
type i. 
U s e  of Risk Strategies with Climatic Data 
The probabilities of different types of weather conditions in the  Marx 
district are given in Table 5. 
Table 5. Probability of occurrence of different types of moisture-year 6). 
Probability 
P P P 
severe deficit deficit sufficient 
% of years 63 18 19 
Let us apply each of the three strategies outlined earlier to  these data. 
The maximin strategy does not require information on the  probability 
distribution of different types of weather- year, only a knowledge of worst 
case. This cautionary strategy is oriented towards expectation of severe 
water deficiency in all years. Allocation under such a strategy would thus 
guarantee a district output of a t  least 4.3 million rubles every year (the 
"drought" strategy). 
The allocation strategy which minimizes the deviations from the mean is 
also a .  "drought" strategy which, it should be noted, may be especially 
convenient if there is limited storage capacity for agricultural production. In 
contrast, the allocation strategy which maximizes the average output over 
the long-term would be that oriented towards a "water-deficit" situation. 
The average value of output under a "drought" strategy is 7.45 mill. 
rubles, but for the "water-deficit" strategy it would be 7.7 mill. rubles. 
Present-day land allocation in the Marx district provides an average output 
of about 7.2 mill. rubles. In the following we will refer to the use of the 
climatic probabilities ast - the "climatic strategy". 
Selection of Allocation Strategies on the Bagis of Weather Forecast 
Information 
Let us specify n possible types of weather conditions. The accuracy of 
different forecasts, F* , may be described as a matrix of combined probability 
of occurence of all possible weather types Wj (Zhukovski, 1981): 
The matrix of combined probability fij 1 provides the full information 
for decision-making based on the Baiesian approach. Assume that we receive 
the weather forecast FK type. The procedure for finding the optimal 
Baiesian strategy, corresponding to this weather forecast would be as 
follows : 
1. Define the benefits for all possible decisions Dj , j =l,..n 
where the conditional probability PC l k  can be calculated through the 
combined probability as follows: 
2. Identify the decision that maximizes the partial benefits: 
max B (Dj (Fk 
j 
(9) 
Repeating this procedure for all types of weather forecasts enable us to 
obtain an optimal strategy j~p~,..JlP~j . In the case where the optimal 
strategy coincides with the strategy utilizing the forecast, the average 
benefit from the optimal strategy is calculated by the  formula: 
An Exampie ot the U s e  of Weather Forecast Information 
Evidently, i t  is necessary to "believe" a weather forecast if it provides 
potentially more beneficial information for decision-making than that  based 
on climatic data alone. Let us illustrate using forecast information with the 
above example of land allocation. 
Naturally, any decision requiring a change in land allocation can be made 
only if we have reliable advance information about seasonal weather 
conditions. Such information may be thought of as climatological and 
meteorological "insight" of the future. For the time being, we can still use 
forecasts based on factors that change less rapidly over time than the 
weather itself, such as water storage in the top one-meter layer in spring. 
A methodology for constructing matrices that incorporate the combined 
probabilities of water supply forecasts (on the basis of the inertial 
characteristics of water storage) and crop yields has been developed by 
Fedoseev (1971). The matrix of combined probability constructed according 
to this methodology for the Erlarx district is as follows: 
I 0.50 0.10 0.03 1 
lPtj 1 = I 0.01 0.11 0.06 I 
1 0.00 0.01 0.18 1 
Calculations using formulas (7)-(9) demonstrate that the optimal strategy 
in this case would be to "completely believe" a forecast. It is easy to 
calculate by formula (10). that the average total income of the district with 
the application of such a strategy will be 9.3 mill. rubles i.e. approximately 
20% more than if the "climatic" strategy were conducted. 
Conclugion 
In this paper some common principles of decision-making based on 
"unreliable" information was illustrated using an example for agricultural 
management. The results show that the use of this approach for a specific 
region might provide considerable benefit for farmers. 
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U N C E R T m  AND RISK IN WATER RESOURCE SYSTEMS 
PLANNING AND OPERATION 
2. Kaczmarek 
Institute of Geographics, Polish Academy of Sciences 
Warsaw, Poland 
There is little to add to the discussion about uncertainty and risk in the plan- 
ning and operation of water resource systems. There are many books and papers 
in which these problems are discussed in great detail, therefore, this paper will 
concentrate only on some selected aspects of these problems, mostly in relation to 
the planning of water resource systems. 
Water management can be understood as the intentention into the natnral 
hydrologic cycle to exploit the water resources for the social and economic 
development of man. This intervention may take several different forms, the most 
advanced of which is a water resource system. As we all know there is a great deal 
of uncertainty in the hydrologic processes which determine the water supply of the 
system. But uncertainties also exist in our projectio~ls of future water demands. 
These demands depend on the future behavior and activities of our societies in 
which there is also a large amount of uncertainty. This is a particularly difficult 
problem when projections are made for many years ahead. When decisions con- 
cerning the balancing of water demands with water supply (which is the essence of 
water resource management) are made, we have to employ certain criteria for 
such decisions. Once again, there are serious uncertainties in the economic and 
social criteria which govern our decisions today. These criteria are not well- 
defined at present, but may change in the future when the system will be 
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implemented and brought into operation. But what is t he  length of t he  implementa- 
tion period? Usually w e  make certain assumptions in this regard ,  but serious 
delays may occur  which ere out of control, therefore  t he  implementation period is 
uncertain as wel l .  
There are many discussions about how r isk should b e  defined. For me, r isk is 
defined as t he  probability of failure of o u r  system. For example, i f  t he re  is a 
water shortage in t he  system, 1 consider this t o  be  a failure of t he  system and i t  is 
possible t o  calculate t he  probability of such a fa i lwe .  This is true f o r  o the r  situa- 
tions w e  encounter in water resource  management, i.e., failures related to flood 
protection. There is a general agreement among all concerned tha t  water 
resource  systems exhibit  two character is t ic  features.  One is the i r  dynamic char- 
a c t e r ,  and the  o the r  is randomness of nearly all input values. In o the r  words, 
decisions taken at any part icular  moment of time have a n  important effect on the  
fu ture  state and performance of t he  system. These future effects depend very  
much on the  outcome of several  random processes which are difficult to predict,  
o r  be t t e r  said, ou r  ability to predict  them is clearly insufficient in relation to o u r  
needs. This is true in t h e  case of hydrologic processes,  but ou r  inability to 
predict  t he  fu ture  does not exist t o  any lesser degree f o r  social and economic 
processes. 
Let me start with two very  simple examples. Then 1 will try t o  draw some les- 
sons from these examples and formulate a few questions f o r  discussion. 
The firs!,  example concerns t he  design of a cofferdam - it is not necessary to 
discuss a complex water resource  system t o  make the  point I wish t o  make. Let us 
assume tha t  w e  have t o  design a cofferdam protecting, f o r  a period of t years ,  t he  
construction of a hydraulic s t ruc tu re  in t he  r i v e r  channel. If t he  construction 
site is to be  protected with a safety fac tor  of a, i.e'., w e  accept  t he  r isk of 
r - 1 - a, then the  cofferdam should be  able  to withstand a T-year flood QT level 
upon a. As we all know: 
1 
a = (1 -p)twhere = - = Frob (Q,,, r 9,) ; T 
Let us assume that t = 5 and a = 0.98 i.e., t = 0.02). In such a case, T = 250 
years, and by application of one of the  probability distribution models, we may cal- 
culate the related value of Qr which is a function of T as wel l  as of model parame- 
ters. 
Now w e  have to face uncertainties inherent in our simple calculations. First, 
the duration of the constkction period, i.e., the value of t ,  may change. Second, 
selection of a give probability distribution model - fo r  example w e  may choose 
Gumbel, log normal, o r  Pearson Type 111 distribution - also carries large uncer- 
tainties. As Klemes emphasized, the same flood discharge may correspond to a 
1000 year recurrence according to one distribution (method of fitting) and to 
10,000 years according to another. He also stresses that this uncertainty is 
inherent in flood frequency analysis and cannot be removed by any mathematical 
trick. Finally, there  is considerable uncertainty in the estimates of parameters of 
a given probability distribution model. 
Let us l imit  ourselves t o  the first type of uncertainties discussed above: the 
dunt ion of the construction period. If i t  changes in our example from 5 to 10 
years, the effect is that  the risk of overtopping our cofferdam changes f r o m  2% to 
3.9%. This means that instead of adopting one single value of acceptable risk - in 
our example 2% - w e  should ra the r  consider an interval of acceptable risk because 
of all the uncertainties discussed above. 
Let us go to  the second example. It concerns planning of a water resource 
system to  meet the water demands of population, agriculture, industry, etc. The 
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case of the Skane region presented a t  this workshop is a good example in this 
respect. Planning the Upper Vistula system in my home country (CP* - Tisza, Vis- 
tula Workshop) could serve as another example of the problems which I would like 
to discuss. 
In such planning exercises, we usually analyze a certain number of investment 
alternatives, each of them including storage reservoirs, water transfer facilities, 
wastewater treatment plants. etc., and one of the major criteria for evaluation of 
alternatives is often the minimization of the risk of water shortage. This r isk can 
be defined as the probability that a water shortage in the system will not exceed a 
given value. For each alternative we can calculate such a r isk using simulation 
techniques. (To perform statistical analysis of simulation results, this simulation 
analysis is often coupled with an analysis optimizing the operation of the system 
components.) 
There again w e  have to employ several assumptions which carry significant 
uncertainties. First, we have to project future water demands for the next 20-30 
years. I have already mentioned the uncertainty of this operation. We have also to 
assume a certain s y s t e m  of priorities concerning resource allocation. It must be 
recognized, however, that this system of priorities may change completely in the 
future. Once again, there a r e  uncertainties embedded in the hydrological data we 
use for simulation of the system operation. Even if we resort  to synthetic hydrol- 
ogy and w e  one of the sophisticated multi-site. multi-period stochastic models for 
generation of synthetic hydrologic data, there a r e  uncertainties related to the 
model  choice and to the model parameters estimated on the basis of a usually short 
historical example. 
It aIl leads to the conclusion that before we employ any sophisticated metho- 
.CP-76-5. 'Workshop on t h e  Vistula  and Tlsza River Basins", 11-13 February, 1975. Edited 
by Andrao Seollbd-Ragy. 
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dology to calculate the risk of water shortage fo r  a given investment alternative, 
w e  have to make several assumptions concerning both the  present and future s tate  
of the  system. The result is that  in addition to the  risk of water shortage - a risk 
which w e  would like to minimize by rejection of the most risk-prone alternatives - 
w e  have to recognize several uncertainties embedded in our data, assumptions and 
models which are employed for calculation of the risk value. In light of this, 
instead of having one risk value, once again I would r a t h e r  see  a risk interval, 
recognizing that  determination of such an interval may be very difficult. 
Here is  our basic dilemma in water resource systems. If w e  accept the  con- 
cept of risk as a probability of failure, as I proposed at the beginning of this 
paper, then w e  will  always try to use different quantitative methods t o  calculate 
this value. But all such calculations are based on a number of assumptions, data, 
and models which, generally speaking, a r e  not at all certain in describing the  
real-world situation now and, particularly, in the  future. 
This brings IIS to the  question: how can w e  deal with this dilemma? I would like 
to offer the  following suggestions: 
(1) We should devote much more time and much more attention to all types of 
research which may improve our knowledge about natural, social, and 
economic processes in water resource systems. This especially concerns our  
knowledge about the  possible ways in which system characteristics may 
develop into the  future. There will  always be many alternative paths into the 
future; therefare, the scenario approach (alternative futures) should be used 
to the  largest extent possible. 
(2) All uncertainties inherent in the analysis of water resource systems should be 
examined and clearly described so  as to  increase our awareness of their 
existence. 
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(3) There seems to  be a need for  more analysis concerning the question of how 
sensitive our solutions and recommendations to dl types of uncertainties 
inherent in water resource systems (different assumptions, different 
scenarios, etc.) are. Such sensitivity analysis may lead to a more complex 
picture of r i s k  than the  one w e  usually adopt in our investigations. As indi- 
cated by my two simple examples, instead of one single value of risk, w e  should 
ra the r  introduce a notion of a r i s k  interval reflecting our uncertainties about 
the  many processes with which w e  are dealing. 
RISK PERCEPTION: 
A SYSlXWlTIC REMEW OF CONCEPTS AND RESEARCH RESULTS 
Ortwin Renn 
Technology and Society P r o g m  
Nuclear Research Centre Jiilich 
November 25-27, 1985 
Invited Paper fo r  the Meeting on Risk and Policy Analysis, 
International Institute fo r  Applied Systems Analysis 
Laxenburg, Austria. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
In the year 1968 the Survey Research Institute at Allensbach (FRG) conducted a 
national poll in the Federal Republic of Germany in which a representative sample 
of G e r m a n  women were asked what kind of profession the ideal husband should 
have. In 1968 the most attractive profession for  a m a n  was that of nuclear physi- 
cist. Eleven years later the same question w a s  again asked of al l  females  between 
the ages of 16 and 70. In this poll the nuclear physicist w a s  not even mentioned 
among the f irst  20 nominations. The top of the List w a s  occupied by a completely 
different type of professional activity. The winner of the game was forest ranger 
(Allensbach, 1979)! 
What has the attractiveness of male professions to  do with risk perceptions? 
There are two answers to  this question: 
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(1) The shift of prestige assignment from a technology-oriented to a nature- 
oriented profession reveals a semantic change in the public understanding of 
risk. In the past, technology was predominantly perceived as  a powerful 
means of reducing risks due to natural catastrophes, climate variations, 
infectious diseases, and biological competitors for  food and biotope (Markl, 
1980), but in recent years i t  has become increasingly associated with causing 
risks and threats to human beings and the natural environment. People have 
become aware of the fact that the tools that liberated them from natural con- 
straints themselves posed new r isks on their lives (Hohenemser et al, 1981, p 
2; Renn, 1984; Renn and Swaton, 1984). 
(2) The change of professional prestige in modern societies further demonstrates 
the interdependences between perceptions, general social attitudes, values, 
and world views. There is no doubt that science is dependent on the concept 
of isolating specific phenomena from their natural o r  social context in order 
to construct modes of causal o r  sequential relationships with the aid of 
analytical techniques. This is also true for studies of risk perception. How- 
ever, it  should be kept in mind that in real life r isk perception does not exist 
as a distinct psychological process among other types of perception, but 
forms an integral part  of assembling and representing beliefs and perceived 
characteristics of an object o r  event in the mind of the individual. Considera- 
tions of risks may o r  may not play a major role in this opinion- o r  judgment- 
forming process. Potential benefits, side effects, symbolic meanings, value 
orientations, the attitudes of reference groups about the risk source, and the 
prestige and image of those who promote o r  oppose implementation of the risk 
source a r e  just some of the many factors, apart  from risk considerations, that 
influence people's perceptions of objects o r  events (Pearce, 1978; Hws, 
1980; Thompson, 1980; Conrad, 1981b; Lee, 1981). 
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Division into features relating to the r i sk  and those relating to the r i sk  
source is admittedly a purely analytical expedient f o r  psychological research. In 
reality, people judge objects, events, and activities only, and not r i sk s  ( c;P. Brown 
and Green, 1980). 
Would it then not be better  t o  remove the concept of r i sk  perception from the 
terminology of cognitive psychology and to  replace it by object perception? This 
so r t  of recommendation can indeed be justified in view of the often unthinking use 
of the concept of r i sk  perception, but it is not necessary from the nature of the 
case, f o r  perception of an object naturally also includes perception of the hazar- 
dous consequences of this object, their mental assimilation, and the development of 
general mechanisms to  cope with the situation of uncertainty (Renn and Peters, 
1982). Thus the hierarchical rank of aspects related to  r i sk ,  benefit, and uncer- 
tainty with respect to object assessment can be analytically investigated. In the 
same way the separate measurement of object and risk perception can answer the 
question whether there  are typical patterns in the intuitive perception of r i sk  
sources which can give some pointers toward the "common sense" assimilation of 
uncertainty owing to  potential danger sources. 
2 BASIC CONCEPTS OF RISK PERCEPTION 
For the purpose of reviewing the major theoretical concepts and empirical studies 
in the field of r i sk  perception it is necessary to define the main terms frequently 
used in the literature on r i sk  perception. 
Object perception 
Object perception describes the process of mentally representing and assimilating 
information and experience with respect to a physical object o r  entity (Renn and 
Peters ,  1982). 
V i u e s  
A value is a conception, explicit o r  implicit and distinctive of an individual o r  
character is t ic  of a group, of the  desirable which influences the  selection from 
available modes, means, and ends of action (Kluckhorn, 1951). 
Belie* 
A belief represents  t he  cognitive images a person has of a given object,  i.e., it is a 
probability judgment whether an at t r ibute is o r  is not, and to  what degree, associ- 
a ted with the  perception of an object. The subjective feeling of goodness and bad- 
ness which is linked with each at t r ibute r e f e r s  t o  the  effect a person might have 
and is called subjective evaluation (Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975). 
At t i tude  
Attitude is a mental and neural s ta te  of readiness, organized through experience, 
exerting a directive o r  dynamic influence upon the  individual's response to  all 
objects and situations with which it i s  related (Allport, 1935). 
Concerns 
A concern r e f e r s  to a s t a t e  of positive o r  negative responsiveness of individuals t o  
awareness and processing of any information o r  personal experience regarding 
salient areas of interest  on that  matter (Renn and Swaton, 1984). 
Risk percep t ion  
Perceived r isk i s  t he  combined evaluation tha t  is made by an individual of t h e  
likelihood that  an adverse event will occur  in the  future and its probable conse- 
quence (Royal Society, 1983, p 34). 
In f i g u r e  1 an attempt is made to  il lustrate t h e  interconnections between 
beliefs, concerns, values, attitudes, and perceptions. The model includes five 
basic categories: physical environment, social environment, cultural environment. 
psychological motives, and socialized motives. Any individual is confronted with a 
specific object tha t  is embedded in a social situation and a cultural context 
f i g u r e  1 A conceptual framework of the interdependences between beliefs, con- 
cerns, values, and attitudes. 
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(symbolic meaning). The physical properties of the specific object and the charac- 
teristics of the situation are elements of the individual perception process. The 
perceived properties are not necessarily identical with the real properties. Lim- 
ited access to  information, intuitive selection filters, and preevaluations bias the 
perception process. In parallel with the perception of properties the social 
characteristics are assembled and perceived; both processes are combined in the 
subjective assessment of consequences that are associated with the object. Asso-  
ciations divided from the cultural context o r  from personal experience are also 
activated at this stage and are compared with the subjectively assessed conse- 
quences. 
The next step refers to  the phase of processing the perceived object proper- 
ties, situational characteristics, predicted consequences, and associations into a 
belief system. The selection of what enters  the belief system, the mode of abstrac- 
tion from personal experience and mediated information in order  to form general- 
ized convictions, and the way of ordering the perceived items into salient clusters 
are influenced by the value orientations, emotions, and attitudes toward similar 
objects. In addition, general heuristics and personal style of reasoning have to  be 
taken into account. 
The last step refers to the process of balancing positive and negative beliefs, 
aiming toward a general evaluative judgment with respect to  the object. For this 
purpose, beliefs a r e  ordered according to  their subjective importance, the judg- 
ments of reference groups a r e  incorporated, the personal consequences of each 
possible judgment are assessed, and the possible outcomes are compared with ear- 
lier experience with similar objects. 
This outline is, of course. just an analytical tool for  understanding the pro- 
cess of attitude formation. The various stages are interlinked in the real world 
and proceed much more unconsciously, as pointed out here. However, it 
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represents a theoretical framework that helps to analyze our research concepts 
and the results of risk perception studies. 
According to the analytical framework of object perception and attitude for- 
mation risk perception studies focus on three  key questions: 
(1) What are the  social goals, values, or motives that drive persons o r  social 
groups to attribute special concerns to specific risk sources? 
(2) In what way do people process information about risk sources, and what kind 
of logical s tructure and reasoning do they follow in arriving at an overall 
judgment on the acceptability of a perceived risk? 
(3) What kind of motivational o r  cognitive biases are incorporated when people 
select information f r o m  the various sources to which they have access, and 
why do they apparently violate their own rules of reasoning? 
A more integrated approach to the investigation of risk perception can be 
developed by taking these three  questions into account. For this purpose, w e  can 
divide risk perception studies into four rough categories: classical decision 
analysis, psychological decision theory, social-psychological judgment and atti- 
tude theory, and sociological concepts including policy analysis. 
Classical decision analysis focuses on the rationality of the decision-making 
process under the assumption that w e  can make use of formal axioms to optimize 
our own judgment (Keeney and Raiffa, 1976). If we go a step fur ther  and demand 
that the optimization process be adapbd  to the individual metarational criteria of 
reasoning, this kind of research fits exactly into our key question (3) above. 
Psychological decision theory (including social judgment theory) has put its 
emphasis on the individual process of comrnon-sense reasoning, incorporating the 
social desirability of perceived consequences and specific motivational factors in 
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processing uncertainty (Hammond et al., 1978). Research in this field can best be 
classified under key question (2) ,  because its purpose is to head toward the indivi- 
dual process of understanding the  representation and assimilation of perceived 
hazards and their  probabilities, which leads to the formation of an overall judg- 
ment. Risk perception is being understood as a process of deriving attributes 
about specific objects from general social values and personal attitudes and link- 
ing these attributes to the perceived properties of the  risk object o r  risk situa- 
tion (Janis and Mann, 1977). This research lies on the borderline between key 
questions (1) and (2). 
Finally, sociological research addresses the problem of group responses to  
risk and concentrates on the  influence of social values, institutional constraints, 
reference group judgments, communication, and power interchange (Nelkin, 1977b; 
Otway and von Winterfeldt, 1982; Frederichs et at.. 1983). I t  is interesting to note 
that the sociological concepts of risk perception, in particular studies of power 
and pressure groups, have some features in common with the  concepts of 
mathematical decision analysis - the other extreme of the scientific spectrum. 
Both concepts assume that individuals try t o  maximize their own utility (in socio- 
logical terms, their  interest) and that objective measures can be identified to indi- 
cate whether individuals o r  groups are better  o r  worse off af ter  the  risk has been 
taken. In decision theory the expected utility is an objective measure of a 
person's gain o r  loss; in sociological theory gain o r  loss of power is an objective 
yardstick fo r  measuring social influence. In our framework sociological research 
deals primarily with key question (1). 
Table 1 gives an impression of the scope of scientific research in the field of 
r i sk  perception. I t  should be acknowledged that the systematic overview simplifies 
the complex situation of risk research and ignores much of the conceptual differ- 
ences within each class. For a more detailed classification reference should be 
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Table 1 Classification of r isk peroeption studies 
Research Short 
scope descr tp t ton 
General Appltcatton 
assumptton to r t s k  
perceptton 
Decision Matching the  decision Maximizing utility Investigating the  
prooess with normative or individuals discrepancies between 
model of rational o r  groups normative risk 
reasoning assessment and 
intuitive peroeption 
Psychologioal Analysis or the  Existenoe of Investigating the  
decision individual decision- typiaal sequential cognitive s t ruoture  
theory making process s t ructures  t o  of the  r isk 
make Judgments peroeption prooess 
under unoertainty 
Social- ~ n a l y s i s  of t h e  Dominanoe of Investigating the  
PYoh- social environment social influenoe influenoe of value 
logioal as a determinator faotors in oommitments, social 
theory fo r  t h e  decision- peroeiving and judgment, and communi- 
making prooess evaluating risks cation prooesses on the  
individual deoision- 
making prooess 
Socio- Effects and impli- Risk taking as an Investigating the  
logical aations of social element of social interests and sooial 
theory interrelations exchange regarding positions which 
between groups and resouroes and impose specific r isk 
institutions on collec- power peroeption prooedures 
t lve  deoislon-making 
made to the corresponding literature (see Otway, 1977; Becker et al.. 1980; 
Covello, 1982; Royal Society, 1983; Renn, 1984). 
3 EESULTS OF EUSK PERCEPTION STUDIES 
According to the various disciplines involved in risk perception research various 
conceptual frameworks have been used to determine the main factors that influ- 
ence people's judgment on expected consequences and their likelihood. Research- 
ers who work with utility concepts investigate predominantly the individual balanc- 
ing procedure and intuitive heuristics that govern the process of assimilating and 
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evaluating information about r isks .  The most frequently applied instruments in this 
category of research studies are psychometric scales. semantic differentials, and 
correlation circles for  determining spatial differences between various r i sk s  (Pel- 
licier et at., 1977; Fischhoff et al., 1978; Vlek and Stallen, 1981; Pages et al.. 
1982). 
Researchers who pursue the attitude concept are searching for  salient 
beliefs and effects that  determine the overall feeling of an individual toward the  
object and influence the willingness ta take actions in correspondence with that 
feeling (Otway, 1980; Thomas et al., 1980; Swatan and Renn. 1984). Attitude 
researchers usually use questionnaires ta collect beliefs and affective patterns, 
which are la ter  processed by factor analysis in order to  detect the salient factors 
of r i s k  perception. 
Researchers who focus on value commftments and concerns analyze the course 
of social interaction between promoters and opponents of the new risk object o r  
risk activity. The also observe the  process of attitude formation as a function of 
avoiding dissonances between value orientations and the selective perception of 
information concerning properties of the risk object and the position and values of 
the people associated with the object. Within this research tradition surveys and 
direct observations are the most common instruments ta analyze the causes of the 
development of various positions toward a r i s k  source and to  reveal the social con- 
straints that  filter the information that each individual is exposed ta and which 
predetermines the willingness ta take account of positive and negative conse- 
quences (Bechman et al., 1981; Conrad, 1981a; Wynne, 1984). 
In addition to  these three basic concepts, more sociologically oriented 
approaches have to  be mentioned which regard r i s k  perception as  an element of 
the continuous struggles of social groups for  power and social influence (prestige, 
status, etc.). However, since this approach takes no interest in the investigation 
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of the underlying psychological and social factors of r i sk  perception, it does not 
need a more specific consideration in this paper (Mazur, 1975; Nelkin. 1977a; 
Kitschelt, 1980; Douglas and Wildavsky, 1982). 
The three  perspectives of risk perception are not exclusive, but focus on dif- 
ferent aspects of the perception process: the rationale of people to produce a bal- 
anced judgment, the  genesis of beliefs about objects, and the  social dynamics of 
processing and evaluating information. Hence it is not necessary t o  present the 
results of empirical studies separately for  each research tradition. Rather, it 
seems appropriate to  initiate a review based on a more fundamental insight into the 
individual process of forming beliefs about risk and risk sources, and to enlarge 
the discussion step by step with more remote factors, such as value orientations 
and trust in sources of information. Since the  field of risk perception has become 
ra the r  popular in recent  years and numerous studies have been published, the fol- 
lowing review can only address the  highlights and discuss the main results. In 
order  to be as brief and precise as possible, the review is organized as a collec- 
tion of theses: 
In general people do a good job in assessing the magnitude of a risk that is 
familiar to them. In principle they are quite aware of the threats  and dangers 
to which they are exposed. f i g u r e  2 shows the results of two surveys, one 
American and one German. A random sample of persons in Germany and 
several groups in the  USA were asked t o  estimate the average losses per  year 
f r o m  various sources of hazard: estimated values are plotted on the y axis 
and the actual statistical figures on the z axis. There is a general tendency, 
in both the USA and Germany, to overestimate l ow risks and underestimate 
high risks, although the  German sample tends ra ther  to exaggerate the rea l  
figures. Nonetheless, the extent of agreement between estimated and actual 
values is fairly high (Lichtenstein et al.. 1978; Slovic et al.. 1979; Renn and 
f i g u r e  2 Respondents' estimated number of losses for the various risk sources 
compared with the statistically computed values. The upper graph 
shows the results of an American poll and the lower graph those of a 
German poll. 
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Peters, 1982). 
(2) The intuitive ability to determine the order of magnitude of r isk disappears a s  
soon a s  questions a r e  asked relating to the number of lives lost in a catas- 
trophic year, to be expected once during the span of a Lifetime. Either all 
risk sources a r e  graded almost uniformly, assigning around 3000 losses for 
each r isk source, o r  exorbitant estimates a r e  made, e.g., an average of 22000 
deaths for drug abuse, 4000 for skiing accidents, and as many as 600000 
deaths caused by nuclear power (all these figures a r e  related to the Federal 
Republic of Germany) (Renn, 1981). When estimates a r e  made for a normal 
average year, experience and common sense can bring about a relatively good 
approximation of the statistical values. However, when questions are related 
to disasters that can be expected over 80-100 years, the intuitive evaluation 
processes will not function since the extent of catastrophes cannot be drawn 
directly from a person's own experience (Slovic et al., 1979; Renn, 1981; von 
Winterf eldt st al., 1981). 
(3) If statistical o r  intuitively estimated values for expected losses a r e  related to 
the intuitive rating of the benefit level, o r  to a risk-benefit ratio, an aston- 
ishing result is obtained. Presumed loss rates per year and r isk perception 
(also risk-benefit perception) a r e  practically independent of .each other, 
i.e., most people do not assess r isk sources according to the presumed losses 
per year but concentrate on other points of view (Renn and Peters, 1982). 
This insight is t rue  not only of the German interviewers; American, English, 
French, and Australian studies confirm the low correlation between the 
public's loss estimation and r isk perception (Slovic et al., 1979; Glennon, 
1980; Pages et al., 1982; Royal Society, 1983). Thus most people a r e  more o r  
less aware of the expected value of well-known risks; however, the expected 
values a r e  merely one factor mong many in the perception of these risks and. 
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as correlation analyses show, a factor with only slight explanatory value. 
(4) Most people a r e  not familiar with the rationale of probability. When the p r e  
babilities of adverse effects a r e  not intuitively comprehensible (as in the 
unlikely example of a jumbo jet crashing into a football stadium), the per- 
ceived degree of riskiness is likely to be related to the worst imagined 
accident. If the imagination of catastrophes is enhanced by media coverage, 
the negative risk perception is further reinforced. This coping mechanism 
tends to evoke high sensitivity for l o w  probability-high consequence risks 
and a strong degree of disinterest in high probability-low consequence risks 
(Tversky and Kahnemann, 1974; Ross, 1977; Jungermann, 1982). 
(5) The attendant circumstances, i.e., the way in which people are exposed to a 
certain risk, are considered in the literature as qualitative features which 
influence the perception process. According to the investigations of Slovic 
and coworkers, three main factors shape the intuitive assimilation of risk- 
related information: the severity of losses when they occur (dread), the fami- 
liarity with the risk, and the "degree of personnel exposure" (societal versus 
personal risk-taking) (Slovic et al., 1980, 1981). Studies of the quality of 
hazards lead to similar results. The Dutch researchers Vlek and Stallen came 
to the conclusion that risk perception is dependent on the "size of a potentid 
accident" and on the perceived "degree of organized safety" (Vlek and Stal- 
len. 1981, pp 235 #.). Green and Brown report  a high preoccupation of people 
for natural versus man-made risks, necessary versus unnecessary activities, 
major consequences versus minor impacts, personal oontrol versus out of con- 
trol, and easy versus difficult to escape (Green and Brown, 1980; Perusse, 
1980). In contrast with the above studies, which use aggrega t iod  p r e  
cedures for all risk sources in order to r eved  universal factors for charac- 
terizing risk qualities, the studies by Gardner et al. (1980, pp 26 ff.) and by 
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Renn (1981) were designed to  analyze the independence of qualitative charac- 
teristics fo r  each risk source (Renn, 1981). F i g u r e  3 shows the  significance 
of individual qualitative features to  the evaluation of the  risk in question fo r  
nine risk sources. The corresponding correlation coefficient is on the  y axis, 
i.e., the  intensity of the  relationship is  depicted, and boxes with individual 
feature classes f o r  nine different risk sources are given on the  z axis. 
If w e  f irs t  consider the  primary factors,  i.e., the  features that  exe r t  the 
greatest influence on risk evaluation, it becomes apparent that  benefit- 
related points of view predominate. People f irs t  of all evaluate r isks accord- 
ing to the  possibilities and accompanying circumstances of their  application, 
e.g., whether they themselves can profit from them, whether they are of bene- 
fit  to everyone o r  only a minority, and whether there  are not fur ther  alterna- 
tives that  provide the  same benefit with less risk. In the case of nuclear 
energy, pesticides, and electrical appliances the  emphasis is on risk features. 
Whereas the voluntariness of utilization brings about a positive weighting of 
the concomitant risk in the  case of electrical appliances, the  dominance of the  
factor "catastrophic consequences possible" in the  case of nuclear energy 
and "possibilities of long-term damage" in the case of pesticides has a nega- 
tive effect on risk perception. I t  is  thus clear that  statistical loss rates are 
not the  decisive motives f o r  skepticism toward nuclear energy and pesticides. 
(6) Apart from qualitative risk features, which are believed to be universal fac- 
tors in the  risk perception process, research has been conducted to find 
salient clusters of beliefs relating t o  different sources of risk. Large-scale 
experiments carr ied out by the  Risk Assessment Group of the  International 
Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna, showed that  people classify their  attitudes 
toward energy systems according t o  the following criteria: indirect effects 
from the  risk source (e.g., health hazards); economic benefits (e.g., increase 
f i g u r e  3 The influence of qualitative risk and benefit characteristics on the gen- 
eral perception of risk and benefit from various risk sources (multiple 
correlation coefficient). 
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in the national income); environmental risks (e.g., pollution); psychological 
and physical implications (e.g., capacity fo r  control of the  r isk,  artificiality 
of the risk source); effect on social and technical progress (e.g., providing 
security of supply, social leveling). These five dimensions in attitudes were 
obtained on the  basis of the  results of surveys of the  assessment of various 
energy systems (Otway. 1980; Thomas. 1981). Since energy systems only cover 
some of the  possible r i s k  sources, w e  conducted a similar experiment in the 
form of an intensive survey involving 12  different types of risk source. The 
aim w a s  to discover the  most important attitudes and their  systematic struc- 
ture. Various statist-ical procedures w e r e  used to trace the  attitudes sub- 
jected to enquiry back to their  central basic pat tern (factor analysis) and 
comparable sets of factors were developed by means of aggregation. This 
interpretation gave rise t o  an allocation and, finally, t o  an evaluation of risk 
sources under the  following five points: 
(i) Effects on the  person himself and on the  social environment (health, sup- 
ply level, security, etc.). 
(ii) Extent to which persons are directly affected (personal benefits, dam- 
age, comfort, well-being, liberty, etc.). 
(iii) Effects on economic and social welfare (employment market, social level- 
ing, general standard of living, quality of life, etc.). 
(iv) Sociopolitical and social values (social justice, democratic rights, equal 
distribution of benefits and detriments, etc.). 
(v) Effects on the  conditions for  coping with the  future (maintaining output 
level, defense of liberty, ensuring supply level, etc.). 
Renn, 0. 
Not all of these five cri ter ia  are brought to  bear for  every risk source and 
the  significance of the individual factors varies greatly. In order to  obtain 
an  overall view of the intensity and composition of the five cri ter ia  for  vari- 
ous risk sources, the average values of the individual factors have been com- 
piled for  six risk sources in FEgure 4. The bars  that extend below the zero 
line show negative estimations with respect to the risk source under con- 
sideration, while the  bars  above the zero line show the corresponding positive 
evaluations (Renn, 1981). 
(7) People s e e m  to avoid risks that pose a pending danger to them. The random- 
ness of occurrence is perceived as a potential threa t  because a dangerous 
situation might occur at a t ime  when the individual is not prepared to react in 
an appropriate manner. Instinctively, human beings react to dangerous situa- 
tions with the responses of aggression, escape, o r  playing dead. If a 
dangerous situation is to  be expected, stress is likely to occur so that  the 
instinctive reaction can be performed fast and almost automatically. Stress, 
however, cannot be sustained over an  extended period of t ime. Therefore, 
people feel uneasy if a dangerous situation can occur at any time without 
prior notice. In this situation they prefer  risk avoidance behavior. If they 
cannot initiate action to move away from the dangerous situation, they demand 
collective regulation as a means of maintaining control over the impending 
danger. This aversion to  randomly occurring hazards is not related to any 
probability, but just to  the nature of randomness. The feeling of uneasiness is 
reinforced if people have the  impression that there  will be no time to flee o r  
protect themselves against the potential hazard (Green and Brown, 1980; Per- 
row, 1984). 
(8) Risk refers to  a compound judgment constructed on the assessment of per- 
sonal utilities and associations with the risk source. This explains some of the 
Fligure 4 Importance of five belief clusters with respect to estimates of the risks 
of various technologies. 
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difficulties that experts  encounter when applying risk comparisons in public. 
Risk in connection with skiing, f o r  example, has a different connotation from 
risk related to  nuclear energy. Risk in the former application is perceived 
as a peculiar thrill to the individual. In the latter case, however, nuclear 
energy is perceived as a threat  to personal health. Any attempts locally to 
compare the  two risks fail t o  convince anyone except the risk expert 
(Gardner et al., 1980; Renn, 1985). 
(9) People are willing to  accept risks more frequently if they feel that risks and 
benefits are distributed equally. Thus justice is a key factor in risk percep- 
tion. When risks are-confined to an identifiable population (e.g., the neigh- 
borhood in the vicinity of a hazardous waste disposal site), this population is 
likely to respond negatively to them. The notion of justice implies two 
categories: equity of risk and benefit distribution, and exclusiveness of expo- 
sure to risks o r  benefits (Keeney. 1980; Renn. 1984). 
(10) In general, i t  has been proved that  value orientation and the  general attitude 
system wil l  increasingly influence risk perception if the risk sources have 
already undergone politicization. For example, scientists of the 
Arbeitsgruppe Angewandte Systemanalyse (Working Group on Applied Systems 
Analysis), Karlsruhe, discovered that the formation of judgments on nuclear 
energy strongly depends on the value orientation of the individual (more 
materialistic, more postmaterialistic, more environmentally conscious) which, 
however, has practically no bearing on the perception of coal (Frederichs et 
al., 1983). With respect to nuclear energy a relationship between value 
orientation and risk assessment was also revealed in studies performed by 
Renn. Even ff general value orientation - similar to  the studies carried out by 
the Social Science Research Centre, Los Angeles (von Winterfeldt et al., 1980) 
- is hardly directly related to the determining factors of risk perception, i t  
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nevertheless codetermines the  perception process indirectly via the  forma- 
tion of related attitudinal patterns (Renn, 1981). With regard t o  perception 
of the  nuclear energy risk, the  perceived risk level is particularly influ- 
enced by five sociopolitical attitudes f i g u r e  5). Low confidence in state- 
ments by scientists and technologists combined with a high priority f o r  
environmental protection produce a more negative perception of nuclear 
energy risks at the  outset. Conversely, confidence in science and technology 
and a low degree of environmental awareness represent  an attitude that, from 
the start, tends to develop positive expected values. However, there  is no 
deterministic relationship between attitudes in the sociopolitical field and 
those toward nuclear energy. 
(11) The credibility of the  source of information about r isks and risk sources has 
turned out to be a crucial factor  in risk perception. If a person distrusts the  
source of information, he o r  she is more inclined to pay attention to counter- 
information and to demonstrate a risk-averse behavior in order  to be on the  
safe side. In particular, scientific dissent and politicization with respect  to 
risk sources lead t o  a risk perception process that  is highly governed by sym- 
pathies and value commitments in favor of one of the  involved parties. Sym- 
bolic beliefs are substitutes f o r  instrumental considerations (Tubiana, 1979; 
Whchmann,  1984). However, the perception of objects does not depend 
solely o r  even primarily on widely acceptable solutions within the scientific 
system. First, scientific dissent w i l l  only have an impact on public perception 
if scientists themselves regard the  issue as political and therefore transfer 
the  dispute into a public debate. Second, the  general public will only be 
a w a r e  of any scientific dispute if its consequences affect ei ther  their  own liv- 
ing conditions o r  their belief system. Thus it is essential that  the  perceived 
consequences of any technology are evaluated as salient with respect to the 
f i g u r e  3 The perceived risk-benefit ratio of nuclear power as a function of five 
sociopolitioal attitudes ( z axis, degree of risk-benefit ratio; y axis. 
strength of attitude). 
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individual formation of attitudes before an  issue gains political weight. 
Finally, empirical studies by Renn (1981) on the  loss of credibility by social 
institutions involved in the  peaceful use of nuclear energy show that ,  despite 
the  loss of confidence in science and politics, a maximum degree of credibility 
continues t o  be  given to scientists working in the  field of nuclear research  
and in universities as w e l l  as to the  pertinent politicians (e.g., Minister of 
Research and Technology). This statement applies to both proponents and 
opponents of nuclear energy. 
4 CONCLUSIONS 
The aim of this  paper  was to review the  state of the  art in the  field of r i sk  percep- 
tion with specific emphasis on European studies. As in any review a selection has  
had t o  be  made with respec t  to t he  concepts, t he  analytical frameworks, and the  
empirical resul ts  reported.  The review is certainly biased by the  author 's subjec- 
tive preferences and interpretations, but an  attempt was made to include aLl 
relevant information and to put the  resul ts  of t he  research  studies in perspective. 
Only a small fraction of the  empirical research  conducted could b e  presented in 
o r d e r  to keep the paper  brief and concise, but enough cross  references have been 
given fo r  those who want t o  study the  formation of r isk perception more inten- 
sively. 
What has  been learned from the  numerous studies of r i sk  perception? Among 
the  major resul ts  of t he  risk perception studies conducted by psychologists, 
sociologists, and decision analysts, the  following have immediate impact on the  pro- 
cess of risk management and policymaking: 
(1) The expected losses over  time a r e  only one, and even a minor, element of the 
public perception of risk. Even the catastrophe potential cannot be  regarded 
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as decisive in the sense that the number of perceived victims in a disaster is 
related to the degree of the perceived riskiness. Rather, subjective proba- 
bility regarding the strength of belief that a catastrophe can happen is one of 
the main characteristics that people apply fn judging the magnitude of risk. 
(2) Two kinds of variables are found to be important f o r  the process of risk per- 
ception: qualitative risk chafacteristics and beliefs about the risk source. 
People wil l  pay special attention to  risks that are perceived as dreadful. 
involuntary, unaccustomed, and personally uncontrollbble, and will  be eager 
to obtain more information about the risk source. 
(3) BeLiefs about risk sources vary from risk to risk. There is no universal 
threshold fo r  risk acceptance either fo r  different risk sources perceived by 
a single individual o r  for  a single risk source assessed by different individu- 
als. 
(4) Social, psychological, and sociological studies show that judgments of risky 
technologies o r  activities depend not only on psychological factors like those 
mentioned above but also on reference group judgments, salient befiefs about 
the risk source, degree of loyalty toward official policymakers, and commit- 
ment to social values and cultural ideas. Since all these factors, including the  
psychological ones, a r e  interrelated and sometimes reflect mere postrational- 
izations of unconscious feefings and social constmhts ,  i t  is very dffficult t o  
set up a reliable model of how people actually perceive and evaluate risks. 
What w e  know is what matters, and pertly to what degree i t  matters, but 
analysts are still searching f o r  a theory that can explain the process of 
people's judgment on risks. 
What, in the light of these premises, are the main lessons fo r  policymakers on 
risk management considering the results of perception studies so  far?  
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Primarily, it  has become evident that the artificially constructed contrast 
between the rational assessment of experts and the supposedly irrational assess- 
ment of laymen has not only disguised the true relationships in the current discus- 
sion about risk, but has also put considerable difficul~ics in the way of the dialogue 
between the two sides. The technological calculation of risk dimensions must be 
regarded a s  ern important component of any decision concerning risk sources and 
is also ern ideal instrument for  constantly improving the safety measures for  pro- 
tecting the public. However, the public is not disputing the fact! To make calcula- 
tions of this kind the sole criterion for  "acceptability" and/or "desirability" of 
technologies o r  of other civilizing r isk sources, however, contradicts the intuitive 
view of risk acceptance and is also unreasonable from political and social stand- 
points. This should not be misunderstood as a plea for  substituting scientific r isk 
assessment with risk perception analysis. The analysis of perception has also 
demonstrated that the assimilation of uncertainty ernd the intuitive mechanisms for 
coping with risks are biased by heuristics, personal experience. media coverage, 
and other factors. Modern societies cannot afford to substitute science with com- 
mon sense. 
If the purpose of science is to explain and predict phenomena. w e  can expect 
scientists to make a better job of prediction than other people. Otherwise science 
would be superfluous. Scientists have a better access to the collected general 
experience of society (empirical knowledge) and a r e  better trained to use sys- 
tematic and consistent models  of extrapolating past experience (methodological 
knowledge). The superior degree of accuracy does not mean, however, that 
experts a r e  not susceptible to  cognitive biases. errors ,  o r  misperceptions, but 
that they are less so than all the other members of society [u. the model of gra- 
duated rationality given by Renn (1981)l. 
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Therefore, r i sk  management has to  incorporate the results of r i sk  perception 
studies in two ways: 
(1) First, the dimensions of each r i sk  source o r  class of r i sk  sources that  are 
perceived as potential violations of the individual's own values o r  interests. 
(2) Second, the  prevalent trade-offs between conflicting values, e.g., cost versus 
environment, which reflects the desire of each citizen fo r  the living condi- 
tions preferred in the  future. 
In a pluralistic society the values of each citizen should have the  same impact 
on policymaking as those of experts o r  policymakers. The technical approach 
adopts those values that  experts  deem to be adequate with respect  to the problem. 
However, such an adequacy does not exist. The decision analytic approach feeds 
in the values of the client, usually the regulator. His or h e r  values are either  
homemade o r  reflect  the regulator's perception of what the public really wants. 
Asking the public directly seems to be the optimal solution, but is not as easy as it 
sounds. Values and beliefs are interrelated. If beliefs are erroneous o r  their  
underlying cognitive heuristics are biased, many values formed in accordance w i t h  
theory are distorted. Innovative survey methods combining attitude measure- 
ments, information, and participation have to be developed to m e e t  this new chal- 
lenge to  social science. A f irst  attempt in this direction has been made by a 
research team at the Nuclear Research Center, Jiilich, and the University of 
Wuppertal who have used the method of "planning cells" to investigate the prefer- 
ences of ordinary citizens f o r  future policies on r i sk  management (Dienel, 1980; 
Renn et ad., 1984). 
Risk perception is a complex phenomenon that requires more investigations 
on a multidisciplinary scientific level. For the purpose of r i sk  management it is 
essential to understand the structure of perception and to  recognize the  concerns 
Renn, 0. 
that  underlie the  overt resistance against modem technologies that impose risks 
on the  public. 
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POLICY PROCEDURES ON THE CARBON DIOXIDE QUESIION: 
RISK UNCERTAINTIES AND EXTREME EXE3TS 
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November 25-27, 1985. 
There is no doubt that atmospheric concentrations of C02 and other "greenhouse" 
gases have been increasing and will continue to  do so  for the next several decades 
at least. Climate modeb predict that this wil l  lead to a significant r i se  in world 
temperatures, particularly in the polar regions, during the next 50 - 100 years. 
However, there  is uncertainty about the timing and magnitude of the warming, as 
well as about the strategies that ought to be adopted to t ry  to reverse the  trend, 
or at least cope with it. 
I believe that the greatest single blunder in contemporary efforts to under- 
stand the practical implications of the carbon dioxide question is the continuing 
focus on "most likely" r a t h e r  than "possibleJ' impacts and consequences (I). In the 
short  run, the greatest single addition to usable knowledge about the carbon diox- 
ide question might well come from recasting i t  a s  a problem of risk assessment and 
management. 
Every responsible scientific assessment of the last several years has noted (if 
not always emphasized) how thoroughly uncertainties pervade the carbon dioxide 
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question. Both the  policy makers and the  scientists who write the  assessments are 
concerned tha t  continued releases of carbon dioxide and related substances might 
bring about changes in the  planet's climate, sea level, water flow, forest  produc- 
tivity, and agriculture that  would be  sufficiently la rge  to fundamentally alter t he  
s t ruc ture  and function of modern civilization. On the  o the r  hand, t he  changes 
might not occur  and, even i f  they do, might be  beneficial o r  might not be big 
enough t o  matter. How t o  weight these contending possibilities in assessing the  
practical implications of the carbon dioxide question is not clear. But experience 
with o ther  situations presenting a small chance of big changes makes it seems vir- 
tually certain that  the most useful approach will not be one which simply assumes 
tha t  t he  actual outcome wil l  lie half way between the  extremes. 
For most environmental questions where scientific uncertainty is important, 
the  policy analysis community has come t o  view i ts  task as one of r i sk  assessment 
and management. For the  carbon dioxide question, t he  policy analysis community 
has, almost without exception, ignored the  uncertainties and the i r  implications 
altogether (2). This lack of analytic attention has  lef t  t he  uncertainties in the  car- 
bon dioxide debate open to unconstrained use as propaganda by all extremes of the 
political spectrum. Those governments and o ther  part ies  tha t  simply don't like the 
policy implications of treating possible impacts of carbon dioxide and related issue 
seriously have found it convenient to declare that  the  uncertainties make any 
assessment premature. Those who do like the  policy implications have used the  
same uncertainties to support the i r  arguments fo r  precipitous action "just in 
case". A r i sk  assessment approach could not be expected to eliminate such pos- 
t u r i n g ~ .  I t  might, however, constrain them and provide more usable knowledge f o r  
those part ies  seriously interested in understanding t h e  practical implications of 
t he  carbon dioxide question (3). 
The methods of risk assessment are relatively w e l l  developed, and a healthy 
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critical dialogue now exists regarding their  strengths and weaknesses (4). General 
frameworks for  risk assessment in the  context of climate change have been dis- 
cussed by several authors (5). Early applications t o  problems of long t e r m  
environmental change were flawed in ways that  could have been avoided through 
bet ter  familiarity with the  basic methodological li terature. An example is  the  
National Defense University's naive use of expert  judgement distributions to 
characterize the  probability of various climate changes t o  the  year  2000 (Stewart 
and Glantz 1985). Several examples of good practice with useful results do exist, 
however, including the  work of the  Tukey Committee on Impacts of Stratospheric 
Change (National Research Council 1979a.b) and of Morgan et al. (1984) on deposi- 
tion and impacts of sulfur emissions f r o m  power plants. These could serve as 
models f o r  useful work on the  carbon dioxide question. The major obstacle to their  
application is the  absence of usable uncertainty estimates f r o m  the  scientific 
research community. 
Scientrnc uncertaint ies  in the carbon dioxide question: Until very 
recently, little effort had been made to provide systematic, quantitative estimates 
of the  scientific uncertainties relevant to the carbon dioxide question. A t  the 
level of basic data measurements and model calibration, of course, conventional 
e r r o r  ba r s  have often been provided. But these are not generally aggregated to 
give "higher level" uncertainty estimates of atmospheric concentrations of carbon 
dioxide or climate response. The f e w  higher level oonfidence limits that have been 
given, such as the Charney Committee's frequently cited average global tempera- 
ture increase of 1.5 to 4.5 degrees Centigrade (C) for a carbon dioxide doubling, 
have lacked explicit methodological foundation and almost certainly suffer f r o m  
the  same kinds of biases identified by Stewart and Glantz for the  NDU study (6). 
An example of what can be done through systematic efforts to estimate higher 
level uncertainties in the  carbon dioxide context is provided by Nordhaus and 
CLark, W.C. 
Yohe's (1983) study of possible global carbon dioxide emissions and concentrations 
to  the  year  2100. The authors used a simple globally aggregate model of energy 
economics, coupled it t o  an even simpler model  of atmospheric retention, estimated 
uncertainties fo r  the  component parameters, and calculated the  resulting range of 
emissions and concentrations using Monte Carlo simulation. A sample of their  
results fo r  the  year  2100 is  given in Figure 14. Note that  these calculations give a 
95% confidence l imi t  of about 450 t o  1450 ppm. 
The implications fo r  climate of such uncertainties in the  levels of future car- 
bon dioxide concentration have been explored by Dr. Robert Dickinson who, 
through his work with the-previously mentioned Tukey Committee, probably has as 
much experience with the  derivation of aggregate uncertainties as anyone in the  
atmospheric science community. Drawing on the  Nordhaus and Yohe analysis, and 
including his own estimates of uncertainties fo r  emissions of other  radiatively 
active trace gasses and fo r  climate sensitivity to such emissions, Dickinson (1985) 
calculated the  range of possible "greenhouse" warnings of the  earth 's  average cli- 
mate. He concludes that  by the year 2100 this could total more than 9 degrees C 
with a probability of about lo-' - 2 1/4 and more than 15 degrees C with a proba- 
bility of lo-' - 3 1/4 to lo-' - 4 1/4. Either possibility would produce "conditions 
as warm as the  Cretaceous era of 100 million years  ago when polar temperatures 
were 10 t o  20 degrees Centigrade (C) warmer and tropical temperatures were 
perhaps 5 degrees warmer than present" (Dickinson 1985). A substantial rise in 
sea level. perhaps accompanied by disintegration of the West Antarctic ice sheet  
and an ice free Arctic Ocean, would almost certainly accompany such a drastic 
change. 
If w e  knew for certain that  environmental changes of the  magnitude described 
by Dickinson would accompany continuing releases of carbon dioxide and other 
gasses to the  atmosphere, a number of extreme social responses could be both 
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economically justified and politically feasible. Common habit, however, has been to 
let the  very s m a l l  probabilities of drastic warming totally rule out consideration of 
such responses. To determine whether this habit is justified or rational would 
require that the probabflities of drastic impacts related to carbon dioxide be com- 
pared with probable drastic impacts of measures that might be taken in response 
to increasing concentrations of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gasses. The 
necessary analysis has not been done. As an illustrative example, however, it may 
be useful to consider some of the risks associated with possible responses to the 
carbon dioxide question that  involve substitution of nonfossil energy sources. 
The relative risks of response options: Large hydropower dams, fo r  example, 
have a probabiLity of failure of about lo-' - 4 1/4 pe r  dam-year (Weinberg 1985). 
A given new dam therefore has something on the order  of a - 2 1/4 chance of 
failing by the year  2100 - the  same chance that Dickinson gives a 9 degree C glo- 
bal warming. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission has set a design goal that 
would have light water reactors experience core damaging accidents at about the 
same rate as dams fail, i.e.. with a chance of lom2 - 4 1/4 or less p e r  reactor-year. 
or 10" - 2 1/4 p e r  reactor by the year 2100 (Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
1983). Most such accidents, like the one at Three Mile Island, would not kill any- 
one. In contrast, the  worst-case nuclear power accident envisioned by the  
Rasmussen Reactor Safety Study is predicted to cause 3000 early fatalities, 45000 
early illnesses, and a highly unoertain number of delayed cancer deaths among the  
10 million people exposed to radiation in the accident scenario (Nuclear Regula- 
tory Commission 1975). N o t e  that the  predicted casualties are thus of the sake 
order  as those actually resulting f r o m  the chemical disaster at Bhopal. The worst- 
case nuclear reactor accident w a s  given by the Rasmussen Study a probability of 
lo-' - 9 1/4 per reactor-year. Under reasonable assumptions about the growth of 
the nuclear power industry (i-e., 100 to 1000 LWRs in operation), this means that 
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the chance of such a worst-case nuclear power accident occurring somewhere in 
the world before 2100 is probably between - 4 l/4 and - 5 1/4. 
To the extent that one believes any of these figures. the chance that the world 
of 2100 will have witnessed a single local nuclear power catastrophe is probably 10 
and perhaps 10 times Less than the chance that everyone in the world will be living 
in a Cretaceous-like hothouse, perhaps with beaches several meters above their  
present levels. This assessment jars common sense, whioh is exactly why careful 
risk assessments of the carbon dioxide question and the possible social responses 
to  it should become a priority task. To enable such assessments. the  f irst  need is 
for  more scientific research to be focused directly on estimating the  uncertainty 
of important higher level components of the  carbon dioxide question. Moreover. it 
may be that research designed to  define and bound the uncertainties wil l  be of a 
qualitatively different nature than research designed to refine estimates of most 
likely outcomes (Dickinson 1985). These possibilities need t o  be seriously investi- 
gated and taken into account in funding priorities fo r  research on the practical 
implications of the  carbon dioxide question. 
Changing Frequencies of Extreme Environments 
Most efforts to  assess the practical implications of the carbon dioxide ques- 
tion have focussed on predicted o r  postulated changes in mean properties of the 
environment. Relevant studies of climate impact, for  example, have usually dealt 
with changes in m u d  o r  seasonal values for  temperature o r  precipitation. W e  
know, however, that some significant impacts of the environment on societies and 
ecosystems are due to extreme events, i.e., to fluctuations around the  mean condi- 
tion. And some of the best recent impact work has shown that one of the most use- 
ful forms in which climate change forecasts can be presented to policy people is a s  
changes in the frequency of significant climate anomolies (Parry et al., 1986). 
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Eztremes in time: Most of the  Literature on extremes deals with fluctuations 
in time. Some analysts have written of a split between analysts emphasizing the 
"slow change" and "extreme event" views (Warrick et al., 1985). The academic 
split has been reinforced by political disagreements over  the  relevance of short 
term versus long term impacts. This is not, however, a useful dichotomy. The 
overwhelming message of the  data is that the environment varies at all scales, and 
societies can respond to such variations at all scales. If carbon dioxide and 
related emissions change the  climate, they will change the  global means and the  
spatial distribution and the frequency of climatic anomdies. Societies could and 
probably would simultaneously respond to such changes at the  global and regional 
and local scales. The challenge is not to  select one scale as the  key to understand- 
ing, but r a t h e r  t o  understand the interactive roles played by environmental 
changes and social responses across the  overall spectrum of spatial and temporal 
scales. Efforts t o  meet this challenge should benefit substantially from recent stu- 
dies on the role of extreme events in determining the response of social and eco- 
logical systems to environmental change. Here I wil l  t r y  to clarify some of the 
aentral themes of that  writing, and to  suggest some useful points of departure for 
fur ther  research.  
The general thrust  of the "extreme event" argument in climate impact studies 
w a s  developed by Martin P m  (1978) and has been summarized by Wigley (1985) as 
follows: '7mpacts accrue... not so  much f r o m  s low fluctuations in the mean, but f r o m  
the  tails of the  distribution, from extreme events. In many cases, an  extreme can 
be defined as an  event where a cLimate variable exceeds some absolute threshold." 
There are two distinct components to  this argument: 1) the  relation between 
changes in mean environmental properties and the frequency with which specified 
extreme environmental conditions are exoeeded, and 2) the nonlinear o r  threshold 
responses of social, agricultural, and ecological systems that give those extreme 
environmental conditions the i r  significance. My discussion will focus (with most  of 
the  Literature) on t h e  problem of climate change, though the  argument should hold 
fo r  o the r  valued environmental components as well .  
Means a n d  h igher  moments: The most common assumption in t he  "extreme 
event" l i te ra ture  is t ha t  a shift  in the mean climate occurs  with no shift in variabil- 
ity. Fukui (1979) introduced this convenient relationship at t he  World Climate 
Conference with his oft-reproduced figure of t w o  bell curves of precipitation, 
identical except f o r  t h e  relative displacement of the i r  means. There is, however, 
little reason to expect  tha t  actual changes in mean  climate would preserve  varia- 
bility. Dickfnson (1985) has pointed out that t he  General Circulation Models (GCMs) 
presently used t o  evaluate the  mean climate changes resulting from increased 
greenhouse gasses actually simulate a wide range of weather and climate fluctua- 
tions. Their output could be sampled to yield a grea t  variety of more realistic vari- 
ability statistics. A t  present,  however, the assessment community has generated 
insufficient demand f o r  part icular  variability statistics to keep them from being 
discarded by climate modelers who find more meaning and less confusion fn simple 
means. This waste could be  avoided if t he  impact assessment cornmunity could come 
to agreement on what kfnds of variability data  would be most  useful f o r  t h e  
modelers to save. I wi l l  have more to say on this shortly. 
m e  probabi l i ty  of ezceeding a r b i t r a r y  vdues:  Because of t he  bell-like 
shape of most  climate variability distributions, t he  frequency with which an arbi- 
trary value of climate will be  exceeded can be very  sensitive to changes in the  
mean and higher moments of t he  distribution. Mearns et al. (1984) calculate this 
sensitivity f o r  changes in weather variability. Wigley (1985) provides a graphical 
summary for normally distributed propert ies  in the  form of Figure 15. He argues 
tha t  "a change in the  mean by one standard deviation would transform the  1-in-20 
yea r  extreme to something that  could be  expected perhaps 1 yea r  in 4, while the  
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1-in-100 year extreme becomes a l-in-11 year event. Changes in the probability of 
two successive extremes are even larger." Which of these transformations is most 
significant fo r  assessing the practical implications of carbon dioxide- related 
environmental changes? There is no purely statistical reason to focus on the l-in- 
20 or 1-in-100 or 3 -consecutive- bad- years scenarios. But if the extreme event 
perspective is not to  become a mindless quest for  all manner of variability statis- 
tics, then the assessment community will have t o  tell the climate modelers and 
other environmental scientists just which changes In what extreme events most 
concern them. Some general guidelines have been discussed by Par ry  and Carter 
(1985). Once again, however, rea l  progress requires that  the assessment commun- 
ity devote much more attention to  characterizing the specific "thresholds" that 
matter in particular social and emlogical systems. 
Thresholds and nodinear impacts: The key to the whole "extreme event" 
argument is the existence of threshold o r  nonlinear responses of social or ecologi- 
cal impacts to changes in climate. If impacts over a given period were directly 
proportional to  the total amount of rain o r  heat o r  whatever provided by the fluc- 
tuating climate over that  period, then knowledge of the mean climate for the  
period would provide all the information w e  needed to predict or explain the 
impact. For some social activities like transportation, such a linear (additive) 
relationship between climate and impact may indeed be the case (Palutikof, 1983). 
For many other properties of interest, however, the relationship between climate 
and impact is highly non linear, and the distribution of extremes relative to thres- 
hold levels may therefore be significant in assessing the practical implications of 
climate change. 
An additional dimension of the nonlinear response argument is fundamental to  
(but often only implicit in) the "extreme events" view of climate impacts. Parry 's  
(1978) pathbreaking work on the significance of extreme events in assessing t h e  
Clark, W.C. 
impact of climate change on society focussed on the abandonment of marginal farm- 
ing land when successive extremes of bad weather exhausted farmers' adaptive 
buffers. The key nonlinearity o r  threshold in Parry 's  farming system w a s  that  
once the buffers w e r e  exhausted and the farmer abandoned the land, a return of 
several years of unusually good weather would not bring the land back under cul- 
tivation, even though the  biological capacity f o r  production had been restored. 
What had not been restored was the stock of labor, capital and social s tructure 
necessary to sustain farming in the area. These could be destroyed by a few years 
of bad weather, but only restored through a much longer run of good weather. 
Multiple equilibria: The cases cited here provide specific examples of the 
properties of multiple equilibria and bifurcation found in many nonlinear social, 
ecological, and physical systems, especially those operating a t  multiple time scales 
(7) .  Typically in such systems, slow variation in one property can continue fo r  long 
periods without noticeable impact on the rest of the  s y s t e m .  Eventually, however, 
the s y s t e m  reaches a state in which its buffering capacity o r  resilience has been 
so  reduced that  additional small changes in the same property, o r  otherwise insig- 
nificant external shocks push the s y s t e m  across a threshold and precipitate a 
rapid transition to a new s y s t e m  state o r  equilibrium. Once this rapid transition 
has commenced, reversal  of the s l o w  variation trend, removal of the external 
shock, or other returns across the threshold g e n e r d y  do not restore the system 
t o  its original equilibrium. Like an automobile driver caught in the one-way 
streets of a big city, getting back t o  the place just passed requires a circuitous 
and time consuming journey. Recent reviews of such discontinuous, imperfectly 
reversible change in ecological systems (HolLing 1985) and sociotechnical systems 
(Brooks 1985) provide a number of rea l  world examples and the beginnings of a 
general understanding of the key processes and relationships involved. 
The time is r ipe f o r  the "extreme event" element of the  carbon dioxide debate 
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to  tap this emerging understanding. The goal should be to  describe what kinds of 
thresholds a r e  relevant to the way social and ecological systems will  respond to 
carbon dioxide- related changes, what kinds of events a r e  sufficiently extreme t o  
push those systems across their  respective thresholds, and how the  frequency of 
those events wi l l  respond t o  increases in carbon dioxide and related emissions. 
Progress towards meeting these goals wil l  first of all require analyses of the 
stress responses of specific social and ecological systems that  a r e  sufficiently 
detailed and reaListic to capture the  multi-equilibrium. multi-time scale, imper- 
fectly reversible phenomena alluded to above. The research program of Martin 
Pa r ry  and his colleagues at the International Institute for Applied Systems 
Analysis (8) shows how such studies can be done for a wide range of agricultural 
systems. Exciting beginnings have also been made in the study of relevant forest 
ecosystem response characteristics (9). 
Still needed are efforts to extract from such studies characterizations of the 
specific kinds of changes in variability and extremes that  impact assessors would 
find most useful as a research output from climatologists, atmospheric chemists 
and other  environmental scientists. When such specific characterizations have 
been made of which environmental extremes would have what significant practical 
implications, i t  wil l  be reasonable t o  ask that  research in the natural sciences 
begin to focus on the  carbon dioxide-related changes in the  the distribution of 
those extremes that  might be encountered in the future. 
Eztremes in  space: The question of extremes in space has been much less dis- 
cussed than that  of extremes in time. It  is not clear, however, that  the  spatial 
issue is any less important. Experience of the  last two decades shows, not surpris- 
ingly, that when droughts occur simultaneously in several major grain exporting 
areas the practical impLications f o r  the world food picture a r e  much more serious 
than when the  same overall rainfall deficit is distributed evenly, o r  concentrated 
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in less critical zones (Hopkins and Puchala 1978). Flohn (1980) suggested that to 
the extent that  droughts or other climatic anomolies (i.e., extremes) have a 
characteristic spatial scale, nations significantly larger  than that  scale should be 
less vulnerable to cLfmate fluctuations than nations significantly smaller. Under 
changing mean climates, however, the spatial scale and locations of anomolies may 
also shift. Both model and analog studies of carbon dioxide-related climate 
changes indeed suggest that  the globally averaged values of temperature, precipi- 
tation, and other properties cm be expected to vary significantly through space. 
Some regions may even become cooler as the global average temperature 
increases. The question remains virtually unasked, however, of whether carbon 
dioxide related climate changes are likely to change the scale and location of 
anomolies in ways that are particularly significant fo r  societies (10). 
As in the case of changes in the temporal distribution of climatic extremes, 
the  f irst  s tep in addressing the problem mus t  be fo r  the assessment community to 
specify the  kinds of spatial anomolies - their  sizes, locations and relationships to 
one another - that  could have a disproportionate impact on society. Parry 's  work 
on climatically marginal areas again provides one of the strongest beginnings w e  
have, but much m o r e  work in this direction is needed (e.g., Pa r ry  et al., 1986). The 
climatologists and other environmental scientists could then focus their  studies on 
determining how Lfkely such specific spatial extremes might be in a future of car- 
bon dioxide-related changes. 
In concLusion: The carbon dioxide debate has now reached a stage at which 
fur ther  advances in coping with its practical implications will require much closer 
integration of political and environmental perspectives than has until how been the 
case. Many approaches should be exposed, including the "polex" recommend at the 
recent ViLlach Conference on Greenhouse Gases. But whatever the details of the 
approach, the practical implications of risk uncertainty and extreme events will 
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have to be dealt with more rigorously. This note has sketched some directions that 
work on these central issues might pursue. Some form of policy exercise, aimed at 
writing future histories of the  carbon dioxide problem and societies' responses to 
it, seems to offer the  most likely prospects for fostering such integration. Over 
the  interval leading to the  next Villach Conference, several experimental policy 
exercises might profitably be  conducted, each involving perhaps a dozen of the 
most informed and creative scholars and policy people concerned with the  carbon 
dioxide question. The only way to discover whether w e  would really learn some- 
thing useful from such an experiment will  be to try it. At a minimum, I suspect it 
would be fun. 
Notes 
1 )  This paper is dmwn from a longer version (W.C. Clark, 1986. On the  practical 
implications on the  carbon dioxide question. WMO, Geneva) prepared f o r  the  
WMO/ICSU/UNEP International Assessment of the Role of Carbon Dioxide, and other  
radioactively active constituents, in climate variations and associated impacts 
(Villach, Austria, October 1985). 
2) The most notable exoeption is Nordhaus and Yohe's (1983) analysis of uncer- 
tainties in energy emissions performed fo r  the  US National Research Council 
(1983) study of the carbon dioxide question. The carbon dioxide studies of the US 
Environmental Protection Administration have made s o m e  useful beginnings on the 
treatment of uncertainties. The US Department of Energy's has repreatedly spo- 
ken of its plans f o r  addressing uncertainties of the  carbon dioxide question. The 
studies implementing those plans were not officially available fo r  review at the 
time this essay was  completed. It  seems, however, that  the joint work of J. 
Edmonds, J. Reilly and R. Gardner on uncertainties in carbon dioxide emissions and 
atmospheric retention will provide a significant additional perspective to that  of 
Nordhaus and Yohe. 
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3) I have explored this question in some depth in Clark (1985d). 
4) See, f o r  example, the forthcoming proceedings of the US National Academy of 
Engineering's "Symposium on Hazards: equity, incentives, compensation" (Washing- 
ton, June 3-4, 1985); National Research Council (1982); and SCOPE (1980). 
5) See, f o r  example, Heal (1984) and Winkler et al. (1983). 
6) See, f o r  example, National Research Council (1979d. 1983) and Rotty (1979). 
7) The general phenomenon is known as "hysteresis" in the literature of topology 
and catastrophe theory. For specific applications see Holling (1985) f o r  ecologi- 
cal systems, Day (1981) f o r  economic systems, Lorenz (1984) f o r  climatological sys- 
tems, and Brooks (1985) f o r  sociotechnical systems. 
8)  This program is briefly described in WMO (1984) and documented in full in Par ry  
et al. (1986). 
9) See, fo r  example. Shugart (1984), Emanuel et al. (1985). Kauppi and Posch 
(1985) and Solomon et al. (1984). 
10) I am not a w a r e  of any analysis of spatial changes from GCM results. Some we- 
ful perspectives are provided by various efforts to construct scenarios of warmer 
climates based on historical data. See, fo r  example, Jaeger and Kellogg (1983)' 
William (1980), Wigley et al. (1981). Vinnikov and Kovyeva (1983). Pittock and Sal- 
inger (1982), and Palutikof et al. (1984). Flohn (1980) is one of the few scholars to 
address directly the question of changes in spatial scale that might accompany a 
changing climate. 
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C O ~ N I C A T I O N  STRATEGIES M CRISES SITUATIONS 
Patrick Lagadec 
Ecole Polytechnique, Paris 
ABSTRACT 
A t  the time of major risk, those organizations in charge can find themselves 
facing huge problems of communication a s  a result of technological breakdowns. 
This brings in its wake operational paralysis and a destruction of public image 
which might be described as extremely worrying, to phrase it  mildly. A lack of 
equipment and especially a heritage of a less demanding past-awareness of risk 
realities, which did not require such great internal mobilization. such highly 
developed external networks, such close links with the media and public opinion, 
has often led to spectacular failures. One needs to have a thorough look a t  the dos- 
sier again, in all its complexity, in order to t ry to give a clearer definition to 
better considered preparation of strategies of communication. 
W e  will first examine in this text (1) the classic scenario which leads the first 
difficulties into a quagmire which swiftly swamps an ever-growing number of par- 
ties concerned. How should the challenge be met? (11) Understanding the situation 
- a game of numerous partners - fashioning new tools and rules constitutes a first 
step in the right direction. But one must guard against allowing oneself to become 
too readily fascinated by some over-simplified model: attitudes and reactions are 
largely determined by the "mentalities" of the organizations concerned; crisis 
situations are highly conflicting; the stakes a r e  often considerable. In part  three 
(111) this text touches on those delicate issues which a r e  the heart of the stra- 
tegies of the handling of a crisis. 
PRESENTATION 
'The waste from Seveso: is it  in France?" (1). 
"Is the North Sea drowning in Uranium?" (2). 
%ue de la Magdaleine, in Rheims: is dioxin fn residence a t  No.21?" (3). 
Dioxin drums from Seveso, the wreck of the Mont-Louis with its drums of 
uranium hexafluoride, the explosion of an Alkarel transformer in Rheims (150 km 
east of Paris): these three affairs which occurred recently in Europe have shown 
us only too wel l  how crucially important communications a r e  in post-accident situa- 
tions - even when risks a r e  not excessive. When disaster can strike on a grand 
scale, a s  i t  did in Bhopal, then i t  is more than time to create new ways of coping. 
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The possibility of an event of enormous gravity; the disconcerting incertitude 
which marks the phenomena at play; the complexity of the organizational systems 
implicated; the rapidly developing domino effect which continues to  spread in the 
ensuing months and hits hard and irreparably at multiple and colossal interests 
("Union Cabide fights fo r  its life" (4)); the irresistible power of the media when it 
trains its cameras on the "fissure" ... have now become the  factors which structure 
post-accident dynamics (5 to  8). 
In such a highly turbulent context, "getting through" - communication - 
becomes a strategic factor of prime importance. We are not. let us insist, talking 
here  of communication as simply a superstructure whose sole concern is  t o  protect 
a public image in some way, but r a the r  of a vital key without which there  is a huge 
risk of even losing the  capacity of immediate action; and from there  on slipping 
rapidly from hesitation into a skid. and from a skid into a scientific, technical, 
organizational, economic and political swamp. 
Communication holds this key role fo r  fundamental reasons: 
The problems posed are technically difficult to define: diagnoses can only be 
established if numerous experts  are in liaison. 
Interests. points of view. attitudes, "mentalities" which have to be taken into 
account are those of a very wide and diversified range of concerns: decisions 
can only be reached through extended consultations and joint-efforts. 
Notions of probability and conviction (less of certitude) are central points of 
reference in the procedures adopted: the  chosen options can only acquire a 
firm operational nature if they are regarded as pertinent and credible by the 
majority of those concerned (especially when the phenomena remain invisible 
and so  cannot be perceived by the senses). 
These events take place while the media puts all under permanent and particu- 
larly acute pressure, with Little o r  no let  up over an extended period: mani- 
festly inadequate information leads in no time to stinging failures. 
A better  informed public is more exigent than w a s  the case in the past, and at 
t imes  immediately suspicious as a result of attitudes adopted until recently 
with regard to information. This public develops a resolute suspicion at the 
f i r s t  signs of incoherence, and is radically rejectful at the slightest hint of 
dissimulation. Any difficulty o r  failure in communication leads rapidly to  a fir- 
ing of ill-conceived, even wild accusations at all and sundry: a veritable 
gangrene, this, in all fragile postaccident situations. 
Immediate operational action. such as the long term exercising of economic 
and administrative responsibilities. demands communications of a very high quality. 
The internal communications of the organizations concerned, inter-organizational 
communications, communications with the public via the media (or  directly, in case 
of extreme urgency): experience shows just how necessary it is to  master these 
multiple lines of communication. 
Here is where w e  are going to  concentrate our  attention in o rder  to  try to  
view more clearly: 
The most common p i ~ a l l s :  on such an explosive field of action a clear per- 
ception of "natural" e r r o r s  is a preliminary and indispensable requisite. It  is 
important to  emphasize he re  that instructions and rvles of response concern- 
ing a crisis situation should thus carry an initial heading: "Actions you will 
almost certainly take, and which you must avoid at all costs". 
The necessary ab i l i t i es  and  tactical tools: this concerns the assembling of 
all the key factors in order  to constrvct a communication base with respect to  
the crisis situation (an analytic and dynamic table of all parties concerned; 
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working guides to  operate in this complex set-up). 
Crucial q u e s t i o n s  jbr the  es tab l i sh ing  of s t ra teg ies  of communication: 
rarely w e l l  pinpointed, these questions weigh heavily on the implicit choices 
made in controlling communication, and rush one into the dangerous reflex 
action mentioned above, s o  hindering the triggering off of proper responses 
and required techniques. Work undertaken at this level must at all times lead 
t o  the avoidance of failures, and, more positively speaking, leave ones think- 
ing unfettered, and ready t o  introduce any required innovation whatsoever. 
Let us emphasize, here,  that the simple search fo r  "techniques" of communi- 
cating remain quite inadequate, even if it is. the  case that  they provide useful 
assistance - as w e  will, indeed, demonstrate later in the text. The point is ra ther ,  
though. to weigh up all aspects of the  problems thoroughly, s o  that  it is  possible to 
build in-depth strategies of communication as required by present-day post- 
accident situations. 
1. UNDER THE WEIGHT OF THE EVENT: ALG COMMUNICATIONS DISINTEGRATE 
The event takes place. It  imposes its law: turbulence, elusiveness, continual 
new developments. What is important is to be able to arrest this whirlwind which 
threatens to  ca r ry  all off with it through a process of wearing down, explosion, 
implosion ... But before attempting to d r a w  up a list of tactical recommendations, i t  
would be advisable to stop and take stock of what experience has taught us. This 
w e  wil l  try t o  do here,  using a consciously simplified analysis. 
1-1. Rapid failure. arrived at through three convergent paths 
1.1.1. Technical and organizational problenw characteristic of a state 
crisis 
With regard t o  the  number of major problems radically affecting the dispatch- 
ing and reception of communication, one might he re  cite: 
- Problems of t r a n s m i t t i n g  ir4fonnation 
Here w e  have a basic problem: the  means of enabling the  ready conveying of 
information in post-accident situations are regularly lacking. Having a cen- 
tral telephone system on site, as was the  case when 216.000 persons had to be 
evacuated in Mississauga (near Toronto, where on 10  November 1979 there  w a s  
a rail accident involving a chlorine car) ,  comes under the  category of the  
anachronistic. The jamming of telephone lines, the  impossibility of getting 
through t o  those in charge (duties not carr ied out, o r  carr ied out by unquali- 
fied personnel) are the  classic obstacles. The same scenario in Mexico. follow- 
ing the earthquake in September 1985, with the  loss of the  communications 
building, an unprotected strategic point. Likewise in Andorra, during the  
floods of November 1982, where communications w i t h  the  outside broke down - 
two central telephone exchanges (linking Andorra to  France and Spain 
respectively) housed in neighboring premises, both disappeared under Lakes 
of mud. Men had to be sent out on foot to sound the alarm (9). 
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- Roblems of unders tanding  messages 
Informing the population in cases of disaster is a determining factor.  A care- 
ful reading of emergency plans can have some surprises in s tore  a t  times. For 
instance, in Canvey Island (England, an industrial s i te  on the  Thames estuary), 
the  handout issued to  the  teachers in the zone stated that  they were to  lift 
children onto the tables should a "heavyJ' gas cloud descend over the  schools, 
but that the children should be made to  lie down flat under the tables if the 
gas were relatively "LightJ'. What w a s  hardly made clear  w a s  how the  teacher 
should ar r ive  at such a diagnosis. In the area surrounding the Union Carbide 
factory - meanwhile - the  object of very particular attention in the  wake of 
the  Bhopal accident, as Newsweek reports  (LO), f e w  people were aware of how 
they should react in cases of emergency. Admittedly, according to the  plant 
spokesman, a letter outlining the  plant's emergency programs had been 
addressed t o  them every year  since 1975 - but f e w  had received it. And 
Newsweek goes on to  state: 'Tf they had, they might still be confused. Accord- 
ing to  the  letter, two three-second blasts of the  plant's whistle m e a n s  a f i re  o r  
medical emergency; th ree  three-second blasts means a gas release; two -  
second blasts every three  seconds fo r  two minutes means a major disaster, 
with two-second blasts every 30 seconds until the  danger has passed. (Last 
year,  when a valve broke on a chemical barge moored at the  plant and a 
neighborhood had to be evacuated at 3 a.m., most people were sleeping with 
the  windows closed and never heard the  whistle.) Instructions fo r  what to do 
next are equally confusing: If the wind is  blowing favorably, stay put. If the 
wind is blowing toward you from the  plant, evacuate <<by going crosswind>>. 
< a n  some cases, you can see the  fumes a s  a white clouds>>, the  letter added. 
<<However, this i s  not always the  case so  don't depend on your eyes>> (10, 
p.40 and 44). 
- Technical incer t i tude  
If the m e a n s  of transmitting exists, one must still have something to  communi- 
cate. Here one hits a second problem: the  impossibility of making a rapid 
diagnosis. Take Seveso in July 1976: no-one knows how much dioxin escaped. 
nor the exact toxicity of the product. A t  Three Mile Island, the chief technical 
officer (H-Denton, NRC Commissioner) speaks of anl'Einsteinian black hole" 
(11, p.206). A s  fo r  Bhopal, Union Carbide, denied access to  the site, is lacking 
information (12). 
- Organizational con&sion 
The Three Mile Island (TMI) case is  a model of the  genre. The Governor is 
advised by the  federal bureau of the NRC (Nuclear Regulatory Commission) to 
prepare  himself fo r  the  imminent evacuation of one million persons, whilst the 
same agency's regional bureau orders no such a thing. Moreover, no evacua- 
tion plans are available, seeing that the  possibility of such a scenario has 
always been excluded (the local authorities received written affirmation of 
this under the  double signature of the  operator of TMI and the  regulatory 
authorities). The mayors threaten the  Governor with taking unilateral meas-  
ures as a result of the  authorities shortcomings. 
Such problems do not remain without effect. The void of information being 
intolerable for  those in charge of operations and even more so, for  the  public com- 
munication channels are soon abounding in contradictory messages whose reliabil- 
ity becomes increasingly questionable. Such has been the  case on TMI, where the 
mayors no longer know whom they shoulc! trust: "Use your own judgment. W e  dare  
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not tell you to leave your homes" (13, p.111). A general absolution has been 
granted in the  local parishes ... (14). 
And a second line of breakdown appears t o  render the situation more fragile. 
1-1-2. A crisis-generating "mentality": the reticence m i r e d  
by information about the risk 
Numerous cases give ample demonstration of the inhibition felt. Quite obvi- 
ously, caution and intelligence are not to  be frowned upon, as w e  will be reiterat- 
ing further  on - the  vehicle of the media, in particular, not being exempt from p r e  
ducing the undesirable, to put i t  mildly. But what should be  emphasised here  is  less 
the necessity of knowing how to cope, than the  irresistible compulsion of which 
those in charge often show themselves to be prisoners. Deep-rooted reflexes 
drastically inhibit the margin of mental maneuverability and lead almost immedi- 
ately to "suicidal" points-of-no-return. 
Practically with no delay and with a regularity which borders on caricature, 
the following mechanisms appear as soon as there i s  a faflure o r  threa t  of a major 
problem: 
Silence heavily  marked by  embarrassment 
The very f irs t  reflex is  to d r a w  a veil over  technical breakdowns. So as not t o  
"panic the  population". In order  that  the public image should not be tarnished 
in any way. In o rde r  to be spared "a media test". Or, more profoundly still, 
because the  acknowledgement of difficulties would go against the  unwritten 
rule: equipment and the experts  are both infallible (this i s  the  central point 
of reference of a scientific and technical society with too many milk teeth). 
Information not being slow to filter through, those in charge rapidly find 
themselves in an embarrassingly defensive position ... from which they 
attempt to extricate themselves by a route which exacerbates the i r  strategic 
position still further .  
- The relentless denzal of r i sk  
Let us return once more to Seveso. It took a fortnight before it was ack- 
nowledged that  the situation w a s  one fo r  concern, and to abandon declarations 
of the "everything is  under control" variety. And not before the  Hoffmann-La 
Roche director  of medical research had thrown the  cat among the  pigeons by 
declaring "the situation is  very serious indeed. requiring draconian meas- 
ures"; in short,  removing the top 20cm. of earth,  burying the  factory and des- 
troying the  houses" (15, p.14). While the regional minister of health attempted 
a final evasion: "I have the  impression", he said, "that this person is bluffing, 
and a m  not convinced that  the  gentleman concerned i s  as aware of the gravity 
of his declarations as he ought t o  be" (16, p.18). This complete denial contin- 
ued through to the  most damaging capitulation f o r  an authority. Scarcely had 
the  gravity of the  situation been denied f o r  the last time, in the  most solemn 
tones, when i t  w a s  felt  that  one w a s  going to have to "accept the  evidence" and 
let the  evil drop. Thus, this communique issued by the  Lombard authorities at 
the  conclusion of the i r  exhausting battle.against reality: "179 persons wi l l  
have to evacuate the i r  premises within the  next 24 hours"(15, p.14). 
- Iqjbnnation given as a rearguard act ion 
The principal is a general one: defeat follows on the heels of defeat, as the 
re t rea t  is conducted In an increasingly clumsy manner, the authority digging 
in to try t o  defend, at each stage, positions already lost. The enormous confu- 
sion which reigns, imposes its law, as in Seveso. "Crumbs of information w e r e  
handed out, following a calculated system of reticence, misrepresentation and 
partial admission (which were given, o r  else extracted), affirmations and 
denials; all this being conducted in such a manner that the elements of certi- 
tude remain invisible and, in particular for  the population affected, com- 
pletely elusive - so much so, in fact, that the most extraordinary reasonings 
and conclusions end up by making it impossible for  those involved to react  as 
the circumstances require they should "(17, p.89-90). 
- Blank r-sarl, to the point of provocation 
A t  Three Mile Island. Metropolitan Edison's Vice-President (J. Herbein) 
declared at one press conference: '7 don't see why w e  need to ... tell you each 
and everything that w e  do specifically" (13, p.120). The Presidential report  
comments: ?It was that remark that essentially eliminated any credibility Her- 
bein and Met. Ed. had left with the press" (13, p.120). 
There you have only some of the features of the dynamic which can develop. 
One could go on t o  review the miscellaneous array of defense mechanisms identified 
by Freud. Any and all might be used in this systematic evasive action - rationalising 
featuring very high, in the second row of action behind bald negation. And what is 
more, this doggedly determined denial, stifling lucidity, is only more marked in 
contact with the media; though the same scenario is played out within the very 
organization itself and between the organizations in charge: 
This is  why one very often sees that the senior management of a corporation is 
informed very belatedly, each echelon not reporting the problem to its supe- 
r io r  echelon until i t  is already too late. In a certain case which w e  have made 
a ve'ry close study of, the top management w a s  more o r  less assured right until 
the end (the explosion of the affair in the media) that the situation was not at 
all one to cause concern. 
The case of the accident in Taft, Louisianna (a Union Carbide plant, an 
accident involving an acrolein tank, 1982) illustrates what reticence there is 
to inform the other organizations concerned; the management refusing 
throughout the episode to establish the proper relations with the relief, res- 
cue and public order authorities (18), which naturally gave r ise to unbearable 
situations of confusion and tension. The public, hearing rumors of an evacua- 
tion of personnel from the factory, started calling the Emergency Operation 
Center to enquire what evacuation routes the law and order authorities had 
chosen ... only to discover that the authorities appeared completely in the 
dark. 'Zvacuation? ... What evacuation?" asked the surprised authorities. 
Worse w a s  yet to come. When the specialists arrived at the site, at the author- 
ities request, they were taken in hand by ... the public relations department, 
with no access to the technical crew. "Nobody knew nothing. nobody w a s  tel- 
ling us anything", one of the officials observed (18, p.29). And, in the midst of 
all this, the authorities were responsible for  having 17,000 persons evacu- 
ated, blocking off the  Mississipi for  50 miles, and preparing themselves to 
face up to the worst - the damaged tank, to  make matters even more alarming, 
being extremely close to  five other acrolein tanks. 
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Everything i s  conducted as though any information concerning risk were per- 
ceived of as f a r  too "deLicate" to b e  handled by obscure mechanisms, themselves as 
elusively shadowy as t he  reality posing problem. 
A s  one wi l l  see immediately. however, technological risks,  major accidents, 
cannot benefit from any r ight  to absolute secrecy in a society of open and f r e e  
communication. On the  contrary: anything which potentially affects  a l a rge  number 
of people, anything out of t he  daily routine, will find those whose work i t  i s  to keep 
the  public informed concentrating the  greatest attention on it. This mentality, some 
of whose contours have just been mapped out, collides head on against another  
mentality, t ha t  of t he  media. equipped as i t  is  with m e a n s  and powers it proves sui- 
cidal to challenge lightly. 
1.1.3. The norms and practices in a society of open information 
Information can no longer be reported in a thoroughly "anaesthetised" way 
f o r  t he  "outside world" once the  affair  has  been brought to a conclusion. having 
been directed in an honorable fashion. A radical change has come about. Any sys- 
t e m  which fails, can no longer be  considered as isolated from the  observation and 
action of sundry third parties.  
Major r isk (which does not respec t  the boundaries of t h e  plants). on t h e  one 
hand, and the  development of our society of communication, on the  o the r  hand, 
demands tha t  t h e r e  should be quite different mental checkpoints. Affected e i ther  
directly or potentially, t he  public is e v e r  more vigilant and concerned. The media 
now take  an interest in what has become a problem f o r  everybody, and not only a 
question of t he  internal activity of an enterprise.  This would often appear  to 
escape the  observation of those in charge, still. labouring under the  conviction 
tha t  factory premises of fer  some sort of absolute protection and tha t  t he  economic 
activity. in general, comes under the  aegis of "reason of State", preserving i t  in 
advance from any "outside interference". 
Here then w e  have industrial activity exposed to the high winds of public opin- 
ion and the  media. The TMI case (just an example among many o thers  one might have 
chosen), enables one to m e a s u r e  t he  magnitude of t he  challenge to be met by any 
who discover the  rules  of his new world. 
- Ihe Lightning speed tuifh which criticcrl i m r m a t i o n  can spread 
"A Harrisburg music station broke the  story of TMI-2 on i ts  8:25a.m. newscast. 
The station t raff ic  r e p o r t e r  uses an automobile equipped with a CB radio to 
gather  his information. About 8:OOa.m. he heard tha t  police and f i r e  fighters 
were mobilfzing h Middletown and relayed this to his station. me] news 
d i rec tor  c u e d  TMI and asked f o r  a public relation official. He w a s  connected 
instead with the  control r o o m  to a man who told him: "I can't taZk now we've 
got a problem" [13, p.1031 - and to telephone Met Ed's headquarters. He 
finally reached the  company's manager of communication services who said 
the re  w a s  a general emergency: 'There's no danger off-site. N o  danger to the  
general public" [13, p.1041. ''I t r ied to tone i t  down so people wouldn't b e  
alarmed" the  radio d i rec tor  declared to the  President's Commission [13, 
p.1043. "At 9:06a.m. the  Associated P res s  filed i ts  f i r s t  story - a brief 
dispatch teletyped to newspaper, television, and radio news rooms across the 
nation. The story contained only six sentences in six paragraphs, but i t  
a ler ted editors to what would become one of the  most heavily reported news 
stor ies  of 1979" [13, p.1041. 
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- InJonnation not flowing in the usual direction 
A s  a result of the power and maneuverability of the media. the officials barely 
have breathing time to call a discreet committee meeting in order to discuss 
how and when the information should be made available. The classic pro- 
cedures fly out the door, the news already being on the a i r  before it  has been 
possible to contact quite a number of officials: they will  learn the news 
through the radio stations. 
- The formidable power of the media 
'Reporters took down License numbers a t  each shift a t  the plant; got the 
names and addresses from the state motor vehicle department ... Then (they) 
started knocking on doors. Many employees w e r e  belligerent, most were 
exhausted but fifty agreed to interviews"[l9, p.481. 'Tarked directly across 
the Susquehanna from the plant, Nordland (a reporter) tooled with his fancy 
scanner radio searching for  TMI transmissions. Nothing on the utility band nor 
the police band. He switched to a frequency the i n s t ~ c t i o n  booklet said w a s  
reserved for  "federal interagency cooperation during nuclear war". And they 
were thereN[19, p.521. 
- The media. a power which reserves the right not to be held u p  to ridicule. 
One might quote the commentary of a European radio ("RTL" - Radio Tele Lux- 
embourg) Washington correspondent, broadcast on 2 April 1979. It shows that 
in a crisis, the henceforth classic 'Washington-Post/Watergaten model  can 
somewhat upset the fine prescription "reason of St9te/Economic reason", if 
the official communication appears too suspect. 'What irritates Americans is 
the feeling that they are being badly, very badly informed. The spokesman for 
the owner company of the plant announced right from the start that every- 
thing is just fine. He is obviously lying. As for  govenunent experts. their opin- 
ion alters every two hours. So. what Americans s e e m  unwilling to put up with is 
that nobody has the honesty to come out into the open and say: 'We just don't 
know what is going to happen". On this same note everybody noticed in Le 
Monde, April 1979, a scathing caricature bearing the simple caption: "Ameri- 
can engineers are asses" - signed: "EDF". (Note: EDF = Electricite de 
France). 
These three paths slide steadily together, their negative effects combining. 
Organizations put barricades up from the inside, consequently their networks 
become deaf and blind and information filters through under the worst possible 
conditions. The media take a close interest in the accident - by now transformed 
into a darkly mysterious affair. The difficulties experienced serve only to 
increase the strain felt by one and all. The "mentalities" mentioned only serve to 
weigh heavier on people's responses: problems mushroom ... one teeters towards 
the precipice and topples over the brink. 
1.2. How giant quagmires are formed 
The cases most pertinent for  analysis a r e  precisely those which presented the 
least effective risks, and which produced catastrophes which were almost entirely 
media events. We will  take three recent examples, concentrating our attention on 
the initial phases of those episodes - decisive moments in the dynamic of all crises. 
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1-2-1. The "Sevew drund'affaira 
This is the biggest "media-affair" France (and even Europe) has ever known 
concerning the environment. For two whole months, the suspense more often than 
not monopolising the front pages of the newspaper; Europe was trying to track 
down 41 drums of waste material from Seveso. It is an affair abundantly rich in the 
matter of communication, revealing how it is possible, a t  every instant, to maintain 
a crisis a t  its apex of activity, by continually distilling half-truths, half-lies, half- 
denials, implicating some new party with every passing day, everything and every- 
one unfailingly coated in a thick, muddy layer of confusion-dissimulation apt, quite 
naturally, to provoke the most searching enquiries [20]. 
Without entering into every single one of these points. here  w e  will take a look 
a t  a relatively little emphasised aspect of this crisis (which exploded on 25 March 
1983 with the publication of a bombshell article in the journal "Science et Vie"). 
W e  wi l l  examine how communications during the affair, from a s  early as October 
1982, set in motion the conditions most favourable for  the development of a crisis. 
- 2 and 6 October: Greenpeace denounces a project to dump, a t  sea, waste 
material from Seveso (ACP, AFP [Agence Centrale de Presse; Agence France 
Presse]). 
- 14 and 16 October: to gain the favour of their citizens, the Lombard authori- 
ties offer up to the public extracts from the dossiers on Seveso's waste 
mate rial... needing twilight o r  even dusk for  the dark stains of trouble to go 
unspotted. Some facts: 2,200 kg. of waste from Seveso, placed in 41 drums, 
were buried outside Italy, having crossed the French border a t  Menton (near 
Nice) - the final destination remaining unnamed (AFP, 14/X). All that implied a 
strange underlying significance: the authorities claim they do not know which 
country, adding the while "only Givaudan knows". This can only trigger trou- 
ble, suspicion. Another element is introduced: there is a red hot dossier which 
everyone tries to discard into other hands (GDR in particular, which denies 
having been the final desthation of the shipment) before it gets burnt. 
- 19 October: Givaudan enters on the scene and declares he is unaware of the 
whereabouts of the "42" (and not 41 a s  w a s  said by Italian authorities) waste 
drums. 'The firm responsible for the transportation alone knows, but Italy and 
Switzerland may be excluded; the deposit w a s  made in complete respect of all 
regulations of the country concerned". 
The whole crisis sphere is by now rapidly becoming a potential minefield: 
surprising ignorances concerning an explosive dossier, exclusions which will not 
fail to be picked up on as indelicate and, even more, stupefying in their admission 
... Everything is transformed into a dangerous rendering of "pass the parcel" o r  
"musical chairs", guaranteeing a swiftly developing snowball effect. The crisis did 
not break out on the spot: f e w  of the press were taking an interest in the trivial 
news. One might have noticed, though, an article in the "Quotidien du Medecin" 
(26/10) which took a look at the entire issue (six months ahead of the "Science e t  
Vie" article). The question is let drop. But there is just a surface calm. On 5 Janu- 
ary 1983 "Le Canard Enchaine" (French satirical journal) whispers: "Somewhere in 
Europe there are people likely to wake up with a nasty surprise one day". 
On 25 March the media explodes with irrepressible force. Over 40 organiza- 
tions, half a dozen countries a r e  involved, with searching rapid-fire questions 
thrown to the music of machine-gun clicking of press cameras. 
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1.2.2. The wreck of the Hont-Louia 
The first news bulletin i s  broadcast on Saturday 25 August 1984 a t  16:lO: "Col- 
lision off the Ostend coast between a French cargo vessel and a ferry. There has 
been no victims" (AE'P). A t  2056 (AE'P) one learns that, following the collision 
which occurred shortly a f t e r  14:00, the Mont-Louis cargo vessel sank. Here are 
some extracts of teletexts of 26 August. They are key-passages taken from the  ori- 
ginal texts published by AFP. W e  have only underlined certain particularly impor- 
tant words. 
AFP, 25.m. "According to Greenpeace the Mont-Louis may have been tran- 
sporting uranium". 
RFlq 16:23. Urgent. Several containers holding radioactive waste material 
were on board the French cargo vessel, said a seamen's union official, speak- 
ing in Le Havre on Sunday. A representative of the CGM (Compagne Generale 
Maritime), the owners of the  Mont-Louis, acknowledged that it was, indeed, a 
case of products with a radioactive content. but failed to specify the exact 
nature". 
AFP, 18:42. When f i rs t  speaking, the  CGM representative stated that  he w a s  
ignorant of what the  containers were holding, hinting that i t  was <<possibly 
medical materials>>". 
RFlq 1?:48. "Having in the f irst  place stated ignorance as to the  content of 
the containers, then saying they were <<possibly medical materials>>, the 
CGM representative has finally admitted the presence of radioactive matter. 
I t  has been impossible up to now, late Sunday afternoon. to obtain any indica- 
tion whatsoever of the degree of noxiousness. and the danger which the sub- 
mersion of these products might represent, following the capsizing of the 
Mont-Louis ". 
RFlq lL?:48. Urgent. Sunday evening, the CGM has let i t  be known that  the 
vessel was transporting, in particular, 450 tons of uranium hexafluoride (UF- 
6). According to the CGM, quoting the CEA (Commissariat a 18Energie 
Atomique). <<the temporary submersion of these containers of gas represents 
no danger whatsoever>>. The CGM has also let i t  be known that the  ship's off- 
icers  have been able to assure themselves that  the containers had remained 
perfectly sealed af te r  the  accident". 
RF13, U:50. 'The Mont-Louis survivors were sworn to silence concerning the 
nature of the  cargo they were transporting, the secretary o r  the National 
Seamen's Union (CFDT) stated on Sunday evening. <<A CGM representative m e t  
them in England shortly a f t e r  their  disembarkment from the  car-ferry (which 
had rescued them). On their  arr ival  in Le Havre, several snrvivors explained 
to m e  that  they had been advised to remain silent as to the  nature of the con- 
tent of the  containers>>. During these brief exchanges with members of the 
Mont-Louis crew, the CFDT official noted that  a CGM representative <<always 
managed to  be present to listen in on the  conversations and thus to discourage 
any possible divulging of confidences > >. " 
RF19 19:52. Sworn to silence (continuad). "In fact. journalists present at Le 
Havre a i rpor t  were struck again by the overwhelming silence of the sur- 
vivors, manifestly ill at ease when i t  come to speaking about the  containers. I t  
had, however. been possible to gain from some of them, and in particular from 
a young officer who had been on board, the confirmation of the presence of 
containers carrying radioactive material. After having tried to  elude the 
journalists' questions, a CGM representative who had earl ier  notably tried to 
say that i t  concerned <<possibly medical materials>> finished by admitting 
that i t  was none other than radioactive materials in the containers." 
dFP, U):Z3; 20:28. "It w a s  the ecologist organisation, Greenpeace, then the 
seamen's t rade union, CFDT, which on Sunday afternoon revealed the presence 
of uranium hexafluoride on board the Mont-Louis [...I. The survivors of the 
French cargo vessel, according to  the seamen's t rade union, CFDT, w e r e ,  on 
their arr ival  in G r e a t  Britain, sworn to silence by the company, as to  t h e  
cargo. I t  took the insight of the ecologist organization to break down the w a l l  
of silence. " 
One image appeared immediately to colour everyone's perception of the 
affair: that of dissimulation. It w a s  to  be headlined all over the French press: "Le 
Monde", <<Silence>> (Editorial, 28/8); "Liberation", <<Uranium: Silence, Sunk>> 
(28/8); "VSD", <me Law of Silence >> (30/8); 'Ze Quotidien de Paris", <<A More 
Dangerous Cargo Than Was Said>> (31/8); "L'Express", <<A Dossier Marked By An 
Astonishing Discretion! >> (31/8); 'Ze Point", <me Sound of Silence>> (3/9); 'Ze 
Canard Enchaine, < m e  Silence of the Sea>> (5/9); 'Ze Journal du Dimanche", 
<<What France Hid>> (16/9); etc. 
And now the media crisis w a s  being coupled w i t h  the  beginning of a diplomatic 
crisis of which RTL (Radio-Tele-Luxembourg) (27/8) made mention "nearly live": 
the Belgian minister in charge of t h e  Environment - while at the same t ime  a f f h -  
ing in a communique that there  w a s  "no danger whatsoever" - complained strongly 
through the media about the total lack of information coming from France. So the 
dissimulation, denounced by a foreign government (a hypothesis certainly not fore- 
seen in the plans for  the control of information), acquired a new status. But this 
did not prevent the Belgian minister from "reassuring" his fellow citizens about 
this dossier, which he  had not yet managed to lay his hands on, he was still able to 
affirm "there w a s  no danger whatsoever". 
The f i rs t  48 hours had been catastrophic: a media crisis had been created, a 
diplomatic crisis had been avoided by a hafr's breadth, the seeds of future crisis 
had been sown. AU this, backing up an idea already too widespread, that ''nuclear" 
can only be linked with "dissimulation". Already the crack w a s  widening, (RTL, 
27/8): "No one wanted to reveal how much the material had been enriched...". 
1.2.3. The BheW dioxin affair 
January 1985: an Alkarel transformer explodes in the basement of an apart- 
ment building, firemen intervene, EDF workers reinstall electricity; fo r  the 
authorities everything is normal and the residents are strongly urged to come 
back to the flats they have evacuated for  a few hours. March 1985: "Science et 
Vie" (again) reveals "the astonishing episode which took place in Rheims on 14 
January, illustrating once again the irresponsibility of the EDF and the public 
authorities in matter of safety". This article, based on the victim's viewing of the 
episode, brings together a series of points which are again just as much 
ingredients for  the development of a crisis [21]. 
Some strangeftzcts,  wh ich  d i d  not go unnoticed bp the v ic t ims  
A flat owner in the building, in talking with one of the firemen, learns that he 
and his fellow officers have received instructions from EDF to keep their uni- 
forms and boots aside so  that they can be collected and destroyed. Why such a 
precaution?". "A visitor to  one of the inhabitants says that he can smell 
Alkarel in the flat. The inhabitant is a works inspector, and she has no diffi- 
culty whatsoever in finding the  characteristics of this product documented in 
her  files. What she finds worries her". 
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- The imposs ib i l i t y  o f f i n d i n g  anyone r e a d y  to consider  the doss ier  
"As early as Saturday morning (16 January), the inhabitants of the building, 
having received a le t ter  from their  managing agent - declining all responsibil- 
ity f o r  them still being in the building and not being evacuated - decide to 
leave their  flats and find themselves out in the street". Woping to find help in 
being relodged, one of them telephoned the town hall. The deputy mayor knew 
nothing about the affair. Neither the mayor nor the sub-prefect (local 
governmental authority representative) w a s  available. 
- Blank rejection, proof of c yn ic i sm  
"Faced with the residents' insistence, a meeting w a s  held [...I which w a s  to 
lead absolutely nowhere. Just like the meeting held in the local EDF offices 
shortly afterwards, on Monday 21 January. The EDF experts  were not in the 
least downhearted. To that lady, the works inspector who stated that 
<<polychlorinatedbiphenils could produce polychlorinated-dibenzofurans and 
polychlori~ted-dibenzodioxins>>, M r .  [. ..I head of the Rheims branch. 
replied in a tone both ironic and condescending: <<Apparently, madam, you 
consider yourself an  expert  >>. 
- Absolute assurance.  bu t  the refLlsal to commit oneseZfin writing 
"<<In any event, there  w a s  no risk: the re  were not the conditions which were 
going to mean that any toxic products were emitted>> concluded the EDF 
branch head, refusing nonetheless to commit his words to paper, as asked f o r  
by the residents of the building. <<We prefer  to w a i t  fo r  the results of the 
analysis>> w a s  all he  chose to  say". 
- Some poin ters  ... 
'The results of these f i rs t  analysis, however, were to be a long t h e  in coming 
[...I. I t  would be learned later that  even more samples had been taken [...I. A 
high-ranking official from the EDF in Paris had had to make a special t r ip  for 
that. These samples, which the Rheims EDF branch were to feign ignorance of 
fo r  a long time, were given fo r  analysis to the Centre fo r  study and research 
of 'Charbonnages de France". 
- Some quest ions 
'We have just become aware of the results of the f i rs t  analyses. They reveal 
the presence of certain products, without giving their  concentration [...I. But 
no dioxins. Is it because the re  weren't any, o r  because the instruments were 
not sensitive enough to register them?". 
- The immediate s i t u a t i o n  
"Meanwhile. the building, which without more searching analysis one does not 
know whether or not is contaminated with dioxin or furan, remains open. The 
residents come to  water the  plants on the upper floors, and collect their  mail. 
The children come to collect their  school books...". 
The scene w a s  set. Two months later the crisis exploded in the media. Pr. 
Rappe a Swedish specialist with faultless credentials, who had been asked by J. 
Denis Lempereur (Science et Vie) to analyse s o m e  samples taken in secrecy from 
the building, had come up with very worrying results. The difficulty of the analyses 
and scientific interpretations, which were to become mos t  delicate, were to be 
handled with anything but a light touch in all matters of communication. But in what 
state were the credibility and the image of the EDF then left? In May, a "Science et 
Vie" headline read: "Once again the policy of burying one's head in sand has led 
nowhere" [22]. 
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Today, while the ex-residents no longer know what to fear o r  in whom to have 
confidence, the EDF is, on its side, measuring how much it w a s  caught off guard. 
Persuaded at the outset that the incident could not have really serious conse- 
quences, comforted by the f i rs t  analysis (insufficient), shaken by the result 
obtained from abroad (Sweden and Canada), reassured yet again by the most recent 
expert  opinions (absence of "Seveso dioxin" which nonetheless does not signify an  
absence of all dangerous products) ... The EDF has still to study in detail the deter- 
mining factors of this crisis. An episode which presents itself as a real headache 
fo r  the immediate future, a damaging stain on its image in general, and for  its 
image as a nuclear power plant operator in particular. 
Here then w e  have summed up three  cases, all of which outline an infallible 
recipe f o r  finding oneself trapped in a crisis: 
the construction of a maze in which truth and falsehood are as elusive as 
those in positions of responsibility; 
the opening up of this maze to the curiosity of observers convinced, by the 
mistakes of the officids involved, that each line of questioning wil l  lead to a 
never-ending chain of "revelations". 
O t h e r  means of competent handling must be arrived at. 
2. THE CONSTRUCTION OF COMMUNICATIONS TO CONTROL THE EYENT 
The brief outlines already given have landed us fairly and squarely at the 
crisis. Here w e  might stand back a Little: to  fix points of reference; to find other 
ways of coping with this maelstrom which threatens to engulf all those concerned, 
both directly o r  indirectly. 
2.1. Understanding the complex -em of  all involved 
Two complementary requirements must be adhered to: always keeping in view 
the major points of reference: giving ground when necessary to the complexities 
o r  irregularities of the situation. 
2.1.1. Topological approach 
A f i rs t  look at the network caught up in the crisis allows immediate identifica- 
tion of the major grouping to  be taken into account; not a single mind must be over 
looked (and particularly the  last): 
The operator. 
Public authorities. 
Experts. 
Population. 
The media. 
But this overview must be broken down at once as each of the categories iden- 
tified in fact only represents a complex sub-system, in turn filled with its own ques- 
tions of communication: 
- The @e ta to t .  This includes: those playing a par t  on the site itself and at the 
firm's headquarters; such diverse categories as internal experts,  emergency 
staff, press and public relations people, company spokesmen lawyers, the top 
management; diverse internal forces such as t rade unions, safety committees; 
-317- 
Lagadec, P. 
diverse bodies also involved such as affiliated companies, direct partners  
such as clients o r  suppliers, o ther  manufacturing plants involved in the  same 
processes, etc. 
- The authorities: This category includes: the emergency services (local, 
regional, national, international; fire-brigades, para-medics, police, ambu- 
lance services, etc.); regulatory bodies; public authorities at local, regional, 
national level; elected authorities, etc. 
- The population. Here must be  taken into account: those living in the  immedi- 
ate area (organised or not into associations); immediate o r  potential victims; 
populations threatened with the  same type of risk at other  sites; public opin- 
ion in general . . . 
- Ezperts. This category covers the  many exper ts  linked with one o r  o ther  of 
the  categories cited. 
- The media. A particularly well-represented body which embraces the  press  in 
all forms: spoken, written, and televised; local, regional, national and interna- 
tional; general, specialised and scientific. etc. 
One could be  even more precise still. What is important, though, is  t o  note that 
complex relationships wil l  be  built up between all these sub-groups. often in the  
shortest possible time, but which will continue to function over  long periods. So 
another approach will  be enlarged on he re  to try to appreciate  the nature of the  
key factors  in these networks. 
2.1.2. A dynamic approach 
Models need to be drawn up to define the  ground rules which will govern how 
communication between those concerned will develop: how do all these people usu- 
ally function? 
In the case of the media, J. S c d o n  and S. Alldred [23, p.13-181 have drawn up 
the  following model (this f i r s t  presentation will  be gone into in depth in p a r t  
three): 
1. The media will hear  of an  event (some citizens will  usually call the media: 
media also monitor the  activity and communications of key emergency agen- 
cies; major accidents are difficult to conceal). 
2. The media wil l  try to obtain more information (they wil l  start to use whatso- 
ever  m e a n s  available; the speed of this activity may be incredible). 
3. The media will use the i r  files to add to the story (most major  news agencies 
have substantial l ibraries; past e r r o r s  are extremely lfkely to be repeated). 
4. The media will dispatch r epor t e r s  to the  scene (again: incredible speed). 
5. All M f  resources will  be applied to a truly major event (global mobilization 
of the  whole network). 
6. The media will use all of the i r  technical resources and ingenuity (specialized 
vehicles; access to communication networks, etc.). 
7. A s  information becomes available i t  w f l l  be reported (the attention given to 
immediacy is a canon of journalism; the news is reported as available, how- 
ever  scanty o r  inadequate the  information and however marginal the  original 
source o r  sources). 
8. Information will spread from medium t o  medium (the various news media are 
intertwined in a way which makes information sharing inevitable; they also 
monitor each o ther  in o rde r  to pick up information they may have overlooked; 
a story by one is  soon f o r  all). 
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9. The media will attempt to f i t  the news into a framework (loss of life, injury, 
persons left homeless ... the media  wil l  push very hard f o r  this so r t  of informa- 
tion to be made available - there  is no perception that the confused aftermath 
of a disaster may make this most impossible to obtain). 
10. The media wil l  demand official news conferences at which official statements 
can be recorded (to give the news form and structure; to  clear up conflicts 
between sources; to be sure not to  be scooped; to  be able to  attribute their 
"facts" to somebody; etc.). 
11. The media wi l l  shape the story to suit particular needs (according to their 
respective audience). 
12. The media wi l l  persuade people to act in such a way as to conform to news 
norms (TMI: TV crews asked people to move indoors so  they could show 
deserted streets).  
13. The media wil l  have trouble dealing with technical matters (most correspon- 
dents go from crisis t o  crisis: they are generalists r a the r  than specialists). 
14. The various media - radio. television and print - wil l  ac t  differently (each 
medium has its own needs and its own technical and logistical problems). 
15. The foreign press tend to support each other and often antagonize Local 
media. 
16. The media  wil l  make demands on communications. transportation and other 
local resources. 
17. In a truly major incident almost alI repor ters  wil l  share  what they have. 
18. The media - whatsoever techniques they use to obtain information - wil l  not 
publish it if they decide it could be harmful. 
19. The media will  also co-operate with official requests that certain information 
be withheld (but if anyone should break the agreement, the  o ther  would follow 
suit. 
Apart from the  basic ground rules, it is imperative that close scrutiny be 
given to the whole complexity of the system which is plunged into crisis. For every 
active participant, an attempt must be made to  draw up a checklist of his: 
primary objectives and interests; 
secondary objectives; 
decision-making criteria; 
uncertainties; 
internal conflicts; 
imperatives as regards the  apportioning of times; 
major loyalties; 
etc. 
Major organizational structures equals complexity. I t  is also imperative to 
take into account those very exceptional factors which can play such a decisive 
role in the dynamics of communication. So, additional points not to be overlooked. 
f o r  example (to take instances obsemed in cases w e  have studied): 
- The personalities and temperament of those involved in the situation; an ordi- 
nary citizen may be an expert  of the highest degree; one key person may 
prove to be terribly determined; some officials can be more outspoken than 
diplomatic. 
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- The ties which may grow up between sub-groups which a t  the outset fell into 
different categories; hence, a journalist may have privileged relations with 
the entourage of a centrally placed figure in the affair; several key people 
may belong to a particular "club" which may diminish other more visible loyal- 
ties; a member of a firm may feel a conflict of interests if he has fears for his 
family (the constraints t o  silence may be ignored), etc. 
- Role changes which can determine the crisis situation: the media can become 
par t  of the  emergency administration. if information is an essential in the 
situation (as w a s  seen with Televisa - the main Mexican chain - during the San 
Juan Ixhuatepec catastrophe [24]. 
- Problems, slippings and slidings which can come to light in matters of exper- 
tise. A Lack of serious scientific support surrounding the  media and environ- 
mental associations has often been observed, but this danger has even been 
known t o  appear a t  the very heart  of the bodies responsible: recent events 
have shown the huge difficulty encountered in trying to  establish rapidly the 
desired communications with the most reliable experts. as jeopardising con- 
tacts may be made with "quasi-experts" who know the field sufficiently to 
exercise a considerable ascendancy over the decision-makers, but inade- 
quately with the very "pointed" questions which arise during a crisis. And 
questions have a tendency of evolving so often during a crisis that  no expert 
can be sure not to be subjected to  the danger underlined. Any expert  can 
become anquasi-expert" (or a "pseudo-expert', if one would ra the r  use a 
stronger term). 
So i t  is in the  midst of aLl this complexity that actions to counter the  event 
must be implemented, and especially so  in the field of communications. 
2.2 Developing fundamental ab i l i t i e s  f o r  crisia communication 
In the face of the event, the  task of communicating is, from all evidence, a del- 
icate one; a key issue fs the  strategy of this whole activity. But, before tackling 
the problem, some basic guidelines, illustrated by some relevant examples drawn 
from experience, should be Laid down. 
2.2.1. The main working guidelines 
a) Internal irCJonnation 
- Assemble the  greatest amount of information on the  event from all possible 
sources. 
- Contact immediately the  relevant people responsible; repor t  regularly. 
- Set up a control room, with the means fo r  passing on information (but a con- 
trol  room is more than a series of telephones [25]. 
Seek out all available data on the installation and the risk in progress. 
Seek out the  most competent experts. 
Designate one official to deal with all press questions - especially the one who 
should be talking to the TV in the hours to come. This step should be taken 
immediately, without waiting fo r  the classic situation of "designating a 
volunteer" at the  last moment, abandoning him to the microphones and the  
cameras, with only the knowledge ... that this could be a very damaging situa- 
tion fo r  him (as w e  have already observed in several case studies). 
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Keep track of all information published by the media. 
Prepare  a dossier on earlier episodes of similar events. 
D r a w  up a dossier on how the event unfolds. 
b) "Eztemal" in$brmation 
Establish without delay all the  requisite links with the  other  people concerned 
Establish these contacts at high level, even if that  seems technically difficult 
o r  touches on delicate matters of protocol. 
Confirm in writing all oral  communications (telex). 
Discuss with all those concerned what communications to establish with the 
media, roles and responsibilities to be assumed by all those involved in this 
field of me& communications. 
c) IWormation for the media 
D r a w  up very precise press releases. 
Ensure that  information is not only available. but that  it actually reaches the  
media. 
Set up a fully operational press centre. 
See that  the re  is a good f low of information (concentrate on the  information 
actually getting through to the  press  centre). 
Provide self-explanatory documents so  that non-specialists can understand 
the  situation. , 
Identify any rumors and correct any e r r o r s  immediately. 
d )  I1.4Pormation d irec t ly  for the populat ion 
In the  event of imminent danger it is imperative tha t  the operator  intervenes 
without delay t o  safeguard people living in the  area and anyone who may be 
passing through the  area affected by the  accident. Very specific communica- 
tion channels should be established and tested out. 
This necessity clearly poses legal questions: who is responsible fo r  these 
flash-interventions and their  possible consequences? 
2.2.2. Some exampies 
a) H i g h l y  developed technical resources: the CiWMTY&TC case 
Worried by transport accidents involving dangerous materials, American chemical 
manufacturers set up, in the  1970's. a communication centre capable of performing 
at peak levels; it maintains an  around-the-clock telephone line. Through the  use of 
a data bank which lists more than 35,000 chemical products, CHEMTREC provides 
information relevant t o  on-scene conditions. More: this crisis centre includes an 
inforanation system so highly developed that  it allows someone actually on the site 
of an accident to be kept in touch with numerous other  concerned persons: the  
senders of the  goods, the  shipper, the  experts,  the  emergency teams, the  authori- 
ties. etc. Telephone conferences can thus be conducted, involving nearly 20 people 
participating at any one time. no matter where they might be  scattered around the  
States. This system enables the  setting up of a greatly extended network of inter- 
vention, f o r  very long periods should i t  be necessary. Such a backup s y s t e m  of 
communication enables the problem of transmitting information t o  be dealt with, 
particularly a problematic question when it concerns transport accidents which 
can occur anywhere in the country [25]. 
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b) Organizational procedures rethought- Union carbide's in ternal  notifica- 
t ions  processes c4fter Bhopal 
Union Carbide has specified the typical accidents that must be considered as 
"major accidents" requiring strict procedures of internal early notification; it is 
interesting to  observe that  it has done so  with regard t o  the problem of informa- 
tion. In the "major accident" category the American group has listed, as general 
guidelines [26]: 
- Multiple fatality accident. 
- Explosion o r  f i r e  Likely to result in national pubLicity. 
- Bomb explosion o r  finding an explosive device placed in o r  near a Union C a r -  
bide facility. 
- Product spiU'or other environmental accident likely to result in national pub- 
licity. 
- Any threat  o r  allegation relating to  the facilities o r  personnel of the Cor- 
poration likely to result in national publicity o r  demanding a prompt cor- 
porate decision. 
In the same spirit, the communications management of Gaz de France has brought to 
the attention of all its personnel that it must be notified about all events which 
might have a repercussion in the  media: here  one is again very f a r  from purely 
technical and quantitative definitions. 
c) Pblicies for wha t  i w o r m a t i o n  to give to the media-  Dozu Chemical 
Donald R. Stephenson (Director, Corporate Communications, Dow Chemical, Canada) 
has clearly set out lessons learned by his company from a certain number of crises 
[27,p.3]: 
1. The public m u s t  be fully informed frequently and accurately through the 
media from the outset. This m u s t  be done by one o r  two highly credible senior 
spokesmen who understand the situation and can explain it cahdy and clearly 
in lay language. The f irst  24 hours of a crisis are critical. 
2. If this is not done, a public information vacuum probably w i l l  develop rapidly - 
and be filled by rumors o r  alarms f a r  worse than the real situation. 
3. Silence in the midst of a crisis impLies guilt, whether justified o r  not. 
4. It is not enough merely to assure the public that  everything is O.K. and 
there's no reason fo r  alarm. To be credible, w e  must provide details of how 
that conclusion is drawn. 
5. It is vital to realise that repor ters  face deadlines hour by hour. Information 
must always be correct ,  consistent and current,  even if all the answers aren't  
immediately available. " 
Following suit, Electricite de  France has established, in case of nuclear accident, 
the principle of rapid information being passed on to  the local media by the branch 
heads. 
2.2.3. Work still to be done 
The investigation should be given further  attention and application, there  
being so  many factors to deal with, and such a volume of lessons to be learnt from a 
wide range of experiences. 
The "communication" grid of emergency plans a r e  call fo r  re-examination. 
Plans do exist. But aren ' t  they too often "paper-plans" as f a r  as communications 
a r e  concerned? Exercises should be conducted, involving officials, and also the 
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media and the  people - as w a s  recently the case in France near Metz with a drill 
based on a toxic gas leak (it was shown that population reaction w a s  extremely 
poor and that much had to  be done on communication grounds). 
Another question is the problem of communicating with the  experts  in the 
crisis situation. As an example, here w e  briefly expand on the case of the Mont- 
Louis, mentioned earlier.  I t  is clear that  the events surrounding the  incident - with 
responsibility falling in the f i r s t  case to a shipper inexperienced in the handling 
of crisis, taking place abroad and during a week-end, non-nuclear but chemical but 
therefore dealt with by the nuclear industry, led to internal communication prob- 
lems in the network linking experts  who would have had the specidsed knowledge 
necessary to handle the situation 1281: 
- the steel containers, tested at 15 bars, were in fact at a pressure of 0.1 bar 
(and not 10 o r  12 bars  as i t  w a s  often thought): 
- the hexaflouride w a s  in solid state, and not a gas; 
the hydrolysis of UF-6, in theory vigorous, is slow in practice because the 
oxyfluoride produced hinders the inflow of the necessary water; 
thus the fluorohydrous acid is produced more slowly than feared, and m o r e  
over, it dissolves in water (being very soluble) and is neutmlized by seawater 
(basic). 
On aLl these points, a scientist - even of the very highest competence - not 
thoroughly acquainted with the question, had every chance of making a mistake 
without suspecting fo r  a single instant that he might be caught out on his "classic" 
theoretical references. This problem of the quality of the information in the very 
first exchanges led to such an agitation in the media that  it took more than a month 
to calm i t  down. 
Here w e  have examined some of the lines fo r  a "tactical" communication reply. 
But this whole issue should be looked at from another angle, so that one may have 
access to much deeper realities which play a decisive pa r t  in determining all these 
attempts at tactical improvement. I t  remains then to explore these fundamental 
keys on which hinge communications in crisis situations, and from which point more 
developed strategies may be defined. 
3. TOWARDS COIWIJNICATIONS STRATEGIES 
It  would not be possible - and w e  do not intend to try here, ei ther  - to supply 
"recipes". One can, nevertheless, attempt to brighten the problem, examining the 
key dimensions of this strategic field which must be brought under surer control. 
To do this, one must try to identify the difficulties which can so  complicate the 
establishing of the required abilities and skills. 
3.1. Developing strategic abiiitiea 
Reflection on communication in crisis situations is often limited to the realm 
of speaking in front of microphones and cameras, whereas, in fact, crises demand 
more than that. Actual policies are required, embracing numerous aspects and 
areas. Three might be singled out from a time dimension. 
3.1.1. The preliminary phase: avoiding pre-critical set ups 
The prevention of a communication breakdown begins w e l l  before the disrupt- 
ing event. It includes being equipped with all necessary material and tools. and the 
creating of a "capital" which can properly support all activities in communication 
through outstanding peak periods. 
Emergency mechanisms, featuring strongly the field of information: including 
here,  fo r  example, internal exercises on this theme, exercises involving the 
media (the mode of application being left wide open to invention according to  
the particular context). 
A general information policy for  r isks and emergency situations: h e r e  w e  note 
the requirement set out in Article 8 (S.1) of the  European 'Seveso Directiveu- 
"Member States shall ensure that  persons liable to  be affected by a major 
accident originated in a notified industrial activity [...I are informed in an 
appropriate manner of the  safety measures and of the  co r rec t  behavior t o  
adopt in the event of an accident" [29]. 
A very serious prevention policy and practice: failing which (the operational 
turmoil in which) all communication would be marked by extremely severe con- 
flicts t o  the extent that  only a minimal exchange would become possible among 
those involved. One can quote he re  the British H. S. E. statement at a recent  
conference in London on the theme "Chemical Industry a f t e r  Bhopal": "Put 
caution into the  process, not into the  tellingn[30]. 
An internal organizational "mentality" more open to communication in general 
and information on risk in particular: the  behaviour observed is not due 
merely to chance; they are patterned by in-depth mentalities. The movement 
towards openness will be a long and exacting task (the tradition of secrecy 
not being easily forgotten) which will only be accomplished with firm direc- 
tives from the  management. A sign of these directives is, f o r  example, the  
status accorded to  the  "communications departments "in the firms: are they 
viewed only as 'publicity machines" both internally as w e l l  as externally? 
Strong positions f o r  credibility and legitimacy: too great  a weakness here  
carries a strong possibility of total failure and uncontrollable situations, no 
matter the tools and materials o r  degree of sophistication being applied. The 
balance to  be  aimed at needs to be defined, particularly in relation to  the 
gravity of the  problem with which one is  likely to be confronted. 
3.1.2. The instant reflex stage: faced with the shock, instantaneous 
collapse m a s t  be avoided 
One overriding rule applies: those "natural" reflexes which lead immediately 
into a quagmire, must be kept firmly under control; examples of which w e  have 
reviewed earl ier .  The absolute necessity of adhering to this rule  cannot be 
emphasised too heavily. 
a) Internal disintegration 
The classic outline includes: 
Initial non-awareness of the  problem: 
(i) because it remains outside the usual threshold of fault-detection (J. Scanlon 
has given the case of a ser ies  of ear th  tremors in Canada, too weak to set up 
in motion the scheduled organizational procedures, but sufficiently strong to  
trigger off a general feeling leading rapidly to the loss of credibility of the 
bodies responsible [31]); 
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(ii) or because the  problem affects an a rea  to which less attention is normally 
paid (i.e., i t  concerns waste materials, and not finished products; "simplyJ' 
some drums and not a notified installation; a chemical product, and not a 
nuclear power plant; a factory which is  being run down, and not a site which is  
under constant surveillance.. .). 
Organizational incoherency, which gets worse, to the point of paralysis when 
it  comes to passing on uncertain, or even more so, worrying information. 
The "isolation" of each of the  organization's sub-systems, a s  the  problem 
becomes clearly visible ... at the precise moment when the  best possible com- 
munications should be in operation. 
b) Network disintegration 
Fragmentation of the  whole can be attributed to  numerous factors: 
Technical problems (lack of availability, the  impossibility of establishing the 
desired connections ...) cannot fail to provide a justification fo r  the closing in 
of each organization in on itself. 
The moment (of peak vulnerability) is not the  most propitious for establishing 
links with "strangers". 
The driving interests at stake are seen in a very limited scope: competition 
overrides, when complementary measures should be taken. 
The obsession becomes to  get oneself "individually" out of the affair as fast a s  
possible, leaving o ther  organizations to  cope fo r  themselves: but a crisis 
often rebounds on those who try to get away too lightly. 
Common-mode failures threaten to weigh heavily. So when a large organization 
assures that  the re  is no risk, all other part ies  concerned follow suit instinc- 
tively. Once one e r r o r  has been committed everything falls apa r t  (as w a s  the  
case with the  Seveso dioxin drums where everything leant on Hoffmann-La 
Roche's statements, which later proved t o  be inaccurate; o r  in the 
transformer case a t  Rheims. in which all  hinged on the  local officials' convic- 
tion of the  infallibility of Electricite de France. 
c) "Media catastrophes" triggered o f f  b . ~ /  the reflez phase 
I t  is imperative to ext rac t  oneself from the all too classic scenario: 
A silence heavy with embarrassment. 
Immediate declarations of the type, "nothing's happened, and besides 
everything's under control" (releases signed either by the  manzgement or 
professionals persuaded that they are thus rendering the  greatest service t o  
their  firm. 
Denials, right up until the  press  "gets to the bottom of it". 
The blank mask response o r  refusals leading to a media as w e l l  as a social 
combat of the ''David and Goliath" type. 
The inability to give details about the  event, earl ier  events, o r  similar risks. 
An attitude of dissimulation giving rise to thinking that the affair is  a real 
mess and that  all determined research will wring out "confessions" which a r e  
even more and more devastating for  those in charge and fabulous for  the  
media. 
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d )  Instant failures 
Everything i s  played out in a matter of minutes if t he  kinetics of t he  accident 
demand instantaneous reactions and communications. There must then be: 
The ability t o  provide and pass on precise and operationally relevant mes- 
sages. 
The very highest credibility: it i s  evident tha t  a long pract ice of non- 
information can h e r e  have devastating effects. Would one, f o r  example, wish 
to confine people at home? In no time at all t h e r e  would b e  the  r isk of seeing a 
headlong flight taking place on the  roads. Here is where the  limitations of 
"paper plans" are liable to show themselves with the  greatest  brutality. 
3.1.3. The development phase: the challenge presented by the complexity 
and duration 
A precise analysis of the  evolution of the  communication dynamics between 
those involved is a requirement which must be  met. What forces are expressing 
themselves? On which ground? Where i s  the action taking place? What a r e  the  pos- 
sible pitfalls? What are t he  potential gaps already discernible? 
Attention must be  kept focused on the  diverse lines of communication identi- 
fied: internal, external,  with the  media, with the  public. In particular,  t he  media 
dynamic must b e  observed minutely - all the  more, too, since certain newspapers 
can serve as a means of expression to the advantage of some of those caught up in 
the  situation (this method of indirect communication, via the  press ,  becoming 
one of the  rules  of confrontation between organizations). The examination in the  
greatest  detail of the Seveso drums case - as a gigantic battle of communication - 
served as a good illustration of this [20]. 
The continuous grasp of this ever-changing reality is, of course, nothing 
o ther  than the  point of departure.  There still remains t o  define the  rules to work 
by: t he  anticipation of t he  rumbling of turmoil, t he  concern with the  long-term in 
the  actions developed. There must also be  set out: 
The key positions which the  organization intends t o  defend absolutely. Where 
are t he  regulatory authorities and the  Sta te  in general concerned: show tha t  
they are in complete control of t he  activity of risk. Where is the  industrialist: 
show tha t  h e  ca r r i e s  out his activity seriously. 
The ability to give a coherent response. Hence, teams combining together 
technical experts ,  communication specialists, members of t he  management, 
must have car r ied  out different pract ice drills, which test not only the i r  par- 
ticular competences but also the i r  ability in dealing together with delicate 
situations. 
But h e r e  a feeling of disquiet can be detected: to be more specific fundamen- 
tal questions which are generally left  hanging in the  a i r  must be tackled. They a r e ,  
nevertheless, those which hinder freedom of action and judgement; and if they a r e ,  
of course, much too delicate to  be "resolved" here ,  i t  is nonetheless desirable t o  
mention some points worthy of ref lexion. 
3.2. Fundamental questions to be explored 
3.2.1. Crisis and communication: an extremely complex field - 
ignore it or invest in it? 
Tactical materials and even fundamental s t rategic abilities rapidly reveal  
the i r  limitations when a n  actual cr is is  situation has to be m e t  head on. The situa- 
tion unfolds as if in a block. evading any attempt t o  review "slicesJ1 of i t ,  t h e  mass- 
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effect being so destabilising. Bitter conflicts threaten to erupt  at any moment. 
They reflect: the position of those involved. the contexts which date back a long 
way, particular contingencies (chain of m i c r ~ v e n t s  in particular); and, in great  
pa r t  (not to be underestimated by any model) the unwieldiness of the organizations 
concerned, which do not always work in their own best interests. 
Precisely with a view to avoiding any simple model, a dual case - particularly 
illustrative - will be studied here. How to deal with the scale of the shock, and 
perhaps worse still, the shock of repetition? 
Union Carbide's fight with Bhopal 
Acute problems 
I t  takes time to gather in information; even longer to  appreciate what has in 
fact taken place. But the media demands immediate explanations. Concoct 
lightweight scenarios and there is the risk of making mistakes, of rapidly los- 
ing all technical credibility. Refuse speculation, and there  is the risk of 
unleashing suspicion along the  lines of "they're hiding the truth". It took ten 
weeks before Union Carbide were in a position to put forward soundly based 
technical explanations. Only then did the Corporation regain some credibility. 
Those involved were working to different calendars. The Indians, on the  eve of 
an election, chose to publish scenarios ... which the American corporation 
judged inexact, but which, at the time, could not be denounced as such. And 
later,  the Indian government w a s  so  much bound, committed, that to put for- 
ward denial w a s  still a delicate matter. 
The press must be informed rapidly. But ca re  must also be taken not to commit 
any blunders: the governments concerned and internal management have to  be 
informed before the media - which, considering the world-wide information 
network, is not an easy thing to do. 
Paps at every t u n  and Curist 
Were the  safety measures at Bhopal the same as a t  the other Union Carbide 
MIC plant a t  Institute (West Virginia)? If the  answer were "no" that  opened the 
door to charges of exploiting the Third World. If the answer were "yes", there  
was the risk of s t i f i ing up serious upheavaLs a t  the  American sites. 
W a s  the firm intending to  take immediate steps? To mitigate the effect of an 
affirmative answer to the  preceding question, all MIC production could be 
halted until what happened at Bhopal were fully understood: but could such a 
decision take the  place of policy, the  collection of information being difficult 
and lengthy? 
W a s  Union Carbide's safety policy on a level with what w a s  required f o r  such 
hazards? The reply could only be "yes". But then, how could one account for  
the avalanche of problems uncovered - "revealed" - a t  Bhopal? Design faults, 
maintenance deficiencies, inadequate preventive measures, poorly trained 
personnel ... In its inquiry, the  N e w  York Times [January 28. 19851 identified 
ten violations of rules that ought to have been followed. Whilst i t  was right to 
point out that the Indians were responsible for  the  operation of the plant it 
could not be pretended that headquarters a t  Danbury (Connecticut) were not 
keeping serious watch on these problems which Union Carbide said were a top 
priority. Nor could there  be any question of laying everything at the door of 
the Indians. Interest in India (and elsewhere), now and in the  future, ruled 
that out. 
Was the company in a position to pay? Here, too, the answer has to be yes, but 
the patch to be trod was a hairline. Over-assurance could tempt applicants 
(and their lawyers of which there were plenty) to step up their claims - which 
could change the group's financial situation. The big question w a s  that of the 
basis of compensation. If North American standards were used, that could 
raise some doubts about the firm's ability to pay. Taking a yardstick with more 
affinity to the country concerned could again spark off the polemic about mul- 
tinationals and the Third World, strategically a ra ther  dangerous question. A 
further point was that the firm has also to contend with attacks from within: it  
own shareholders had filed a court action against the management for  having 
jeopardised their profits. 
Then with its accident at Institute 
On 11 August, 1985, there was a leak of toxic gas a t  the plant a t  Institute 
(USA). This factory (which in particular treats the product made a t  Bhopal - 
MIC -) was the one to which all eyes had been turned, about which everyone 
had been asking: "Can i t  happen here? 'The incident (130 people hospitalized) 
showed yet again the possibility of worrying technical faults, and more espe- 
cially insufficiencies in matters of emergency communfcations - i t  seems that 
there had been a delay of twenty minutes before the alarm had been raised 
outside the plant. Union Carbide's Chairman had to apologize for this. This 
"test" of communications proved even more terrible for  Union Carbide's image 
than that of the Bhopal disaster. 
Faced with this hyper-complex challenge, an answer does sometimes s e e m  to 
take shape: i t  is futile to allocate budgets, to devote energy and ability in order to 
avert and m e e t  similar situations - situations which a r e  just as uncertain in their 
occurence as in their development and their consequences ... and moreover which 
may indeed never happen. The reasoning continues thus: i t  is never sure to be 
worse... even the best prevention m e a s u r e s  can never ensure an absolute guaran- 
tee. .. and, if the worse does happen, i t  may still not be damning for  the organiza- 
tion. But what is sure is the economic crisis: a reality which is immediate, certain, 
daily. So, in consideration of these issues, the choice may be not to take a stand. 
In today's organizations, the "governing" mentality s e e m s  to sustain and 
encourage this sort  of reflection. Overall, no one is spontaneously inclined to ask 
himself about the problem of anything other than minor faults - and this tendency 
is naturally more marked in the technical and scientific community which ori- 
ginated the systems constructed. The "marketing" mentality, which dominates in 
many highly successful companies, is besides more receptive to questions about an 
additional par t  of the market, the profitability of a new product which can be 
launched o r  withdrawn according to immediate results. In this scenario and under 
very intense daily constraints, the management (which come from the two mileux 
mentioned) are naturally more drawn to being interested in the short and medium 
term profitability of monetary commitments, ra ther  in the problem of "crises", 
which f a l l  into the category of the uncertain. 
Another line of response is to say that, from now on, and increasingly so, the 
life of an organization will indeed depend on its ability to prevent and to control 
crises. Consequently, it  would appear imperative to make available new means, to 
create an internal mentality appropriate to meeting the challenge. The plea here 
is for  organisations to have more confidence in their ability to confront the excep- 
tional, to absorb the irregular (as much as possible) into the arena of scientific 
management. A truly innovative company might thus envisage, fo r  example, the 
addition to its "balance-sheets" and chairman's reports a section devoted 
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specifically to  its ability to identify, prevent, and control crises - equally on 
technical and organisational matters as in communication. The intensification of 
risks as w e l l  as the increased vulnerability of the contexts in which they take 
place, invite this change in company's reappraisal - seen from the angle not only of 
its immediate profitability, but also its ability t o  assure its longevity. 
According to the answers chosen, it is clear that the overall reaction of an 
organization in crises situations will be different. And a second deep dilemma 
appears. 
3.2.2. To inform or not? 
The problem posed by the media here  is a sixty-four dollar question. In order  
to understand it, one really has to dig out the grievances which are levelled 
against the press: they a r e  fixed points which there is no getting round, greatly 
affecting the attitudes of all involved. The major reasons fo r  conflict are the fol- 
lowing: 
Fear of sensationalism and its consequences which may be provoked by the 
broadcasting of inaccurate news, o r  even too accurate Information. J. Scanlon 
reports  on this, in the field of hostage-taking, the case of the media  letting 
the terrorists  know where the sharpshooters are positioned, making them feel 
they should probably substantially raise their  ranson demand [32]. In the field 
of accidents (it happened in a French pit) one might cite, for  example, the 
case of a radio repor t  which, exacerbating public emotion, produced a forced 
interruption of a vital rescue operation. 
An impasse caused by the over-technical nature of the problems to be tackled 
(particularly the question of probabilities). 
A withdrawal as a result of the possible destruction of a public image should 
the affair be given too much publicity. 
Refusal, faced with the media coming across more as commercial enterprises 
in search of a share of the news-market, than organisations of information at 
service of the people. 
Rejection, at the idea of the media  being a l a w  unto themselves (acting outside 
the framework within which regulations can be made on the basis of adjusta- 
bility), acting with complete impunity (it being impossible to ask fo r  an 
account of anything written, said o r  shown; to ask fo r  the source, nor fo r  the 
editing, etc). 
Deep suspicion, a certain press organization appearing to be manipulated by a 
party directly involved in the conflict (or even a certain press campaign 
being seen as directed by a particular aggressive competitor). 
These numerous barr iers  a r e  answered by determined counter-barriers, on 
the media 's  side: 
Conviction that accurate information is being withheld. 
Distrust of the ability of those responsible. 
Fear as to what freedom the press will  be allowed. 
Acute irritation at the mounting of classic anti-press attacks (in particular: 
the accusation of being a sensationalist is  often put forward but not always 
justified 1331). 
From mental contortions to the desire to say little o r  nothing, the crisis 
threatens to  become an area fo r  acrimonious confrontation - under the formidable 
weight of the event. Witness the exchanges between a journalist (Mr. Kilmer) and 
Union Carbide's spokesman (Mr. J. Browning) a t  the time of the Bhopal drama. The 
reporter wants to make the industrialist admit his guilt. The latter, while if he 
agrees to accept a moral responsibility, has absolutely no intention of accepting 
legal responsibility. So goes the dialogue reported by the New-York Times: 
"I think you've said the company was not liable for the Bhopal victims", M r .  
Kilmer said. 
"I didn't say that", M r .  Browning replied. 
"Does that mean you are Liable?" M r .  Kilmer asked. 
I didn't say that either", M r .  Browning responded. 
'Then what did you say?", the reporter asked. 
"Ask m e  another question", the Carbide spokesman said. 
"Under what circumstances would you not be liable?", the radio reported 
asked, his voice rising in frustration, to which M r .  Browning calmly declined 
to respond" [34,p.30]. 
It  is easy to appreciate that it  may be difficult to cope with wide open information: 
the accident (or the risk) may reveal a general problem which the industrial- 
ist judges impossible to correct in the short term; difficulties which could 
have dramatic consequences for the company's image, the entire branch con- 
cerned, indeed a national economy (as w e  have recently seen in a case of a 
country in South-America); 
the accident may reveal failings in expertise, and threaten to discredit i t  to 
an unacceptable level; 
the accident may reveal basic defects in the organization of the public ser- 
vices; etc. 
So, we arrive fairly rapidly a t  the basic question: to inform o r  not to inform? In 
reply, three major stances show themselves: 
- The s tance for openness  a n d  collaboration with the media 
This was the choice of the Canadian authorities during the Mississauga railway 
disaster. The idea: the population must understand why they have to be evacu- 
ated (216,000 persons); for  that they need to be very w e l l  informed and that 
demands excellent information from the press. All was done, from the very 
first minutes, to work in closest collaboration with the journalists. 
- TRe s tance f ir  caut ions  openness a n d  d i scre t ion  
This is the most classic case: one gauges at every moment what one can tell 
the press, when, and through what channel; one identifies what must be kept to 
oneself, in order always to have a "reserve stock" of news to distill to the 
media. In brief, one plays a game which has its rules of fairplay, but does not 
exclude making use of w e l l  guarded silences, o r  offering pieces of tempting 
but hardly relevant information. 
- The s tance for secrecy a n d  d i s s imula t i on  
This is the choice for  giving "zero" information, practising disinformation, o r  
a t  any rate giving the minimum of external communication. The wager? 'The 
less w e  say, the less trouble we' l l  have". In many cases this strategy of silence 
may effectively succeed. A t  a public session during a recent symposium in 
Paris (AFFITE, 25 October 1985), an official from the French emergency 
management agency reported that last April a huge potential accident could 
have affected 10,000 persons: the Administration had never said anything 
about it, and no-one had ever known. This line of response continues, leading 
to very tough confrontations - especially in the wings - if the strategy of the 
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secret is in danger of not sufficing. The case of the Seveso drums is a model  of 
its genre, taken to the extremes. H e r e  one must, to avoid committing the sin of 
naivety, mention the possibility of the crisis drffting towards m o d e s  of 
response destined to remain obscure. All the resources of the manipulating of 
sumbols, facts, men and groups will possibly be used. It is Machiavelli and 
Clausewitz readapted for  the great battles of communication. Some of the 
cases which w e  have studied have shown us some illuminating examples of this. 
The choice between these three models  of reference is not a l w a y s  established 
in the s a m e  organization. Circumstances may have one chosen in preference to 
another; during the one case, options might vary according to what phase the 
crisis is in. 
The choice wi l l  be made depending on numerous criteria: the margin of 
manoeuverability allowed by the crisis, by internal mentality, by the quality of the 
network with which the event has to be dealt with, by external social conditions in 
which the event takes place. And equally so: more ethical criteria - personal o r  of 
organizations. Thus, a certain large enterprise informed us of its determination 
about having to refuse business and reject certain strategies of communication 
going manifestly counter to the demands made byNgood citizenship" (a policy, 
perhaps damaging in the short run, but clearly viewed as the only viable one in the 
long term). 
Not to come down on any one particular side, i t  should perhaps simply be 
emphasised that if the parties concerned must reside with the angels, they must 
also know not to succumb to the fascination which shady manoeuvres can exert - 
which can reveal themselves f a r  more dangerous and f a r  less relevant than a stra- 
tegy conducted in a clearer light. Particularly so if one considers the longevity of 
the organization. It is true that if one regards economic activity in its narrowest 
possible form, there are some who have nothing to fear  from a total shutting off 
from these questions of communication. They must, of course, be very certain then 
of holding winning cards. One must also be able to forget to ask oneself about what 
coherency might exist between such a principle of shutting off and the very funda- 
ment& of western society, in which freedom of information is one of its dearest 
held values. 
CONCLUSION 
This text has attempted to fix some points of reference in order that one 
might be better able to grasp the problems of communication, linked with the 
dynamics of turmoil, produced in crisis situations. It has pointed out many areas 
being worked on, as w e l l  as the work ahead. 
In conclusion. w e  would simply like to emphasise certain very important 
points: 
Communication in crisis situations today represents a regularly uncontrolled 
problem, leading to difficulties which are, a t  t imes ,  of the world of carica- 
ture. 
Keeping communication under control is indispensable if one is to cope effec- 
tively in a crisis. A s  3. Scanlon writes: 
"An emergency, among other things, is an information crisis and must be 
treated as such "[31,p.31]. 
'To a considerable extent whoever controls the access to information, who- 
ever is the source of information becomes the centre of operations and con- 
trol; and if you don't have communications systems operational, if you can't 
disseminate it, then you also lose the power to have operational control and it 
will shift to whoever has that "[35, p.171. 
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f%ommunications are so important in the aftermath of disaster that the  cen- 
tres of communication may w e l l  be the  centres of operational control as w e l l  
"[36, p.4291. 
Coping more effectively in a crisis is indispensable f o r  the  continuing life of 
organizations as they have had t o  o r  will have t o  tackle poignantly charged 
situations increasingly frequently. 
If one is to overcome the all too often observed tendency to failure, then fun- 
damental research, tactical procedures and strategic reflection are all 
necessary. So too is the choosing of general company policies on the  status to 
be accorded communication in organizations, and more generally on the  status 
to be accorded information fo r  the "outside"; in other  words, a society of 
open communication, in which access to information has a recognised worth. 
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Laxenburg, Austria. 
I INTRODUCTION 
The environmental and public health risks presented especially by the  use of 
nuclear and chemical technologies a r e  fundamentally altering the  way in which 
society copes with technological hazards. There has been a significant increase in 
the  number of scientists and analysts whose work is specifically focused on 
environmental and public health risks; a growth industry has developed in formal 
risk assessments; an expanded role f o r  public regulatory institutions f o r  control- 
ling environmental hazards has evolved; and the re  has been a dramatic entrance of 
the  public environmental groups in regulatory processes (Covello and Mumpower, 
1985). %ese developments are not unique to the  U.S., but are to  varying degrees 
characteristic of environmental politics in Western Europe, as well .  
Despite the  increasing ro le  of public institutions and environmental groups in 
the  regulation of technological risks, the  developing literature on risk assessment 
and management has had very little rooting in understanding organizational 
behavior o r  political processes. One reason fo r  this has been the  presumption 
tha t  individual decision making models can be easily Lransplanted to the public 
arenz,  but public policy making is fundamentally different from individual decision 
making since decisions are not "made" by a single individual but are negotiated, 
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not comprehensively, but sequentially by competing groups and institutions 
(Majone. 1982). 
The failure t o  understand risk management as a political process. where poli- 
cies are negotiated, defended, and too often not implemented, has led to  serious 
misconceptions about t he  role of the  risk analyst, and science generally, in the  
risk management process. For instance, one accepted wisdom, "Better (risk 
assessment) science produces be t t e r  (risk management) policy", may hold equally 
w e l l  in the  reverse ,  "Better policy (and policy procedures) produces be t t e r  sci- 
ence". In o the r  words. t h e r e  i s  not a simple, one-way input of science into public 
policy, but t he  two are intricately intertwined and cannot be easily separated into 
distinct activities. This science-policy circularity has  important implications f o r  
future research  in the  area of environmental risk management, since i t  implies 
that  improving institutional procedures may be as important as improving the  
scientific input into these procedures. 
In this paper.  I w i l l  demonstrate this science-policy circularity by refer r ing  
t o  cross-national research  car r ied  out at IIASA on the  siting of liquid energy-gas 
terminals, t h e  management of hazardous wastes, and the  transportation of 
dangerous chemicals. A close look at these areas of environmental policy making 
shows that  t he  standard model  of risk assessment. where risk analyses are viewed 
as a one-way input into r isk management procedures, is seriously misleading as a 
descriptive model and possibly unattainable as a prescriptive model. After sum- 
marizing the  standard model, I suggest t h r e e  possible alternative models-which 
are also woefully incomplete-but which shed some important doubts on the  
accepted notions of r isk management. In the  final section, I suggest some promis- 
ing avenues f o r  research  on the  institutional aspects of environmental policy mak- 
ing. 
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II THE ACCEPTED MODEL OF THE RISK MANAGEMENT PROCESS 
One of t he  f i r s t  attempts t o  lay out a schematic framework depicting the  r isk 
management process  w a s  a paper  addressing the  social acceptability of t h e  r i sks  
presented by the  commercial use of nuclear power (Otway, et al. 1979). In i t s  sim- 
plest form, t he  four-stage process,  as shown below, included t h e  identification of a 
man-made o r  natural  hazard, the  (quantitative) estimation of t he  r isks ,  t he  evalua- 
tion of t he  seriousness of t he  r i sks  (social acceptability), and the  management of 
t he  risks. With slight variations, this framework o r  model has  subsequently been 
adopted by such bodies as t h e  Scientific Committee f o r  Protection of the  Environ- 
. ment (SCOPE), the U.S. National Research Council. The Royal Society, and the  
World Health Organization (WHO) (see Krewski & Birkwood. this  volume). It  w a s  one 
of the  f i r s t  attempts t o  re la te  "hard" and "soft" science -risk estimation and r isk 
evaluation-with management decisions. A logical sequence from science t o  
management w a s  described. where i t  w a s  clear tha t  science w a s  (and is) a n  input 
into management decisions. and not vice-versa. 
Figure 1. 
Hazard Risk 
Identification Estimation Ksk ' ~ v d u a t i o n  Risk 1-d Management I 
This model of t he  r isk management process has  been elaborated and refined t o  
include. f o r  instance, public perceptions of r isk as a legitimate input t o  r isk 
management (see, e.g. Slovic. et al.. 1979) as w e l l  as the  possibility that  r i sks  a r e  
not evaluated separately from the  technology o r  hazard (see Otway & von Winter- 
feldt, 1982). In fact, since the  conception of this model. a whole body of l i t e ra ture  
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has evolved to "fill in the boxes", from improved screening procedures for  hazard 
identification, refined anaiytical tools for  estimating probabilistic r isks and risk 
perceptions. to  a host of suggestions fo r  judging the acceptability of r i sk s  (see, 
especially, Fischhof, et al., 1981). These scientific endeavors are meant t o  lead to  
improved risk management decisions, where the costs of reducing the  risks are 
ideally balanced with the  benefits of a safer environment. 
This linear concept of the  r i s k  management process, which stems from early 
debates on nuclear power, has been adopted virtually unchanged as a schematic 
framework f o r  chemical risk management. According to the  r epor t  of a recent  
meeting of the  European Regional Program on Chemical Safety: 
The risk management process can be conceived as consisting of the  fol- 
lowing corn;ments: hazard identification, risk estimation, risk evaluation 
culminating in public decisions which are more o r  less rational [WHO. p.1, 
19851. 
While overlaps are recognized, this four-stage management process fo r  chemical 
risks is almost identical t o  the  framework posed ten years ear l ie r  fo r  nuclear 
power risks. The message is also familiar: In order  fo r  risk management to  become 
more "rational", be t ter  scientific information is needed. In the  words of one parti- 
cipant at this meeting: 
Considerable efforts have been made to  establish risk management on a 
fully rational o r  objective basis, but success has not measured up to  ear-  
lier optimi sm... Risk management, as a process, operates on information 
and its communication, and there  is evident need f o r  improvement. 
Improved effectiveness involves increasing the  quality, inteuigibility and 
strength of the  signals being transmitted between the  elements and sub- 
systems comprising the  overall process. Simultaneously, "noise" in the  
system must be countered. Some of this noise is inherent due to less than 
perfect data and the  resulting uncertainties. Other noise may be 
injected into the  system. Interference may be caused, f o r  example, by 
competing risk estimates by o r  on behalf of different interest groups, as 
well as those advising decision-makers. No stage of the  risk-management 
process is immune from the  hazard of misinformation (WHO, 1985, p.3). 
This "noise" in the system, due primarily to less-than-perfect information, is com- 
pounded by the existence of "bad" science. According to another participant: 
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The credibility of the technical inputs to the risk evaluation stage raises 
the metaphysical point that what is done by scientists is not necessarily 
science o r  scientific. Public confusion on this is a serious "impediment" 
to the risk evaluation process. To improve the situation, ideally decision 
makers should obtain a scientific consensus on the risk estimates, 
although experience in the nuclear energy field has shown how difficult 
this would be. In any case, the scientists should remain in their own role 
and not be implicated directly in the decision making process. (WHO, p.9. 
1985) 
What these quotes suggest, and what follows directly from the accepted model, 
is that failures in risk management can be tmced to inadequacies in the scientific 
input-misinformation as a result of scientific disagreements - representing s m a l l  
disturbances, o r  "noises", in a system that is otherwise intact. That these distur- 
bances might be part and parcel of risk management procedures as they exist in 
most countries is not addressed. Recipes for improvement are ,  again, familiar: 
Improve risk (and risk perception) estimates with better methodology 
and pmctices, 
Keep management considemtions (values and politics) separate from 
scientific risk assessments. 
In sum. the message of the accepted m o d e l  is that better and more value-free sci- 
ence will  produce better risk management policies. 
Many decisions affecting technological o r  environmental risks a r e  made on the 
basis of broader technological issues of which r i sk  is a part: the routing of city 
traffic; agricultural policies affecting the use of pesticides; zoning policies; and so 
on. The siting of hazardous facilities is one such multi-dimensional issue, of con- 
siderable concern a t  the present. for which policies a r e  negotiated and settled 
upon in the absence of any "risk managersJ'. The risk issue generally becomes 
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salient only a f t e r  t he  entrance of public groups concerned about safety, and then 
risk analysts en ter  t he  public debate with the implicit purpose of shoring up and 
supporting arguments of t he  participants. I will illustrate with a shor t  description 
of sf ting a liquid-natural-gas facility in California. 
LNG in ~ a L t j ' o r n i a ~ :  
In 1974. Western LNG Terminal Company applied to t he  Federal Power Commission 
f o r  approval of t h ree  s i tes  on the  California Coast t o  locate an LNG receiving ter- 
minal: Point Conception. Oxnard, and Los Angeles. These applications generated 
considerable controversy on the  federal,  s tate ,  and local levels concerning the  
need f o r  natural gas and t h e  safety of locating a terminal at the  populated Los 
Angeles and Oxnard sites. The most frightening possibility was t ha t  the  s torage 
tanks would fail catastrophically, releasing a large quantity of natural gas which 
would vaporize into a cloud tha t  might t ravel  ove r  a neighboring population center  
and then ignite. The conflicts among t h e  many groups involved were exacerbated 
by the  different results of the  r isk analyses commissioned by different groups. 
After more than ten years  of controversy, t he  Point Conception s i te  w a s  approved. 
but Western withdrew i ts  application. Following the  deregulation of domestic 
natural gas pr ices  in 1978, i t  appeared that  California did not need an LNG termi- 
nal. 
The decision process i s  described in detail elsewhere (Lathrop and Lin- 
n e r w t h ,  1982; Kunreuther, et al., 1984). For ou r  purposes h e r e  i t  is worth noting 
that: 
%his discussion is based on a co l labora t ive  s t u d y  a t  IIASA [See Kunreuther ,  Llnnerooth. 
e t  a1 (1983)l. As background it may be helpful t o  know that :  
Lfquefied na tura l  g a s  (LNG) is a po ten t ia l  sou rce  of energy  which r equ i r e s  a f a i r l y  
complicated technological p rocess  t h a t  has  t h e  potent ial ,  a lbe i t  wi th  v e r y  low probabil- 
i t y ,  of c r ea t i ng  s e v e r e  losses. Fo r  purposes of t ranspor t ing ,  na tura l  ga s  can be con- 
verged  t o  liquid form at about  1/600 its gaseous volume. I t  is shipped i n  especial ly 
cons t ruc ted  t a n k e r s  and rece ived  a t  a t e rmina l  where it undergoes regas i f ica t ion  and 
is then  d is t r ibu ted .  The e n t i r e  s y s t e m  (i.e., t h e  l iquefact ion f ac i l i t y ,  t h e  LNG t anke r s ,  
t h e  rece iv ing  terminal, and t h e  regas i f ica t ion  f ac i l i t y )  can c o s t  more than  $1 billion t o  
cons t ruc t .  
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- There w a s  no single decision maker. The final choice of Point Conception 
evolved from a'variety of actions taken by the  many authorities as w e l l  as 
interactions between the applicant, citizens groups and environmental- 
ists. 
- The institutions involved w e r e  often dealing with many issues in addition 
to the  siting of the  LNG terminal, and thus their  stands were consistent 
with objectives related to a multiple of issues, including the  long-term 
survival of their  institution. While the problem may have been formu- 
lated as approving a certain site, other  institutional concerns related 
fo r  instance to energy policy o r  regional development often determined a 
party's position on the  narrower agenda item. 
- The policy process moved sequentially through a set of questions and at 
each stage only segments of the  problem w e r e  addressed. This precluded 
the  use of a broader decision-analytic model in which the  tradeoffs 
between environmental quality, public risk, costs, etc.. could be expli- 
citly set out (see Lindblom, 1959). 
- How the  policy agenda was set,  whether the  need for  a terminal w a s  
addressed o r  the site, and in what order ,  played an important role in the  
final outcome (see Levine and Plott. 1977). 
These features of a political decision process are not unique to siting an LNG 
terminal, and they are addressed in grea t  detail in the  literature. The concern in 
this paper is  how such characteristics of the  policy process influence the  types of 
analyses produced o r  the  ways in which science enters  the  political arena. 
A t  least five comprehensive, quantitative risk analyses were produced during 
the  process of siting an LNG terminal in California (for a review and critique of 
these studies and five more fo r  sites identified in Europe, see Mandl and Lathrop, 
1983). These analyses attempted to  quantify the  very low-probability event of a 
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catastrophic failure of an LNG storage facility. The results of these different ana- 
lyses differed remarkably, for example. the risk of a citizen living in Oxnard was 
estimated to be between l o 4  and lo-? by one study and between lo'? and 10-lo by 
another-a difference of three orders of magnitude. These discrepancies were, in 
part, due to the differences in the choices made by the analysts in defining the 
boundaries of the risk problem they were addressing: One study of the Oxnard site 
focused on a geographical a rea  that put 15.000 people a t  risk; another study con- 
sidered a broader area that put 90,000 people a t  risk. Two of the three risk 
assessments done for  the Point Conception site considered risks involving tran- 
sport ships, the transfer of LNG to shore, and the storage tanks on shore; the 
third study considered only risks involving the transport ships. One major risk to 
an LNG facility is sabotage and another is w a r ;  none of the various California risk 
assessments, however, included either possibility (Kunreuther, et al., 1984). 
The large discrepancies in the results of these studies, the shaping of the 
problem frames, the assumptions chosen, and the presentation of the results were 
not due to misinterpretations and scientific errors,  but reflect the wide discretion 
the analysts enjoy in quantifying risks with so large a subjective component. And 
institutions of dl sorts battling in the political arena commission studies that a r e  
likely to bolster their cause. The multi-party, multi-issue process described 
above, where policies are negotiated sequentially, rewards analyses that address a 
n a r r o w  agenda (in this case, public risk) and that make a persuasive case for 
policy stands that may have already been made on other grounds. The assumptions 
may be hidden, the uncertainties not calculated, the data carefully chosen, and 
presentation formats constructed to direct the reader's attention to one aspect o r  
another of the safety of the operation. As Majone (1978) has observed, there is a 
role for the analyst as "a producer of policy argumen ts... more similar to a 
lawyer.. . than to a problem solver. " 
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This policy perspective presents a profoundly different picture of the risk 
management process as approximated below: 
Figure 2. 
I Policy 
I Process k d  Ide:$Etion k4 Evaluation Risk '-4 1 Estimation 
Here w e  find that there are no risk managers, pe r  se, but people and institutions 
for and against the particular LNG site, who seize upon risk and other issues to 
support their arguments. This does not mean that the safety of the facility w a s  not 
of real concern, but the risks of the facility were only one issue in a multi-issue 
problem. The policy procedures were initiated by Western LNG Terminal Company 
before the  full range of public risks had been identified, which only occurred 
af ter  the choice of a si te  became a public issue. The risks were subjectively 
evaluated by the participants as acceptable o r  not, and consulting firms were 
commissioned to ca r ry  out quantitative assessments. In contrast to  the standard, 
accepted model, risk est imation in this multi-party bargaining process was not an 
e z  an te  input into a "risk management decision" but w a s  primarily an e z  post 
exercise aimed at supporting party arguments. 
This brief description of the LNG siting process, where analyses were 
produced to bolster the arguments of one participant. illustrates the procedural 
limitations scientists may face in reaching any kind of consensus on their disparate 
estimates. Analysts a re ,  themselves, participants in a system that rewards 
"sloppy" analysis, where assumptions are not explicitly stated o r  uncertainties 
recognized. These lapses from "ideal" analysis do not represent "noises" in the 
system due t o  unintended miscommunication. as suggested by t h e  WHO participant,  
but a r e  inevitable in a political bargaining process where the  participants re ly  on 
science to legitimize the i r  policy stands. Risk analyses a r e ,  in these cases,  tools 
f o r  achieving political standing; this  tool function i s  strengthened since risk 
assessment cannot be  fully objective, but involves human judgement throughout t h e  
estimation process  (Gumming, 1981). McColl (1985), has  shown tha t  this subjective 
element i s  also a significant p a r t  of t he  procedures f o r  assessing the  
carcinogenity of chemicals: 
Unfortunately, several  hidden biases may exist  in even the most scientific 
assessment procedures.  These biases are contained in t h e  fundamental 
assumptions made by scientists in t he  design of experiments (statistical 
power), choice of dose response models (low-dose extrapolation), and 
determination of biological end-points (tumor detection) (p.83). 
As t h e  LNG r i sk  analyses demonstrate, these biases allow considerable 
discretion to t he  analysts. Among o thers ,  thus, Ravetz (1983) calls f o r  t h e  
destruction of t h e  myth of scientific objectivity as ineffective and 
counterproductive in today's debates on technological risks,  and suggests that  
scientific resul ts  be  regarded not as "hard factual nuggets" but r a t h e r  as "robust 
tools". Recommendations calling f o r  more objective and be t t e r  r isk analyses are. 
thus, doomed t o  failure unless this tool concept of analysis is recognized, as w e l l  as 
t he  procedural constraints t o  ?bettern science. Better science may only be 
possible through improved policy making procedures. 
IV dLTERNATIVE MODEL IZ: TOPSY-TUBYY REGULATION 
The entrance of t he  public in regulatory processes has  fundamentally changed 
the  rules and dramatically increased t h e  need of regulatory bodies to justify the i r  
policy stands, in many cases with quantitative r isk analyses. This need f o r  
persuasive analyses i s  especially apparent  in t he  U.S. where t h e  system of judicial 
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oversight requires supportive, preferably quantitative, evidence to defend agency 
decisions (Brickman, et al., 1982). In Europe, with i t s  less adversarial regulatory 
systems, the role of expertise rarely takes on such political overtones, although 
this is  changing with the  entrance of environmental groups and environmental 
parties on the political scene. 
This participatory style of regulation has extensively involved scientists and 
analysts, if in a defensive role, and contrasts markedly with o ther  less public 
issues where regulations have often evolved "topsy-turvy", frequently in response 
to  widely publicized accidents and with little need for  quantitative risk analyses. 
This contrast can be illustrated by considering the  historical development of 
regulations fo r  the  transportation of hazardous materials (for more detail. see 
Linnerwth, 1984). 
The IPtansportation of Hazardous Materials 
Government officials and the public have reason for  the i r  concern that a 
catastrophic accident on the  scale of, for  example, the  recent  Bhopal accident, 
with over 2500 deaths from a release of methyl isocyanate o r  the gas explosion in 
Mexico with nearly 500 deaths, is  possible from the  transport of hazardous 
materials (Lagadec, 1985). During the  last century, at least half of the 
catastrophic accidents from dangerous materials have occurred during their  
transport (Smets, 1985). 
This concern with the  catastrophic potential of large volumes of literally 
thousands of hazardous materials criss-crossing the American and European 
continents has motivated national legislators in most  western countries to pass 
far-reaching legislation t o  control their  transport. In implementing this 
legislation, regulatory agencies have developed highly complex and detailed 
systems of control, including m e a s u r e s  to convey information regarding the 
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hazards throughout the  t ransport  chain (labeling goods, placarding vehicles, and 
carrying t ransport  documents) and direct  safety measures (transport bans on 
certain goods. routing measures, containment standards, opersting requirements, 
etc.). Since the  risk activity. as compared with the risk ftself (e.g. air pollution). 
regularly crosses national borders. t h e r e  are also numerous international 
conventions governing all aspects of transportation. 
In the  U.S.. as w e l l  as o the r  countries. t he  controlling structures f o r  the  
regulation of dangerous substances have continuously broadened the scope of 
the i r  control as t h e  definition of what is hazardous f o r  transport has expanded. 
First  explosives. and then o the r  materials such as flammable Liquids and solids, 
poisons. and corrosives fell in the  category of regulated hazardous materials. The 
ensuing regulations developed differently fo r  each transport mode. and with the 
often conflicting rules. shippers  were stymied in the i r  efforts  to meet t h e  demands 
of t he  many governing bodies. 
Though the U.S. Congress consolidated the various federal  agencies charged 
with transportation safety in the  new Department of Transportation in 196'7, still 
different pa r t s  of the organization were responsible f o r  t he  different modes. This 
disarray was described in a DOT statement in 1973: 
Ever since the  inception of hazardous materials control in 
transportation ... t h e r e  has been no real direction or coordination of 
this important safety function. Parts and pieces have been added when 
the needs were demonsttated by severe  accidents and catastrophes. o r  t o  
accommodate the needs of individual manufacturers and shippers. The 
body of laws and regulations has grown like 'Topsy". piece by piece. 
package by package. rule by rule. A s  a resal t ,  the s t ruc ture  today is an  
ill-fitting ramshackle, largely outdated set of confusing and conflicting 
requirements. (in Marten, 1981) 
While the  situation has  improved in the  last decade with the  creation of one 
agency, t h e  Materials Transportation Board within t h e  DOT. to deal with the  
t ransport  of dangerous goods over  all modes, the  situation today is still staggering 
in t he  complexity of t h e  rules. Five federal  agencies. o the r  than DOT, also 
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regulate the transportation of hazardous materials. and the regulations number 
over 1100 pages. The m o s t  detail is found in the packaging requirements2 and 
there  are efforts underway to incorporate the performance-based packaging rules 
prescribed in the United Nations Recommendations fo r  the Transportation of 
Dangerous Goods, a f i rs t  step in the eventual fu l l  adoption of the U.N. system. 
These international rules wi l l  require major adjustments and w i l l  increase the 
already wide gulf between those that produce the  regulations and the local bodies 
(mainly police) that  are responsible for their  enforcement. 
This "enforcement gap" is only one aspect, however, of a serious 
implementation malady. The problem as i t  stands is sufficiently complex, 
considering the severely heterogeneous and ill-structured transport  system, to 
question the viability of any regulatory program. There are enormous volumes of 
dangerous substances transported (although no reliable statistics exist on the 
quantities o r  the  structure of the system), thousands of designated hazardous 
chemicals (and the List may expand significantly if environmental considerations 
are taken into account), four different modes  of transport each with unique 
characteristics (e.g.. f i res  are of great concern f o r  maritime transport, but are of 
less concern fo r  road transport-so what should be the relevant flammability 
limit?) a wide diversity of economic and safety interests among the  many handlers 
of the goods. and several tiers of institutional authority. Informing the regulatory 
community and stepped-up inspections (and possibly stricter liability clauses) 
appear to be the key to more effective implementation: yet, present government 
budgets only scratch the surface in training the thousands of personnel involved 
(e.g., over 1 1/2 million fire fighters in the U.S.), and generally local police forces 
'As an example. TOY CAPS must be packed i n  containers camplying with specifications 15& 
15B. 16A. 19A. o r  IQB. Spec i l i cat ion  15A is f o r  nailed wooden boxes, f o r  whlch there  a r e  
nearly 7 pages o f  specff icat ions.  For instance, t h e  ends of t h e  boxes must be "one piece. 
o r  equivalent. o r  cleated a s  prsscrlbed; joints  tongued, grooved, and glued. S t y l e  1 o r  
s t y l e  6 boxes may have milled depressions i n  each end of box f o r  hand-holds, of not  more 
than 3/8 inch i n  depth and not  exceeding one-third of  t h e  wldth of t h e  box, only when ends 
ore  of lomber a t  l e a s t  1/4 inch in thickness" (Tltle 49, CFR, p.17El-214). 
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do not have the facilities (laboratory and other) to control hazardous materials 
traffic. 
E'ull implementation of the  extensive regulatory codes. therefore, can result 
only at an enormous expense to government as wel l  as t o  industry. Can this 
expense be justified with a rigorous risk-benefit analysis? Possibly not. The U.S. 
data shows, for example, that  in 1983 there  were only 8 reported deaths and 191 
injuries from some 5,761 incidents involving the transport of hazardous materials 
(DOT, 1985). While regulators claim that  the relatively small number of dangerous 
goods transport fatalities are a result of the regulations in place, according to a 
repor t  in the U.S.. accident rates increased when the regulations came into force3 
(U.S. General Accounting Office, 1980). This figure of 8 deaths in the  U.S. 
compares with over 60,000 reported deaths f r o m  highway tmnsportation alone. 
Similarly, in the U.K. during the  13-year period f r o m  1970 to 1982, only 1.2 deaths 
pe r  year can be directly associated with the transportation of dangerous goods on 
the nation's roads, which works out to be a risk of 0.24 x lo-' p e r  person (Kletz 
1984). Research in the psychological dimensions of technological risks has 
cautioned against making these types of simplistic "body count" comparisons of one 
type of risk with another. Still, in this case there  appears to be an extreme 
contradiction between the elaborate detail and expense of the regulations and the 
number of reported fatalities and injuries which the regulations are designed to 
prevent. 
In sum, the  regulation of the transportation of hazardous materials has been 
and continues to be motivated by concern f o r  the potential catastrophic accident, 
whereby layer upon layer of regulation has evolved into a vast system of 
international, national, and local control. This system can be implemented only at 
%here has  been a recent  decline. but t h i s  appears t o  be a result  i n  changes i n  reporting 
requirements. 
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very high expense. From a risk-benefit perspective. these regulatory regimes can 
be justified only by considering the  catastrophic event, since available statistics 
show tha t  only a very small number of deaths and injuries can be  at t r ibuted t o  t he  
transportation of hazardous materials. The question. then, is  whether t h e  
regulatory systems, as they stand, will reduce this  catastrophic potential t o  some 
"acceptable" level. What role have analyses played in addressing this  question? 
The answer to this question is  virtually none. There have been no formal, 
quantitative r isk assessments except in those isolated cases where the  public has  
become concerned, e.g., t h e  t ransport  of radioactive substances o r  chlorine 
through major cities. Even in t h e  United States,  where agency decisions requi re  
detailed justification. t h e r e  have been no quantitative assessments of t h e  r i sks  
underlying the  more than 1100 pages of rules addressing a problem which by some 
measures might be  considered a non-problem, at least where t h e  catastrophic 
potential i s  acceptably low. In sum, t h e  rules have developed "topsy turvy", this 
model is  characterized below: 
Figure 3. 
V ALTERNATIVE MODEL IIL- COMPREHENSIVE REGULATION 
Contrasting with t h e  siting and transportation issues, where public risk 
exposure w a s  determined through multi-party, political procedures and in 
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response to  widely publicized accidents respectively, is a set of issues which are 
f o r  the  most p a r t  resolved internally t o  a regulatory body in light of available 
scientific evidence. This model comes closest t o  t he  standard, accepted model of 
r isk management. The hazard is broadly identified through enabling legislation, 
and an  agency is charged w i t h  setting out a regulatory program. This agency turns 
to the scientific community t o  identify more precisely the hazard and possibly t o  
supply final risk assessments. This scientific data then becomes an  input into the  
risk management decision. e.g. determining what standard to set based upon cost, 
implementability, etc. 
An important dictum of this  process  is to keep considerations of r isk 
management separa te  from the wholly scientific questions concerning the  extent 
and seriousness of the hazard. This theoretical distinction may be  lost, however, 
when institutional considerations are taken into account. When faced with a 
socially complex problem, a regulatory agency must inevitably reduce  the  full 
scope of t he  potential issue to proportions with which i t  can cope. A t  the  same 
time, i t  must maintain its credibility by appearing to manage t h e  issue 
comprehensively. This tension between scoping the  regulatory issue and managing 
it comprehensively may inadvertently compel t he  agency to bound the problem at 
the  ear ly  phases of hazard identification and estimation, thus mixing management 
concerns with scientffic "facts". I will i l lustrate by describing t h e  process  
whereby the  U.S. Environmental Protection Agency established a list and testing 
procedures  f o r  determining which of the  thousands of industrial and o the r  wastes 
are hazardous. 
C L a s m n g  H a z a r d o u s  Was te s  
With passage in 1976 of t he  U.S. Resource Conservation and Recovery A c t ,  the  
EPA w a s  given the task of designing and implementing a comprehensive regulatory 
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system f o r  managing hazardous wastes within the broad directive of a single 
overriding statutory goal-the protection of human health and the  environment. 
This task would be fulfilled by, among other things, developing a federal 
classification s y s t e m  to determine what wastes would enter  the  regulatory system. 
The difficulties the EPA would face in shaping a regulatory control program can be 
appreciated by considering the following: 
There are about 7 000 000 known chemicals. 
Approximately 80 000 a r e  in commercial circulation. 
Approximately 1000 new chemicals enter  commercial use each year. 
Using the total of world laboratory resources, about 500 chemicals p e r  
year could be testable for  toxicity (at colossal expense). 
One test. fo r  carcinogenicity alone. can involve 800 test animals and 40 
different tissue specimens p e r  animal f o r  pathology examinations; that  is, 
32 000 specimens. This needs approximately 5500 000 and 3.5 years t o  
perform. 
the re  are approximately 14 000 food additives and contaminants. Many 
natural components are thought to be also toxic (Wynne, forthcoming). 
With the potential breadth of the problem, and the  underdeveloped science 
accompanying the issue. the EPA's regulatory attention would inevitably be 
selective. As expected. artificial boundaries developed f o r  what is and is not 
hazardous, such as concentration levels and volume cutoffs. which have more t o  do 
with pragmatic. administrative necessities than objective, natural science dictates. 
This can be seen by examining the development of the EPA's policies for listing 
hazardous wastes. 
The EPA set out two sets of criteria for  listing hazardous waste: criteria fo r  
wastes that are acutely hazardous and fo r  other toxic wastes. An acutely 
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hazardous waste is either fatal to humans in low doses, o r  has an animal toxicity of 
oral  LD 50 of less than 50 mg/kg in rats o r  an inhalation LD 50 of less than 200 
mg/cubic m e t e r  in rabbits. Other wastes, that were not acutely toxic. were t o  be 
listed if they were carcinogenic. mutagenic, teratogenic, phytotoxic o r  toxic to 
aquatic species. 
The w a s t e  lists: The E P A  developed two hazardous waste lists: (1) the wastes from 
standard manufacturing o r  industrial processing operations known to contain toxic 
constituents. and (2) hazardous commercial products which became wastes when 
discarded. The industrial waste lists were developed by examining some 200 
studies of industrial wastes that  had been compiled at the EPA pr ior  to the RCRA 
legislation. From these studies approximately 125 wastes w e r e  identified as 
hazardous. The EPA estimated, however, that there were over 10,000 major 
industrial w a s t e  processes, so  the identified wastes did not begin to encompass the 
full gamut-this gap would be filled by requiring generators to test their wastes. 
The question of concern here  is the scientific information that allowed the 
EPA to choose these 125 wastes and a number of commercial products fo r  Listing, 
as well as the criteria f o r  establishing tests which wi l l  be discussed below. The 
compilation of the Lists began with the identification of hazardous (carcinogenic 
mutagenic, toxic to aquatic species, etc.) constituents. However, chemical testing, 
especially f o r  carcinogens. is a complicated. costly procedure, and f o r  this reason 
the EPA relied almost exclusively on other environmental regulation to identify 
380 hazardous constituents. Specifically, it took approximately 300 entr ies from 
the Clean Water Program, six o r  so from the Clean A i r  Program. approximately 20 
from the EPA List of Toxic Substances, and approximately 20 f r o m  those identified 
by the EPA Cancer Assessment Group (Dietrich, 1984). 
Since data from the Clean Water Program w e r e  used so extensively, it is 
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instructive to note how these constituents were compiled. Their history can be 
traced back t o  1974 when environmental groups sued the EPA f o r  not implementing 
Section 307 of the Clean Water A c t ,  which required the EPA to identify and 
regulate specific toxic water contaminants. In reaching a compromise with 
environmental groups the EPA hastily compiled these constituents from the 
scientific literature-what has been described as a 'hasty midnight session where a 
larger list was whittled down by crude analysis" (Dietrich, 1984). One source 
provided the bulk of the information, a book titled Water Quufity Cri ter ia ,  edited 
by McKee and Wolf. This book was f i r s t  published in 1952 and has been repeatedly 
revised to its last edition in 1971. It  contains a survey of potential toxic 
contaminants of water with reference to the U.S. and foreign literature, giving 
gene- information on effects of pollutants to aquatic We. 
In fulfilling its mandate to protect human health and the environment, 
therefore, the EPA was severely constrained by the availability of scientific data 
on the hazardous constituents of wastes. The criteria chosen were weighted much 
more heavily towards protecting aquatic We than human We, because in this area 
scientifically justifiable arguments could be made based on the precedent of water 
quality control. Interestingly, much of the scientific basis of the comprehensive 
hazardous waste regulations can be found in one edited book originally published 
in 1952. 
A waste containing one or more of these 380 hazardous constituents was not 
necessarily listed-eleven factors were identified which could justffy not listing a 
waste including, f o r  instance. the nature of the toxicity of the constitutent, the 
concentration of the constitutents in the waste. the quantity of waste generated, 
and "such other factors as may be appropriate" (Federal Register. p.33121). The 
actual process w a s  described by EPA staff as follows: If a w a s t e  contained one of 
the 380 constituents identified as hazardous, it was then analyzed to see if the  
constituents were present in significant concentrations. If so, the waste w a s  listed. 
The final lists of wastes promulgated by the EPA contains 13 w a s t e s  resulting from 
non-specific sources (spent solvents), 76 wastes f r o m  specific sources (e.g. w a s t e  
water treatment sludge) and more than 400 hazardous chemical products (e.g. 
acetaldehyde). 
The detailed justification f o r  listing each waste in the  regulations w e r e  
contained in background documents. The documents included: 
1. A summary of the Administrator's basis fo r  listing each waste. 
2. A brief description of the  specific industry; 
3. A description of the manufacturing process: 
4. An identification of waste composition, constitutent concentration; and 
annual quantity generated: 
5. A discussion of the basis fo r  Listing each waste stream; and 
6. A summary of the  diverse health effects of each of the  constituents of 
concern. Federa l  Register, p. 331131 
Despite this elaborate justification, the  EPA admitted that  decisions to list a w a s t e  
were often based on qualitative judgments, generally involving expert  assumptions 
r a the r  than precise field measurement. Federa l  Register, p. 331141 
Testing Procedures: The EPA recognized that  its listing procedure would not 
comprehensively cover the  range of hazardous wastes--at least 9,800 major 
industrial processes had not been examined. To fill this gap. the  EPA required 
generators to test those wastes that  did not appear on the lists. The draft 
regulations originally proposed eight characteristics requiring testing, but these 
w e r e  reduced to four in the f ina l  regulations: ignitability, corrosivity, reactivity, 
and toxicity. 
The toxicity characteristic was by far the  most controversial, and the  EPA 
encountered grea t  difficulties in trying to develop testing procedures (Quarles, 
p.54). An Ext.raction Procedure Test was settled upon whereby laboratory steps 
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were specified to analyze representative waste samples of 14 contaminants Listed in 
the U.S. Federal Drinking Water Standards. If these contaminants were present at 
levels 100 times o r  greater  than the  concentrations a l l o w e d  in drinking water, then 
the waste is considered hazardous. This test and the  '100 ttmes" standard have 
been subject to heavy criticism due to the large scientific uncertainty involved 
(Federal Register. p .33112). 
The U.S. is the only country in the western, industrialized world that requires 
generators to test their wastes if they are not listed. The F.R.G., for instance, has 
developed a "waste catalog" which supposedly Lists aIl wastes, and those that are to 
be considered hazardous or "special" are designated in this catalog (for a fu l l  
discussion of the F.R.G.. the U.K.. and A u s t r i a .  see DowLing and Linnerooth, 1984). 
By requiring the  generators to test their  wastes, the  scope of the regulatory 
program is significantly broadened-by as much as 902 greater ,  according to one 
estimate. 
Throughout EPA's five-year period of rule-making. the intended scope of the 
regulatory program was a subject of continual internal controversy between those 
preferring a smaller list of high-priority wastes and those who preferred 
comprehension. I t  appears that the  EPA preferred the latter, which according to 
the  former Deputy Administrator of the EPA was mistaken: 
Certain categories of waste and certain industrial activities clearly 
present far more serious environmental hazards than do others. By 
focusing on selected priority problems to impose initial controls, EPA 
probably could have put a program into effect in half the time i t  took to 
establish such a broad and elabomte framework. It  could then have 
expanded coverage to other  wastes and other operations wlth the benefit 
of practical experience. By attempting to be so ambitious. the Agency 
delayed the whole program ... Driven by the forces of environmental 
politics, w e  have repeatedly committed ourselves to goals and programs 
that are utterly unrealistic. (Quarles, p. xvi) 
As this quote illustrates, many critics of the EPA thought it necessary to go beyond 
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the one-level distinction of high-priority wastes to a multi-tiered classification 
system. and then to set regulatory priorities accordingly. This w a s  rejected by 
the EPA on the grounds that there  w a s  simply not enough scientific information to  
make this distinction. mere w a s  another angle, however, of the degree-of-hazard 
question which was suggested both internally and by industry. The hazard posed by 
a waste. i t  was argued. depends not only on its physical characteristics, but also on 
the way in which i t  is handled. The regulations should, at least initially, be limited 
t o  those wastes that  present a constant risk and require special care,  and should 
not include those which do not present a risk, when handled in a "normal" manner 
using standard equipment and containers. Proponents of this argument pointed to 
the wording of the RCRA statute defining hazardous waste which differentiated 
between highly toxic wastes and those which pose a hazard "when improperly 
treated, stored, transported, o r  disposed of, o r  otherwise managed". 
This argument blurred the  distinction between the intrinsic hazard of a 
chemical waste and the hazards posed by w a s t e  management procedures-between 
risk assessment and risk management--and w a s  flatly rejected by the  EPA which 
emphasized that: 
The fact  that  a w a s t e  is properly managed by particular generators o r  
particular classes of generators, does not make a w a s t e  non-hazardous. 
It is only necessary that  the hazard could result when w a s t e s  are 
mismanaged (Federal Register, Vol. May 19, 1980, p.33113) 
In comparison with other countries, the EPA took extreme c a r e  to keep the 
scientific issue separate from the political by its exclusion of management 
possibilities and costs in defining hazard and listing wastes (in contrast, the  costs 
of managing w a s t e s  w a s  an explicit consideration in listing wastes in the 
Netherlands). Yet, even with such strong intentions on the  pa r t  of the EPA to keep 
science separate from policy, w e  find that i t  w a s  not entirely a one-way process. 
A s  fears mounted within the EPA that the scope of the regulatory program was 
becoming unmanageable, pressure intensified to draw in the boundaries. These 
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pressures  subtly entered those areas where the  EPA staff had allowed themselves 
sufficient discretion, such as: 
In deciding whether the  concentration of one o r  more of t h e  380 
hazardous constituents was sufficient to l ist  a waste; o r ,  if t he  w a s t e  w a s  
generated in sufficient quantities; o r  the o the r  nine possible fac tors  that 
justified not listing a waste. 
By drawing back from the 8 character is t ics  fo r  testing to determine if a 
waste is hazardous t o  4 characteristics.  
By choosing only t h e  14 hazardous drinking water constituents to 
substantiate t h e  toxicity characteristic.  
While t he  EPA justified these imposed boundaries by the  inadequacy of t h e  
scientific data ,  t h e  opposite argument can also b e  made: Because so l i t t le is  known 
about t h e  effects of chemical c o n ~ t s ,  i t  i s  be t t e r  to err on the conservative 
side by, e.g., including all w a s t e s  containing hazardous constituents regardless  of 
concentration o r  quantity, requiring testing f o r  all possible hazardous 
character is t ics  even if testing procedures are in some cases rough, and by 
including all possible contaminants in t h e  definition of toxicity. But expanding the  
definition into these "fuzzier" areas would have added an unbearable 
administrative burden on generators  and t h e  EPA. In o the r  words. management 
considerations were a n  inevitable input into the  "scientific" question of what 
wastes are hazardous. 
Again in this case. w e  find tha t  formal. quantitative r i sk  assessments played no 
role. According t o  an EPA staff member, only t h e  most hazardous w a s t e s  and t h e  
least controversial  had been identified and, thus, t he  EPA w a s  c o r r e c t  in i t s  
assessment that  t h e r e  would be no consequent cour t  battles. For this  reason, 
quantitative justification f o r  EPA's listing decisions w a s  not deemed necessary. 
Once again, quantitative r i sk  assessments appea r  t o  be called upon only when t h e  
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public becomes involved, and as a way of defending a n  agency's decision. 
This model, although the  most similar t o  t he  standard model of r isk 
management, lacks the  formal r isk estimation phase and has a n  important (although 
in this case  subtle) feedback from the  policy questions to t he  "scientific" 
questions. I t  i s  illustrated below: 
Figure 4. 
The identification of t h e  hazard, a seemingly scientific endeavor, could not be  
fully scientific in light of t h e  many unknowns. This gap allowed tha t  consideration 
of program implementability and cost en te r  into identification c r i te r ia ,  such as in 
choosing the  hazardous constituents and the  waste character is t ics  f o r  testing. 
Another feedback loop can be  found in the  evaluation phase, where t h e  somewhat 
arbi t rar i ly  chosen concentration levels f o r  the  hazardous constituents and 
quantity exclusions again permitted r isk management considerations to en te r  what 
w a s  considered the  fully scientific exercise  o r  assessing hazard o r  risk. 
Hazard 
Identification 
VI CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The accepted model of t he  r isk assessment/management process,  where the  
"hard" scientific tasks of identifying hazards and estimating the i r  risks. and the  
"soft" scientific tasks of evaluating these r i sks  flow linearly into r isk management 
decisions-is misleading as a descr ip t ive  model of r isk management processes. The 
Risk Risk ( *, Evaluation * Management 
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"new style" of environmental policy making is a tri-party process involving 
government regulatory authorities, industry. and environmental groups, each of 
which calls on analysts to provide "scientific" justification fo r  their  policy stands. 
The highly subjective element of risk estimation lends itself to meeting these 
conflicting demands, and the  result is that  risk management decisions are often not 
based on scientific estimates of risks but r a the r  are justffied by these estimates. 
Analysts are thus caught in a process that  rewards correct analyses, but those 
which may be construed to present an overconfident picture of the  certainty of the  
estimates by not stating assumptions, not providing error bands, and so forth. 
The old style of regulation is characterized by the  long-term development of 
complex rules usually in response t o  highly visible accidents and with little 
involvement of the  public or environmental groups. Formal risk analyses. even in 
those cases where the  authorities would find i t  difficult to justify costly 
regulations. have played little o r  no role. This underscores the  finding that  risk 
analyses in pluralistic management processes may be valued more fo r  their  
enhancement of an agency's bargaining position than as an ez an te  input into an 
agency's management decisions. 
The accepted model would appear to have more promise as a presc t i p t i v e  
model, where the  prescriptions fo r  improving the management of risks are both 
intuitive and attractive: 
Improve methods f o r  estimating risks (promote more "objective"" 
analyses) ; 
Communicate these improved estimates to all concerned: and 
Keep management considerations separate from scientific activities 
(value-free facts) 
If. indeed, the  problems encountered in managing risks are due to the  quality of 
the  information and the  inadequacies in communication, then improving the  
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"factual" basis of the  estimates and "spreading the  word" should result in a more 
harmonious and efficient risk management process than has been apparent to date. 
Unfortunately, as shown in this paper, these prescriptions are largely 
unobtainable given the inherently subjective nature of risk estimates and our  
current  institutions and political processes for  managing risks, and even if 
obtained, may not be  helpful in today's debates on technological risks. Risk 
analysts do not and cannot produce facts; but they can give some important 
insights, and the analyses should be  regarded as "robust toolsJ' fo r  making social 
choices. Moreover, the  identification of hazards and the  estimation of their  risks 
is  inevitably a process that  w i l l  to some extent encompass values and pragmatic, 
administrative considerations. This w a s  seen in the case of identifying hazardous 
wastes where administrative concerns entered into definitions of hazard as 
necessary in bounding the  scope of the  regulatory problem. 
In sum. the  scientific and procedural reforms suggested by the  accepted 
model of risk management are largely unobtainable in light of the  adversarial 
nature of environmental debates and the  inevitably subjective content of formal 
risk analyses. Furthermore, improvements in the  science of risk estimation may 
not help in highly politicized debates concerning environmental issues. A whole 
body of research on the  perception of r isks and the  cultural underpinnings of risk 
debates show that  the  people and groups involved may operate with different and 
conflicting rationalities, and formal analyses w i l l  do little to change these social 
and cultural forces. 
Rather than following in the  same t racks  as the  long and unresolved social 
debate on the commercial use of nuclear power (where the  resolution of the  social 
conflict surely does not lie in fmproving scientific estimates of risks). regulators 
f o r  similarly controversial environmental risks should try t o  gain an 
understanding of these social and cultural forces and work towards institutional 
and procedural reforms that  accommodate them. Some promising directions lie in 
devising better  tools fo r  negotiating conflicts in the light of uncertain information, 
but many questions remain unanswered. For instance, how can highly uncertain and 
conflicting scientific evidence play a constructive role in these negotiations? 
What other tools are available? And, most importantly, what types of social institu- 
tions would accommodate an open negotiating procedure? 
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Introduction 
This paper presents an overview of t he  results of t h e  International 
Conference on Transportation, Storage and Disposal of Hazardous Materials. 
which was held a t  t h e  International Institute fo Applied Systems Analysis 
(IIASA), July 1-5, 1985. The Conference brought toeether representatives of 
academia, business, and government from East and West t o  discuss t he  nature 
of current  problems in t h e  area of hazardous materials. An important objec- 
tive of t he  Conference was to  suggest s teps  t ha t  could be  undertaken by 
industrial firms, t h e  insurance industry and government agencies to  improve 
t h e  safety and efficiency with which hazardous materials a r e  produced and 
con trolled in industrialized societies. 
In July of 1984, t h e  Geneva Association convened a meeting for t h e  pur- 
pose of planning an international conference on transportation, storage and 
disposal of hazardous materials, with special focus on t h e  role of compensa- 
tion, regulation and insurance. The Geneva Workshop recommended that  t he  
Conference be held a t  t h e  International Institute for Applied Systems 
*Professor of Economics and Decision Sciences, Director of the Center for Organizational Innova- 
tion, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19104 
**Professor of Decision Sciences and Public Management, Director of the Center for Risk and Deci- 
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***Paper presented at the IlASA Task Force Meeting on Risk and Policy Analysis Under Conditions 
of Uncertainty, November 25 through 27, 1985. 
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Analysis (IIASA) in Vienna, which has been an important focus for interna- 
tional risk research.  The recommendations of the  Geneva Workshop were 
strongly supported by the IIASA Directorate. Thus was launched the  Inter- 
national Conference on Hazardous Materials, the  Proceedings of which follow. 
The focus of t he  Conference was on petrochemical industry problems, 
with emphasis on regulation and insurance. The Conference had as  i ts  major 
objective a research agenda for the  next five to  ten years for hazardous 
materials research in these areas. Given the  international nature and scope 
of hazardous materials problems, participants a t  the  Conference included 
broad representation from the  international community, and a rich mixture 
of practitioners and scholars. 
The basic themes for the  Conference were laid out a t  the  Geneva Plan- 
ning Workshop. They came to  be  s t ructure  under the  following headings: 
1. Historical Background.  This topic was intended to  provide per- 
spectives on the  nature and magnitude of accidents and losses from 
previous technological disasters. notably Seveso and Bhopal. 
Problem Context .  W e  were concerned with hazardous materials prob- 
lems in the  following contexts: production, transportation, han- 
dling, storage and disposal of hazardous materials. These contexts 
were meant to  include both the  dangerous goods sector (e.g., 
chlorine and sulfuric acid) as well as the  hazardous waste area. 
Risk A n a l y s i s .  Here we planned to  discuss the  traditional problems 
of hazard identification, risk estimation, risk evaluation and related 
perception and communication problems. W e  w e r e  specifically con- 
cerned with linking risk analysis to  available policy instruments for 
managing hazardous materials risks. 
4 .  Risk Management a n d  Insurance .  Finally, the  prescriptive focus 
of t he  Conference was principally on risk management and insurance 
measures. W e  were interested in determining what policy instru- 
ments could be  used to  mitigate risks, to reduce or  eliminate risks, 
t o  spread risk,  and to absorb the financial and other  loss potential 
of risks in socially and financially acceptable ways. 
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Figure 1 below summarizes t he  above areas and shows the  principal 
stakeholders associated with t he  hazardous materials problem. The overrid- 
ing theme of t he  Conference, as i t  evolved, was linking theory and practice in 
t he  use of policy instruments and legal institutions for  resolving conflicts 
among these stakeholders for t he  problem contexts depicted in Figure 1. 
W e  now provide a brief overview of t he  Conference papers t o  provide the  
reader  a foretaste of t he  contents of this volume. Thereafter,  the  research 
recommendations resulting from the  Conference will be presented. 
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STAKEHOLDERS 
Scientists Industry Insurers Regulators 
Interest Groups The Public Media Politicians 
PROBLEM CONTEXTS 
Production, Transportation, 
Storage, and Disposal 
of Hazardous Material 
1 
RISK ANALYSIS 
Identification, Assessment, Reception, 
and Communication of Risks 
RISK MANAGEMENT 
I INSTITUTIONS AND POLICY INSTRUMENTS 
Insurance, Regulation, Laws, Negotiation 
and Compensation 
Figure 1: Basic Themes of the Conference 
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OVERVIEW OF THE CONFERENCE PAPERS 
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
The f i r s t  g r o u p  o f  p a p e r s  were commissioned t o  p r o v i d e  h i s t o r i c a l  
p e r s p e c t i v e s  on  t h e  n a t u r e  and m a g n i t u d e  o f  t h e  h a z a r d o u s  m a t e r i a l s  
p rob lem,  w i t h  p a r t i c u l a r  a t t e n t i o n  p a i d  t o  t h e  n a t u r e  o f  s e r i o u s  
a c c i d e n t s  i n  t h i s  a r e a .  W e  were a l s o  c o n c e r n e d  w i t h  p r o v i d i n g  a n  
o v e r v i e w  of  t h e  m a g n i t u d e  o f  l o s s e s  s u f f e r e d  t h r o u g h  man-made e n v i r o n -  
m e n t a l  d i s a s t e r s .  
I n  t h e  f i r s t  p a p e r ,  P a t r i c k  Lagadec d i s u s s e s  s e v e r a l  c a s e  s t u d i e s  
o f  c o n s i d e r a b l e  i n t e r e s t  i n  t h e  r i s k  management a r e a .  These  i n c l u d e d  
t h e  r e l e a s e  o f  d i o x i n  i n  S e v e s o ,  t h e  e x p l o s i o n  o f  a  l i q u i f i e d  p r o p a n e  
g a s  t a n k  i n  Mexico C i t y ,  and t h e  l e a k a g e  o f  t o x i c  g a s  from a  p e s t i c - i d e  
p l a n t  i n  Bhopa l ,  I n d i a .  H e  u s e s  t h e s e  c a s e  s t u d i e s  t o  d e r i v e  a  
framework f o r  d e s c r i b i n g  how o r g a n i z a t i o n s  and p u b l i c  a u t h o r i t i e s  h a v e  
r e a c t e d  t o  cr is is  s i t u a t i o n s .  Lagadec a l s o  u s e s  t h e s e  c a s e  s t u d i e s  t o  
d e s c r i b e  means f o r  c o p i n g  w i t h  cr is is ,  i n c l u d i n g  better emergency 
p l a n n i n g ,  o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  and i n s t i t u t i o n a l  d e s i g n  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  and 
a p p r o a c h e s  t o  t h e  management o f  cr is i s .  
T h i s  p a p e r  is f o l l o w e d  by o n e  by  Giovann i  Naschi  who d e s c r i b e s  
e n g i n e e r i n g  a s p e c t s  o f  s e v e r e  a c c i d e n t s ,  w i t h  s p e c i f i c  r e f e r e n c e  t o  
S e v e s o ,  Mexico C i t y  and Bhopal .  N a s c h i ' s  m a j o r  f o c u s  is on e r r o r s  i n  
t e c h n i c a l  d e s i g n  a n d / o r  management o f  t h e  o p e r a t i o n  which l e a d  t o  
c a t a s t r o p h i c  f a i l u r e .  H e  d e s c r i b e s  some o f  t h e  s a f e t y  d e v i c e s  i n  p l a c e  
f o r  t h e  t h r e e  c a s e s ,  and i n d i c a t e s  why t h e y  d i d  n o t  f u n c t i o n  p r o p e r l y  
a t  t h e  t i m e  of  t h e  a c c i d e n t s .  Naschi  summarizes  h i s  argument  by  
s u g g e s t i n g  t h a t  t h e  major  c a u s e s  o f  S e v e s o ,  Mexico C i t y  and Bhopal were 
"a  c o m b i n a t i o n  o f  d e s i g n  d e f i c i e n c i e s ,  o p e r a t i n g  e r r o r s  and m a n a g e r i a l  
m i s t a k e s . "  
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The paper  by F. P o c c h i a r i ,  V. S i l a n o ,  and G. Zapponi d e s c r i b e s  
Seveso and i ts  a f t e r m a t h  i n  d e t a i l  from a  p u b l i c  h e a l t h  p o i n t  o f  view. 
T h i s  paper  was p r e s e n t e d  i n  a  c o l o r f u l  f a s h i o n  by P r o f e s s o r  P o c c h i a r i  
a t  t h e  Conference and d e s c r i b e d  bo th  t h e  Seveso i n c i d e n t  and t h e  
e v a c u a t i o n  p r o c e d u r e s  fo l lowing  t h e  Seveso a c c i d e n t .  P r o f e s s o r  
P o c c h i a r i  u s e s  Seveso a s  a  c a s e  s t u d y  t o  d i s c u s s  t h e  u n c e r t a i n t i e s  
su r round ing  whether such  e v a c u a t i o n s  should  be o rde red  t o  s a f e g u a r d  
pub1 ic  h e a l t h .  
The paper  by Henri  Smets a d d r e s s e s  t h e  fo l lowing  q u e s t i o n :  What 
is t h e  magni tude .of envi ronmenta l  damage caused  by i n d u s t r i a l  a c t i v i -  
t i e s ?  And, f u r t h e r ,  a r e  such  damages i n s u r a b l e ?  Smets rev iews  damage 
due t o  o i l  p o l l u t i o n  a t  s e a ,  a c c i d e n t s  i nvo lv ing  dams, a i r ,  water  and 
n o i s e  p o l l u t i o n ,  a s  w e l l  a s  envi ronmenta l  impairment r e s u l t i n g  from 
r a d i o a c t i v e  p o l l u t i o n  and hazardous  was tes .  I n  each  of  t h e s e  c a s e s ,  
Smets l ooks  a t  t h e  b e s t  e s t i m a t e s  a v a i l a b l e  on a c t u a l  damage and t h e  
p r o p o r t i o n  of l o s s e s  covered by i n s u r a n c e  and o t h e r  payments t o  
v i c t i m s .  H e  conc ludes  t h a t  envi ronmenta l  damage is n o t ,  by n a t u r e  of  
i ts magnitude and o c c u r r e n c e  l e v e l s ,  an  I ln insurab le  e v e n t .  The magni- 
t u d e  and o c c u r r e n c e  l e v e l s  appear  t o  be no h i g h e r ,  f o r  example,  t h a n  
t h o s e  a s s o c i a t e d  wi th  commercial a i r l i n e  a c c i d e n t s .  Th i s  paper  set t h e  
s t a g e  f o r  a  l i v e l y  d i s c u s s i o n  a t  t h e  Conference a s  t o  what d i s t i n g u i s h -  
es envi ronmenta l  impairment a c c i d e n t s ,  f o r  which i n s u r a n c e  is l a r g e l y  
u n a v a i l a b l e  i n  t h e  U.S. today ,  from a c c i d e n t s  o f  o t h e r  t y p e s ,  f o r  which 
i n s u r a n c e  is c l e a r l y  a v a i l a b l e .  T h i s  d i s c u s s i o n  is  r e f l e c t e d  i n  t h e  
comments fo l lowing  t h e  Smets pape r ,  a s  w e l l  a s  i n  s e v e r a l  o t h e r  p a p e r s  
reviewed below. 
- '- Kleindorfer,  P.R., K u n r e u t h e r ,  H.C. 
PROBLEM COKTEXT 
A s  n o t e d ,  t h e  theme o f  t h e  C o n f e r e n c e  was t h e  u s e  o f  t h e  p o l i c y  
i n s t r u m e n t s  o f  i n s u r a n c e ,  c o m p e n s a t i o n ,  r e g u l a t i o n  and n e g o t i a t i o n  t o  
p romote  s a f e  and  e f f i c i e n t  p r a c t i c e s  i n  t h e  h a z a r d o u s  m a t e r i a l s  a r e a .  
S e v e r a l  C o n f e r e n c e  p a p e r s  e x p l o r e d  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  be tween  t h e s e  
p o l i c y  i n s t r u m e n t s  and t h e  s p e c i f i c  problem c o n t e x t s  o f  F i g u r e  1, 
namely t h e  p r o d u c t i o n ,  t r a n s p o r t ,  s t o r a g e  and d i s p o s a l  o f  h a z a r d o u s  
m a t e r i a l s .  
The p a p e r  b y  P a u l  K l e i n d o r f e r  and Howard K u n r e u t h e r  i n v e s t i g a t e s  
t h e  u s e  o f  i n s u r a n c e  and c o m p e n s a t i o n  a s  p o l i c y  i n s t r u m e n t s  i n  t h e  
c o n t e x t  o f  h a z a r d o u s  w a s t e  management. F i r s t ,  ~ l e i n d o r f e r  and 
K u n r e u t h e r  r e v i e w  t h e  n a t u r e  o f  h a z a r d o u s  w a s t e  management a c t i v i t i e s ,  
from d e c i s i o n s  b y  f i r m s  a s  t o  how much waste t o  g e n e r a t e ,  t h r o u g h  t h e  
d e c i s i o n s  r e l a t e d  t o  t h e  t r a n s p o r t  and  d i s p o s a l  o f  t h i s  was te .  They 
d i s c u s s  t h e  complex i n t e r w e a v i n g  o f  l i a b i l i t y  and i n s u r a n c e  c o n s i d e r a -  
t i o n s  w i t h  t h e s e  d e c i s i o n s .  I n  t h e o r y ,  t h e r e  is a n  o p p o r t u n i t y  t o  
u t i l i z e  i n s u r a n c e  a s  a  p o l i c y  i n s t r u m e n t  f o r  e n c o u r a g i n g  i n d u s t r i a l  
f i r m s  t~ e n g a g e  i n  r i s k  r e d u c t i o n  measures .  However, r e c e n t  c o u r t  
r u l i n g s  i n  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  and e l s e w h e r e  on t h e  n a t u r e  o f  l i a b i l i t y  
f o r  h e a l t h  e f f e c t s  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  h a z a r d o u s  m a t e r i a l s  h a v e  c r e a t e d  
p r o b l e m s  f o r  i n d u s t r y  and i n s u r a n c e  f i r m s  t o  implement  s u c h  a  p l a n  o f  
a c t i o n .  The p a p e r  t h e n  d e s c r i b e s  t h e  c u r r e n t  s t a l e m a t e  i n  s i t i n g  new 
h a z a r d o u s  w a s t e  f a c i l i t i e s .  K l e i n d o r f e r  and K u n r e u t h e r  recommend t h e  
u s e  o f  i n s u r a n c e  and c o m p e n s a t i o n  a s  p o l i c y  i n s t r u m e n t s  f o r  s h a r i n g  t h e  
b e n e f i t s  t o  a  r e g i o n  from l o c a t i n g  a  h a z a r d o u s  w a s t e  f a c i l i t y  w i t h  
t h o s e  s t a k e h o l d e r s  who h a v e  t o  b e a r  t h e  r i s k s  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  s u c h  
f a c i l i t i e s .  
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Michael O'Hare's paper describes the importance of bargaining and 
negotiation in risk management in the context of hazardous materials 
transportation. O'Hare points out the tremendous importance of 
negotiation both in striking deals to appropriately spread risks and 
benefits, as well as a means of communication to arrive at an informed 
consensus about the facts associated with a particular hazard. O'Hare 
describes the negotiation problem for hazardous materials transporta- 
tion by considering first the negotiable issues (e.g., classification 
of substances, handling procedures, and emergency response measures). 
He then describes the various stakeholders to the hazardous materials 
transportation negotiation process and the impediments in bringing all 
of them together in attempting to negotiate the issues involved. These 
frequently turn out to be very serious problems since the issues are 
technically complex and there are many stakeholders involved. O'Hare 
argues, however, that there are also significant opportunities for 
negotiations to improve the regulation and management of hazardous 
materials transportation. 
The paper by Roger Kasperson has as its problem context the siting 
of hazardous waste facilities, both for radioactive as well as for 
chemical wastes. Kasperson points out the very contentious nature of 
the current stalemate amongst the stakeholders depicted in Figure 1. By 
now everyone is clear on the nature of the NIMBY (not in my backyard) 
and LULU (local unwanted land use) syndromes. These acronyms reflect 
the difficult dilemma facing society when there is substantial benefit 
to the general population from the production of goods and potential 
risk to a much smaller set of individuals who are exposed to the risks 
of having waste products transported and stored from industry in their 
backyard. Kasperson argues for the increased use of policy instruments 
such as public communication, benefit sharing or compensation, and 
p u b l i c  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  i n  r e s o l v i n g  t h e s e  c o n f l i c t s ,  However, g i v e n  t h e  
p r e v a i l i n g  s c i e n t i f i c  u n c e r t a i n t y  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  t h e  c o n s e q u e n c e s  o f  
h a z a r d o u s  w a s t e ,  KaSperSOn s u g g e s t s  t h a t  w e  h a v e  a  v e r y  r o c k y  r o a d  
a h e a d  o f  u s  i n  s i t i n g  h a z a r d o u s  w a s t e  f a c i l i t i e s ,  H e  p r o p o s e s  a  set o f  
e t h i c a l / e q u i t y  p r i n c i p l e s  a s  g u i d i n g  p r i n c i p l e s  f o r  winn ing  and  
m a i n t a i n i n g  p u b l i c  t r u s t  i n  t h e  r e g u l a t i o n  o f  h a z a r d o u s  m a t e r i a l s  a n d  
t h e  s i t i n g  o f  new f a c i l i t i e s ,  
RISK ANALYSIS 
The t h i r d  g r o u p  o f  C o n f e r e n c e  p a p e r s  f o c u s  on r i s k  a n a l y s i s ,  
e n c o m p a s s i n g  t h e  t r a d i t i o n a l  a r e a s  o f  h a z a r d  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n ,  r i s k  
e s t i m a t i o n  and  r i s k  a s s e s s m e n t .  W e  were p a r t i c u l a r l y  c o n c e r n e d  i n  
u n d e r s t a n d i n g  t h e  way i n  which p e o p l e  and f i r m s  p e r c e i v e  and e v a l u a t e  
r i s k s ,  
The p a p e r  by  V i n c e n t  C o v e l l o  and Mi ley  Merkhofer  d e s c r i b e s  and  
e v a l u a t e s .  p r o m i n e n t  me thods  f o r  h a z a r d o u s  r i s k  a s s e s s m e n t  f o r  d e t e r m i n -  
i n g  t h e  n a t u r e  o f  d i f f e r e n t  c h e m i c a l s .  These  methods  a r e  o r g a n i z e d  
a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e  component  o f  t h e  r i s k  a s s e s s m e n t  p r o c e s s  t h e y  a r e  
m e a n t  t o  a d d r e s s ,  Methods d e s i g n e d  f o r  c h a r a c t e r i z i n g  a  s o u r c e  o f  r i s k  
a r e  d i s c u s s e d  i n i t i a l l y ,  f o l l o w e d  by methods  f o r  a s s e s s i n g  e x p o s u r e s ,  
d o s e  r e s p o n s e  a s s e s s m e n t s  and  l a s t l y  methods  f o r  r i s k  e s t i m a t i o n .  
C o v e l l o  and Merkhofer  e x p l o r e  i n  d e t a i l  t h e  complex r e l a t i o n s h i p s  among 
t h e  v a r i o u s  p h a s e s  o f  c h e m i c a l  r i s k  a n a l y s i s  and management i l l u s t r a t e d  
i n  F i g u r e  1, 
The p a p e r  by  Neils C, Lind s u r v e y s  c u r r e n t  methods  o f  r i s k  
a n a l y s i s  and  r e c e n t  a d v a n c e s  i n  t h i s  a r e a ,  Lind d e s c r i b e s ,  t h r o u g h  a  
set  o f  e x a m p l e s ,  c u r r e n t  me thods  f o r  a s s e s s i n g  b o t h  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t i e s  
o f  f a i l u r e s  and t h e i r  c o n s e q u e n c e s  t h r o u g h  f a u l t  trees and e v e n t  trees,  
H e  a l s o  e m p h a s i z e s  t h e  c r u c i a l  i n f l u e n c e  o f  d a t a  and u n c e r t a i n t y  i n  
r i s k  a n a l y s i s .  T h i s  paper  t r i g g e r e d  an animated d i s c u s s i o n  on t h e  
l i m i t a t i o n s  of  r i s k  a n a l y s i s ,  which is  t aken  up a t  l e n g t h  i n  b o t h  o f  
t h e  d i s c u s s a n t s  comments on t h i s  paper .  These comments d e s c r i b e  t h e  
p r a c t i c a l  use  and promise ,  a s  w e l l  a s  t h e  p i t f a l l s ,  o f  r i s k  a n a l y s i s  
f o r  i n s u r e r s  and i n d u s t r y .  
Paul S l o v i c ' s  pape r  d i s c u s s e s  t h e  problem of communicating r i s k  t o  
t h e  p u b l i c .  The o b j e c t i v e  of  informing and e d u c a t i n g  t h e  p u b l i c  a b o u t  
r i s k  i s s u e s  has  t r i g g e r e d  a  concern  among p o l i c y  makers  a s  t o  j u s t  how 
t o  p r e s e n t  i n f o r m a t i o n  t o  t h e  p u b l i c .  This  means among o t h e r  t h i n g s  
f i n d i n g  ways of  making t e c h n i c a l  and s c i e n t i f i c  u n c e r t a i n t i e s  compre- 
h e n s i b l e ,  a s  w e l l  a s  unde r s t and ing  t h e  p u b l i c ' s  c o n c e r n s  and a n x i e t i e s  
a b o u t  t h e  r i s k s  caused  by complex hazards .  S l o v i c  d e s c r i b e s  t h e  
c u r r e n t  s t a t e  o f  r e s e a r c h  and i ts  p o s s i b l e  u s e s  f o r  overcoming t h e s e  
o b s t a c l e s .  
Det lof  von W i n t e r f e l d t ' s  paper  d e s c r i b e s  a  new methodology, v a l u e  
tree a n a l y s i s ,  f o r  unde r s t and ing  t h e  v a l u e s  which v a r i o u s  s t a k e h o l d e r s  
may have i n  r e s p e c t  t o  p o l i c i e s  a f f e c t i n g  t h e  r i s k s  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  
hazardous m a t e r i a l s .  P r o f e s s o r  von W i n t e r f e l d t  d e s c r i b e s  t h e  h i s t o r i -  
c a l  and d i s c i p l i n a r y  r o o t s  of v a l u e  tree a n a l y s i s  i n  d e c i s i o n  a n a l y s i s  
and m u l t i - a t t r i b u t e  u t i l i t y  techniques .  H e  a l s o  d e s c r i b e s  its u s e  i n  
v a r i o u s  a p p l i c a t i o n s  t o  d a t e .  Value t r e e  a n a l y s i s  a l l o w s  a  h i e r a r c h i -  
c a l  d e s c r i p t i o n  of  t h e  v a l u e  s t r u c t u r e  o f  v a r i o u s  s t a k e h o l d e r s  a s s o c i -  
a t e d  wi th  a  p a r t i c u l a r  hazardous m a t e r i a l s  problem. Such an a n a l y s i s  
may h e l p  i n  d i a g n o s i n g  and r e s o l v i n g  c o n f l i c t s  and i n  e v a l u a t i n g  
a l t e r n a t i v e  p o l i c y  o p t i o n s  from t h e  d i f f e r e n t  s t a k e h o l d e r  p e r s p e c t i v e s .  
H e  i l l u s t r a t e s  t h i s  methodology i n  an extended c a s e  a n a l y s i s  o f  o p t i o n s  
f o r  o f f - sho re  o i l  d e v e l o p a e n t  i n  Southern  C a l i f o r n i a .  
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RISK MANAGEMENT AND INSURANCE 
The f i n a l  g r o u p  o f  p a p e r s  a t  t h e  C o n f e r e n c e  c o n s i d e r  t h e  i n s t i t u -  
t i o n a l  a r r a n g e m e n t s  which s o c i e t y  h a s  d e v e l o p e d  f o r  c o p i n g  w i t h  r i s k s .  
The key a r e a s  o f  i n t e r e s t  i n v o l v e d  r e g u l a t i o n s ,  b o t h  b y  government  
a g e n c i e s  and b y  i n d u s t r y ,  l e g a l  i n s t i t u t i o n s ,  a n d ,  p r i m a r i l y ,  i n s u r -  
a n c e .  
The p a p e r  by  Timothy O 'Riordan  and B r i a n  Wynne compares  r e g u l a t o r y  
s t y l e s  f o r  h a z a r d o u s  w a s t e  management i n  v a r i o u s  c o u n t r i e s .  The 
a u t h o r s  a s k  w h e t h e r  t h e r e  a r e  f u n d a m e n t a l l y  d i f f e r e n t  o r  c o n v e r g e n t  
r e g u l a t o r y  s t y l e s  i n  e a c h  o f  t h e s e  c o u n t r i e s  i n d u c e d  b y  t h e  n a t u r e  o f  
t h e  h a z a r d o u s  waste prob lem i t s e l f .  The e s s e n t i a l  d i f f e r e n c e s  a c r o s s  
c o u n t r i e s  r e l a t e  t o  c e n t r a l i z a t i o n  v e r s u s  d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n  o f  c o n t r o l .  
However, f u n d a m e n t a l  s i m i l a r i t i e s  a r e  found t o  be i n d u c e d  by t h e  
common p r o b l e m s  o f  s c i e n t i f i c  u n c e r t a i n t y  and t e c h n i c a l  c o m p l e x i t y  i n  
r e g u l a t i n g  h a z a r d o u s  w a s t e s .  
M i c h a e l  Baram's  p a p e r  c o n s i d e r s  t h e  l e g a l  background  o f  l i a b i l i t y  
i n s u r a n c e  and r i s k  a n a l y s i s  f o r  c h e m i c a l  i n d u s t r y  h a z a r d s .  C e r t a i n l y ,  
t h e  key  i n s t i t u t i o n  f o r  a j u d i c a t i n g  and r e s o l v i n g  c o n f l i c t s  amongst  
p a r t i e s  w i l l  be t h e  l e g a l  s y s t e m .  For  t h i s  r e a s o n ,  Baram r e v i e w s  
r e c e n t  d e v e l o p m e n t s  i n  t o x i c  t o r t  l a w  and i n s u r a n c e  law.  The i m p a c t  o f  
new d e v e l o p m e n t s  i n  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  and  i n  o t h e r  c o u n t r i e s  s i g n i f i -  
c a n t l y  a f f e c t  t h e  economic  v u l n e r a b i l i t y  o f  i n d u s t r y  and i n s u r e r s .  H e  
a l s o  s u g g e s t s  t h a t  d e f e n s i v e  s t r a t e g i e s  on  t h e  p a r t  o f  f i r m s  o r  
i n s u r e r s  i n  r e s t r i c t i n g  t h e i r  l i a b i l i t y  o r  c u r t a i l i n g  i n s u r a n c e  w i l l  d o  
l i t t l e  t o  p r e v e n t  r i s k s  o r  s a t i s f y  t h e  p u b l i c .  I n d e e d ,  t h e y  may l e a d  
t o  f u r t h e r  r i s k  r e g u l a t i o n  which may impose c o s t s  o n  i n d u s t r y  and 
i n s u r e r s  i n  e x c e s s  o f  t h e i r  own p r i v a t e  i n i a t i v e s .  P r o f e s s o r  Baram 
c o n c l u d e s  t h a t  i n s u r e r s  s h o u l d  j o i n  w i t h  i n d u s t r y ,  government  and 
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academia  i n  p r o m o t i n g  t h e  d e v e l o p m e n t  o f  a c t i v e  s t r a t e g i e s ,  b a s e d  o n  
r i s k  a n a l y s i s  and r i s k  management,  t o  p r o t e c t  b o t h  t h e i r  own i n t e r e s t s  
and s o c i e t a l  w e l l - b e i n g .  
One o f  t h e  h i g h  p o i n t s  o f  t h e  C o n f e r e n c e  was t h e  e x t e n d e d  
d i s c u s s i o n  e l u c i d a t i n g  t h e  r o l e  o f  i n s u r a n c e  f o r  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  i m p a i r -  
ment  l i a b i l i t y ,  T h i s  d i s c u s s i o n  ranged  from t h e o r e t i c a l  e x p l a n a t i o n s  
o f  i n s u r a n c e  and r e g u l a t i o n  t o  t h e  r e a l i t i e s  o f  i n s u r a n c e  i n  p r a c t i c e ,  
A l f r e d  Klaus  p r o v i d e s  a n  i n t r o d u c t o r y  d i s c u s s i o n  o f  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  
impa i rment  l i a b i l i t y  (EIL)  f o r  l and-based  i n c i d e n t s ,  H e  i n d i c a t e s  
t h a t ,  from t h e  i n s u r e r ' s  v i e w p o i n t ,  s u r p r i s i n g l y  low l o s s e s  i n  r e l a t i o n  
t o  f i r e  c l a i m s  h a v e  r e s u l t e d  from t h e  well-known r e c e n t  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  
d i s a s t e r s ,  T h i s  r a i s e s  a  n a t u r a l  q u e s t i o n  a s  t o  why t h e  i n s u r a n c e  
i n d u s t r y  is s o  c o n c e r n e d  a b o u t  o f f e r i n g  EIL c o v e r a g e ,  K l a u s  s u g g e s t s  
t h a t ,  w i t h  t h e  p o s s i b l e  e x c e p t i o n  o f  t h e  Uni ted  S t a t e s ,  where  c o u r t  
s e t t l e m e n t s  a r e  p r o h i b i t i v e ,  EIL is i n s u r a b l e ,  However, D r .  Klaus  a l s o  
a r g u e s  t h a t  p o l l u t i o n  o f  t h e  e n v i r o n m e n t  e n t a i l s  v e r y  complex manage- 
ment  and i n s u r a n c e  i s s u e s .  H e  recommends s t r o n g  a d h e r e n c e  t o  r i s k  
a s s e s s m e n t  and r i s k  management p r a c t i c e s  on  a  c o o p e r a t i v e  b a s i s  b e t w e e n  
i n s u r a n c e  f i r m s  and c o m p a n i e s  t o  i n c r e a s e  t h e  l i k e l i h o o d  t h a t  EIL 
i n s u r a n c e  w i l l  b e  o f f e r e d  on a  b r o a d  b a s i s  i n  t h e  f u t u r e ,  
E n r i c o  O r l a n d o  d i s c u s s e s  r e c e n t  d e v e l o p m e n t s  c o n c e r n i n g  t h e  
t r a n s p o r t a t i o n  o f  h a z a r d o u s  m a t e r i a l s  b y  s e a .  O r l a n d o  p o i n t s  o u t  t h a t  
m a r i n e  i n s u r a n c e  h a s  a  v e r y  l o n g  t r a d i t i o n ;  m a r i n e  u n d e r w r i t e r s  h a v e  
b e e n  w i l l i n g  t o  p r o v i d e  c o l l i s i o n  l i a b i l i t y  p r o t e c t i o n  f o r  s h i p ,  c a r g o  
and  f r e i g h t ,  I n  t h e  a r e a  o f  e n v i r o m e n t a l  i m p a i r m e n t  l i a b i l i t y  
a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  o c e a n  t r a n s p o r t  o f  o i l  and o i l  p r o d u c t s ,  v a r i o u s  
p o o l i n g  and fund  a g r e e m e n t s  p r o v i d e  workab le  a r r a n g e m e n t s  f o r  i n s u r i n g  
s u c h  l i a b i l i t i e s .  O r l a n d o  i n d i c a t e s ,  however ,  t h a t  a t t e m p t s  t o  a r r i v e  
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at an international agreement covering transport of other hazardous 
substances besides oil have not been successful for several reasons 
outlined in the paper. 
The above contributions highlight a perplexing dilemma. The paper 
by Smets indicates that the nature and magnitude of losses in the 
environmental area is not extraordinarily high compared to other areas 
for where insurance is currently available. The papers by Klaus and 
Orlando propose some workable arrangements for insuring environmental 
liabilities which might be profitable for the insurance industry. 
Nonetheless, several participants pointed to the stark reality that 
many firms increasingly were going "naked," unable to purchase EIL 
coverage at any reasonable price due to limited worldwide capacity in 
these lines. The institutional arrangements and decision processes o f  
the insurance industry itself comes under closer scrutiny in an attempt 
to explain this state of affairs. 
Malcolm Aicken describes the basic logic of risk spreading in the 
insurance industry. He indicates several features which make a set of 
risks insurable and then comments on the nature of EIL which make it a 
very risky business for insurers, These issues include the well-known 
problems of latent effects and gradual occurrence, as well as uncer- 
tainties in establishing causality for toxic effects and large court 
settlements negotiated by toxic tort lawyers, 
The final paper by Werner Pfennigstorf considers these insurance 
specific issues in more detail. Pfenningstorf discusses the manner in 
which the catastrophic character of certain environmental risks affects 
the insurability and coverage of these risks, After a detailed 
comparison of environment insurance in the United States and Europe, 
Pfenningstorf considers the outlook, challenge and market prospects for 
insurance in the hazardous materials area, This paper stimulated a 
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v e r y  a c t i v e  i n t e r c h a n g e  amongst Conference p a r t i c i p a n t s  on t h e  r e a s o n s  
f o r  l a c k  o f  a v a i l a b l e  cove rage  a g a i n s t  envi ronmenta l  r i s k s .  Some o f  
t h e  f l a v o r  of  t h i s  i n t e r c h a n g e  is con ta ined  is t h e  t h r e e  d i s c u s s a n t  
comments fo l lowing  t h e  P f e n n i g s t o r f  paper .  One o f  t h e s e ,  by John G. 
Cowell ,  s u g g e s t s  t h a t  t h e  l a c k  of  i n su rance  i n  r i s k  s p r e a d i n g  f o r  
t e c h n o l o g i c a l  and env i ronmen ta l  haza rds  is one of  t h e  key problems o f  
ou r  t i m e s .  
SMALL GROUP SESSIONS h RESEARCH PLANNING AGENDA 
A major  o b j e c t i v e s  o f  t h i s  con fe rence  was t o  p l a n  a  r e s e a r c h  
agenda f o r  t h e  n e x t  decade  i n  t h e  hazardous m a t e r i a l s  a r e a .  The l a s t  
t h i r d  of  t h e  c o n f e r e n c e  was s p e n t  i n  do ing  j u s t  t h a t .  An ex tended  
p a n e l  d i s c u s s i o n ,  fo l lowed by s m a l l  g roup  mee t ings ,  deve loped  an  agenda 
f o r  f u t u r e  r e s e a r c h .  The r e s e a r c h  p r o p o s a l s  g e n e r a t e d  by t h e  sma l l  
g r o u p  mee t ings  were p r e s e n t e d  a t  a  conc luding  p l e n a r y  s e s s i o n  and were 
based  on i d e a s  from t h e  p a p e r s  included i n  t h i s  volume, and t h e  
d i s c u s s a n t  and p a r t i c i p a n t  comments which fol lowed.  W e  summarize t h e s e  
r e s e a r c h  recommendations a t  t h e  end of t h i s  book i n  an Epi logue ,  which 
w e  hope w i l l  s e r v e  a s  a  p ro logue  f o r  s i g n i f i c a n t  f u t u r e  work i n  t h e  
a r e a  of  hazardous  m a t e r i a l s  management. 
RESEARCH RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE CONFERENCE 
A p r i n c i p a l  o b j e c t i v e  of t h e  IIASA Conference was t o  deve lop  a  
set of  recommendations f o r  f u t u r e  s t u d i e s  between r e s e a r c h e r s  and 
p r a c t i t i o n e r s  t h a t  would improve t h e  management of  hazardous  m a t e r i a l s .  
To t h i s  end w e  i n v i t e d  s i x  p r a c t i t i o n e r s  t o  p a r t i c i p a t e  i n  a  p a n e l  
d i s c u s s i o n  fo l lowed by s m a l l  g roup  meet ings .  Each of  t h e  s m a l l  g roups  
was asked t o  o u t l i n e  a  set o f  r e s e a r c h  needs i n  t h e i r  a r e a  wi th  a  
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c o n c e r n  f o r  l i n k i n g  t h e o r y  w i t h  p r a c t i c e e 2  The r e s e a r c h  recommenda- 
t i o n s  d e v e l o p e d  b y  t h e  s m a l l  g r o u p s  a r e  p r e s e n t e d  be low b y  l i n k i n g  them 
t o  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  themes  h i g h l i g h t e d  b y  t h e  c o n f e r e n c e .  
1. Problem C o n t e x t .  T h e r e  is a  need t o  i n c r e a s e  o u r  u n d e r s t a n d -  
i n g  o f  t h e  p r o b l e m s  and o p p o r t u n i t i e s  f a c i n g  f i r m s  which m a n u f a c t u r e  
p r o d u c t s  t h a t  c r e a t e  t o x i c  w a s t e ,  t h e  a l t e r n a t i v e s  open  t o  t r a n s p o r t e r s  
o f  h a z a r d o u s  m a t e r i a l s ,  and  t h e  c h a l l e n g e s  f a c i n g  i n t e r e s t e d  p a r t i e s  
i n v o l v e d  i n  t h e  s i t i n g  o f  s t o r a g e  a n d  d i s p o s a l  f a c i l i t i e s .  
2. R i sk  A n a l y s i s .  T h e r e  is a  need t o  document  t h e  p o t e n t i a l  
b e n e f i t s  and i n h e r e n t  l i m i t a t i o n s  o f  r i s k  a n a l y s i s  b o t h  a t  t h e  a s s e s s -  
ment  l e v e l  and a t  t h e  l e v e l  a s  t o  how d a t a  a r e  communicated t o  t h e  
d i f f e r e n t  i n t e r e s t e d  p a r t i e s  (e .g . ,  t h e  p u b l i c ,  i n d u s t r y )  . I n  p a r t i c u -  
l a r ,  w e  need t o  u n d e r s t a n d  how b a r g a i n i n g  and n e g o t i a t i o n  c a n  f a c i l i -  
t a t e  t h e  d e c i s i o n  p r o c e s s  and  e n a b l e  i n t e r e s t e d  p a r t i e s  t o  r e a c h  
compromise s o l u t i o n s .  
3. R i s k  Management and  I n s u r a n c e  T h e r e  is a  need t o  u n d e r s t a n d  
t h e  r o l e  t h a t  l e g a l  i n s t i t u t i o n s  and  r e g u l a t i o n  c a n  p l a y  i n  f a c i l i t a -  
t i n g  t h e  p r o d u c t i o n ,  t r a n s p o r t  and s t o r a g e  o f  h a z a r d o u s  m a t e r i a l s .  What 
is  t h e  a p p r o p r i a t e  r o l e  o f  i n s u r a n c e  i n  d e a l i n g  w i t h  t h e s e  p r o b l e m s ?  
W e  now summarize  a  set of  key  i d e a s  by  t h e  p a n e l  members, o p e n  
d i s c u s s i o n s  a t  t h e  C o n f e r e n c e ,  and r e s e a r c h  recommendat ions  f rom t h e  
s m a l l  g r o u p s  b y  s p e c i f y i n g  a  set o f  t o p i c s  r e l a t e d  t o  t h e  above  t h r e e  
a r e a s .  
2  The members o f  t h e  p a n e l  were K a r o l y  Bard (Board  o f  I n s u r a n c e  E n t e r -  
p r i z e ,  Hungary) ; P r e d e r i c  Bjorkman ( D i r e c t o r  o f  t h e  Swedish  R e g u l a t o r y  
A u t h o r i t y  f o r  T r a n s p o r t  o f  Dangerous  ~ o o d s ) ;  O r i o  G i a r i n i  ( S e c r e t a r y  
G e n e r a l  o f  Geneva A s s o c i a t i o n ) ;  P e r r y  Hopkins ( D i r e c t o r  o f  M a n u f a c t u r -  
l n g  s e r v i c e s  a t  DuPont ) ;  ~ u d w i g  Kraemer ( J u d g e  o f  t h e  A p p e l a t e  C o u r t  i n  
Germany); and  ~ i c h a e l  S t r a d l e y  ( E n g i n e e r i n g  C o n s u l t a n t ) .  
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I. PROBLEH CONTEXT 
PRODUCTION OF HAZARDOUS MATERIALS 
In his panel presentation, Perry Hopkins provided a set of 
principles for firms to follow in preventing and dealing with Bhopal- 
like incidents. In particular, he emphasized the importance of firms 
recognizing the need for expertise and safety in technology when they 
deal with highly hazardous materials which are also essential for 
meeting society's needs. Manufacturing line management must be full 
participants in the development and implementation of all business 
planning involving hazardous materials, and they need to participate 
actively in developing industry standards, government regulations and 
laws for the management of hazardous materials worldwide. Hopkins also 
pointed out the need for improved methods of detection of hazardous 
materials discharged into the atmosphere from devices that relieve 
pressure in vessels that might otherwise rupture. Currently, there are 
no means to neutralize, disburse or otherwise protect the environment 
from these discharged materials. 
KEY RESEARCH AREAS FOR PRODUCTION 
*HOW do we reconcile differences in allowable concentrations 
or doses in the workplace versus the external environment? 
*HOW can industrial firms remain competitive while still 
addressing hazard and risk concerns of the public? 
*How does one introduce industrial practice and compliance 
techniques into small firms for problems involving chronic and gradual 
pollution, as well as possible explosive accidents. 
*Determine the effects of various organizational structures 
and managerial behavior on the levels of risks in a firm. 
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* u n d e r t a k e  a  s t a t e - o f - t h e - a r t  s u r v e y  o f  c u r r e n t  s a f e t y  
a p p a r a t u s  used i n  i n d u s t r y  and i ts  e f f e c t s  on r e d u c t i o n  o f  r i s k  (e -g . ,  
t h e  u s e  o f  d a t e d  o r  modern equ ipment )  . 
*Under take  c a s e  s t u d i e s  o f  management p r a c t i c e s  i n  d e a l i n g  
w i t h  r i s k s  f o r  f i r m s  o f  d i f f e r e n t  s i z e s ,  i n c l u d i n g  a  s u r v e y  o f  r i s k  
l e v e l s  a c c e p t e d  by s a f e t y  managers  i n  d i f f e r e n t  t y p e s  o f  i n d u s t r i a l  
f a c i l i t i e s .  
*What a r e  e f f e c t i v e  p r o c e d u r e s  f o r  d e v e l o p i n g  t r u s t  be tween  
t h e  p u b l i c  and f i r m s ?  How d o  s u c c e s s f u l  companies  d e a l  w i t h  t h i s  
i s s u e ?  
*How d o  d i f f e r e n t  f i r m s  d e a l  w i t h  mismanagement i s s u e s ?  Can 
r i s k  s c e n a r i o s  p l a y  a  c r e a t i v e  r o l e  i n  t h i s  p r o c e s s ?  
TRANSPORTATION OF HAZARDOUS MATERIALS 
I n  t h e  p a n e l  d i s c u s s i o n ,  F r e d e r i c  Bjorkman s t r e s s e d  t h e  i m por t an ce  
o f  t h e  c a r r i e r  o f  h a z a r d o u s  m a t e r i a l s  a s  a n  i d e n t i f i a b l e  p a r t y  i n  t h e  
h a z a r d o u s  m a t e r i a l s  p r o c e s s .  H e  i n d i c a t e d  t h a t  t h e  p u b l i c  is f r e q u e n t -  
l y  unaware o f  t h e  s e n d e r  o r  t h e  r e c e i v e r  o f  t h e  goods ,  b u t  c a n  n o r m a l l y  
i d e n t i f y  and w i l l  demand compensa t ion  from t h e  t r a n s p o r t e r .  For t h i s  
r e a s o n ,  l o c a l  a u t h o r i t i e s  f r e q u e n t l y  p l a c e  a  number o f  r e s t r i c t i o n s  on 
c a r r i e r s  t o  p r o t e c t  t h e  g e n e r a l  p u b l i c .  
K E Y  RESEARCH AREAS FOR TRANSPORTATION 
*What is t h e  l i n k a g e  between t h e  t r a n s p o r t a t i o n  o f  h a z a r d o u s  
m a t e r i a l s  and t h e  s i t i n g  o f  d i s p o s a l  f a c i l i t i e s  from t h e  p o i n t  o f  v i ew  
o f  managing r i s k  and d e a l i n g  w i t h  t h e  c o s t s  o f  an  a c c i d e n t ?  
*Can one  d e t e r m i n e  minimal  a c c e p t a b l e  s t a n d a r d s  f o r  t r a n s -  
p o r t i n g  hazardous  goods?  What is t h e  e v o l u t i o n  and r a t i o n a l e  o f  
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  c o n v e n t i o n s  r e g a r d i n g  t h e s e  s t a n d a r d s ?  
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*Can one develop regulations for dealing with transportation 
of goods that have an opportunity of being appropriately monitored and 
controlled? What is the past experience with these types of regula- 
tions in different countries? 
*What are appropriate liability and insurance mechanisms for 
covering transport of hazardous materials? HOW easily can these be 
enforced in practice? 
SITING OF STORAGE AND DISPOSAL FACILITIES 
Research in this area needs to be designed so that consideration 
is given to the technical, social, political and economic aspects of 
the siting process. As in the other areas, there is a need to investi- 
gate implementation problems associated with siting a new facility and 
ways of enforcing any rules and regulations. As was pointed out by a 
number of participants in the meeting, the siting issue encompasses a 
wide variety of problems at all levels, including legal issues, public 
participation, as well as the role of policy tools such as compensation 
and insurance for facilitating the process. 
KEY RESEARCH AREAS FOR SITING 
*What are the trade-offs between equity and efficiency 
considerations in making siting decisions? 
*What role can risk assessments play in siting decisions? 
Can one develop a set of criteria for the evaluating the risks result- 
ing from siting in one place versus another? 
*Does insurance availability influence siting? What type o f  
insurance would be most useful in this connection? 
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*HOW can one bring the public effectively into the siting 
process? In what ways can technical assistance be useful in enhancing 
public participation? 
*How can one enhance public trust in institutions and 
facilitate the siting of hazardous facilities? 
*What role can compensation and benefit sharing play in 
conjunction with other policy instruments such as regulations for 
facilitating the siting of hazardous facilities? 
11. RISK ANALYSIS AND DECISION PROCESSES 
RISK ASSESSMENT 
Orio Giarini, in his panel discussion comments, indicated that in 
the 19th century it was much easier to determine risks from industrial 
plants such as a textile mill by undertaking a specific inspection. In 
the last twenty years, technology has changed so rapidly that it is 
difficult for those in the plant to fully understand technological 
. . 
risks and even more difficult for outsiders, such as insurance inspect- 
ors, to monitor and understand these risks. This may create moral 
hazard problems if those inside the firm have a better conception of 
the risk than those external (e.g., insurers). This is one reason that 
insurance for many types of risk is not available today. To improve 
the situation with respect to risk assessment, the following research 
needs have been out1 ined : 
KEY RESEARCH AREAS FOR RISK ASSESSMENT 
*Creation of new data bases and coordination of existing 
ones on the toxicity of chemicals in different environments and on 
their physical effects. 
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 evelo loping simple assessment models that contain only key 
variables and can be applied to a number of different situations 
without large expenditures of time or money. 
*Conducting a survey of risk assessment activities of 
international and national institutions. 
 evelo loping worst case scenario methodoloqies for use in a 
variety of industrial settings. 
*Impact of scientific uncertainty in undertaking risk 
assessments and settling differences between experts. What role can 
science courts play in adjudicating the process? 
RISK PERCEPTION AND COMMUNICATION 
There was considerable discussion at the conference on the 
different perceptions between experts undertaking risk assessment and 
the lay public. There was general consensus of a need to study ways 
of improving the communication of information on the nature of the risk 
to the general public as well as the costs and benefits of alternative 
policy strategies. 
KEY RESEARCH AREAS FOR RISK PERCEPTION AND COMMUNICATION 
*How can one make risk information more relevant to specific 
interested parties (e.g., top level officials, lower level executives, 
government agencies). How do different political regulatory statutes 
and cultural factors affect these communication needs? 
*How can one better communicate uncertainties with respect 
to probabilities, consequences and trade-offs between different 
alternatives? What is the role of computerized decision support 
systems in improving the way individuals process this information? 
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*What information about risks do people feel they need in 
contrast to information that the government feels may be "good for 
them"? Do people want to know about the chances of potentially 
catastrophic accidents in the future,(e.g., an earthquake in Califor- 
nia) if they are living in the area? Does framing of data in different 
forms (e-g,, gains vs. losses) change people's cognitions or just their 
responses? 
*What do people feel is a fair political process and how 
does that affect the way information is/should be presented to them? Is 
it useful to consider compensation or benefit sharing as a way of 
facilitating communication? 
RESEARCH ON BARGAINING AND NEGOTIATIONS 
In his panel discussion, Kar0ly Bard indicated the need to focus 
on the different interested parties affected by hazardous materials and 
to determine the appropriate role of insurance and compensation as 
policy tools for facilitating bargaining and negotiation. He indicated 
that one needed to link these alternative mechanisms to the objectives 
of society, For example, there are differences between socialist 
economic planning, where insurance is compulsory, and the available 
coverage in other countries where a voluntary system is in place. 
Political, psychological, social and economic conditions may set up 
different atmospheres for bargaining and negotiating on environmental 
matters, 
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K E Y  RESEARCH AREAS FOR B A R G A I N I N G  AND NEGOTIATION 
*What is and should  be t h e  r o l e  of e x p e r t  and e x p e r t  
knowledge i n  t h e  n e g o t i a t i o n  p rocess?  Should e x p e r t  knowledge b e  used 
a s  a  t o o l  f o r  b a r g a i n i n g  o r  is i t  perce ived  a s  a  c o n s t r a i n t  on ba rga in -  
ing?  
*What is  t h e  b e s t  way t o  p repa re  peop le  f o r  n e g o t i a t i o n ?  A r e  
e x i s t i n g  t r a i n i n g  programs h e l p f u l  i n  r e s o l v i n g  c o n f l i c t s  on envi ron-  
men ta l  problems? 
*At what s t a g e  i n  t h e  p o l i c y  p rocess  - p o l i c y  fo rma t ion ,  
s t a n d a r d  s e t t i n g ,  implementat ion - do ba rga in ing  and n e g o t i a t i o n  
occur?  What o p p o r t u n i t i e s  e x i s t  f o r  ba rga in ing  and n e g o t i a t i o n  t h a t  
a r e  n o t  p r e s e n t l y  be ing  e x p l o i t e d ?  
*How do b a r g a i n i n g  and n e g o t i a t i o n  p r o c e s s e s  d i f f e r  among 
p o l i t i c a l  c u l t u r e s ?  A r e  t h e r e  s p e c i f i c  l e s s o n s  t h a t  can  b e  t r a n s f e r r e d  
from one  c o u n t r y  t o  a n o t h e r ?  
I I I. RISK MANAGEMENT 
LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 
In h i s  pane l  d i s c u s s i o n ,  Ludwig Kraemer i n d i c a t e d  t h a t  i n  t h e  
European Economic Community T r e a t y  t h e r e  a r e  ove r  100 b i n d i n g  l e g a l  
i n s t r u m e n t s  which r e l a t e  t o  r i s k  and t h e  environment .  H e  po in ted  t o  
t h e  Seveso D i r e c t i v e  a s  a  model f o r  d e a l i n g  wi th  p l a n t  s a f e t y  p r a c t i c e s  
and one t h a t  is l i k e l y  t o  be expor ted  from Europe t o  t h e  United 
S t a t e s .  S ince  c o n f l i c t s  over  v a l u e s ,  f a c t s  and p o l i c y  a c t i o n s  w i l l  
c o n t i n u e  t o  b e  a d j u d i c a t e d  by law, i t  is c l e a r  t h a t  l e g a l  i n s t i t u t i o n s  
and p r a c t i c e s  w i l l  be  a  c o r n e r s t o n e  o f  r i s k  management. The f o l l o w i n g  
a r e a s  were deemed e s p e c i a l l y  impor t an t  r e s e a r c h  t o p i c s  he re .  
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KEY RESEARCH AREAS FOR LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 
*What a r e  t h e  p o t e n t i a l  re forms  t o  t h e  l e g a l  system i n  t h e  
United S t a t e s  w i th  r e s p e c t  t o  t o x i c  t o r t  and compensation f o r  damages? 
A r e  t h e r e  any l e s s o n s  from European c o u n t r i e s  which may be  h e l p f u l  i n  
t h i s  r ega rd?  
'Eva lua te  t h e  j o i n t  and s e v e r a l  l i a b i l i t y  system i n  t h e  
c o n t e x t  o f  hazardous  m a t e r i a l s .  What a r e  t h e  c o s t s  and b e n e f i t s  o f  
c o n t i n u i n g  wi th  t h i s  t y p e  o f  a r rangement?  
*What a r e  t h e  economic i n c e n t i v e s  o f  t o x i c  t o r t  law and 
l i a b i l i t y  w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  p roduc t  developments ,  (e.g.  pha rmaceu t i ca l )  
and h e a l t h  and s a f e t y  p rocedures  w i t h i n  f i r m s ?  
*How does  t h e  l e g a l  framework i n f l u e n c e  t h e  a v a i l a b i l i t y  of  
i n s u r a n c e ?  What r e fo rms  would be  h e l p f u l  i n  p rov id ing  i n c r e a s e d  
c o v e r a g e  a g a i n s t  envi ronmenta l  p o l l u t i o n  damage? 
R E G U L A T IO N  
S e v e r a l  of t h e  p a n e l i s t s  d i s c u s s e d  t h e  importance of  r e g u l a t i o n s ,  
w i th  a p p r o p r i a t e  mon i to r ing  and c o n t r o l  p rocedures ,  a s  r i s k  management 
t o o l s  f o r  t h e  hazardous  m a t e r i a l s  problem. When t o  u t i l i z e  r e g u l a t i o n s  
produces  a wide range  o f  r e sponses .  In some c u l t u r e s  t h e r e  is a 
r e l u c t a n c e  t o  impose r e g u l a t i o n s  u n l e s s  t h e r e  is a c l e a r  f a i l u r e  o f  
m a r k e t - l i k e  mechanisms such  a s  e f f l u e n t - c h a r g e  i n c e n t i v e  systems.  I n  
o t h e r  c o u n t r i e s ,  r e g u l a t i o n s  a r e  a way of  l i f e .  The hazardous m a t e r i -  
a l s  problem is viewed by most c o u n t r i e s  a s  one t h a t  needs  t o  be  a t  
l e a s t  p a r t l y  remedied through r e g u l a t i n g  a c t i v i t i e s  of p l a n t s ,  
t r a n s p o r t e r s  and t h o s e  who o p e r a t e  s t o r a g e  and d i s p o s a l  f a c i l i t i e s .  I n  
a d d i t i o n ,  t h e  p u b l i c  is ex t r eme ly  r e l u c t a n t  t o  s a n c t i o n  new f a c i l i t i e s  
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t h a t  have t h e  p o t e n t i a l  o f  caus ing  damage t o  h e a l t h  and s a f e t y  wthout  
a s s u r a n c e  t h a t  s t r i c t  r e g u l a t o r y  and c o n t r o l  p r o c e d u r e s  w i l l  b e  
en fo rced .  
KEY RESEARCH AREAS ON REGULATION 
*What a r e  t h e  i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p s  between s t a n d a r d  s e t t i n g ,  
mon i to r ing  and en fo rcemen t  of  r e g u l a t i o n s  i n  t h e  r e s p o n s e s  of f i r m s  
producing hazardous  m a t e r i a l s  a s  byproducts?  
*What is t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between s e l f - r e g u l a t i o n  by f i r m s  
and e x t e r n a l l y  imposed r e g u l a t i o n s  by government a g e n c i e s ?  
*What a r e  t h e  a p p r o p r i a t e  r e g u l a t o r y  a u t h o r i t i e s  and 
enforcement  mechanisms a s s o c i a t e d  wi th  hazardous  m a t e r i a l s  s t o r a g e  and 
d i s p o s a l  f a c i l i t i e s ?  How w i l l  r e g u l a t i o n s  f a c i l i t a t e  t h e  s i t i n g  
p r o c e s s ?  
*What t y p e s  o f  r e g u l a t i o n s  c a n  a s s i s t  t h e  p r o c e s s  of  
b a r g a i n i n g  and n e g o t i a t i o n s  f o r  t r a n s p o r t ,  s t o r a g e  and d i s p o s a l  o f  
hazardous  m a t e r i a l s ?  
*What r o l e  c a n  r e g u l a t i o n  p l a y  f o r  d e a l i n g  wi th  hazardous  
m a t e r i a l s  problems when t h e  c a u s a l i t y  of  c e r t a i n  h e a l t h  e f f e c t s  c a n n o t  
b e  a s c e r t a i n e d ?  
*What l e s s o n s  can  be  l e a r n e d  from i n t e r n a t i o n a l  compara t ive  
r e s e a r c h  on haza rdous  m a t e r i a l s  r e g u l a t i o n s  f o r  model r e g u l a t o r y  
l e g i s l a t i o n ?  
RESEARCH ON INSURANCE 
I n  h i s  commentary, Michael S t r a d l e y  p o i n t e d  o u t  t h a t  t h e  marke t  
f o r  envi ronmenta l  impairment l i a b i l i t y  has  c o l l a p s e d  i n  t h e  United 
S t a t e s ,  R e i n s u r e r s  t h roughou t  t h e  world a r e  r e l u c t a n t  t o  p r o v i d e  
coverage  i n  t h e  u n i t e d  S t a t e s  because  of  t h e  u n c e r t a i n t y  a s  t o  t h e  
m a g n i t u d e  o f  c l a i m  s e t t l e m e n t s  i n  c o u r t .  T h i s  h a s  c r e a t e d  a  l a c k  o f  
c a p a c i t y  i n  t h e  i n d u s t r y  and r a i s e d  q u e s t i o n s  a s  t o  a l t e r n a t i v e  
mechanisms f o r  i n s u r i n g  i n t e r e s t e d  p a r t i e s  a g a i n s t  p o t e n t i a l l y  c a t a -  
s t r o p h i c  l o s s e s .  
KEY RESEARCH AREAS FOR INSURANCE 
*HOW c a n  u n i n s u r a b l e  e v e n t s  b e  made i n s u r a b l e  f o r  p r o t e c t i n g  
a g a i n s t  damages  f rom h a z a r d o u s  m a t e r i a l s ?  What a c t i o n s  a r e  needed t o  
i n c r e a s e  t h e  c a p a c i t y  o f  i n s u r e r s  and r e i n s u r e r s ?  When c a n  c la ims-made 
r a t h e r  t h a n  o c c u r r e n c e - b a s e d  p o l i c i e s  b e  h e l p f u l  i n  t h i s  r e g a r d ?  
* I s  t h e r e  a  need f o r  government  invo lvement  f o r  d e a l i n g  
w i t h  c a t a s t r o p h i c  l o s s e s  t h r o u g h  some t y p e  o f  r e i n s u r a n c e  program? Is 
t h e  P r i c e  Anderson A c t  o r  t h e  B lack  Lung Program a  u s e f u l  model f o r  
some t y p e  o f  g o v e r n m e n t / p r i v a t e  s y s t e m  i n  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s .  
*What t y p e  o f  s e l f - i n s u r a n c e  p l a n s  by  i n d u s t r y  a r e  l i k e l y  
t o  b e  s u c c e s s f u l  i n  f i l l i n g  t h e  g a p  i n  i n s u r a n c e  p r o t e c t i o n ?  
*What a r e  t h e  i n c e n t i v e  e f f e c t s  o f  i n s u r a n c e  i n  i n c r e a s i n g  
t h e  s a f e t y  l e v e l  and  p r o t e c t i v e  a c t i v i t i e s  o f  i n d u s t r i a l  f i r m s ?  
I n  o r d e r  t o  u n d e r t a k e  r e s e a r c h  o n  t h e s e  i s s u e s ,  t h e r e  n e e d s  t o  b e  
a n  o p e n  d i a l o g u e  be tween  t h e  a c a d e m i c  community and r e a l  wor ld  p r a c t i -  
t i o n e r s .  The C o n f e r e n c e  on T r a n s p o r t ,  S t o r a g e  and D i s p o s a l  o f  Hazard- 
o u s  M a t e r i a l s  was d e s i g n e d  a s  a  f i r s t  s t e p  i n  t h i s  d i r e c t i o n .  Hopeful -  
l y ,  t h e  p r o c e s s  w i l l  b e  a c c e l e r a t e d  i n  t h e  coming y e a r s .  
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WTROVUCTZON 
Developing countlieb leplebenting mole than two-thiuib 
06 the human lace and a wide bpectlum 06 ethnocultu~eb and 
tladitionb ale on the onwald malch towaldb attaining a bettel 
deal 601 thembelveb. The b t d e g y  601 development 01 the 
apploacheb adopted valy dlom countuj t o  countly. Yet  one can 
lecognibe a unidolm patteln and phdobophy behind all the develop- 
mental ploglammeb cuwently being pu~bued in Latin Amelica, 
Adlrica and Abia. In mobt 06 the developing count~ieb development 
hab become bynonymoub uith a tapid indubtlrd glrowth and 
modemnization 06 aglricultulre (ff oedgate, Kabbab and White, 1963). 
The tlranbitio~z dlrom a btate 06 undelrdevelopment t o  one 
06 development hab i t b  own inhelrent lribkb. The clru 06 the plroblem 
dated b y  thebe countlrieb ~0nbibtb in devibing m m b  b y  which 
the tlranbition i b  eddected bmoothly and achieved in a time bpan 
bholrtelr than what it took the plrebent developed countlrieb 06 the 
Webt  t o  lreach in the wafze 06 the Indubtlrd Revolution in Eulrope 
(Wolred Bank, 19751. 
Obvioubly, the veuj natulre 06 the plroblem pobeb many 
chdlengeb t o  d~.veloping countlrieb. In the context 06 the plrebent 
meeting 06 the Tabk Folrce, home 06 the chdengeb that btand out 
ate - 
(a)  lribk identidicatio n in the plroglrammeb 06 development; 
( 6 )  abbebbment 06 the lribkb involved againbt a blroad 
dlramewo& 06 b o c d  beneditb; 
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Ic) evolution 06 basic developmentd policies and p h s  
based on such policies; 
(dl capability t o  mahe ~isk-bene6it analysis 06 m h  
one 06 them; 
[el management 0 6  ~isks  b y  plredictive and p~eventive 
meabulres. 
An outline 06 the natu~e  and magnitude 06 these challenges 
i s  plresented in this papelr. Since population plressulre i s  a bu~den 
common t o  (244 the developing countlries, the 4 h t  will be on health 
associated with developmental plroglrammes. 
The autholr's exposulre t o  developmental plroblems i s  
necessalrdy eimited t o  those culrlrentb daced b y  India. It i s  obvious 
that the expe~ience 06 India may be neithelr typical 06 nolr unique 
t o  (244 developing countlries. Nevelrtheless, othelr developing countlries 
c o d  use the lndian example as a pointelr. Fulrthelrmolre, the 
lndian expelrience can also dolrm the basis 601 a scientidic undelrstand- 
ing 06 the innu.melrable plroblems 06 development. What one desilres 
t o  achieve in the developing countlries i s  the deployment 06 the 
tools 06 systems applroach t o  analyse situations that ale high& 
contempolralry. It i s  not di66icult t o  develop a model 601 tlransition 
dlrom undeufevelopment t o  development dlrom the past expelrience 
06 the West. ffowevelr, policy mahelrs in the developing count~ies 
may stdl be le6t with the almost impossible task 06 extuzpo4ating 
i t s  validity t o  clrisis scenelrio eme~ging today in an enti~e& diddelrent 
histolrical setting and socio-political and geoglraphicd mileu. 
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lDENTZFlCA7lON OF HAZARDS W DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMMES: 
A net wolrh ie4ustlration 06 developmental plroblems i s  
plresented in F i g .  1 in olrdelr t o  4implidy the  plrocess 06 identidication 
06 situations with a potential 601 hazalrds. 8lrie6ly, t he  diaglram 
highlights the  600owing intelrconnected event s: 
(i) In olrdelr t o  push the  plrocess 06 the  dolrwalrd movement 
dlrom undelrdevelopment t o  development, thelre i s  
need t o  use a stmtegy 601 t he  uzpid utilization 06 natulral 
lresoulrces, both physical and biological. 
lii) Exploitation 06 natulral .resouices expands the  mining, 
minelral plrocessing industlries and tends t o  the  setting up 
new manudactulring industlries. 
(iii) The need 60.2 inclreaed dood plroduction lrequilres mole 
intensive aglricultutal activities, which, in turn, involve 
tlrans6olrmation 06 hithelrto uncultivated h d  into man- 
managed aglro-ecosystems and intioduction 06 lrish 
6actolrs alribing out 06 the  application 06 modew 6olrming 
techniques. 
(ivl Even the  maiginal public health meaulres intlroduced 
t o  implrove the  q t d t y  06 li6e 06 the people plrodoundly 
a66ect the  demoguzphic pattelrn a lredlected in some 
06 the  indicatolrs 06 Community ff&t;z such as extended 
expectancy 06 li6e at bilrth, declrused indant molrtaeity 
and lreduced endemicity 06 communiclzble disus.:s. 
Patently, t he  uncontlrolled lrise in population has 
nu t ta l i zed  the  gains made in .raising Glross National 
Plroduct. As a lresdt, in spite 06 innumelrzble positive 
achievements in the  developmental p h s ,  lzbolition 
06 povelrty and Q i n g  the  dilrm doundation 631 budding 
a bet te i  society have eluded the  g m b p  06 phnelrs.  
Some 06 the obvious negative pulls exelrted by the  events 
initiated by the  developmental piocess as outlined lzbove ale:- 
(a) i m b h c e s  between .relatively undeveloped and palrtly 
developing legions and intelr-legions within the coun t i y ;  
Ibl miglration 06 eaboulr dlrom lrulral t o  ulrban clustelrs olr new 
industlriallmininglpowelr complex townships and socia! 
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tenbionb aTibing out 06 the conblicting intetebtb 06 
the local ovel the miguxnt popuhtion,and 
(c]  envi-tonmental deg~adation inc4uding va~ying degqeeb 
06 pollution. 
One can'looh 6 0 ~  the like& hazatds in each one 06 thebe 
linhb and inte~actionb and p ~ i o ~ i t i z e  them acco~ding to t h e i ~  magnitude 
ah ieeated t o  impact on the phy4ica.b envi~onment OT on human health 
(K~ibhan Mu~ti ,  1912). In o ~ d e ~  t o  6mCPitate the pe~ception 06 ~ibhb t o  
human health in the developmentaf context a conceptual model ab bhown 
in Fig.2 tentative& debignated the "double buzdenn model can be ubed.  he' 
b u ' c  abumptionb made in enunciating thib model aTe that - 
(il the state 06 unde~dcvelopment compelb a citizen 06 a developing 
county  t o  caTTy a p ~ i m a ~ y  bu~den which i b  a mix 06 undef- 
nuttition OT malnut~ition, coexibtent endemicity 06 pauz~itic 
and in6ectioub d i ~ u b e b  a~ibing out 06 an unhygienic ambient 
and living. envi~onment and low p~oductivity; 
(ii) development impobtzb on the individual i t b  own u te tna f  bu~den 
~epzebented by the bt~eb4 involved in the change in the !ide btyle 
6 ~ 0 m  a ~ u d  babe to a bemiu~ban enui~onment. ;
( i i i l  t h e ~ e  aTe wide unce~tainty e lemnth in ~ e g a ~ d  t o  the outcome 
06 the inte~action between the inte~nal bt~cb4 and the e x t e ~ n w  
applied bt~ebb; and 
(ivl moTe bignidicant& the ql~ebtion ab t o  whet he^ the change in 
lide btyle 6o~ce.d upon the indivarlnl will lead to  imp~ovement 
in the qual i ty  06 li6e i 4  albo undet a cloud 06 unce~tainty. 
3; EVOLUTION OF BASIC DEVELOPMENT POLICES AND PLANNED 
DEVELOPMENT: 
India, since  he^ political independence, ha& embadzed on b e v e d  
developmental pTogTamrneb ~ e h t e d  t o  health. The machine~y behind planning 
hab been neceb.uz~i& lreliti4t" in outlooh 'and t~aining but hab a p p u ~ e d  
conbibtent& to uphoed the babic v&eb 06 the bt~uggle 6 0 ~  political 6~eedom. 
Undoubtedly, in each p h  pe-tiod. t h e ~ e  ha4 been wide gap4 between goal& 
llOUBLE 
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and actual achievementb. The lreabonb 601 the dihpalritie~ have been wide& 
debated and attempts made t o  6iee lrecognizable gapb in bubbequent p h b .  
The quebtion 06 dinding lrebouiceb within and without ha6 4460 been abkd 
diequently. Theie i b  4460 the nevei ending quebtion 06 the inheient zibk in 
dot t ing zeboulrceb on the babib 06 bhoit-telrm olr immediate piiolritieb 
v e z u  long-telrm piioiitieb. The invibible condlict in the hedth bectolr ha4 
been pievention b y  pelrbpective planning vezbub cuie 06 immediately vibibOe 
bymptomb. 
4. CAPABZLZW TO MAKE RlSK-BENEFIT ANALYSZS OF DEVELOPMENT 
PROGRAMMES: 
Taking envilronmental h d t h  ab one 06 the main theme& one can 
a h  what aie the rn,ain policy ibbueb zequizing lribh ab~ebbment. The WozPd 
Banh chbbidication 06 d i b a b e b  pattelrn global& (See Table 11 maizeb a c l a i  
distinction between dibeabeb due t o  the btyle-06 living and d i b a b e s  cubed 
by the enviionment. Zn thib chbbi6ication bcheme, the developed countlrieb 
&how a high incidence uxte 06 d i b a b e b  attlributable to  living btyle and the 
lebb developed countlrieb exhibit a high incidcence lrate 06 aibeabeb CUboCided 
with an unhygienic enviionmmt. 
Againbt thib bachgiound i6 one piojectb the envilronmental bcenalrio 
06 the Developing countzieb, what emeigeb ab piiolritieb alre the needb 60z 
mitigating the eddectb 06 biological pollution. Contlrol 06 biological qoht ion  
in (L42 lifzelihood wdf bzing valuable long-telrm lretuin~ and mubt be a t o p  
plrioiity. At the bame time, plannelrb can i42 addoid t o  ignolre the bignb 
06 indubtlrd pollution which have not on& bulrdaced but 4460 begun t o  c u b e  
concezn. 
TABLE:I WORLD BANK CLASSIFICATION OF DISEASE PATTERN ACCORDING TO 
-- 
DISEASE STATUS 
(&red on ctdue mottality data) 
DEATHS FROM 
DISEASES DUE TO STYLE 
OF LIVING 
DEVELOPED UNDERDEVELOPED 
SOCIETY SOCIETY 
10-80% 20-305 
DEATHS FROM 
DISEASES DUE TO POOR 
ENVIRONMENTAL CON DlTlONS 
-395-  
Krishna Murtt ,  C.R. 
In the wake 06 Tapid indubt~iaeizat&rr ~rq;lcynk &welipping 
count~ieb have begun to  acquilre indigenous capability to manu- 
,-jactulre chemicalb. The impact 06 chemical pollution ha4 begun 
to 4ulr6ace on an ~vi lronment  dlr@ biologicallj po4luted. 
lt becomeb impezative, thelredolre, that the lebdting health 
liskb be identidied. Thib i 4  an alrea whelre thele i b  a conbidedle  
amount 06 uncelrtainty, palrtidalrly &out the validity 06 adopting 
h&h cutelria 4et up 60lr human upo4ulreb to industtiad chemical4 
in the developed' indubtlrial bociety to a popdation with an 
entilrely diddelrent envilronmental backglround and genetic inhelitance 
now getting expohed to  the chemidb .  One would lihe to a k  
how applroplriate it is to  apply to India, Banglcrde4h, Nigelria 
oz Ma&* Thlrebhoki ~ i k t  V&e4 or Maximum Pelrmibaible 
Concenttations in the wo& envilronment used in USA, USSR 
olr Japan. 
Envilronmental impact abebsment 06 majoi d6velopmental 
plroguzmmeb cannot be complete without evaluating health 
e66ectb on the l&ed  ecosystem^. Indeed health lri4k auebdment 
06 developmental project4 h a  emelged a~ a vital alrea lrequiiing 
highly 4ophi~ticated 4killb 6 expeltibe. Theze i b  need 60.2. 
alrtidation 04 the plroblems, howevelr tuvial t h q  appaz  to  
be on cobt considezationb. The lrelated htzategieb 60% theilr 
bolution wiU have to  be de~igned against a d a m e  04 lredelence 
06 ~ocial  benebit, &he1 than on the btlrength 06 conventional 
cobt plrohit anebi4.  The 40cial benehitb wilf have to  be debined 
and quantidied in telrmb 06 employment oppolt~nitie4 and 6ette.z 
living conditionb conducive 06 impzoved health. I 6  it i b  a new 
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chemical indu~tzid complex being ebtabli~hed, 6actozb to be taken into 
con~ideuztion wiff  be ~ t i n g  06 the indu~tzy, uzw-matezicrlb, tm~poz ta -  
- . 
tion and btoluzge hazaufb 06 intezmediateb and the 6inbihed pzoduct, 
" c d e  t o  guzvef@ hibtoq 06 toxic wabteb gmeuzted, ebtimateb 04 upo4uze 
t o  the chemicalb in the eabouz dozce and the community inhabiting the 
adjacent mvizonb, ed6Qrrmt dibpobal and envizonmental pzotection. 
In the cabe 06 hazauf pzone chemical indubtzie~, zibh adbeb~ment 
wiff  have t o  lead t o  the needb doz the pzovibion 06 batjety mmuzeb 
du~ing zoutine opezation ad weU ad emezgencieb. Ahzm bignalb and opeuz- 
tionb including nozmal "dize 6ightingn pzochzeb, upid evnllrlntion 06 
pezbonnel t o  &e azub wiff  have t o  be mezgibed in cabe 06 an accident 
in bituationb wheze theze may be A powez &z.iluze and it may be diddicult 
to ebtabMbh communication Cinhb. 
In zegauf t o  ebtabMbhing indubtzid complexeb in zemote wzdez- 
developed zegionb, beved 6actozb  wiPr have t o  be takm into con6ideuztion. 
F o z  example, the backgzound in(oz&ation on the quality 06 envizonmentd 
pawnetezb h to be coffected. The type 06 populcrtion t o  be engaged 
in the diddezent pzoceb~ing opeuztionb mubt be himtidied 40 that bpeciaty 
vufnezczbje gzoupb, id any, can be efiminated dzom the wo& dozce. 
Facifitieb doz ddhent di6pom.f mubt be bet up. Thebe dactozb  become 
a4f the maze vital in view ad the dact that the 6ozmulcrtion 06 pebticideb, 
phazmacuticalb and d u g 6  aze now being tzanbdezzed t o  zemote wzdez- 
developed zegionb; thebe aze not only hazauf-pzone but albo lihefy t o  
46ect the envizonment id pzevmtive mmuzeb ate not incozpouzted in 
the package 06 technology that i 4  ubd t o  ebtablibh the 6ozmdation 
pfant. 
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In the a i m  04 agiicdtuie, the iibkb abbociated with incieabing 
ube 06 p u t  contiol chemicalb and man-made p h t  nutlienth have been 
haidly identidied, The main iibh in the ube 06 pebt contiol chemical4 
alribes out 06 the need t o  ube the bame type 06 chemicalb 601 vectoi 
cont~ol in public health and the iebufting condlict 06 inteiebtb and enviion- 
mental pollution; u n u ~ ~  high buied-up 06 pebticideb iebidueb in human 
and animal tibbueb and the incieabed .rate 06 development 06 iebibtance 
t o  pebticideb 'by the pebtb againbt which the chemical agent6 aie taigetted 
[Kiibhan Muiti, 19831, 
5. ANTZCTPATORY AND PREVENTZVE STRATAGZB FOR RlSK 
MANAGEMENT. 
Enviionmental Impact Abbebbment hab been intioduced in India 
in iecent y u i b  a6 on e b b ~ t i a f  pieiequibite 60.2 the c l ~ i a n c e  06 all 
majoi developmental pio jects. Public senbitivity t o  enviionmental de- 
giadation h a  iegibteied 06 Pate a mole noticeable vocal expiebbion 
at, exemplidied in the Silent V d q  Pioject in the Oebte~n Ghatb, India., 
the Mathuia Petioleum Redinziy Pioject ab addecting the Taj Mahid 
and the 8ha~atpui &id Sanctwriy and the Re6ineqeum-Feitilizer 
Complcx in Tal Vaiebht in the coatal belt 06 Mahaiabhtlra ab a66ecting 
coabtal li6e and iecieational bwheb. Theig - - ha4 been giowing concein 
about enviionmental pollution without any beiioub attempt t o  evrhate 
the health i ibk  qualitatively and quantitatively. 
Expiebbion 06 public concein with enviionmental ibbueb doe& not 
necebbaiily mean the exibtence and speiation 06 bophibticated inbtitutionb 
-398- 
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which can meaning6ully aztic~llcrte the ibbueb and catahbe the czeation 
06 adequate contzol mechanismb. The appzoplriate dibciplineb belonging 
to Natuzal and Social Sciences alre yet to emezge a czitical dozce~. 
6 .  CONCLUSZON3 
Uncelrtainties have been maze the d e b  than exception in zegalrd 
to isweb lrekrted to chemical ba6ety. In the abbence 06 powezdd plrebbulre 
glroupb and political lobbieb, consumez ba6ety and public health have 
not lreceived adequate attention. Thelre have been conbtzaintb in the 
,zeafm 06 implementing lregulatofy zequilremutb. Admibsible DaiQy 
Intake vcdueb 06 toxic chemical6 thlrough dood, watez and a i z  olr Maximum 
Pelrmissible Concentdionb 06 toxic chemicalb in the occupational en- 
vizonment alre 6ixed on what ale stated 46 pqmat ic  considezationb 
d h e z  than a6te-t czitefia have been laid down by  scientidic btrldy and 
Undelr these cilrcumbtanceb, it wiU be unzealistic to expect 
the zisk management system dunctioning in the less developed count~ies 
to be the ideal one. The management 06 accidents associated with 
the plroduction, tmspolrt and pzocessing 06 chemical6 is  natu- a 
"c~i6is managementw. Pzog.zess has to be achieved in the dollowing 
Tzagic consequences 06 the 6aieLze 0.2 walrning oz rrlazm 6ignals 
in chemicals inbtaPlationb have t o  be anticipated in the initial 
phabe 06 planning buch units. 
Sadety monitolring and badety p~otection dlriU4 have to be done 
with lritudistic zeal. 
The unceitaintied in the tlrans6e.z 06 package technologieb 
dlrom oneclrnuial mileu to anothez must be identidid. 
Above all, the hazaui potential 06 modezn technology must 
be accepted a4 palrt 06 the lribk. 
Ktishna Musti ,  C.R. 
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